ML23027A056
| ML23027A056 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07201004 |
| Issue date: | 01/27/2023 |
| From: | Narayanan P TN Americas LLC |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Document Control Desk |
| Shared Package | |
| ML23027A055 | List: |
| References | |
| EPID L-2022-LLA-0079, E-62004 | |
| Download: ML23027A056 (1) | |
Text
Orano TN 7160 Riverwood Drive Suite 200 Columbia, MD 21046 USA Tel: 410-910-6900 Fax: 434-260-8480 Enclosures transmitted herein contain SUNSI. When separated from enclosures, this transmittal document is decontrolled.
January 27, 2023 E-62004 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852
Subject:
Response to Request for Additional Information - Application for Amendment 18 to Standardized NUHOMS Certificate of Compliance No.
1004 for Spent Fuel Storage Casks, Revision 3 (Docket No. 72-1004, CAC No. 001028, EPID: L-2022-LLA-0079)
Reference:
[1] Letter from Chris Allen (NRC) to Prakash Narayanan (TN Americas LLC), Review of Amendment No. 18 to Certificate of Compliance No. 1004 for the Standardized NUHOMS System - Request for Additional Information (EPID: L-2022-LLA-0079), dated December 21, 2022
[2] Letter E-60447 from Prakash Narayanan, Application for Amendment 18 to Standardized NUHOMS Certificate of Compliance No. 1004 for Spent Fuel Storage Casks, Revision 0 (Docket No. 72-1004), dated May 20, 2022
[3] Letter E-61864 from Prakash Narayanan, Response to Request for Additional Information - Application for Amendment 18 to Standardized NUHOMS Certificate of Compliance No. 1004 for Spent Fuel Storage Casks, Revision 2 (Docket No. 72-1004, CAC No. 001028, EPID: L-2022-LLA-0079), dated January 20, 2023 TN Americas LLC (TN) hereby submits our response to the Request for Additional Information (RAI) forwarded by Reference [1] that was excluded from Reference [3]., herein, provides a proprietary version of the response to RAI 4.1. Enclosure 3 provides a public version of the response to RAI 4.1. provides the proposed proprietary version of the CoC 1004 Amendment 18, Revision 3 changes to the Standardized NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) with a footer on each page annotated as 72-1004 Amendment 18, Revision 3, January 2023, and changes indicated by italicized text and revision bars. The changes are further annotated with gray shading or a gray box enclosing an added section, to distinguish the Amendment 18, Revision 3 changes from previous Amendment 18 changes. Revised drawings show alpha-numeric revision numbers and clouds surrounding the changed drawing information. The public version of these UFSAR changed pages is provided as Enclosure 5.
E-62004 Document Control Desk Page 2 of 2 Certain portions of this submittal include proprietary information, which may not be used for any purpose other than to support the NRC staffs review of the application. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, TN Americas LLC is providing an affidavit (Enclosure 1), specifically requesting that this proprietary information be withheld from public disclosure.
Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please do not hesitate to contact Mr. Douglas Yates at 434-832-3101 or me at 410-910-6859.
Sincerely, Prakash Narayanan Chief Technical Officer cc:
Chris Allen, NRC DFM
Enclosures:
- 1. Affidavit Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
- 2. RAI and Response (Proprietary)
- 3. RAI and Response (Public)
- 4. Proposed Amendment 18, Revision 3 Changes to the Standardized NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (Proprietary)
- 5. Proposed Amendment 18, Revision 3 Changes to the Standardized NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (Public)
TN Americas LLC State of Maryland County of Howard
)
)
ss.
)
AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.390 Enclosure I to E-62004 I, Prakash Narayanan, depose and say that I am the Chief Technical Officer of TN Americas LLC, duly authorized to execute this affidavit, and have reviewed or caused to have reviewed the information that is identified as proprietary and referenced in tbe paragraph immediately below. I am submitting this affidavit in conformance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.390 of the Commission's regulations for withholding this information.
The information for which proprietary treatment is sought meets the provisions of paragraph (a) (4) of Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations. The information is listed below:
- - Portions of Proposed Amendment 18, Revision 3 Responses to RAls
- - Portions of Proposed Changes to the Standardized NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Repmt This document has been appropriately designated as proprietary.
I have personal knowledge of the criteria and procedures utilized by TN Americas LLC in designating information as a trade secret, privileged or as confidential commercial or financial information.
