ML22215A044

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NYS NSA Exemption Comments and Recommendations
ML22215A044
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point, Holtec  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/01/2022
From: Peterson A
State of NY
To: Shana Helton
Division of Fuel Management
Allen W 3014156877
Shared Package
ML22215A042 List:
References
Download: ML22215A044 (5)


Text

August1,2022 ShanaHelton,Director DivisionofFuelManagement OfficeofNuclearMaterialSafetyandSafeguards U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission Rockville,MD20852

Subject:

IndianPointEnergyCenterExemptionRequestfortheHISTORM100SVersionECaskAllowable Contents

DearMs.Helton,

TheStateofNewYorkhasreviewedtheHoltecDecommissioningInternational(Holtec)March24,2022 requestseekingNRCapprovalofanexemptionfromanallowablecontentsrequirementcontainedinthe CertificateofCompliance(CoC)No.1014fortheHISTORM100SVersionECask.Specifically,CoCNo.1014, AppendixD,Table2.11,SectionV,MPCMODEL:MPC32M,ItemConlypermitsasingleNeutronSource Assembly(NSA)tobeloadedintotheMultipurposeCanister(MPC).Additionally,Section2oftheFinalSafety AnalysisReport(FSAR)specifiesthattheneutronsourceistobeplacedinthecenterofthecanister1.

HoltechasrequestedtoincreasetheallowablenumberofprimaryPlutoniumBeryllium(PuBe)NSAsinany singleMPC32Mcanisterfromone(1)tofive(5)andupto32secondaryNSAs.Holtecstatesthatthe proposedexemptionwillallowloadingoffuelassembliesfromwhichtheNSAcannotberemovedandthat undersuchconditions,thecurrentCoCrequirementspreventsomefuelassembliesfrombeingloadedintodry storagesystems,thereforepreventingthefullremovalofallassembliesfromtheIndianPointUnit2(IP2)and Unit3(IP3)spentfuelpools.

HoltecsrequestincludesinformationthathasbeendeemedproprietarybytheCompany,withheldfrom publicdisclosure,andisunavailabletothehostStateanditsofficialsandsubjectmatterexperts.Absent accesstothefullcriticality,thermal,anddosecalculationsusedtosupporttherequest,theStateisunableto

1HISTORMFSARpartialRevisionNo.15https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1813/ML18130A139.pdf

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performacompletereview.Wehaveidentifiedanumberofconcernsandoutlinethemherein.Werequest thattheNRCensureallcalculations,evaluations,andanalysesareperformedinadetailed,thorough,and comprehensivemanner.

ThepubliclyavailableversionofHoltecsrequestprovideslimitedfactualinformationonthefuelassemblies andNSAsduetotheassertionthatmuchoftheinformationisproprietary.Asstatedpreviously,proprietary informationisnotavailabletotheStateorthegeneralpublic.Intheabsenceoftheproprietaryinformation, NYSERDAtogetherwiththeDepartmentofPublicServiceandtheDepartmentofHealthparticipatedintwo telephonecallswiththeNRCandonewithHoltectoinformallydiscussspecific,targetedStatequestions.

TheStatesduediligencereviewwasthereforelimitedtothenonproprietaryversionoftheexemption request,publicliterature,andtelephonediscussionswithNRCandHoltec.TheStateoffersthefollowing observationswithaffiliatedrecommendationsforfurtherNRCinquiry:

IncreaseinNeutronDoseMayNegateRationalePresentedinFinalSafetyAnalysisReport ThelatestavailablerevisiontotheHISTORMFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)inNRCsADAMSdocument accesssystemisapartialRevisionNo.152,whichstatesthatneutrondoseevaluationsofneutronsource assemblies(NSAs)havenotbeenperformedbecauseonlyasingleNSAispermittedinacanisterandthesingle NSAneutrondoseissmallcomparedtotheassembliestobestored.3AsingleNSAislikelyafewpercentof thetotalneutronpopulation,sothisrationaletoforgodoseevaluationsmightbedeemedacceptablewithin thoseparticularparametersandassumptions.However,increasingthelicensedcanistercontentstoinclude fiveNSAs,asproposedbyHoltec,couldincreasetheneutrononlydoseratebyasmuchas15percent.As such,HoltecsFSARrationaleappearstobenolongertrue,accurate,orapplicable.

