ML19345D349

Interim Storage Partners LLC - Submission of ISP Draft Responses for RAIs and Associated Document Markups from Part 2 Chb Cat B Design Draft Docket 72-1050 Cac/Epid 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002

ML19345D349
Person / Time
Site:	Consolidated Interim Storage Facility
Issue date:	12/09/2019
From:	Isakson J Consolidated Interim Storage Facility
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
References
CAC 001028, E-55622, EPID L-2017-NEW-0002
Download: ML19345D349 (56)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:INTERIM STORAGE PARTNERS Director, Division of Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 December 9, 2019 E-55622

Subject:

Submission of ISP Draft Responses for RAls and Associated Document Markups from Part 2 CHB Cat B Design DRAFT Docket 72-1050 CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002

Reference:

1.

Letter from John-Chau Nguyen (NRC) to Jeffery D. Isakson, "Interim Storage Partners LLC's License Application To Construct And Operate The Waste Control Specialists Consolidated Interim Storage Facility, Andrews County, Texas, Docket No. 72-1050-First Request For Additional Information, Part 2," dated March 6, 2019 Interim Storage Partners LLC hereby submits draft responses to two additional RAls from First Request for Additional Information; Part 2 issued March 6, 2019 (Reference [11) related to the Cask Handing Building (CHB) to support the continued review of the Licensing Application. Enclosure 1 (Public) contains the draft responses to the RAls RAls NP-7-1 and NP-7-12 along with the associated marked up pages for the Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Should you have any questions regarding this submission, please contact Mr. Jack Boshoven, of my staff, by telephone at (410) 910-6955, or by email at jack.boshoven@orano.group. Sincerely, Jeffery D. Isakson Chief Executive Officer/President Interim Storage Partners LLC P.O. Box 1129

• Andrews, Texas 79714
• interimstoragepartners.com

Document Control Desk cc: John-Chau Nguyen, Senior Project Manager, U.S. NRC Jack Boshoven, ISP LLC Elicia Sanchez, ISP LLC

Enclosures:

E-55622 Page 2 of 2

1.

Draft RAI Responses with associated application change pages (Public)

RAls and Responses to E-55622 Add theSAR Chapter 7, "Installation Design and Structural Evaluation" RAI NP-7-1: Specify how the cask handling building (CHB) overhead crane design combines seismic loadings with normal loadings (e.g., CMAA #70, "Specifications for Top Running Bridge & Gantry Type Multiple Girder Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes," with discussion of how seismic loading is incorporated or an appropriate alternative standard such as the design criteria for a Type II crane as defined in ASME NOG-1), and justify the "not-important-to-safety" (NITS) classification of the crane structure exclusive of the seismic clips and runway beams. The design measures necessary to ensure the crane structure itself can withstand design seismic loading must be specified to verify the crane structure would not fall and damage important-to-safety (ITS) equipment per 10 CFR 72.122(b). WCS CISF SAR Section 7.5.3.1 states the following regarding seismic design of the overhead bridge cranes: The overhead bridge cranes are classified as [NITS] and are designed in accordance with ANSI 830.2, "Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Single or Multiple Girder, Top Running Trolley Hoist)." The overhead bridge cranes rails are attached to the CHB structure in a manner that provides adequate assurance that the rails will remain attached to the CHB structure during the above-described seismic event. Seismic clips are provided on the overhead crane bridge trucks and trolley to limit uplift during a seismic event, thereby eliminating the potential for the bridge or trolley to fall onto loaded casks inside the CHB. Also, WCS CISF SAR Section 3.4.1 states: The 130-ton overhead crane and associated NUHOMS MP197HB and MP187 Casks Lift Beam Assembly are NITS because the NUHOMS cask and canister are not lifted above the Technical Specifications [3-1] height limits. The building structure (structural steel and column foundations) is classified as ITS, Category C to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 72.122(b)(2)(ii) [3-23] and to prevent massive building collapse onto cask systems and related ITS SSCs. The overhead crane bridge trucks and trolley seismic clips are ITS. WCS CISF SAR Section 7.5.3.7, "Structural Analysis and Design," describes how the loadings on the crane runway beams were established, but not the loadings on the crane structure itself. This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122(b)(2)(ii). Response to RAI NP-7-1: This RAI makes the following requests related to CHB overhead crane design:

1. Justify the NITS classification of the CHB overhead cranes exclusive of the seismic clips and runway beams.

2. Specify the design measures that ensure the crane structure itself can withstand design seismic loading and will not fall and damage ITS equipment.

Page 1 of 3

RAls and Responses to E-55622

3. Specify how the overhead crane design combines seismic loadings with normal loadings, with discussion of how seismic loading is incorporated.

These requests are addressed by the following:

1. The CHB overhead cranes are equipped with important-to-safety (ITS) Category B seismic clips on the trolley and bridge to prevent separation of the trolley from the bridge girder and separation of the end trucks from the runway beam. The runway beams and their supporting structures are also ITS Category B to prevent failure or deformation. ITS classification of these components, which serve the safety function of preventing collapSe of crane structures onto canisters, provide reasonable assurance that collapse and resulting potential for loss or reduction of packaging effectiveness will not occur. The integral crane structure consisting of the bridge rails, bridge girders, and trucks, as well as the.trolley structure and the various drive components, are NITS because they do not have the potential for structural collapse onto canisters as long as the ITS Category B seismic clips and runway support structure retain their safety function. For lifting, operational protocols. limit overhead crane lifts to a height not exceeding the drop height that could cause loss or reduction of packaging effectiveness for the NU HOMS casks. Additionally, for insurance reasons and to provide defense in depth, the overhead cranes are analyzed and designed as Type 1, single failure-proof (SFP) cranes in accordance with Americao St,dety of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) NOG-1-2015, even though this does not form the 1icensing basis for these components.

2. The crane structures (bridge rails, bridge girders. trucks, etc.)* not have the potential for collapse onto canisters e.g. during seisll1i$ JoadirlQ as long as the ITS Category B seismic clips and runway support structure retain their safety function. The cranes are, however, analyzed and designed as Type 1, SFP cranes fn accordance with ASME NOG-1-2015, providing defense in d~as discussed above. In accordance with ASME NOG-1-2015, Section 4150, seismiodemands on the overhead cranes are determined from modal response spectrum ealysis of a three-dimensional mathematical model meeting all requirements of Sectioft 4153, including requirements for model geometry, boundary conditions, and trolley and hook positions. WCS CISF Safety Analysis Report (SAR)

Sections 7.5.3.2.4 and 7.5.3.6 have been added to reflect this discussion.

3. New WCS CISF SAR Sections 7.5.3.2.4 and 7.5.3.6 have been added to provide clarification that seismrcdeman~ on the CHB overhead cranes are analyzed in accordance with ASME NOG-1-2015 and ASCE 4-16 and to provide more details on incorporation of seismic loading.

SAR Sections 3.2.3.10.9, f.2.8.4, 3.2.8.6, 3.4.1, 4.7.2, and 7.5.3.1.3, and Table 3-5, have further been revised to reflect the SFP design of the overhead crane in accordance with NOG 2015 and clarify the classification of the overhead crane bridge truck and trolley seismic clips and crane runway support beams as ITS Category B SSCs. Impact: SAR Sections 3.2.3.10.9, 3.2.8.4, 3.2.8.6, 3.4.1, 3.8, 4.7.2, and 7.5.3.1.3, and Table 3-5, have been revised as described in the response. SAR Sections 7.5.3.2.4, and 7.5.3.6 have been added as described in the response. Page 2 of 3

RAls and Responses to E-55622 RAI NP-7-12: Provide a report for the design of the CHB that, at a minimum, includes the following: (1) the dimensions of all sections that have a structural role including locations, sizes, configuration, and spacing, (2) structural materials with defining standards or specifications, (3) location and specifications for assembly, and (4) fabrication codes and standards. WCS CISF SAR Section 7.5.3.7, "Structural Analysis and Design," states that the CHB will be designed using static analysis methods for the determination of forces and moments on structural steel members from service loading conditions and dynamic methods for loading conditions involving seismic loads. The application, however, provides no additional information that would allow the staff to review the design of the CHB consistent with the guidance in Section 5.5.4 of NUREG-1567. The report provided should include descriptions of the design method used, computer models used, and information on the application of the structural analysis methods used to determine the capacity of the CHB for service and natural phenomena loads. In addition, clarify if the modal response spectrum analysis will be the dynamic method used for the evaluation of seismic loads of the CHB. This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122(b)(2)(ii). Response to RAI NP-7-12:

1. The dimensions (sizes, configuration, and spacing) of all sections with a structural role are provided in new Table 7-41 and new Figures 7-54 through 7-63 in the WCS CISF Safety Analysis Report (SAR), with a corresponding discussion added in Section 7.5.3.1.1.