Pmsuant to the provisions of paragraph (b) (4) of Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations, the following is furnished for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure, included in the above referenced document, should be withheld.
- 1)
The information sought to be withheld from public disclosure involves portions of the RAJ Responses and the UFSAR, all related to the design of the Standardized NU HOMS dry spent fuel storage system, which are owned and have been held in confidence by TN Americas LLC.
- 2) The information is of a type customarily held in confidence by TN Americas LLC, and not customarily disclosed to the public. TN Americas LLC has a rational basis for determining the types of information customarily held in confidence by it.
- 3)
Public disclosure of the information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of TN Americas LLC, because the information consists of descriptions of the design of dry spent fuel storage systems, the application of which provide a competitive economic advantage. The availability of such information to competitors would enable them to modify their product to better compete with TN Americas LLC, take marketing or other actions to improve their product's position or impair the position of TN Americas LLC's product, and avoid developing similar data and analyses in support of their processes, methods or apparatus.
Further the deponent sayeth not.
Prakash Narayanan Chief Technical Officer, TN Americas LLC Sub;Qf ~~~t ____
rern* this.:/4 ~ ay of January, 2023.
~
- ==
KHYNESYA TAYLOR Notary Public
==---
Notary Public Howard County My Commission Expires _lQ_; Q I ;;}__fj;fj Maryland
..,J.._c My Commission Expires Oct. 5, 2025 Page 1 of 1 to E-62004 RAI and Responses (Proprietary)
Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
RAI and Response - Public to E-62004 Page 1 of 2 Structural:
RAI 4.1:
Provide complete licensing drawings for the NUHOMS 24PTH dry shielded canister (DSC) Type 3 basket.
The drawings provided in section P.1.5 (reference 1) do not contain the necessary dimensional information on key components of the basket (e.g., R90 transition rails, R45 transition rails, R45 angle plates, steel plates, aluminum plates, and metal matrix composite plates) to evaluate the geometry, interlocking features, and numerical models. Reference dimensions alone are insufficient. The complete licensing drawings, including the missing dimensional information (including nominal dimensions and associated tolerances on thicknesses of components and overall basket and rail lengths) for the 24PTH DSC basket assemblies, are needed for the staff to completely evaluate the structural, criticality, and shielding performance impacts.
The above information is necessary to comply with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 72.230(a); 72.124(a) and (b); and 72.236(b), (c) and (d).
Response to RAI 4.1:
Several dimensions have been added or revised on the Type 3 basket drawings in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section P.1.5 to help facilitate the evaluation of the UFSAR. Typically, UFSAR drawings include nominal dimensions or minimum dimensions when relevant to the safety analysis; UFSAR drawings do not include manufacturing tolerances.
Overall lengths have been added to the basket transition rail drawings (UFSAR Drawings NUH24PTH-S-5011-SAR, NUH24PTH-L-5011-SAR, and NUH24PTH-S-LC-5011-SAR) as reference dimensions for the basket, the R90 transition rails, the R45 transition rails, and the R45 angle plates for each of the DSC Type 3 basket configurations (24PTH-S, 24PTH-L, and 24PTH-S-LC).
Section P.6.6.4 of the UFSAR was also updated to reflect the sensitivity studies that were performed for minimum and nominal compartment widths.
RAI and Response - Public to E-62004 Page 2 of 2 Impact:
The following UFSAR drawings from UFSAR Section P.1.5 have been revised as described in the response:
NUH24PTH-L-5011-SAR NUH24PTH-L-5012-SAR NUH24PTH-S-5011-SAR NUH24PTH-S-5012-SAR NUH24PTH-S-LC-5011-SAR NUH24PTH-S-LC-5012-SAR UFSAR Section P.6.6.4 has been revised as described in the response.