DoseratesfortheHISTORMsystemlicensingareshownforboundingconfigurationsandcanbeashighas 3,828mrem/houratlocation2.4Thistheoreticalboundingconfiguration,however,willnotexistatIndian Point.DuetotheuseoftheMPC32Mcanisters,the125tonHITRAC,andfuelwithsignificantlylessburnup thanusedinthelicensingcalculations,actualdoseratesmaybemuchless.

ThecurrentconfigurationallowsoneNSAtobeloadedinthecenterofeachcask,whichhastheeffectof maximizingtheshieldingprovidedbythecask.AdditionalNSAsloadedintothesamecaskwillbeplacedin slotsclosertotheexteriorofthecask,thusreducingthelevelofshielding.LoadinguptofivePlutonium BerylliumNSAsinasinglecask,asproposedbyHoltec,couldresultinactualsurfacedoseratesincreasing

2HISTORMFSARpartialRevisionNo.15https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1813/ML18130A139.pdf 3Seesection5.2.7.1onpages558and559.

4Seetable5.1.7onpage520.

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significantly,duetoboththeadditionaldosecontributionoftheNSAsthemselvesandtheirplacementcloser tothecaskexteriorwallthancurrentlyallowed.

Inatelephonecall,NRCrepresentedthatapprovaloftheHoltecexemptionrequesttoloaduptofive PlutoniumBerylliumNSAsinasinglecaskcouldincreasetotalsurfacedoseratesforcasksatIndianPointbyas muchas28%orabout1,100mrem/hourforatotalsurfacedoseof3,934mrem/hour.5Thisappearstobea verylargeincrease,particularlywhencomparedtotheactualcaskdoseratesratherthanthedesignbasis calculatedvalues,andbringstheFSARrationaleforomittingdoseevaluationintofurtherquestion.

Recommendation1:TheNRCshouldrequireHoltectoperformanupdatedandconservativedose evaluationofaloadedHISTORMcaskwithfivePlutoniumBerylliumNSAsand32secondaryNSAs.

AsLowAsReasonablyAchievable(ALARA)ConcernsHaveNotBeenEvaluated TheabilitytoloaduptofiveNSAsinanindividualcanisterdoesnotappeartobenecessaryforHoltecto completethetransferofallspentfuelintodrycaskstorage.Rather,itappearsthatthereliefrequiredto completethetransferisadditionalflexibilityontheallowableNSAstoragelocationswithinthecasks,in particularforthoseNSAscontainedindamagedfuelassemblies.Ifapproved,theproposedexemptionwill increasesurfacedosesincethelocationsfordamagedfuelarefurtherfromthecaskcenterandwillreceive lessselfshielding.Thus,theexemptionwouldcreateasituationthatunnecessarilyincreasespotentialworker exposure.Indeed,inaJune6thtelephonecall,NRCnotedthatradiationtechniciansmayneedtorequire workerstoincreasethedistanceatwhichtheyperformsomeoftheirworksoastoreduceworkerspersonal exposure.6ThiswouldseemtobecontrarytoALARAprinciplesand,dependingonthespecifictaskinvolved, itmaynotbepossibletoincreasedistance.However,toourknowledge,noestimatesoftheincreaseincrew exposurehavebeenprovidedtoevaluatewhethertheproposedexemptiondoesindeedcomplywiththe principlesofALARA.

Recommendation2:TheNRCshouldrequireHoltectoprovideanevaluationofthepotential increaseinworkerexposureduringloadingoperationsforNRCreview.