1. Structural materials with defining standards and specifications are provided in new SAR Table 15-1.

2. Locations and specifications for assembly and connections are provided in new SAR Section 7.5.3.4.2.

3. Fabrication codes and standards are provided in New SAR Section 15.2.4.

Discussion of the design and analysis of the CHB is provided in SAR Section 7.5.3 and all subsections, which have been significantly expanded and restructured, and material and construction specifications and properties have been provided in new sections in SAR Chapter

15. ISP calculations providing the detailed analysis methodology and results will be enclosed with the final response for NRC information. SAR Sections 1.2.3, 7.4, and 7.5 and SAR Figures 1-7 and 1-8 have been revised in accordance with the expanded discussion in Section 7.5.3.

Impact: SAR Sections 1.2.3, 7.4, 7.5, and 7.5.3 (including all subsections) have been revised, SAR Sections 15.1.5, 15.2.4, and 15.3.4, Tables 7-41, 7-42, 15-1, and 15-2, and Figures 1-7, 1-8, and 7-54 through 7-63 have been added as described in the response. Page 3 of 3

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 1.2.2 1.2.3 L Principal Design Criteria The WCS CISF principal design criteria are based on the site characteristics, the design criteria associated with the cask systems listed in Table 1-1 that have been previously approved by the NRC, and specific criteria required for the WCS CISF design. The cask systems listed in Table 1-1 meet the WCS CISF design criteria. Table 1-2 provides a sunnnary of the WCS CISF principal design criteria. Facility Descriptions The major fucilities at the WCS CISF are the Cask Ha area. The Cask Handling Building is approximatel).::; 72 feet high. The building is a two-bay steel s cormnercial overhead cranes used to move tranerr,nrt<> transport vehicle. One bay of the building described in Section 1.3.1.2 and the other transportation casks :from the rail car to the ti'alP@tQ.11 of the building is set aside for cask storage. Th,c:c,......... Figure 1-7. Figure 1-8is a sec* pgh the buu~IIH1'!11.. location Air monitors and dos* ated in

• ding for monitoring purposes. The building is not de o p vide confinement or shielding for SNF or GTCC mate
• classified as ITS - Category B.

The purpose of the ling is to receive and prepare for storage shipments of dua . It will a1so receive GTCC waste canisters for storage at o process canisters stored at the site for off-site shipme is designed to handle canisterized material and does not bare fuel ...._- -....Achievable (ALARA) principles are incorporated, to the throughout the facility design to reduce radiation exposure Cr "fling devices for transferring the NUHOMS r casks :from the transportation skid to the transfer trailer/skid are the need for :facility personnel to be near the loaded cask. This as the lift heights of the loaded casks are maintained below 80 after removal of the impact limiters. The analysis ofbounding drop s that a NUHOMS transportation/transfer cask will maintain structural integrity o e DSC confinement boundary and maintain basket geometry from an 80 inch (:from the bottom of the cask to the "ground') drop. The ITS canister transfer system for the vertical transfer of canisters is remotely operated and the transfer equipment used to make the transfer to the storage overpacks is substantially identical to that used to transfer the canister into dry storage at the reactor fucilitie s where the material was initially stored. Page 1-5

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WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 3.2.3.10.3 Procedure Used to Lump Masses The mass of a system is distributed throughout the actual structure. Lumping mass is an idealized method that concentrates the mass of a system at the nodes of the structure tmdel The lwnped masses at the nodes of a structure are the sums of the actual system mass that can be reasonab]y attributed to that specific oode point represented in the ana]ysis tmdel 3.2.3.10.4 Methods Used to Couple Soil with Seismic-System Structures The soil can be represented by discrete springs or a finite the soil subgrade. 3.2.3.10.5 Methods Used to Account for Torsional Effects The storage pads and the CHB are nndeled to eccentricities of the masses. 3.2.3.10.6 Methods for Seismic Analysis of Dams 3.2.3.10.7 Methods to Determine Ove ge pa is evaluated to ensure stability. site-specific seismic design parameters. for seismic effects in accordance with the requirements of ] for single-:fuilure-proof cranes. es in the CHB are analyzed fur the seismic effects in accordance

• ments in OG-1-2015 3-36]/orTJ!.. e 1 single-.lailure-roof_ crane.

Seismic c are provided on the overhead crane bridge trucks and trolley to limit uplift during a seismic event, thereby eliminating the potential fur the bridge or trolley to full onto loaded SNF casks inside the CHB. 3.2.3.10.10 Seismic Analysis ofSpecific Safety Features SSCs cJassified as ITS meet the requirements of 10 CFR 72.122(b )(2) [3-23], which requires SSCs be designed such that design basis ground tmtion will oot impair the capability to perform their safety functions. Page 3-12 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-1

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 3.2.8.1 NUHOMS and Vertical Cask Systems Tue NUHOMS storage systems and the Vertical storage systems are designed to provide long-term storage of SNF. The canister materials are selected to protect against degradation during the storage period, including the application of system specific aging manageirent programs. 3.2.8.2 Cask Storage Pad Load Combinations Tue storage pads fur the Vertical system storage modules are provided in Section 7.6.1.4. . Load combinations 3.2.8.3 Canister Transfer System The CTS is ITS. Load combinations 3.2.8.4 Cask Handling Building Load Combinatio L 3.2.8.5 3.2.8.6 accordance with nuclear facilit required by these codes. Section design criteria. 1 mat foundation of reinforced concrete oadfactors, and allowable stresses used in 49-13, refer to Section 7.5.3.2.1 ---==--==---------_..I Page 3-14 ~

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 3.4.1 Criteria utilized fur criticality safety of the canister/cask systems are not based on site-specific criticality safety criteria, therefore no additional criticality evaluations are required specific to this application Chapter 10 addresses the criticality criteria fur each of the canisters authorized fur storage at the WCS CISF identified in Table 1-1. Table 3-5 describes the Quality Assurance classifx;ations fur major SSCs as utilized at the WCS CISF per NUREG/CR-6407 [3-31]. Quality Asstrrance Classifications fur each of the Storage Systems SSCs are addressed in TabJe 3-4. The canisters are classified as Category A because a fuih.rre could Jead in loss of p

• ry contairurent.

The Storage Overpacks, CTS, VCT, and CHB have been c1as

• as Category B because the failtrre of these components would require the e of an additional component to resuh in an unsafe condition The Storag the Vertical Storage System hifve been classified as Category C because se components would not likely resuh in an unsafe situation AD other components condition The classification of the components that ma cask systems authorized fur storage at the WCS CISF, including canister, tra casks, storage overpacks, transfer equipment and storage rovided endices A.3, B.3, C.3, D.3, E.3, F.3 and G.3, depending on syste ection 2.1 ofthe Technical Specifications [3-1] lists the SN fo storage at the WCS CISF.

Table 3-1 provides the cross refere appendix and section fur each canister/storage ere the of the components of that system are identified. and associated lifting equipment is to receive, inspect and nts of canisterized SNF and GTCC waste canisters and to r light maintenance. The CTS and associated lifting tack d transfur operations for the NAC canisters is located The 130-ton overhead crane and associated NUHOMS 87 Casks Lift Beam Assembly are NITS because the NUHOMS e not lifted above the Technical SJJeci:fications [3-1] height limits provide reasonable assurance against crane structural collapse onta caniste e crane is designed toNOG-1-2015 3-36 T 'J!..e 1 Single Failure roof spec. 1cations to provide defense in depth. The buildin structure structural steel and colunm. fumdations) is c1assified as ITS, Category B to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 72.122(b)(2)(il) [3-23] and to prevent massive building collapse onto cask systems and related ITS SSCs. The overhead crane bridge trucks and trolley seismic clips are ITS. The balance of the facility is a1so NITS as the fuel remains seaJed :from the environment inside the confinement botmdary provided by the canister fur all operations and the overpacks provide protection :from natural phenomena and postu1ated off-nonml and accident eventsl Page 3-23

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 3-22 Title 10, Code ofFederal Regulations, Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation." 3-23 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 72, License Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuei lligh-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater than Class C Waste." 3-24 ASCE-7 (formerly ANSI A58.l), Minimum Design Loads for Building; and Other Structures, American Society of Civil Engineers, 1995. 3-25 McGuire, RK., Silva, W.J. and Constantino, C.J., 2001, Techni basis for revision ofregu]atory guidance on design grmmd rmtions: Hazard-a

• k-consistent grourxl.

