ML18205A179

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search

International HI-STORM 100 Multipurpose Canister Storage System Amendment Request 1014-13
ML18205A179
Person / Time
Site: Holtec
Issue date: 07/18/2018
From: Manzione K
Holtec
To: Michael Layton
Division of Spent Fuel Management
References
5014853
Download: ML18205A179 (14)


Text

Holtec Technology Campus, 1 Holtec Blvd, Camden, NJ 08104 HOLTEC I N TERNATfi ON!AL July 18, 2016 Mr. Michael Layton Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Docket No. 72-1014, Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 1014 Telephone (856) 797-0900 Fax (856) 797-0909

Subject:

Holtec International HI-STORM 100 Multipurpose Canister Storage System Amendment Request 1014-13

Dear Mr. Layton:

We request DSFM's review of LAR#13 for our HI-STORM 100 system which makes two much needed changes to the CoC to serve existing users of the HI-STORM system. These changes are already covered by existing analyses previously reviewed by the NRC staff. Therefore, we expect an expeditious review of this amendment. to this letter provides a summary of the proposed changes in this amendment. to this letter provides the changed pages of the Certificate of Compliance and its appendices. Attachment 3 contains the changed FSAR pages to address these changes.

If you have any questions please contact me at 856-797-0900 ext. 3951.

Sincerely, Kimberly Manzione Licensing Manager, Holtec International Document ID 5014853 Page I of2

Holtec Technology Campus, 1 Holtec Blvd, Camden, NJ 08104 HOLTEC fN TE RNAT I O N A L cc:

(via email)

Ms. Yen Chen, USNRC Mr. Jose Cuadrado, USNRC Mr. John McKirgan, USNRC Attachments:

Telephone (856) 797-0900 Fax (856) 797-0909 : Summary of Proposed Changes for HI-STORM 100 LAR 1014-13 : Proposed CoC 1014 Amendment 13 Including Appendices : HI-STORM 100 FSAR Proposed Changed pages Document ID 5014853 Page 2 of 2

Proposed Change #1 to Holtec Letter 5014853 LAR 1014-13, REVISION 0

SUMMARY

OF PROPOSED CHANGES Include allowance for canisters currently loaded under earlier amendments which had different helium leak test requirements. These canisters were manufactured and loaded in full compliance with the certificate effective at the time; however, subsequent amendments required additional testing. For this change, modifications are made in CoC Condition 2, CoC Appendix A, and FSAR Chapters 2 and 9.

Reason for Proposed Change #1 The licensing basis for canisters loaded under CoC Amendments 2 through 7 did not include a requirement to helium leak test the base metal used for the MPC lids. Therefore, although these canisters are currently safely stored at various sites in full compliance with their applicable certificate of compliance amendment, sites cannot upgrade them to the latest amendment of the system as otherwise supported by the CoC.

This change will allow those sites to perform the necessary evaluations and upgrade the canisters to the most up to date amendment. This change only applies to previously loaded and stored canisters; current and future canisters will continue to be helium leak tested as specified. The ability for sites to upgrade to the latest amendment provides an operational benefit to sites (particularly shut-down sites) to minimize the administrative burden of maintaining multiple licensing bases for multiple amendments. This reduced administrative burden will then allow an increased focus on safety.

Justification for Proposed Change #1 A number of canisters were loaded under earlier amendments without the requirement to test the base metal. For these canisters, Holtec previously analyzed the detectible leak rate, and the loss of helium in the canister which could result from a leak of this magnitude, and the effects on the canister's ability to reject heat under such a condition. This was documented in letters from the affected sites to the NRC in 2010. The results of these letters showed that for the loaded heat loads, the canisters will maintain the peak cladding temperature of the fuel below the regulatory limit. Monitoring of the radiation levels at the ISFSls demonstrates that there is no significant radioactive release from these canisters that would indicate that there is a leak in the lids.

Based on this information, NRC had previously concluded that continued use of the MPC canisters under HI-STORM 100 CoC Amendments 2 through 7 is acceptable. The proposed change allows sites to perform the necessary evaluations for those systems to be upgraded to a later amendment. This change does not require any physical change to the system and therefore the continued use of those systems maintains the same safety margins. No change is requested for new systems to be stored under Amendment 13, this change only applies to currently loaded and safely stored systems.