to E-62004 Proposed Amendment 18, Revision 3 Changes to the Standardized NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (Proprietary)
Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390 to E-62004 Proposed Amendment 18, Revision 3 Changes to the Standardized NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (Public)
Proprietary and Security Related Information for Drawing NUH24PTH-L-5011-SAR, Rev. 0B Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
Proprietary and Security Related Information for Drawing NUH24PTH-L-5012-SAR, Rev. 0B Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
Proprietary and Security Related Information for Drawing NUH24PTH-S-5011-SAR, Rev. 0B Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
Proprietary and Security Related Information for Drawing NUH24PTH-S-5012-SAR, Rev. 0B Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
Proprietary and Security Related Information for Drawing NUH24PTH-S-LC-5011-SAR, Rev. 0B Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
Proprietary and Security Related Information for Drawing NUH24PTH-S-LC-5012-SAR, Rev. 0B Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
January 2023 Revision 3 72-1004 Amendment No. 18 Page P.6-87a P.6.6.4 Type 3 Basket Sensitivity Analysis The Type 3 basket features an alternate design compared to the Type 1 or 2 baskets. The Type 3 basket has a larger minimum compartment width and a higher poison loading than the Type 1 or 2 baskets. It is demonstrated in Table P.6-13 for the Type 1 or 2 baskets that reactivity decreases as the compartment width increases. Therefore, keff will decrease for the Type 3D basket when compared with the Type 1C/2C basket. All enrichment limits developed for the Type 1C/2C basket may be conservatively applied to the Type 3D basket, and this conclusion is verified with the following sensitivity analysis.
Methodology Sensitivity cases are developed for intact, damaged, and failed fuel to explicitly demonstrate that reactivity decreases for the Type 3D basket compared to the Type 1C/2C basket. Because the Type 1C/2C basket analysis was performed with KENO 4.4, which is no longer installed, SCALE 6.0 [6.4] is used in this sensitivity study. To allow a direct comparison between the Type 1C/2C basket and Type 3D basket results without computer code biases, all Type 1C/2C basket cases are first rerun using SCALE 6.0, and the Type 1C/2C basket SCALE 6.0 results are compared to the Type 3D basket SCALE 6.0 results.
The CSAS5 (KENO V.a) control module of the SCALE 6.0 program is used to calculate the effective multiplication factor (keff) of the system. The CSAS5 control module allows simplified data input to the functional modules BONAMI, NITAWL, and KENO V.a. These modules process the required cross sections and calculate the keff of the system. BONAMI performs resonance self-shielding calculations for nuclides that have Bondarenko data associated with their cross sections. NITAWL applies a Nordheim resonance self-shielding correction to nuclides having resonance parameters.
Description of the KENO Model for the Type 3 basket This section describes the details of the KENO input used in the analysis. The KENO model of the Type 3 basket is developed based on the design provided in the drawings in Section P.1.5.
The material description, KENO V.a parameter data, and unit cells for fuel rods, instrument tubes, and guide tubes are taken from the base cases (described under Section P.6.4.2, K).
The poison plates that form the egg crate structure are modeled in such a way that the plates fit together tightly. In reality, the plates have slots to fix the vertical and horizontal plates that are slightly wider than the total plate thickness. These small gaps at the slots are conservatively not considered in the KENO model developed for Type 3 basket since these gaps would be filled with borated water, which would decrease the reactivity. The egg crate is formed by a set of horizontal and vertical plates crossing each other, which forms the wall of the compartment. In this discussion, horizontal is parallel to the x-axis, while vertical is parallel to the y-axis.
The following paragraphs provide the description of the KENO model for the compartment nominal width of 8.9 inches. The minimum width of the compartment is 8.8 inches and the sensitivity analysis is performed for both minimum and nominal compartment widths.
All indicated changes on this page are in response to RAI 4.1
January 2023 Revision 3 72-1004 Amendment No. 18 Page P.6-87b The horizontal plates are modeled as one single length plate whose length is calculated manually. For example, the length of the plates (Al+MMC+SS) that spans 4 compartments, 4 thin (vertical) plates and 1 thick (vertical) plate each is calculated as (4x8.9 + 4x0.945 +
1x1.195) = 40.575 inches (see Figure P.6-27). The full length of the plate that spans all the 6 compartments, with only Al on the peripheral assemblies, is calculated as 59.001 inches. The lengths of the horizontal plates in the model are slightly shorter than the actual plates since the gaps are not considered.
The vertical plates are modeled as short segments with their length the same as the compartment width. These segments are then included in between two fuel compartments to form an array.
These arrays are then placed as holes in the global unit. The overall length of the vertical plate at the center without considering the thickness of the horizontal plate that runs in between the vertical plates is calculated as (6x8.9 + 2x2.8345) = 59.069 inches. If the thicknesses of the horizontal plates are considered, the total vertical length in the model would be 64.67 inches.
The overall lengths of the plates in the KENO model are shorter than the actual plates and hence the total area of the poison plates modeled is reduced compared to the actual plates. This is conservative since the overall poison in the model is reduced compared to the actual basket.