motion spectra guidelines, U.S. Nuclear Regu]atory Co NUREG/CR-6728. 3-26 Noillse,d. 3-27 Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values For se* U.S. Nuclear Regu]atory Connnission, Octobe 3-29 3-30 3-31 3-32 3-33 3-34 !3-35 3-36 NUREG-0554, Single-Failure-Proof Crane"'-..._,,, Regulatory Connnission, 1979. ASME B30.2-2005 Overhead -

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NUREG/CR-6407, (INEL-95/0 Dry Spent Fuel Storage System portation Packaging and ~~~ to Importance to Safety, 1996. Electric Power Re project, Final 2013, Ground motion rrodel (GMM) review 2 , "Report of Geotechnical Exploration: ISF) Andrews, Texas," August 20, 2015. ules for Construction of Overhead Gantry Cranes (Top Girder)," The American Society ofMechanical Engineers, um ~in. Lpads for µuildtngf anq (.)Jber Struc(~res. " , "Rules f or Construction of Overhead Gantry Cranes (Top ulti le Girder, " The American Society_ of Mechanical Engineers, Page 3-30 I~ RAI NP-7-1

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim Table 3-5 Quality Assurance Classification of Structures, Systems, and Components as Utilued at the WCS CISF(JJ Important-To-Safety Classification Category A SNF Canister Classification Category B Storage Overpacks Canister Transfer System(See Note}) Vertical Cask Transporter Cask Handling Building Classification Category C Storage Pads (Vertical Cone overpacks) Security Alarm Sys te Not Important-To-Safety Facility Infrastructure Security and Admini<;tration Building rage Overpacks) Temperature Monitoring System Communication System Fire Protection System Potable Water System Sanitary Waste/Septic Systems Facility Roads Railroad Line Components Backup Electric Power (Generators) (See Note 2) Associated Support Equipment Notes: (1) Quality Assurance Classifications for each of the Storage System; SSCs are addressed in Table 3-4. (2) Treated as ITS Category C with the exception 10 CFR Part 21 does not apply. '(3), The_,c;q~f#er Transfer System includes transfer casks for the NAC MAGNASTOR, UMS, and},1PC systems. Page 3-34

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility System Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 4.7.1.3 Confinement Features The CHB is not cmmted on to provide confinement fur SNF or GTCC waste. 4.7.1.4 Fmction The CHB :facilitates cask handling operations at the WCS CISF. Those operations are described in more detail in Chapter 5. The fimctions of the CHB include: loading and llllloading transportation casks from rail cars; general weather protection fur the handling operations; a location fur the CTS; support structure fi werhead cranes; staging area fur storage oveipacks; and storage and staging fi er transfer and shipping equipment. The CHB is not comted on to pro

• 4.7.1.5 Components 4.7.1.6 4.7.2 The major components that comprise the CHB cranes. Minor components include a compr discussed in Section 4.3.3 and the CHB
• system in the Utility and Storage room area not be heated or cooled. Ventilation will be comtiiiti materials.

r arts of the transfer systems rre 'M:teli~were evaluated fur storage in the terns various cask transfer systems. ections 4.7.3 and 4.7.4. Table 4-1 provnes a and section fur each canister/storage systems are discussed. being ITS Category B. The design bases fur the CHB are o 130 ton overhead bridge cranes. These cranes are c1assified as ception of seismic clips and runway beams and support structures, d as Type 1, Single Failure Proof cranes in accordance with N00 2015 topr ide defense in depth. The cranes are provned fur the pmpose of loading and llllloadin NUHOMS trans12ortation casks off or on the rail car and to or from the Transfer Trailer. The cranes shall include limit switches that shall be procedurally vefif!'f!d IQ,f,epre-:s.et,,limiting the travel (lifting height) so that they do not lift the NUHOMS casks above their ana]yzed drop height. Section 7.5.3.1 provnes additional information on the overhead bridge cranes. The NUHOMS casks will be lifted by the crane utilizing the WCS Lift Beam Asseni>ly, which is referenced in Section 4.10. Page 4-23

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WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 7.4 Reinforced Concrete Structures - Important To Safety The NUHOMS Horiwntal Storage Modules (HSM ), NAC VCCsl storage pads for the vertical sy tem5 and the CHB foundation and oor slab compme the on1y WCS CISF reinforced concrete structures that are ITS. The individual Appendices describing each of the proposed system components provide the structural descriptions and evahiatiom for each of the selected cask systems. Table 7-2 proviles the cross reference to the applicable appendix and section for each caimter/storage overpack where the structural evahiation E di<lcussed. rfteinforced structures associated with the CHB are discuss 7.5.3.5. Page 7-5 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 7.5 Cask Handling Building The Cask Handling Building (CHB) is a two-bay ITS - Category '8 steel structure. The CHB is 75 feet by 91 feet and approximately 72 feet tall with rail access to facilitate cask unloading operations, canister transfer operations, and miscellaneous maintenance activities. Figures 1-7 and 1-8 show the general building layout and building cross section CHB Structural Design is discussed in Section 7.5.3. To facilitate rail car unhading activities for NUHOMS systems the CHB design incorporates two overhead bridge cranes rated at 130 tons eac

• ing loaded transportation casks :from the rail car, reiroval of impact *
• and shielding, etc.

All transfer operations to Irove the NUHOMS Syste transportation casks are accomplished with the tra orientation utilizing a NITS bridge crane as all of 80 inches. The vertical systems will utilize reIIDve impact limiters and personnel barriers, an used to Irove the NAC transportation cas ___ *~--~ System (CTS). The CHB also houses operatio unhading transportation casks casks into the storage casks. Bo transport of a storage cask to the p nd a VCT in support of canist om the NAC transportation ~"""**-=---. ere ITS, although the VCT vaM~ for limited lift height drops. signed and analyz.ed to rreet the intent of oads at Nuclear Power PJants," ~ ~~~:,"to minimize the occlrrrence of the load han accidents and to provide an adequate depth for handling heavy loads near spent fuel and safe SF will not have safe shutdown equiprrent or spent fuel that the canisters loaded with fuel nrust be safely and securely tecting the fuel :from damage and protecting the site and

from any potential radiological impacts. Even though the potential release is very low, the WCS CISF objective is to prevent the occlrrrenc f load handling accidents. Therefore, the licensing basis is to provide handling systems that are robust to faihrre which 1mkes the likelihood of a load drop event extrerrely small.

Page 7-6 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 7.5.3 7.5.3.1 The VCT is not an overhead hoisting system as defined by any ASME Standard, rather it is a mobile hydraulic gantry crane and adheres to applicable ASME B30. l requirements. The lift links, lifting pins and header beam are designed, load tested and inspected in accordance with the requirements as specified in ANSI N14.6. Cask Handling Building Structural Design This section presents the structural description and design criteria and analysis for the WCS CISF Cask Handling Building (CHB). The CHB structure re designed to meet the applicable requirements for II'S structures in 10 CFR 72.1 -s outlined in UKEG-1567 Section 5.4.. The CHB is a two bay comme designed and

fabricated steel frame structure with metal siding and ro igned to provide a eather-protective enclosure for cask handling Of!er:

an ppport two commercial overhead cranes used to move transpo

• o casks e rail car to the transfer vehicle. The CHB and its foundations S - Category.

e overhead cranes will also be used to remove or install nnel barriers, llll)act

• rs from the transportation casks. All operations to e the N MS System 187 and MP197HB transportation casks are acco e transportation casks in a horirontal orientatioti
• n t CHB structural design elf.

re1 'd concretefoundationsfor the e cranes. Arrangement of the CHB are provided in the following subsections.

• ary structural com onents of_ all CHB.