5ThisinformationwasprovidedduringateleconferencebetweentheNRCandNYSERDAonJune6th,2022.Weunderstandthatthis estimatebyNRCwasbasedonNRCsevaluationofcalculationsprovidedbyHoltecbuttodateweareunabletofindadocument reflectingthiscalculationonADAMS.

6Ibid.

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AbsenceofCriticalityAnalysesandConsiderationsforFutureRemovalOffsite Forstoredfueltoberemovedfromthesite,itmustbetransportable.Forittobetransportable,itmustbein casksthatmeettransportationrequirements.ItisunclearwhethertheproposedloadingofuptofiveNSAs, includingNSAsinadamagedfuelassembly,intoanindividualcaskwouldresultinloadedonsitestoragecasks thatwillfailtomeettransportationrequirements.

Norevisedcriticalityanalysesappeartohavebeenperformedfortheproposednewconfiguration.Holtec assertsintheexemptionrequestthatthereisnoincreaseinthecriticalityfactor,Keff,sothereisnocriticality concernand,thus,noneedforrevisedanalyses.However,Holtecintendstoremovethespentfuelpoolsat IndianPointandshouldcomplywiththeNRCsfuelretrievabilityguidance.Toensureconsistencywiththe NRCsInterimStaffGuidance7,thesealedcanistershouldbecompatiblewithatransportationcask.This seemstowarrantanalyzingtheconfigurationofanNSAcontainedinadamagedassembly(togetherina damagedfuelcan)fortransportation.

ToaddresstheStatesconcern,theNRCreferredustotheHISTORMSafetyEvaluationReport,whereinHoltec determinedtheminimumrequiredsolubleboronduringloadingandunloadingconsideringthemostreactive configurationofdamagedfuelandfueldebrisinadditiontononfuelhardwareorneutronsourceassemblies inguidetubesfilledwithboratedwater8.However,theseanalysesandconclusionsdonotaddressthecriteria fortransportationunderconditionswherestructuralintegrityofadamagedassemblyisnotassured,andin particularthecriticalityofadamagedassemblytogetherwithanNSA.Asaresult,itisnotcleartotheState thatretrievabilityhasbeensatisfied.

Asstatedpreviously,iftheloadedonsitestoragecasksfailtomeettransportationrequirements,thecask contentsmayhavetoberemovedandrepackagedpriortotransport.Theseareactivitieswhichwillbe difficultandexpensivewithoutaspentfuelpoolonsite,thusincreasingpotentialworkerdose,theriskof mishaps,andcost.PerformanceofrevisedcriticalityandthermalanalysesnowmayallowtheNRCtotailor theexemptiontoavoidproblemsinthefuture.

Recommendation3:TheNRCshouldrequireHoltectoproviderevisedcriticalityanalysestoensure thatNRCsretrievabilityrequirementsforeventualoffsitetransportationofthespentfuelcasksare met.

7DivisionofSpentFuelStorageandTransportationInterimStaffGuidance(ISG)-2,Rev2.April2016:

https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1611/ML16117A080.pdf 8Section7.1.3CriticalityAnalysis,HiStorm100Amendment15SafetyEvaluationReport(SER):

https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2111/ML21118A871.pdf

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Insummary,theStatestronglysupportsthetimelytransferofIndianPointspentfuelintodrycaskstorage.

WealsostronglysupporttimelyandefficientretrievalandremovaloffsitebytheU.S.DepartmentofEnergy (DOE).

NRCsevaluationofchangestoonsitestoragecontainerloadingshouldincludeconsiderationoftheeventual needtotransportthosecontainersandanyNRCapprovalsshouldbemadewithaneyetowardavoiding complicationsdowntheroad.

Ifyouhaveanyquestionsorwouldlikeamoredetailedtechnicalexplanationoftheseconcerns,youmay contactmeat(518)8621090x3274.

Sincerely,

AlysePeterson,P.E.

SeniorAdvisor

cc:

DougTifft,NRC