ML20028D893

SAR Change Pages, WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report

ML20028D893
Person / Time
Site:	Consolidated Interim Storage Facility
Issue date:	01/22/2020
From:	Consolidated Interim Storage Facility
To:	Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Shared Package
ML20028D890	List: ML20028D891 ML20028D892 ML20028D893
References
E-55866, CAC 001028, EPID L-2017-NEW-0002, RAI NP-15-7
Download: ML20028D893 (3)

Text

Enclosure 2 to E-55866 SAR Changed Pages

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim Page E.3-6 Safety Protection Systems E.3.1.2 The NAC-MPC relies upon passive systems to ensure the protection of public health and safety, except in the case of fire or explosion. As discussed in Section 2.3.6 of Reference E.3-1, fire and explosion events are effectively precluded by site administrative controls that prevent the introduction of flammable and explosive materials into areas where an explosion or fire could damage installed NAC-MPC systems. The use of passive systems provides protection from mechanical or equipment failure.

E.3.1.2.1 General The NAC-MPC is designed for safe, long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel. The NAC-MPC will survive all of the evaluated normal, off-normal, and postulated accident conditions without release of radioactive material or excessive radiation exposure to workers or the general public. The major design considerations that have been incorporated in the NAC-MPC system to assure safe long-term fuel storage are:

1. Continued confinement in postulated accidents

2. Thick concrete and steel biological shield

3. Passive systems that ensure reliability

4. Inert atmosphere to provide corrosion protection for stored fuel cladding Each NAC-MPC system storage component is classified with respect to its function and corresponding effect on public safety. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 7.10, each system component is assigned a safety classification into Category A, B or C, as shown in Tables 2.3-1 and 2.3-2 of Reference E.3-1. In addition to those tables, coating systems and sealants are considered not important to safety. Table E.3-2 provides the safety classifications for the Auxiliary Equipment referenced in Sections E.4.1.4 of this SAR. The safety classification is based on review of each components function and the assessment of the consequences of component failure following the guidelines of NUREG/CR-6407, Classification of Transportation Packaging and Dry Spent Fuel Storage System Components According to Importance to Safety.

Category A - Components critical to safe operations whose failure or malfunction could directly result in conditions adverse to safe operations, integrity of spent fuel or public health and safety.

Category B - Components with major impact on safe operations whose failure or malfunction could indirectly result in conditions adverse to safe operations, integrity of spent fuel or public health and safety.

Category C - Components whose failure would not significantly reduce the packaging effectiveness and would not likely result in conditions adverse to safe operations, integrity of spent fuel, or public health and safety.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-15-7

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim Page E.3-12 Safety Protection Systems E.3.2.2 The MPC-LACBWR relies upon passive systems to ensure the protection of public health and safety, except in the case of fire or explosion. As discussed in Section 2.3.6 of Reference E.3-1, fire and explosion events are effectively precluded by site administrative controls that prevent the introduction of flammable and explosive materials into areas where an explosion or fire could damage installed MPC-LACBWR systems. The use of passive systems provides protection from mechanical or equipment failure.

E.3.2.2.1 General The MPC-LACBWR is designed for safe, long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel.

The MPC-LACBWR will survive all of the evaluated normal, off-normal, and postulated accident conditions without release of radioactive material or excessive radiation exposure to workers or the general public. The major design considerations that have been incorporated in the MPC-LACBWR system to assure safe long-term fuel storage are:

1. Continued confinement in postulated accidents

2. Thick concrete and steel biological shield

3. Passive systems that ensure reliability

4. Inert atmosphere to provide corrosion protection for stored fuel cladding Each MPC-LACBWR system storage component is classified with respect to its function and corresponding effect on public safety. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 7.10, each system component is assigned a safety classification into Category A, B or C, as shown in Table 2.A.3-1 of Reference E.3-1. In addition to those tables, coating systems and sealants are considered not important to safety. Table E.3-2 provides the safety classifications for the Auxiliary Equipment referenced in Sections E.4.2.4 of this SAR. The safety classification is based on review of each components function and the assessment of the consequences of component failure following the guidelines of NUREG/CR-6407, Classification of Transportation Packaging and Dry Spent Fuel Storage System Components According to Importance to Safety.

Category A - Components critical to safe operations whose failure or malfunction could directly result in conditions adverse to safe operations, integrity of spent fuel or public health and safety.

Category B - Components with major impact on safe operations whose failure or malfunction could indirectly result in conditions adverse to safe operations, integrity of spent fuel or public health and safety.

Category C - Components whose failure would not significantly reduce the packaging effectiveness and would not likely result in conditions adverse to safe operations, integrity of spent fuel, or public health and safety.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-15-7