Page 7-33 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim .5.3.1.1 Description ofCHB.Steel Building As shown in Figures 7-54 through 7-61, the CHB steel building is a braced frame tructure with column centerline grid plan dimensions of 175'-0" (north-south) by IJ93'-0" (east-west) and an eave height 72'-0" above the top ofthe concrete foundation (Elevation 100'-0" in the figures). The roof is gabled with 1/4-inch per foot slope on each side and peak ridge elevation of 174'-0 1/8". The north-south plan dimension of the building comprises seven equal bays of 25 '-0" spacing, with vertically braced interior bays similar to those shown in Figure 7-56 on column Ii A, C, F, H, K, and 'M The east-west plan dimension comprises two crane bays 4'-0" spacing between independent crane support columns that are later upported by three eparate vertically braced frames at column lines A-C, K-M (see Figures -55 and 7-56). All seven east-west column lines SUJJ. a pr lateral roof truss ~stem that is tied together with a secondary nort uth bridgin truss system 'Gnd horizontal roof bracing at the top and bott uss chord levels. roof trusses vary in depth from 7'-6" at thee o 9'-61/8" at the ridg. bracing and primary roof truss arrangem shown

• gure 7-56, wit secondary bridging roof trusses and horizo oo.f.

s chord bracing shown in Fi ures 7-60 and 7-61, res ectivel

• *zed on all seven east-west d lateral stiffness with ness to meet drift limitations e des objectives are further achieved stem (i.e., diaphragm); see Figures 7-54, st-west roof trusses are laterally supported long the full north-south length of the.

ch crane bay (Column lines D. l, D.2, 11, 1 own in Figure 7-60). Horizontal diagonal es of the top and bottom chords is then provided between the sses to create a continuous roof diaphragm that assure&

• uting lateral loads among the north-south and east-west vntinuous roof diaphragm also limits relative drift ofi_

ames subjected to localized lateral iorces imp__arted b the cranes. Page 7-34 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 'he bridge crane support system consists of simply-supported runway girders panning 25 feet between the aforementioned independent crane support columns. As 'llustrated in Figure 1-7, the crane runways provide crane access to the complete length of the building in the east crane bay, while in the west crane bay the runways pan only the four southernmost east-west column lines (from Line 1 to Line 4). imilar to the main building column lines, vertical bracing is provided in two bays of each crane column line (Lines D, E, I, and J); see the typical section shown in Figur -59. The runway girders are built-up steel sections with overall depth of 5 '-6". A 'the top girder flange and at Elevation 136'-2", crane runway tie ck elements are rovided to transfer lateral loads from the runway girders to upportin verticallJ!.J raced frames. The tie-back elements and their connectio e detailed to ccom modate flexural displacements of the runway wit iencing fatigue. The crane rail supported by the runway girders is 175 lb-

ard, A 759 crane rail with rail clips sized and spaced to ensure both the

• sand rail c lateral crane o erating loads as well as seismi els.

and east-west directions, in CE 7-16 is not a governin code ittedby ASCE 7-16 Table gory C and lower. For th port (SAR Attachment E, r ASCE 7-16 Section 11.6. 'All vertical braces

• most efficient se

~1085 round HSS sections, which are thei

• c ductility and slenderness requirements o din multi-story X corifigurations in both the to lance braces in tension and compression A/SC 341-16 zm ced forces on intersecting columns and struts.

ed frames, the three-column arrangement for each of the brace, re 7-56 is selected to provide vertical and lateral load patli olumn damage due to tornado missile impact. Similarl]!; ved i e north-south braced frames by providing two bays o (four vertical brace members per level) in each of the north-soutJi edundant longitudinal struts between columns (see Figure 7-581. ion, the loss ofan individual brace, or connection thereto, would 'Contribution of the given braced frame to the strength ofth ilding story_ b 25%. This will result in no loss in overall structura rFigures 7-55 through 7-60 illustrate typical member size groups utilized for CHB rimary framing. Member size classes utilized for each primary framing member category are also summarized in Table 7-41. Further discussion of the CHB tructural steel anai)!_sis and desi is given in Sections 7.5.3.3 and 7.5.3.4. Page 7-35 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim v.5.3.1.2 *Description o[CHB Foundation 'he principal safety function of the foundation system for the CHB is to transfe 'design-basis normal operating and extreme environmental loading demands from the uilding columns and crane support columns to the supporting soils, while providing 'Sufficient resistance to sliding and overturning. These functions are achieved with a foundation consisting of cast-in-place, reinforced concrete footings and pedestals upporting the CHB column base plates. The use of shallow spread-footing type oundations is in accordance with recommendations in the proje eotechnical report, (see SAR Attachment E). The general foundation arrangeme sists of three continuous strip mat footings running north-south, each su ing one of three column line groups shown in Figure 7-55: Lines A-D, L

• and LinesJ-M!

eparate footings are provided for the wind column v at the north and outh ends of the building. All footings are found ta nomina of 9 feet below ade. This depth is selected to provide suffici destal depthfo lopment of the reinforcement and anchor rods required esistance of tornado-1 d up/if~ 'demands on the CHB columns. Excavati the bea

• tratum depth of nominally feet below grade also ensures the found will on competent materia

'below the maximum 6.5-foot depth of loose o n material encountered in boring activities documented int roject geot al report. See Section 7.5.3.3.3 for evaluation of $Oil-structure effects. er discussion oi CHB. oundation analy_sis and desi

• n 7. 5.

unlo

• g activities fur NUHOMS system;, the CHB design rhead bridge cranes rated at 130 tons each fur lifting loaded from the rail car, removal of impact limiters, and sbiek:ling, etc.

will utilize the overhead bridge cranes to remove impact Jimiters ~IQQlt1~:J.:1arr*ers, and the VCT is used to move the NAC transportation casks ar to the CTS. Page 7-36

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WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 'he two cranes are identical in terms of geometry and configuration, which generally consists of two box-beam bridge girders supporting a top-running trolley. As show conceptually in Figures 1-8 and 7-56, the bridge girders span 64'-0" between crane runway rails, and a minimum height of 40'-2" is provided from hook to finished floor. V3ridge and trolley travel are limited by structural steel end stops installed on the crane runway girders and bridge girders, respectively. The end stops engage bumpers installed on the crane and trolley that are sized and configured to limit impact forces applied to the supporting structure. A minimum of 3 inches of clearance is provided in all directions between crane components and surroundin ob ctions in th building, in accordance with ASME NOG-1 and CMAA-70. Lifts perfonred by the overhead NUREG-0612, Control ofHeavy Generic Technical .,-.....,;._c;;Ul,;,>.rl-"rned by the guidance of a uclea ower P1ants: Resohrtion of ~

• ze the potential for release of radioactive s transportation/transfer cask lifts are and the lift height is administratively

.AnE~tt--nJ.,,..,..,.._.d.,._e::__* basis drop accidents previously approved w...._.,,.... u,g e WCS CISF SAR Tables A.3-1, B.3-1, C.3-1, 'b.V!:mread cranes may be used for IIIBcellaneous lifts that do not y(11~:.JittW~ er loaded transportation or storage casks inside the CHB. of the CHB structures are governed by nuclear facility codes andi -1567 Section 5.4.4., "Other SSCs Important to Safety, " reference nd the codes and standards cited therein as the basic references for es important to safety. Although ANSI/ANS 57.9 is no longer....._ __ aintaine as an American National Standard, the principal references it cites Jo nalysis and design of ITS steel and concrete structures are consistent with currenti codes and standards applicable to safety-related nuclear facilities. As als ummarized in Section 15. 2. 4, the allowing codes and standards are utilize.... d-c-or-t~he rg_iven purposes. Page 7-37

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WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim ANSIIAISC N690-18, SpecificationforSqfety-Related SteelStructuresf9r Nuclea~ !Facilities. Applicable to definition of steel design load combinations and steel ember and connection design requirements. ANSI/AJSC 360-16, Specification or Structural Steel Buildings, is the baseline document modified in p_art by IA.NS// A/SC N 690-18 {or a lication to nuclear iacilities. ANSI/A/SC 341-16, Seismic ProvisionsforStructural Steel Buildings. Applicable to definition of seismic design and detailing re uirements or the CHB structura~

steel seismic lateral force resisting system.

AC/ 349-13, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Rela Applicable to definition of concrete design load comb* reinforced concrete structures and anchorages. ASCE 43-05, Seismic Design Criteria for Stru uclear Facilities. App_licable to evaluatio he CHB structures. ASCEISEI 7-16, Minimum and Other Structures. App foads, snow and rain loads, re is designed to withstand snow and rain in accordance lftt:J'IJ~¢ lnternafl Building Code. In addition, it is designed to resist failure ofttt~~fflral members under concurrent loading by design-basis tornado winds, atmospheric pressure change (APC), and tornado missiles. Page 7-38

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WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim Administrative Controls will be used to mitigate certain impacts of design-basis tornado loading. The transportation cask will not be moved into the building to begin the railcar unloading process unless current and forecasted weather for the approaching eight (8) hours indicate safe weather conditions. Eight hours is the estimated time to move any of the casks from the railcar to a stable configuration within the CHB in which the crane is no longer overhead or adjacent. For the NU HOMS systems, eight hours bounds the approximate time (6.4 hours for MP 187 casks, 4.3 hours/or MP197HB casks)from entryofthecask railcar into the CHB, to the point where the cask has been placed on the transfer skid an e overhead crane can be relocated to the south end of the CHB. For theNAC s s, eight hours bounds the approximate time (5.5 hours/or NAC-STC cas .'5 hours/or NAC-UTC casks, and 8 hours/or NAC-MAGNATRAN casks) from e cask railcar into the CHB, to placement of the canister on the Caniste