The MMC poison plate is modeled as borated aluminum alloy poison, consistent with Type 1 basket. The thickness of the poison plate is 0.164 inches in the Type 3 basket. The poison content is 35 mg B-10/cm2 (poison loading D). 90% credit is taken and hence in the KENO model 31.5 mg B-10/cm2 is modeled. The boron and aluminum ratio in the poison plate is calculated based on this thickness and poison content values.
The transition rail is modeled using stainless steel material. This is based on the results of the transition rail region material study using the Type 1 basket, which demonstrated that the use of steel for transition rail material is most reactive. The Type 1 basket transition rail geometry is conservatively applied to the Type 3 basket KENO model. The other materials used for describing the canister and the cask are the same as in the base cases. Water fills the gap between the canister and cask.
The axial height modeled is 11.94 inches in the KENO model, with periodic boundary conditions applied to the top and bottom of the model. This boundary condition ensures the model is infinitely long in the axial direction. For failed fuel analysis, the length in the axial direction is changed to match the length used in the failed fuel analysis using the Type 1 basket.
In the damaged and failed fuel analysis, it is assumed that the maximum pitch is the optimum pitch value that leads to highest keff. The maximum pitch is calculated using the compartment width (W), the fuel rods cladding radius (r) value and the number of fuel rods in a row (n). The compartment width value is 8.9 inches; however, for the optimum pitch calculation, 8.85 inches is considered to give a small gap between the peripheral row of fuel rods and the poison plates forming the walls of the compartment to avoid KENO overlap errors. The formula used to compute the maximum pitch value is (W-2r)/(n-1). Similar analysis is performed for the minimum compartment width of 8.8 inches.
The material inputs are the same in the Type 3D basket models compared to the Type 1C/2C basket models with the exception of poison loading D, which is provided in Table P.6-8.
All indicated changes on this page are in response to RAI 4.1
January 2023 Revision 3 72-1004 Amendment No. 18 Page P.6-87d
- 3. B&W 15x15 case with soluble boron at 2300 ppm, enrichment at 4.6 wt.% U-235 and internal moderator density value at 90%.
- 4. B&W 15x15 case with soluble boron at 2400 ppm, enrichment at 4.7 wt.% U-235 and internal moderator density value at 90%.
- 5. B&W 15x15 case with soluble boron at 2500 ppm, enrichment at 4.8 wt.% U-235 and internal moderator density value at 90%.
- 6. B&W 15x15 case with soluble boron at 2600 ppm, enrichment at 4.9 wt.% U-235 and internal moderator density value at 90%.
- 7. B&W 15x15 case with soluble boron at 2700 ppm, enrichment at 5.0 wt.% U-235 and internal moderator density value at 90%.
For damaged fuel analysis, the base cases are taken from the Type 1C/2C basket analysis. The damaged analysis is carried out with 12 damaged fuel assemblies loaded in the peripheral locations. Two cases are selected from Table P.6-36. These cases feature fuel rods in the guide/instrument tube locations and fully expanded pitch:
- 1. B&W 15x15 assembly with 4.5 wt.% U-235 enrichment, 2300 ppm of soluble boron concentration, and 90% internal moderator density;
internal moderator density.
For failed fuel analysis, the base cases are taken from the Type 1C/2C basket analysis. The failed fuel analysis is performed with 8 failed assemblies loaded at the designated locations along the periphery. These cases feature fully expanded pitch and the rods shifted axially with 6 inch of the fuel rod not covered by the poison plates. The rods are either intact (cladded) or fully/partially de-cladded. The two cases selected here are from Table P.6-40:
- 1. B&W 15x15 case with both intact and failed fuel at 5.0 wt.% U-235 enrichment, 2700 ppm soluble boron concentration, and 80% internal moderator density;
- 2. WE 15x15 case with intact fuel at 4.6 wt.% U-235, failed fuel at 4.5 wt.% U-235, soluble boron concentration at 2100 ppm and internal moderator density at 90%.
These base case inputs are converted from SCALE 4.4 to SCALE 6.0 format. SCALE 4.4 uses NITAWL for cross-section processing, so PARM=NITAWL is included in the input before running these cases using SCALE 6.0. For damaged and failed fuel cases, the MOREDATA card in SCALE 4.4 is replaced with explicit LATTICECELL card in SCALE 6.0. The results of the intact, damaged and failed fuel analysis for the nominal compartment width are presented in Table P.6-49, Table P.6-50, and Table P.6-51. The results of the intact, damaged and failed fuel analysis for the minimum compartment width are shown in Table P.6-49a, Table P.6-50a, and Table P.6-51a.