Page 1 of 2

Proposed Change #2 to Holtec Letter 5014853 LAR 1014-13, REVISION 0

SUMMARY

OF PROPOSED CHANGES Update the initial uranium weight (kg/assembly) for the I 6xl 6B and I 6xl 6C assembly classes to match the value for 16xl6A in HI-STORM 100 CoC Appendix B.

Reason for Proposed Change #2 Fuel assemblies that fall under the I 6xl 6B and l 6xl 6C classes have higher. uranium weights than currently allowed in the CoC.

Justification for Proposed Change #2 As stated when classes 16x16B and 16xl6C were added in HI-STORM 100 Amendment 10, and echoed in the staffs SER for Amendment 10 (ML16l44Al8I), the 16xl6B and 16xl6C classes are bounded by the already existing evaluations for l 6xl 6A. The three classes are geometrically very similar, so utilizing the same value is considered appropriate. Therefore, no additional analyses are included in this amendment.

Editorial Changes Holtec International address updated Page 2 of2

NRC FORM 651 (1 0-2004) 10 CFR 72 ATTACHMENT 2 TO HOL TEC LETTER 5014853 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR SPENT FUEL STORAGE CASKS U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Page 1

of 5

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is issuing this Certificate of Compliance pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 72, "Licensing Requirements for Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste" (10 CFR Part 72). This certificate is issued in accordance with 10 CFR 72.238, certifying that the storage design and contents described below meet the applicable safety standards set forth in 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart L, and on the basis of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) of the cask design. This certificate is conditional upon fulfilling the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72, as applicable, and the conditions s ecified below.

Certificate No.

1014 Effective Date 05/31/00 Expiration Date 05/31/20 Docket No.

72-1014 Amendment No.

Amendment Effective Date Package Identification No.

13~

TBD USA/72-1014 Issued To: (Name/Address)

Holtec International Holtec CenterTechnology Campus One Holtec Gfi.v.eBlvd MarltonCamden, NJ 08 107 4~

Safety Analysis Report Title Holtec International Inc.,

Final Safety Analysis Report for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System CONDITIONS This certificate is conditional upon fulfilling the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72, as applicable, the attached Appendix A (Technical Specifications) and Appendix B (Approved Contents and Design Features) for aboveground systems or the attached AppendixA-100U (Technical Specifications) and Appendix B-100U (Approved Contents and Design Features) for underground systems, and the conditions specified below:

1. CASK
a. Model No.: HI-STORM 100 Cask System The HI-STORM 100 Cask System (the cask) consists of the following components: (1) interchangeable multi-purpose canisters (MPCs), which contain the fuel; (2) a storage overpack (HI-STORM), which contains the MPC during storage; and (3) a transfer cask (HI-TRAC). which contains the MPC during loading, unloading and transfer operations. The cask stores up to 32 pressurized water reactor fuel assemblies or 68 boiling water reactor fuel assemblies.
b.

Description The HI-STORM 100 Cask System is certified as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Safety Evaluation Report (SER) accompanying the Certificate of Compliance (CoC). The cask comprises three discrete components: the MPC, the HI-TRAC transfer cask, and the HI-STORM storage overpack.

The MPC is the confinement system for the stored fuel. It is a welded, cylindrical canister with a honeycombed fuel basket, a baseplate, a lid, a closure ring, and the canister shell. All MPC components that may come into contact with spent fuel pool water or the ambient environment are made entirely of stainless steel or passivated aluminum/aluminum alloys such as the neutron absorbers. The canister shell, baseplate, lid, vent and drain port cover plates, and closure ring are the main confinement boundary components. All confinement boundary components are made entirely of stainless steel. The honeycombed basket, which contains neutron absorbing material, provides criticality control.

Page 1 of 4

NRC FORM 651 (3-1 999) 10 CFR 72 ATTACHMENT 2 TO HOL TEC LETTER 5014853 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FOR SPENT FUEL STORAGE CASKS Supplemental Sheet U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Certificate No.

1014 Amendment No.

12 Page 2

of 5

1.
b.

Description (continued)

There are nine types of MPCs: the MPC-24, MPC-24E, MPC-24EF, MPC-32, MPC-32F, MPC-68, MPC-68F, MPC-68FF, and MPC-68M. The number suffix indicates the maximum number of fuel assemblies permitted to be loaded in the MPC. All nine MPC models have the same external diameter.