• ity pad, at which point the overhead crane will no longer be overhe cask on the railcar. Estimated time to perform cask receipt occupancy times in the occupational collecti respective Appendix, refer to Tables A.9-el's

-1, and G.9-1. Administrative controls will restrict t of the overhead crane such nee railcar unloading has been

• anal non-empty casks on that it will remain in the south-most bay of th completed Administrative contr will prohibit railcars inside the CHB, and t to the er ntil the previous cask has been removed from the CHB an conditions permitting. Similar"Jy, ion can proceed, weather rations following retrieval of a t be per ztted to proceed unless current ing eight hours indicate safe weather loaded canister, the lo and forecasted we conditions. The tentialfor collapse of overhead cranes onto
• eval operations (with storage operations occurring o recast is considered to be the absence of: Tornado and Severe ornado and Severe Thunderstorm Warnings, andpr?dicted oul
• for a Severe Thunderstorm Watch (58 mph or greaterJ.

ill be 'Ccessed from the NOAA Weather Forecast Office prior to /unloading. The nearest NOAA Weather Forecast Office to the YOdessa Office. Administrative controls triggered by the presence ere Thunderstorm Watches, Tornado and Severe Thunderstorm redicted wind speeds that would qualify for a Severe Thunderstorm Watch en avoidance of atmospheric conditions which are favorable for the development of severe thunderstorms capable of producing tornados within the following eight hours. I This section describes loads, loading combinations and analysis methods to be met fur design of the WCS CISF reinforced concrete and structural steel structures. Page 7-39 'a RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim Loads used in analysis and design of CHB structtrre include the following: D Dead load L Live load C - Crane o - Snow load H lateral soil pressure load T0 Thennal load WWind load W1 Tornado load F' Flood load E' Design Basis Earthquake setsrruc Load Definitions DeadLoad as any normal load, including related internal moments ry with intensity, orientation and/or location of application. s, other than crane loads loads due to vibration and any nt e cts and operating load are types of live loads. The tions provide design requirements for various types of live "-,~~Jrrtation Vehicle Loads and Heavy Floor Loads -Loads due to ~!!!j,Unr truck and rail traffic in designated building areas are in accordance standard loadings defined by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) and by the American Railway Engineers Association. Special heavy loading conditions resuhing from transport of SNF and storage casks on truck and rail transporters/carriages are considered. Design basE cask weights bound the worst-case condition of all vendor designs handled at the WCS CISF. Floor loadings from transportation, transfer and storage mode casks are also considered, along with sufficient allowance for any impact resuhing from placing the moving loads on the floor or other areas of the structtrre. Within the building, the floor under the Page 7-40

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WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim Canister Transfer System will be designed to handle the specific loads I produced by the hydraulic gantry systeml I 1 Floor Live Loads -A floor live load of 300 lb/:ft2 is a lied in areas of heavy equipment operation in the CHB. Live load for stairs, walkways, and platform is 100 lb/; t2. Crane and Hoist Loads (C) - Design loads for the CHB permanently installed cranes and hoists envelop the full rated capacity of the cranes, including allowances for impact loads and test load requirements. T. ated capacity of ach of the two overhead bridge cranes in the CHB is 13

s. Crane test load&

'Ore considered in the design at 125% of the rated cap of the cranes, '-- increased by an additional 5% in accordance with G-1-2015 Section 7423. Forces induced by crane movement are c IASCE 7-16 as allows. Vertical impact: 25% of maximum w crane sel -wei ht. Lateral side thrust: 20% of the su o the crane trolley_ and hoist. Longitudinal traction: JIIIII!.!* ~!!!::::!!!.!.!!!.!:!...!: and crane self-weight). now Load (SJ - As describ es1gn live load due to rain, IS'now, and ice is 10 lb/ft2, whi oun w load Determination of roofi now and ice l ith the re uirements oi ASCE 7-16. Are due to fluids held in internal building no reinforced concrete tanks in the 1111-igned in accordance with rrechanical ed on the density of the soil and includes the efrects of see nt E of the WCS CISF SAR Chapter 2. Since the WCS ry, re

• ely flat site and the CHB is a sJab-on-grade structure, no soil pressure loads are exerted on building structures. Therefore, f Jateral soil pressure loads is not necessary fur structural analysis Page 7-41 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim Thermal Load (T0)- Consists of thermally induced forces and moments resulting from operation and environmental conditions affecting the CHB. The design temperature changes (,11) used for structural analysis and design of the CHB are the differences between expected construction temperatures and winter or summer operating temperatures, assuming the building is unheated and without air conditioning. The temperatures considered for these LJT calculations are ased on data for Midland, Texas in Technical Report No. 65, Expansion Joints in rJJuildings, which include a 66°F mean temperature during construction, a rsummer operating temperature of l00°F (exceeded, on ave , only 1% of the ime between June and September), and a winter operat* mperature of 19°P exceeded, on average, 99% of the time between Dec and February). This esults in a positive LJT of 34°F and a negative LJT consideration in the CHE analysis. In accordance with NUREG-NS 57. 9, hermal loads are not combined with tornad 'Seismic load that the CHE hermal loading is self-limiting and will b eved during resR_o the rstructure to these extreme loading con ed by the design (or etermine design wind loads on esign wind loads are determined 7-69), which consider than service level wind se with unity (1.0) LRFD wind sign combinations. Wind loading in Wind Force Resisting System are irectional Procedure given in ASCE 7-16, coefficients are based upon an enclosed s ~ operational protocols to shut all CHB t we esign velocity pressures (qJ are determined quation 26.10-1: 4z *~ 0. 00256KzKz,KdKe V2 essure exposure coefficient, equal to 1.18 for Exposure Category eight o/73 feet above ground Kd =wind directionality factor,*equal to 0.85 for Building Main Wind Force Resisting System Ke= ground elevation factor, taken as 0.9 for site elevation of approximately 3500/eet V = basic wind speed, equal to 116 mph for the WCS CISF site. Page 7-42

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WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim Assessment of the site soil properties and the CHB dynamic response indicates that Soil-Structure Interaction (SSI) effects are minimal, such that the criteria of ASCE 4-16, Section 5.1.1 can be applied to justify fcxed-base analysis in lieu of detailed SSI analysis. Section 5.1.l(a) permits seismic response analysis without consideration of soil-structure interaction (i.e., fixed-base analysis) if the frequencies of a rigid structure supported on soil springs representing site-specific soil properties are more than twice the dominant frequencies of the actual structure. This condition is present for the CHB, given the stiff soils at the WCS CISF site and the relatively low dominant structuralfreque

• es of the updated CHB design. Soil spring frequencies calculated for the s are larger than twice the primary lateral response frequencies of the CHB, terminedfrom analysis of the CHB framing arrangement and structure ma ore, fcxed-base analysis is performed, utilizing the surface Desig span ectra (DRS) developed in the Probabilistic Seismic Hazar alysis fort S CJSF (discussed in SAR Chapter 2).

stifled by the separation of the DRS (approximately (less than 4 Hz). ASCE 4~16, sment is a prerequisite for Section 5.1.1. Regarding 6, Section 5.1.l(b) related s allow mat foundations in t reco endations (SAR Attachment E), e significant. Finally, the criterion in ASCE SSI analysis in all cases where wave d, is not applicable to the CHB analysis. ~SCE 4-16, Section 5.1.10, ground motion ected for WCS CISF structures. n ofCHB seismic load development, see ~ections 7.5.3.3.3

3. 6 (overhead cranes).

combinations applicable to the CHB are based on the LRFD load en in ANSI/A/SC N690-18, with the/pl/owing three basic The design-basis seismic load case discussed above (E) is utilized where the safe-hutdown earthquake load (SSE) appears in the ANSI/A/SC N690-18 load combinations. Load combinations with operating-basis earthquake loads a licable to nuclear ower /ant SSCs are not appf icable to CHB desigfl. As previously stated, self-limiting operating thermal loads are not combined with <tornado or seismic loads, in accordance with ANSI/ANS 57.9. Page 7-45 ~ ~

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim

3.

Since wind loads are developed per ASCE 7-16 using ultimate wind speeds, use o a 1.0 load factor on the wind load case (W) is appropriate in the severe environmental load combinations. Crane load (CJ is included with normal wind load (W) and seismic load, but is 'neglected with tornado loads (WJ given the aforementioned crane administrative controls for tornado warnings. This is in accordance withANSUAISC N690-18 Equations NB2-4 and NB2-7

5.