All indicated changes on this page are in response to RAI 4.1
January 2023 Revision 3 72-1004 Amendment No. 18 Page P.6-87e The criticality results obtained with the Type 3D basket are compared to the corresponding base case results. The difference between the two is calculated as:
Difference = keff-T1/2 - keff-T3 A positive value of the difference indicates that the Type 1C/2C basket results bound the Type 3D basket results. All difference values presented in Table P.6-49, Table P.6-49a, Table P.6-50, Table P.6-50a, Table P.6-51, and Table P.6-51a indicate that reactivity decreases for the Type 3D basket. Therefore, all Type 1C/2C enrichment limits are bounding and may be conservatively applied to the Type 3D basket. Reactivity decreases for the Type 3D basket due to the larger poison loading and larger minimum compartment size compared to the Type 1C/2C basket. Therefore, it is concluded that the NUHOMS-24PTH DSC with the Type 3 basket is compliant with the criticality related portions of 10 CFR Part 72.
All indicated changes on this page are in response to RAI 4.1
January 2023 Revision 3 72-1004 Amendment No. 18 Page P.6-183a Table P.6-49 Comparison of the Intact Fuel Results for Type 3D Basket to Type 1C/2C Basket - Nominal Compartment Width Case ID(1)
Type 3 Type 1/2(2)
Difference kKENO 1
keff kKENO 1
keff 24PTH_T3_BW15B21_P35E43_090 bw15b21_p32e43_090 0.9144 0.0008 0.9160 0.9321 0.0008 0.9337 0.0177 24PTH_T3_BW15B22_P35E45_090 bw15b22_p32e45_090 0.9180 0.0010 0.9200 0.9340 0.0009 0.9358 0.0158 24PTH_T3_BW15B23_P35E46_090 bw15b23_p32e46_090 0.9176 0.0009 0.9194 0.9348 0.0010 0.9368 0.0174 24PTH_T3_BW15B24_P35E47_090 bw15b24_p32e47_090 0.9159 0.0009 0.9177 0.9345 0.0010 0.9365 0.0188 24PTH_T3_BW15B25_P35E48_090 bw15b25_p32e48_090 0.9165 0.0010 0.9185 0.9331 0.0009 0.9349 0.0164 24PTH_T3_BW15B26_P35E49_090 bw15b26_p32e49_090 0.9166 0.0009 0.9184 0.9338 0.0009 0.9356 0.0172 24PTH_T3_BW15B27_P35E50_090 bw15b27_p32e50_090 0.9155 0.0010 0.9175 0.9329 0.0010 0.9349 0.0174
- 1. Case ID for Type 3 basket starts with 24PTH_T3, while the other filename beginning with bw15 is the corresponding base case from intact fuel analysis with the Type 1 or Type 2 basket.
- 2. The results given in the Type 1/2 column are the results from re-running base intact cases with SCALE 6.0.
All indicated changes on this page are in response to RAI 4.1
January 2023 Revision 3 72-1004 Amendment No. 18 Page P.6-183b Table P.6-49a Comparison of the Intact Fuel Results for Type 3D Basket to Type 1C/2C Basket - Minimum Compartment Width Case ID(1)
Type 3 Type 1/2(2)
Difference kKENO 1
keff kKENO 1
keff 24PTH_T3_BW15B21_P35E43_090_CW2 bw15b21_p32e43_090 0.9198 0.0009 0.9216 0.9321 0.0008 0.9337 0.0121 24PTH_T3_BW15B22_P35E45_090_CW2 bw15b22_p32e45_090 0.9228 0.0009 0.9246 0.9340 0.0009 0.9358 0.0112 24PTH_T3_BW15B23_P35E46_090_CW2 bw15b23_p32e46_090 0.9242 0.0008 0.9258 0.9348 0.0010 0.9368 0.0110 24PTH_T3_BW15B24_P35E47_090_CW2 bw15b24_p32e47_090 0.9243 0.0009 0.9261 0.9345 0.0010 0.9365 0.0104 24PTH_T3_BW15B25_P35E48_090_CW2 bw15b25_p32e48_090 0.9207 0.0009 0.9225 0.9331 0.0009 0.9349 0.0124 24PTH_T3_BW15B26_P35E49_090_CW2 bw15b26_p32e49_090 0.9227 0.0008 0.9243 0.9338 0.0009 0.9356 0.0113 24PTH_T3_BW15B27_P35E50_090_CW2 bw15b27_p32e50_090 0.9195 0.0009 0.9213 0.9329 0.0010 0.9349 0.0136
- 1. Case ID for Type 3 basket starts with 24PTH_T3, while the other filename beginning with bw15 is the corresponding base case from intact fuel analysis with the Type 1 or Type 2 basket.