The HI-TRAC transfer cask provides shielding and structural protection of the MPC during loading, unloading, and movement of the MPC from the spent fuel pool to the storage overpack. The transfer cask is a multi-walled (carbon steel/lead/carbon steel) cylindrical vessel with a neutron shield jacket attached to the exterior.

All transfer cask sizes have identical cavity diameters. The higher weight HI-TRAC transfer casks have thicker shielding and larger outer dimensions than the lighter HI-TRAC transfer casks.

Above Ground Systems The HI-STORM 100 or 1 OOS storage overpack provides shielding and structural protection of the MPC during storage. The HI-STORM 1 OOS is a variation of the HI-STORM 100 overpack design that includes a modified lid which incorporates the air outlet ducts into the lid, allowing the overpack body to be shortened. The overpack is a heavy-walled steel and concrete, cylindrical vessel. Its side wall consists of plain (un-reinforced) concrete that is enclosed between inner and outer carbon steel shells. The overpack has four air inlets at the bottom and four air outlets at the top to allow air to circulate naturally through the cavity to cool the MPC inside. The inner shell has supports attacheGl to its interior surface to guide the MPC during insertion and removal, provide a medium to absorb impact loads, and allow cooling air to circulate through the overpack. A loaded MPC is stored within the HI-STORM 100 or 1 OOS storage overpack in a vertical orientation. The HI-STORM 1 OOA and 1 OOSA are variants of the HI-STORM 100 family and are outfitted with an extended baseplate and gussets to enable the overpack to be anchored to the concrete storage pad in high seismic applications.

Underground Systems The HI-STORM 100U System is an underground storage system identified with the HI-STORM 100 Cask System. The HI-STORM 100U storage Vertical Ventilated Module (WM) utilizes a storage design identified as an air-cooled vault or caisson. The HI-STORM 100U storage WM relies on vertical ventilation instead of conduction through the soil, as it is essentially a below-grade storage cavity. Air inlets and outlets allow air to circulate naturally through the cavity to cool the MPC inside. The subterranean steel structure is seal welded to prevent ingress of any groundwater from the surrounding subgrade, and it is mounted on a stiff foundation.

The surrounding subgrade and a top surface pad provide significant radiation shielding. A loaded MPC is stored within the HI-STORM 1 OOU storage WM in the vertical orientation.

2. OPERATING PROCEDURES Written operating procedures shall be prepared for cask handling, loading, movement, surveillance, and maintenance. The user's site-specific written operating procedures shall be consistent with the technical basis described in Chapter 8 of the FSAR.
3. ACCEPTANCE TESTS AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM Written cask acceptance tests and maintenance program shall be prepared consistent with the technical basis described in Chapter 9 of the FSAR. At completion of welding the MPC shell to baseplate, an MPC confinement weld helium leak test shall be performed using a helium mass spectrometer. This test shall include the base metals of the MPC shell and baseplate. A helium leak test shall also be performed on the base metal of the fabricated MPC lid. In the field, a helium leak test shall be performed on the vent and drain port confinement welds and cover plate base metal. The confinement boundary leakage rate tests shall be performed in accordance with ANSI N14.5 to "leaktight" criteria. If a leakage rate exceeding the acceptance criteria is detected, then the area of leakage shall be determined and the area repaired per ASME Code Section Ill, Subsection NB requirements. Re-testing shall be performed until the leakage rate acceptance criterion is met. Casks previously loaded to Amendment 7 and all prior amendments are exempt from this requirement and must meet the requirements of the amendment to which they were loaded.

Page 2 of 4

ATTACHMENT 2 TO HOLTEC LETTER 5014853 Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) 3.1.1 3.1 SFSC INTEGRITY 3.1.1 Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC)

LCO 3.1.1 The MPC shall be dry and helium filled.

Table 3-1 provides decay heat and burnup limits for forced helium dehydration (FHD), vacuum drying (VOS), and open loop drying (LPD). FHD is not subject to time limits. Vacuum drying of MPCs may be subject to time limits, from the end of bulk water removal until the start of helium backfill, as shown in Table 3-1.

APPLICABILITY: During TRANSPORT OPERATIONS and STORAGE OPERATIONS.