For uplift load combinations, 90% of dead load is consid 100% of operating crane loads with a destabilizing ef[J impact, side thrust, and longitudinal traction loads) ANSUAISC N690-18 SectionNB2.5d(4). The following are structural steel design load c assumptions, when reduced to contain only t applicable to the CHB:

1.

1.4D + C + T.

2.

1.2D + l.6L + l.4C + 0.5 e Load Combination zn conjunction with .e., crane vertical

• in accordance with a

crete load combinations applicable to the CHB foundations and floor ed on the load combinations given in AC! 349-13 [7-68], with similar assumptions to those applied to the structural steel load combinations:

1.

The design-basis seismic load case discussed above (E) is utilized where the safe-shutdown earthquake (SSE) load appears in the ANSUACI 349-13 load combinations. Load combinations with operating-basis earthquake loads are not applicable.

2.

As previously stated, self-limiting operating thermal loads are not combined with tornado or seismic loads, in accordance withANSUANS 57.9. Page 7-46 ~ ~

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim '3. Since wind loads are developed per ASCE 7-16 [7-69) using ultimate wind speeds, use of a 1.0 load factor on the wind load case is appropriate in the concrete load combinations.

4.

For consistency with the CHB steel design load combinations, crane load (C) is included with normal wind load (W) and seismic load but is neglected with tornado loads (WJ given the aforementioned crane administrative controls for tornado warnings.

5.

For uplift load combinations, 90% of dead load is consid 100% of operating crane loads with a destabilizing ejjj impact, side thrust, and longitudinal traction loads) The following are concrete design load combinatio assumptions, when reduced to contain only the l applicable to CHB concrete structures:

1.

1.4D + Ta

2.

3.

1.2D + 0.8L + l.4C + 1.6

4.

1.2D + J.6L + W + C

5.

6.

7.

m conjunction with . e., crane vertical lions applicable to the design of the overhead bridge cranes are ance withASMENOG-1 Section 4140. The design-basis seismi above is considered in the safe-shutdown earthquake SSE load NOG-1 extreme environmental load combinations. Page 7-47 J_ ~

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 7.5.3.3 CHB Steel Building Structural Analysis 7.5.3.3.1 To evaluate the performance of the CHB steel framing shown in Figures 7-54 through 7-61, the building is modeled in a detailed three-dimensional structural analysis model and subjected to all of the applicable design load cases and load combinations 'defined above in Sections 7.5.3.2.1 and 7.5.3.2.2. The assumption of linear elastic esponse for static, seismic, and tornado wind loads permits separate analysis of each loading condition and superposition of applicable load case member forces and moments to determine total load combination demands for evalu ion vs. code defined member capacities. e three-dimensional finite element analysis TAAD). The STAAD version utilized is the , which is verifled and validated under an t quality program m for the CHB STAAD model is defined with positive.x1" up , and positive Z southward The global boundary, in all static and dynamic loading cases in STAAD consist of e base of each column. Each pinned base restrains the globa nslations, as well as ROTY rotations for analysis stability. The s are modeled at the bottom of column base plate elevation. Local itions applicable to individual members typically involve pinned member e releases (local ROTY and ROTZ) for all beams, vertical braces, and horizontal braces, as well as at the top of columns where they connect to the continuous root truss chords. Page 7-48 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 7.5.3.3.2 The model includes approximately 3100 nodes and 5800 beam elements, with the intent of sufficient refinement to provide an accurate assessment of structure response to static and dynamic loading. The ST AAD beam elements are formulated with six degrees of freedom per node (three translations and three rotations) and with shear deformation effects included in the member stiffness matrix. STAAD utilizes a diagonal, lumped mass matrix approach, with mass terms at all active degrees of freedom. Since dynamic analysis is performed to evaluate the CHB for seismic and tornado missile loading, members with significant transverse loading between points of support (e.g., beams and girders) are subd-ivided into multipl am elements to capture dynamic flexural responses while utilizing the STAA ped mass formulation. At a minimum three intermediate nodes (fou ents) are used for all beams and girders. Member stiffness properties for all rolled shapes section property tables provided in STAAD, wh* as the crane runway girders are manually c trolley members are not modeled in the C bridge is proportionally distributed to the load mass is distributed to the runways accor Other entities modeled only as a lied mass inc elements, such as girts, urlins, e for all steel members in the us (., oisson 's ratio ( v), unit weight r a). See Table 15-2 for the material roperty ormed to determine member forces, column reactions, and to gravity loads, crane operating loads, and wind/tornado (D), crane (C), wind (W), and tornado wind (W J load lion...2 are subdivided into several separate static load case design load combinations that include enveloping directional ate static load cases are modeled and analyzed for structure dead e dead load, crane lifted load, and crane impact loads in eac I, lateral, and longitudinal). With regard to wind load (Jf?, separate es are modeled for each primary direction of wind loading (i.e., +X -X Z, and - , each containing the associated windward, leeward, sidewall, and roo/J ressures. Internal pressures are also addressed in a separate static load case. These are then combined in accordance with theASCE7-16 Directional Procedure, as 'discussed in Section 7.5.3.2. A similar approach is used/or tornado wind pressures, with a separate static load case/or each primary_ direction of wind ressure load (WlJ and/or atmos heric ressure change ~J. Page 7-49 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim Static analysis is also performed for the operating thermal (J'-, 0) load case to evaluate forces induced in the CHB due to restraint of building temperature changes be twee ambient construction and winter or summer operating temperatures, as discussed i~ ection 7.5.3.2.1. Two load cases are developed to apply uniform temperature changes (AT) to all CHB framing equal to + 34°F and -470F, as previously defined rJn accordance with ANSI/ANS 57.9, the resulting forces and moments are combined with gravity load cases within normal operating load combinations, but are not a,plied.[pr extreme environmental conditions. 7.5.3.3.3 Seismic Analysis The seismic response of the CHB is evaluated using mo analysis, in accordance withASCE 43-05 andASCE for the analysis are developed from the site-specif!. PSHAfor the WCS CISF site (discussed in SA se spectrum t response spectra enerated by the Evaluation o So;/ Structure Interaction E Per ASCE 43-05 Section 3.1 and ASCE 4-1 .1 (a), soil-structure interaction ificance ofSSI effects for the (SSI) effects must be considered CHB, an assessment of site soil performed in accordance with calculation ofsoil frequencies ba of the lateral, vertical, torsional, o moment of inertia Ji. erall C t structural frequencies is tion 5. his evaluation entails ee-lf-freedom system consisting ck

• oi and the relevant mass or mass e mass of the embedded CHB foundation is soil spring stiffness terms are calculated in neglected in this accordance w
• determined grade). A mi bearin e ual to di cal ing strain-compatible shear modulus tion of foundation bearing (9 feet below ear wave velocity at the depth of foundation rt/second is assumed. Equivalent rectangular foundation d on the basis of the combined contact areas of the three
• ns as preliminarily sized. As shown in Table 7-42, all ncy s exceed 2, in which case the CHB seismic analysis is

-16 to be performed assuming frxed-base supports. The minimum 7-42 (2.1) pertains to the vertical response. The response 'ed for this ratio is not associated with a dominant mode involving response. The mode involves the response of the loaded crane runway and has a small overall mass participation of approximately 10% in the vertical direction. There are also other modes involving vertical response of the crane system with similar frequencies and mass participation ratios. Page 7-50 ~ ~

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim

7. 5.3.3.4 Tornado Missile Impact Analysis Refer to the discussion of Tornado Loads in Section 7.5.3.2.1 for an introduction to the Tornado Missile Impact Analysis.

The transient dynamic analysis performed in ST AAD utilizes the mode superposition method of calculating structural response at each time step. Similar to the seismic response spectrum analysis, the Load-Dependent Ritz eigensolver is utilized, as it is more effective in capturing high frequency modes important to to nado missile response. A sufficient number of modes are extracted to capt ore than 90% mass participation. A time step of0.0001 seconds is considered e transient analysis, which is well less than 1120th of the shortest structural r eriod of interest, in accordance with industry practice. A constant modal 'Pin

• of 5% is assumed. The impulsive missile loading for the giv.

1 'Pact Zoe is applied as a nodal load with a rectangular load vs. time fun that has a mag equal to that of the calculated impulsive force and a on of0.05 seconds. uration is in accordance with guidance on automob

• nado m
• impacts in 115234, Title I Wind!I'ornado Design Gui for.