- 2. The results given in the Type 1/2 column are the results from re-running base intact cases with SCALE 6.0.
All indicated changes on this page are in response to RAI 4.1
January 2023 Revision 3 72-1004 Amendment No. 18 Page P.6-183c Table P.6-50 Comparison of the Damaged Fuel Results for Type 3D Basket to Type 1C/2C Basket - Nominal Compartment Width Case ID(1)
Type 3 Type 1/2(2)
Difference kKENO 1
keff kKENO 1
keff 24PTH_T3_12D_BW15B23_P35E45_090 bw15_d12e45_090 0.9185 0.0009 0.9203 0.9351 0.0009 0.9369 0.0166 24PTH_T3_12D_WE17B26_P35E50_090 we17_d12e50_090 0.9239 0.0010 0.9259 0.9358 0.0008 0.9374 0.0115
- 1. Case ID for Type 3 basket starts with 24PTH_T3, while the other filename is the corresponding base case from damaged fuel analysis with Type 1 or Type 2 basket.
- 2. The results given in the Type 1/2 column are the results from re-running base damaged fuel cases with SCALE 6.0.
Table P.6-50a Comparison of the Damaged Fuel Results for Type 3D Basket to Type 1C/2C Basket - Minimum Compartment Width Case ID(1)
Type 3 Type 1/2(2)
Difference kKENO 1
keff kKENO 1
keff 24PTH_T3_12D_BW15B23_P35E45_090_CW2 bw15_d12e45_090 0.9242 0.0010 0.9262 0.9351 0.0009 0.9369 0.0107 24PTH_T3_12D_WE17B26_P35E50_090_CW2 we17_d12e50_090 0.9265 0.0008 0.9281 0.9358 0.0008 0.9374 0.0093
- 1. Case ID for Type 3 basket starts with 24PTH_T3, while the other filename is the corresponding base case from damaged fuel analysis with Type 1 or Type 2 basket.
- 2. The results given in the Type 1/2 column are the results from re-running base damaged fuel cases with SCALE 6.0.
All indicated changes on this page are in response to RAI 4.1
January 2023 Revision 3 72-1004 Amendment No. 18 Page P.6-183d Table P.6-51 Comparison of the Failed Fuel Results for Type 3D Basket to Type 1C/2C Basket - Nominal Compartment Width Case ID(1)
Type 3 Type 1/2(2)
Difference kKENO 1
keff kKENO 1
keff 24PTH_T3_08F_BW15B27_P35E50F50_080 bw15b27p32e50f50_080 0.9158 0.0010 0.9178 0.9322 0.0009 0.9340 0.0162 24PTH_T3_08F_WE15B21_P35E46F45_090 we15b21p32e46f45_090 0.9178 0.0009 0.9196 0.9370 0.0010 0.9390 0.0194
- 1. Case ID for Type 3 basket starts with 24PTH_T3, while the other filename is the corresponding base case from failed fuel analysis with Type 1 or Type 2 basket.
- 2. The results given in the Type 1/2 column are the results from re-running base failed fuel cases with SCALE 6.0.
Table P.6-51a Comparison of the Failed Fuel Results for Type 3D Basket to Type 1C/2C Basket - Minimum Compartment Width Case ID(1)
Type 3 Type 1/2(2)
Difference kKENO 1
keff kKENO 1
keff 24PTH_T3_08F_BW15B27_P35E50F50_080_CW2 bw15b27p32e50f50_080 0.9199 0.0010 0.9219 0.9322 0.0009 0.9340 0.0126 24PTH_T3_08F_WE15B21_P35E46F45_090_CW2 we15b21p32e46f45_090 0.9291 0.0009 0.9309 0.9370 0.0010 0.9390 0.0081
- 1. Case ID for Type 3 basket starts with 24PTH_T3, while the other filename is the corresponding base case from failed fuel analysis with Type 1 or Type 2 basket.
- 2. The results given in the Type 1/2 column are the results from re-running base failed fuel cases with SCALE 6.0.
All indicated changes on this page are in response to RAI 4.1