ACTIONS


NOTES--------------------------------------------------- * ----

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each MPC.

Condition D and SR 3.1.1.3 are not applicable to casks that were loaded to Amendment 7 or earlier amendments CONDITION A.

MPC cavity vacuum drying pressure or demoisturizer exit gas temperature limit not met.

REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.1 Perform an engineering 7 days evaluation to determine the quantity of moisture left in the MPC.

A.2 Develop and initiate 30 days corrective actions necessary to return the MPC to compliance with Table 3-1.

Certificate of Compliance No. 1014 Amendment No. 1 32-I Appendix A 3.1.1-1 Page 3 of 4

ATTACHMENT 2 TO HOLTEC LETTER 5014853 Table 2.1-2 (page 3 of 5)

Design Features 3.0 PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTERISTICS (Note 1)

Fuel Assembly 15x15G 15x15H 15x151 Array/ Class Clad Material ss ZR ZR Design Initial U

$ 495 (kg/assy.)(Note 3)

.::: 420

.::: 495 Initial Enrichment

.::: 4.0

.::: 3.8 (24)

N/A (24)

(Note 9)

(MPC-24, 24E, and 24EF without soluble boron

.:::4.5 credit)(wt % 235U)

(24E/24 (Note 7)

EF)

Initial Enrichment (MPC-24, 24E, 24EF, 32, or 32F with soluble

.::: 5.0 boron credit - see Note 5) (wt%

235U)

No. of Fuel Rod 204 Locations Fuel Rod Clad

0.422 O.D. (in.)

Fuel Rod Clad I.D. (in.)

0.3890 Fuel Pellet Dia.

(in.) (Note 8) 0.3825 Fuel Rod Pitch

.::: 0.563 (in.)

Active Fuel

.::: 144 Length (in.)

No. of Guide and/or Instrument 21 Tubes Guide/Instrument Tube Thickness (in.)

0.0145 Certificate of Compliance No. 1014 Appendix B

.:::4.2 (24E/24E F) s 5.0 (Note 9)

.::: 5.0 208 216

_:::0.414

~ 0.413

.::: 0.3700

$ 0.367

.::: 0.3622 s 0.360

.::: 0.568 s 0.550

.::: 150 s 150 9

17 (Note 10)

~ 0.0140

0.0140 2-40 Page 4 of 4 16x16A 16x168 16x16C ZR ZR ZR

.::: 448

< 44~ < ~48

.::: 4.6 (24)

.::: 4.6 (24)

.::: 4.6 (24)

.::: 5.0

.::: 5.0

.:::5.0 (24E/24E (24E/24E (24E/24E F)

F)

F)

.::: 5.0

.::: 5.0

.::: 5.0 236 236 235

.::: 0.382

0.374
0.374

.::: 0.3350

.::: 0.3290

.::: 0.3290

.::: 0.3255

.::: 0.3225

.::: 0.3225

.::: 0.506

.::: 0.506

.::: 0.485

.::: 150

.::: 150

.::: 150 5 (Note 4) 5 (Note 4) 21

.::: 0.0350

0.0400
0.0157 Amendment No. 13J I

ATTACHMENT 3 TO HOLTEC LETTER 5014853 ring welds to the MPC lid and shell, as discussed in Section 2.2.4. In addition, the threaded holes in the MPC lid are designed in accordance with the requirements of ANSI Nl4.6 for critical lifts to facilitate vertical MPC transfer.

Helium leakage testing of the MPC base metals (shell, baseplate, and MPC lid) and MPC shell to baseplate and shell to shell welds is performed on the unloaded MPC. MPCs that were loaded under CoC Amendments 7 and prior amendments are subject to the requirements of those amendments, which may differ.

The MPC closure welds are partial penetration welds that are structurally qualified by analysis, as presented in Chapter 3. The MPC lid and closure ring welds are inspected by performing a liquid penetrant examination of the root pass and/or final weld surface (if more than one weld pass was required), in accordance with the drawings contained in Section 1.5. The integrity of the MPC lid weld is further insured by the non-destructive tests set forth in Chapter 9 and by a rigorous stress analysis described in Chapter 3.