Production Reactors, " Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 1993. As maximum member forces are shown to occur within he first secon duration of the transient analy econds. For each impact location of inter static analyses for all other torna D odel is executed to perform C, avity load cases in the tornado load combinations, 'th the rperposition transient analysis for the single automobile imp accordance w

• for all prim combination ion. Member demands are calculated in ions for each tornado missile impact model

~AD model, and the envelope of all load re considered in the member design checks. stee ing is performed in accordance with the requirements o..i , which overlays additional requirements on the provisions oJi This is in general accordance with the NUREG-1567 reference to ich in turn references ANSJ/AISC N690-1984 for steel structur s and design limits. ANSI/A/SC N690 is considered for CHB design ecaus ides specific requirements for safety-related nuclear structures, including ad combinations containing tornado loading. The 2018 version is utilized or compatibility with current national consensus codes and standards roviding equirements.fpr building structures e.g., /BC 2016 andASCE 7-16). ------ Page 7-53

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim v.5.3.4.1 With regard to seismic design, the CHB lateralforce resisting system is evaluated in 'accordance with the design requirements and acceptance criteria given in ASCE '43-05. ASCE 43-05 identifies OCBFs as acceptable structural systems/or use in nuclear facilities, and permits design of steel structures in accordance withLRFD requirements given in AISC specifications (AISC 360 or AISC N690), as modified by the AISC Seismic Provisions (see ASCE 43-05 Section 4.2.4.) Thus, the CHB OCBFs are designed to meet the system, member, and connection requirements given in ANSI/A/SC 341-16, Section Fl. fJ3othASCE43-05 andANSIIAISC 341-16 ensure acceptable s. OCBF systems by requiring design of critical members an seismic demands than those considered for vertical brae design of the CHB OCBFs in accordance withASCE rievelopedfrom the elastic analysis is considered~ connections except vertical brace members. Th zc performance of nections for larger. r design. In the seismic force bersand braces is taken as the elastic seismic deman nergy Absorption Factor (Fµs; see ASC HB to Limit State C, the F µsf actor appli .5 (see ASCE 43-05 Table 5-1). The CHB h fundamental frequencies are less. an the ampli response spectrum; therefore 'hus, des1 ensures that inelastic response u braces, while the columns and be vertical bracing members is ak or soft stories and its celeration region of the design the CHB per ASCE 43-05 1rst occur in the vertical to buckle under the desi n basis seismic loads (t the elas 1c analysis with Fµ = 1.01, g confirms that no applicable strength or 'S excee en the structure is subjected to the design load of strength limit states, the design compares all individual and demands calculated from the design load combination sis model with the corresponding LRFD desig. ance ithANSIIAISC N690-18, member design strengths are 1AISC 360-16 Chapters D throughH, without modification. In or each member and each applicable strength limit statei wher~ Ru,~}lherequited ~trength (109d combination demand), Rn is the nonii,;lal 'Strengl ~ t :is the licable resiStance actoide med in ANSIIAISC 360.. ;J 6. Page 7-54 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim With regard to serviceability, seismic story drifts are confirmed to meet the drift ratio limit specified in ASCE 43-05for concentrically braced frames designed to Limit State C, which is 0. 005. Additionally, the crane runway girders are confirmed to have ateral and vertical deflections less than the serviceability limits specified in CMAA-70 '(L/400for lateral deflection and L/600 for vertical deflection under service level foading conditions. rsTAAD Code Checking, !Member strength design checking is performed in accordance [RFD provisions using the code checking capabilities prov* hecks are executedfor all analyzed members and all de 'demands calculated in each STAAD analysis model. executedto determine gravity, normal wind, ands

• ANSUAISC 360-1~

in ST AAD. Code nd separate models executed to determine loa bination dema combined effects of tornado wind, APC, and ocations considered Within the primary '(ldditional load combinations applicable o 'def1ned with seismic load case demands divi D requires user entry oi all tion ofmember design tr ngth i>f!he modeled! rs, a w-ious parameters def ming the aced length arameter in uts include th supported lengths of member top and bottom.flan es in revaluation oilateral torsional buck/in. member strength checks lorthe demands calculated at each end of every m , as well as at 11 equally-spaced points along the member length (11121h points). T. e maximum Demand/Capacity Ratio (OCR) for any of these points i presentedfor each member in the STAAD postprocessor, alongwiththe governingi foad combination and the governing ANSUAISC 360-16strength equation. The governing OCR for each CHB member is taken as the maximum DCR calculated in all rsTAAD CHB models. Page 7-55 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim rJt is noted that STAAD AISC code checking considers the limiting width-to-thickness (member slenderness) ratios defined for members subjected to axial compression and !fiexure in ANSIIAISC 360-16 Chapter B. However, the seismic ductility and tenderness limits specified in ANSIIAISC 341-16 are not evaluated in ST AAD. In 'accordance withANSIIAJSC 34].. ]6 SectionFJ.5, all OCBFvertical braces are confirmed in separate calculations to be moderately ductile and to have memben slenderness ratios Vr less than 4"-i(&Fy)- 7.5.3.4.2 Conn~ction Desi@ CHB structural steel framing connections utilize shop-weld 'detailing, to minimize field welding and field weld inspe connections is performed in accordance with ANSI/A modified by ANSI/A/SC N690 Chapter NJ, and A J¥.; required. The required strengths of connection design load combinations, including seismic addition to meeting the general requireme. lateral force resisting system connections with the provisions applicable to OCBFs in summa oia?P..licable re uirem ts implement All bolts are high strength lied stre OCBF vertical brace connections is determined usin!sJ h seis v loads, in accordance with A/SC 341-16 Section FL 6a. t is met by desig!!:_ing f._oYF = 1. 0 seismic demands in ASCE43-05. 'ded connections are detailed and installed in accordance with the re uirements oiAWS Dl.1 and Dl.8 as re uired Column base connections and splices are designed for the required axial shear, 'Clnd exural!JJrces de.flned in ANSIIAJSC 34].. ]6 SectionsD2.5 and D2.6. The available strengths of concrete and reieforcing steel utilized in column base 'anchorage to thefpundation are determined in accordance with AC] 349-13. Page 7-56 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 7.5.3.5 Reinforced Concrete Structural Analysis and Design Analysis and design of the CHB reinforced concrete foundations is performed in accordance with the requirements of AC! 349-13, considering all design load combinations defined in Section 7.5.3.2.3. This is in general accordance with the NUREG-1567 reference to ANSI/ANS 57.9, which in turn references AC! 349-85 for concrete load combinations and design limits. Design ofCHB column baseplate anchorage is in accordance with the requirements of AC! 349-13 A endix D. Material properties considered in foundation analysis and des.* trengths for structural concrete, reinforcing steel, anchor r.. (utilized for baseplate shear lugs) are summarized in Ta considered in foundation design are those specified i otechnical report cSAR Attachment E). This includes an allowable b z g pressu 000 lb/ft2 and subgrade modulus of 150 lb/in3. As stated in th technical repo earing pressure is permitted to be increase voo lb/fr (33% incre combinations that include transient loads ismic, and tor ado loads. The unit weight of structural fill considere stability calculations i assumed to be 110 lblft3* oundation, which is --=--- nd west strip mats have a an the center strip mat, while th d lo 1th fewer crane columns than th of 1. 5 is required for sliding and

• ity load combination containing normal wind

.2.3 (l,oad combination #6). For the seismi nd #8 in Section 7.5.3.2.3), the minimum ng is 1.1. This is in accordance with ASC B verhead cranes can withstand design-basis seismic loading and age ITS equipment, the cranes are analyzed and designed a e-proof cranes in accordance with ASME NOG-1. NUREG-0800 section 14.C, states that an acceptable approach for ensuring ---- e safety is to comply with NUREG-0554, and that design in accordanc - criteria for Type 1 cranes is an acceptable method ofcompliance witH WUREG-0554. Type 1 criteria require the cranes to be designed to ensure that an~ credible failure involving a single component does not result in loss of capability to stop and hold the critical load. In the case of the CHB overhead cranes, the critical oad is conservatively_ considered as the rated crane ca acify_ 130 tons. Page 7-57

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim rJn accordance withASMENOG-1-2015 Section 4150 {7-70], seismic demands on th cranes are determined from modal response spectrum analysis ofa three-dimensional mite element model meeting all requirements of Section 4153, including requirement f or model geometry, boundary conditions, and trolley and hook positions. Input to the esponse spectrum analysis consists of broadened in-structure response spectr (ISRS) computed in each ofthree directions at the crane support level of the CHB. 'he crane-level ISRS are developed from coupled analysis of the building and crane, in accordance with the requirements of ASCE 4-16 {7-'71 J, Section 3. 7. For response spectrum analysis of the crane in the vertical direction, the cran ode! includes th mass of the credible critical load, defined by NOG-1 as the li robability of occurrence in conjunction with the Design igreater than or equal to 10-7. For analysis ofCHB ITS eriod is 10,000 years (lxl0-4 annual probability) a e ex foad lifts per year, per crane is approximately 20 "f an assu ours per lift. As the combined probabilities o cranes lifting a onjunction with the DBE exceeds 10-:-7~ the load is considered as credible critical load for seismic analysis of the er For re se spectrum analysis in the orizontal directions, response of the lifte addressed in accordance witli OG-1 Section 4153.3 criteria/or separation n thefrequency of pendulum otion and the fundamental hor