Compliance with the ASME Code as it is applied to the design and fabrication of the MPC and the associated justification are discussed in Section 2.2.4. The MPC is designed for all design basis normal, off-normal, and postulated accident conditions, as defined in Section 2.2. These design loadings include postulated drop accidents while in the cavity of the HI-STORM overpack or the HJ-TRAC transfer cask. The load combinations for which the MPC is designed are defined in Section 2.2.7. The maximum allowable weight and dimensions of a fuel assembly to be stored in the MPC are limited in accordance with Section 2.1.5.

Thermal The design and operation of the HI-STORM 100 System meets the intent of the review guidance contained in ISG-1 I, Revision 3 [2.0.8). Specifically, the ISG-11 provisions that are explicitly invoked and satisfied are:

i.

The thermal acceptance criteria for all commercial spent fuel (CSF) authorized by the USN RC for operation in a commercial reactor are unified into one set of requirements.

11.

The maximum value of the calculated temperature for all CSF (including ZR and stainless steel fuel cladding materials) under long-term normal conditions of storage must remain below 400°C (752°F). For short-term operations, including canister drying, helium backfill, and on-site cask transport operations, the fuel cladding temperature must not exceed 400°C (752°F) for high burn up fuel and 570°C (1058°F) for moderate burn up fuel.

111.

The maximum fuel cladding temperature as a result of an off-normal or accident event must not exceed 570°C (1058°F).

1v.

For High Burnup Fuel (HBF), operating restrictions are imposed to limit the maximum HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MA TERI AL HI-STORM 100 FSAR I

I Rev. 15A REPORT HI-2002444 I

2-2 I

Page 1 of 6

ATTACHMENT 3 TO HOL TEC LETTER 5014853 meets the guidance in Interim Staff Guidance 18 to classify confinement boundary leakage as non-credible. Therefore, no confinement dose analysis is performed. The confinement function of the MPC is verified through appropriate non-destructive examinations performed in accordance with the acceptance test program in Chapter 9.

Helium leakage testing of the MPC base metal (shell, baseplate and MPC Lid) and MPC shell to baseplate welds and shell to shell weld is performed on the unloaded MPC. MPCs that were loaded under CoC Amendments 7 and prior amendments are subject to the requirements of those amendments, which may differ.

Operations There are no radioactive effluents that result from storage or transfer operations. Effluents generated during MPC loading are handled by the plant's radwaste system and procedures.

Generic operating procedures for the HI-STORM 100 System are provided in Chapter 8. Detailed operating procedures will be developed by the licensee based on Chapter 8, site-specific requirements that comply with the 1 OCFR50 Technical Specifications for the plant, and the HI-STORM 100 System CoC.

Acceptance Tests and Maintenance The fabrication acceptance basis and maintenance program to be applied to the MPCs are described in Chapter 9. The operational controls and limits to be applied to the MPCs are discussed in Chapter I 2. Application of these requirements will assure that the MPC is fabricated, operated, and maintained in a manner that satisfies the design criteria defined in this chapter.

Decommissioning The MPCs are designed to be transportable in the HJ-STAR overpack and are not required to be unloaded prior to shipment off-site. Decommissioning of the HI-STORM 100 System is addressed in Section 2.4.

2.0.2 HI-STORM Overpack Design Criteria General The HI-STORM overpack is designed for 40 years of service, while satisfying the requirements of 1 OCFR72. The adequacy of the overpack design for the design life is discussed in Section 3.4.11.

Structural The HI-STORM overpack includes both concrete and structural steel components that are classified as important to safety.

HOL TEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL HI-STORM I 00 FSAR I

I Rev. IS A REPORT HI-2002444 I

2-5 I

Page 2 of 6

ATIACHMENT 3 TO HOL TEC LEDER 5014853 Table 2.1.3 (continued)

PWR FUEL ASSEMBLY CHARACTER1STICS (Note 1)

Fuel Assembly Array and Class 15x15 G 15x15H 15x15I 16x16 A 16x16B 16x16C Clad Material (Note ss ZR ZR ZR ZR ZR

2)

Design Initial U (kg/assy.) (Note 3)

_:s 420 S 495 S 495 S448 S 4+/--1448 s 4+/-6448 I Initial Enrichment (MPC-24, 24E, and S 4.0 (24)

S 3.8 (24)

S 4.6 (24)

S 4.6 (24)

S 4.6 (24) 24EF without soluble boron NIA credit)

_:s 4.5

_:s4.2 (Note 9)

_:s5.0

_:s5.0 S 5.0 (24E/24EF)

(24E/24EF)

(24E/24EF)

(wt% 235U)

(24E/24EF)

(24E/24EF)

(Note 7)

Initial Enrichment (MPC-24, 24E, 24EF, 32 or 32F

_:s5.0

_:s5.0 S 5.0 S 5.0 S 5.0 S 5.0 with soluble boron (Note 9) credit - see Note 5)

(wt% 235U)

No. of Fuel Rod 204 208 216 236 236 235 Locations Fuel Clad 0.0. (in.)

~ 0.422

~ 0.414

~ 0.413

~ 0.382

~ 0.374

~ 0.374 Fuel Clad 1.0. (in.)

S 0.3890 S 0.3700 S 0.367 S 0.3350 S 0.3290 S 0.3290 Fuel Pellet Dia.

S 0.3825 S 0.3622 S 0.360 S 0.3255 S 0.3225 S 0.3225 (in.) (Note 8)

Fuel Rod Pitch (in.)

S 0.563 S 0.568 S 0.550 S 0.506 S 0.506 S 0.485 Active Fuel length S 144 S 150 S 150 S 150 S 150 S 150 (in.)

No. of Guide and/or 9 (Note Instrument Tubes 21 17

10) 5 (Note 4) 5 (Note 4) 21 Guide/Instrument Tube Thickness

~ 0.0145

~ 0.0140

~ 0.0140

~ 0.0350

~ 0.0400

~ 0.0157 (in.)

HOL TEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRJGHTED MA TERI AL HI-STORM 100 FSAR I

I Rev. I SA REPORT Hl-2002444 I

2-52 I

Page 3 of 6

Component MPC Lid and Closure Ring Welds MPC Closure Ring, Vent and Drain Cover Plate Welds MPC Lid to Shell Weld MPC Enclosure Vessel and Lid HJ-STORM I 00 FSAR REPORT HT-2002444 ATIACHMENT 3 TO HOLTEC LETIER 5014853 Table 2.2.15 (continued)

UST OF ASME CODE ALTERNATIVES FOR HI-STORM 100 SYSTEM Reference ASME Alternative, Justification &

Code Code Requirement Section/ Article Compensatory Measures NB-4243 Full penetration welds MPC lid and closure ring are not full penetration welds.

required for Category C They are welded independently to provide a redundant Joints (flat head to main seal. Additionally, a weld efficiency factor of0.45 has shell per NB-3352.3) been applied to the analyses of these welds.

NB-5230 Radiographic (RT) or Root (if more than one weld pass is required) and final liquid ultrasonic (UT) penetrant examination to be performed in accordance with examination required.

NB-5245. The closure ring provides independent redundant closure for vent and drain cover plates. Vent and drain port cover plate welds are helium leakage tested. MPCs that were loaded under CoC Amendments 7 and prior amendments are subject to the requirements of those amendments, which may differ.

NB-5230 Radiographic (RT) or Only UT or multi-layer liquid penetrant (PT) examination is ultrasonic (UT) permitted. If PT examination alone is used, at a minimum, it examination required.

will include the root and final weld layers and each approx.

3/8" of weld depth.

NB-6111 All completed pressure The MPC vessel is seal welded in the field following fuel retaining systems shall be assembly loading. The MPC vessel shall then be pressure pressure tested.

tested as defined in Chapter 9. Accessibi lity for leakage inspections precludes a Code compliant pressure test. Since the shell welds of the MPC cannot be checked for leakage during this pressure test, the shop leakage test to I 0-7 ref cc/sec (as described in Chapter 9) provides reasonable assurance as to its leak tightness. All MPC vessel welds (except closure ring and vent/drain cover plate) are inspected by volumetric examination, except the MPC lid-to-shell weld shall be verified by volumetric or multi-layer PT examination.

If PT alone is used, at a minimum, it must include the root and final layers and each approximately 3/8 inch of weld depth. For either UT or PT, the maximum undetectable flaw size must be demonstrated to be less than the critical flaw HOL TEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MA TERTAL Rev. 15A 2-174 Page 4 of 6

ATIACHMENT 3 TO HOLTEC LETIER 5014853 required.

Leak testing results for the MPC shall be documented and shall become part of the quality record documentation package.

Leakage testing of the vent and drain port cover plates shall be performed after welding of the cover plates and subsequent NDE. The description and procedures for these field leakage tests are provided in FSAR Section 8.1 and the acceptance criteria are defined in the Technical Specifications in Appendix A to CoC 72-1014.

MPCs that were loaded under CoC Amendments 7 and prior amendments are subject to the requirements of those amendments, which may differ.

9.1.4 9.1.4.1 Component Tests Valves, Rupture Discs, and Fluid Transport Devices There are no fluid transport devices or rupture discs associated with the HI-STORM 100 System.

The only valve-like components in the Hl-STORM 100 System are the specially designed caps installed in the MPC lid for the drain and vent ports. These caps are recessed inside the MPC lid and covered by the fully-welded vent and drain port cover plates. No credit is taken for the caps' ability to confine helium or radioactivity. After completion of drying and backfill operations, the drain and vent port cover plates are welded in place on the MPC lid and are liquid penetrant examined and leakage tested to verify the MPC confinement boundary.

There are two pressure relief valves installed in the upper ledge surface of the HI-TRAC transfer cask water jacket. These pressure relief valves are provided for venting of the neutron shield jacket fluid under hypothetical fire accident conditions in which the design pressure of the water jacket may be exceeded. The pressure relief valves shall relieve at 60 psig and 65 psig.

9.1.4.2 Seals and Gaskets There are no confinement seals or gaskets included in the HI-STORM 100 System.

9.1.5 Shielding Integrity The HI-STORM overpack and MPC have two designed shields for neutron and gamma ray attenuation. The HI-STORM overpack concrete provides both neutron and gamma shielding.

Additional neutron shielding is provided by the encased neutron absorber attached to the fuel basket cell surfaces inside the MPCs. The overpack's inner and outer steel shells, and the steel shield shellt, provide radial gamma shielding. Concrete and steel plates provide axial neutron and gamma shielding. A concrete ring attached to the top of the overpack lid provides additional t The shield shell design feature was deleted in June, 2001 after overpack serial number 7 was fabricated. Those overpacks without the shield shell are required to have a higher concrete density in the overpack body to provide h' Id' S

T bl 1 D 1 compensatory s 1e mg.

ee a e...

HOL TEC INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTED MA TERJAL HI-STORM I 00 FSAR I

I Rev. J 5A4 REPORT HI-2002444 I

9-10 I

Page 5 of6

ATTACHMENT 3 TO HOL TEC LETTER 5014853 Table 9.1.1 ( continued)

MPC INSPECTION AND TEST ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Function Fabrication Pre-operation Maintenance and Operations Structural a)

Assembly and welding of MPC components a)

None.

a)

An ultrasonic (UT) examination or shall be perfom1ed per ASME Code Section multi-layer liquid penetrant (PT)

IX and III, Subsections NB and NG, as examination of the MPC lid-to-shell applicable.

weld shall be perfonned per ASME Section V, Article 5 (or ASME b)

Materials analysis (steel, neutron absorber,Section V, Article 2). Acceptance etc.), shall be performed and records shall be criteria for the examination are kept in a

manner commensurate with defined in Subsection 9. 1.1.1 and in "important to safety" classifications.

the Design Drawings.

b)

ASME Code NB-6000 pressure test shall be perfom1ed after MPC closure welding. Acceptance criteria are defined in the Code.

Leak Tests a)

Helium leakage testing of the MPC shell and a)

None.

a)

Helium leak rate testing shall be M PC shell to baseplate welds is perfom1ed on performed on the vent and drain the unloaded MPC.

port cover plate to MPC lid field welds and the cover plate base b)

Helium leakage testing of the MPC base metals. See Technical Specification metals Bases in Chapter 12 for guidance on (shell, baseplate, lid) is perfonned.

acceptance criteria.

M PCs that were loaded under CoC Amendments 7 and prior amendments are subject to the requirements of those amendments, which mav differ.

HOL TEC INTERN A TTONAL COPYRIGHTED MA TERI AL HI-STORM 100 FSAR I

I Rev. 145A REPORT HT-2002444 I

9-18 I

Page 6 of6