• tal frequenc1 he crane. All operational hoo'l<l ositions are considered when the J!.en re uencY... oithe li ted load.

trolley and bridge, lifted loads, ed in ordance withNOG-1 Sectio loads and seismic loads are developed in ith the DBE seismic loads discussed above ke (SSE) load case in the extreme --- ussed above, the credible critical load I!! oad. expbsions are not considered credible since insufficient are present to initiate an event that woukl resuh in the destruction uring operations, the amount of flammable liquids that are in the CHB w clministratively controlled to ensure the amount of flammable liquids is .:. :. e*ta

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~:~Ai~iff~?~q~~,iafW N:if.ifJMJJ. TiiJtllMA"lfNf"', .*. C'.** 1n combination with fuel

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.t'~,.. '!'/~,;... ~;.,-~~~*'..V',~ ;_,_.-;,, ,-" - v"'~:,;-!is,- ;. 1- ~--.,-*:c-*~~"'.. f) limitations and a fire suppression system, the fire hazard for the building is adequately mitigated (see WCS CISF SAR Section 3.3.6). 7.5.3.9 O:ff.Site Accidents 0:ff.site accidents are addressed in WCS CISF SAR Section 12.2.2. Page 7-58

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 7-58 Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), "Consistent Site-Response/Soil-Structure Interaction Analysis and Evaluation," Jlllle 2009. 7-59 Deleted. 7-60 Deleted. 7-61 ANSI/AISC N690-06, Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Steel Safety-Related Structures in Nuclear Facilities." 7-62 ANSI/AISC 360-05, Specification for Structural Steel Buildings " 7-63 APA Consulting Computer Code SASSI, Version 1.0. 7-64 ASCE 7-10, "Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and 7-65 AN SYS Computer Code and User's Manual, Version 7-66 Calcu1ation AREVATNOOl-CALC-002, Rev. 0 " o Structure Inte c TN Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installatio FSI) Concrete Pa TX." 7-67 Calcu1ation AREVATNOOl-CALC-001, Re Andrews, Texas." 7-68 J~li~flfl:::l*li :l<;Jefle Requireme 731Commentary." \\,-.""~"'-'""'~ 7-69 17-70 7-11 -Related Nuclear Structures, "American. Page 7-123

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WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim able 1-41 ask Handling Building Primary Framing Member Sizes Member S(ze Class Page 7-166 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim Cask Handling Building Evaluation of Soil and Structural Dominant rFre uencies

Mode, rRocking in E-W direction (about Z)

~oil Frequency, !sou Hz)

18. 7.

18.1 Page 7-167 "CHB Fixed-Base Dominant Frequency, fcnn(Hz)

3.

All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

5.3 4.5

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim igure 1-54 View of Cask Handling Building Structural Steel Framing Page 7-221 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report t HJ i I = = t , I ~t = I ~ = t~-G".J!l._ II II I II I I I I I I I I I .. I 113'-G" M'-G" J:i:... 15"-G" JL ,r-G"

111-G" IT-G" I

I m,.,..., I I I I I I I I I I I I I !Figure 7.55 Structural Steel Framin Page 7-222 tT-G" <)) All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP*7*12 Revision 3 Interim I I II~ 1 I I I I 1 't I I I I I I I I I I l I I -t-G- I I I 1 ¢) <;) Ievation I 00' *0

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report ..l.., __ ~ j C 0 0 1~"'1' _ 29Pi.cue,,*""'*n... _:_ ..J"'- ,... ~

• • 15'-0"'*Y,4' Wl*

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W,2 Cl ~~;!' W1!1,, Page 7-223 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12 Revision 3 Interim M

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report ' A 'BJ ~ D I r

_2SP...-ase 1r.v

• 27,v :;_

_r,o;_ 2 SP~G 1S-O"*l0'-0" D.! __ySPACE501 1'.Q"*t,O"'-- ..:J<r_ --r+--. Page 7-224 r,:, 1 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12 Revision 3 Interim ll ~J I K M I J

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report 25'.r 25'.r 25'.r l + ~~L112'.r W14 = ~ J 11 J l *~~....,. W14 = ~

• ~*2'-T WH w,,

= w,, = 0 a 0 l *~-*2" l W14 = w,, = Wl4 = ta SWAY 8AAC1NG TOS + a.,>>.r I WH -= w,, w,, 0 ~ - ta .po ~ wi.' '~ = !!.~. W\\4 =- I * ~T-T I = = i i ... i BOT BASE Pl FIMISII FLOOR TOC El. IOG'.r Revision 3 Interim i 17S',(J' 25'.r 2$'q 25'.r 21.3.545, TYP. ~~J,I 1\\.# ~ ~ w,, TOS = El.142'-T+ 0 Q ~ TOS = I WI* = 1 tal a,.-T+ I WH w,, '° TOS -= 1 = I n,JO'.r+ I?.. ~ WH WI*

!j - I n.~<;.+ I

~ ii: ta !! -= 'l;:,~'{P" ~ I igure 7-58 'ng Arrangement, Typ_ica/ Section at Main Building Column Line gooking West) Page 7-225 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report + ~30'-2" 1 WII = 0 Wtl W11 a.m tl'-0" - 0 = 1 wii" 11'4' c:, Revision 3 Interim 5 r EST. TOP Of" CRANE COi. 1*-e-(TYP.1 WI = 0 = i c:,' <P(J ~, c:,' ~ igure 1-59., __ 1!14'

_j W11

-= w,, = T I l?t "t ~ o I ~ - \\ . ~ i I I? raming Arrangement, TY, ical Section at Crane Column Line (Looking West) Page 7-226 El.. i~-+ a,;~ + TOS I? a130'-r + l:I n,i,?:, + I? Ii: All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report IIOT BASE Pl Revision 3 Interim 14 SPACU O 12'.r

• 175'.o" 2S.O-Figure 7-60

~~~i'~~lll raming Arrangement, Typ_ica/ Section at Wind Column Line ooking WesO Page 7-227 IIOT Of BASE Pl All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Fac ility Safety Analysis Report

t.

H = l 1 ~ i I t Cask Handling B ~ I C O IJ! 01 ti 0 I I.I J IC l Ill

1!1'-4' J.'E-1174'

...Z.'E-1S',O' J.'E- ...,O' _,l.:'l_. 15*-4'" = ,r.v __ 174' _ 1T..V 'J/1.ff' 17-V Figure 1~61 tructural Steel Framing Arrangement, Plan View at Roof Top Cltord ottom Chord Similar) Page 7-228 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12 Revision 3 Interim

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Fac ility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim fFigure 7-62 3D STAAD.Pro Finite Element Model Page 7-229 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report low-frequency ~ (Predominantly out-of-phase response) I~ m~~-frequency r--> j ~ high-frequency 1 (Trans1t1on ~rom out-of-1 (In-phase pseudo-I phase to m-phase I tati* ) s c response response) I I esp_onse Sp_ectrum, Page 7-230 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12 Revision 3 Interim

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 5.1.5 L Because only previously loaded canisters will be accepted at the WCS CISF the fulhwing topics identified in ISG-15 are remain W1changed from what bas been previously reviewed and approved by the US NRC in the applications incorporated by reference listed in Section 1.6. Material Properties Weld Design and Inspection Galvanic and Corrosive Reactions Bolt Applications Protective Coatings and Surface Treatments Neutron Shielding Materials Materials fur Criticality Control Seals Low Temperature Fuel CJadding, incruding burnup and cla limits Prevention of Oxidation D*(;U.1..1"""'~ Page 15-3 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim 15.2.2.2 AHSM The reinforced concrete AHSM is designed to meet the requiremmts of ACI 349-97. Load combinations specified in ANSI 57.9-1984, Section 6.17.3.1 are used for combining nonnal operating, off:.normal, and accident loads for the AHSM. 15.2.2.3 HSM Model 102 The HSM Model 102 reinforced concrete is designed to meet the of ACI 349-85 and ACI 349-97 Editions, respectively. Load combinaf specified in ANSI 57.9-1984, Section 6.17.3.1 are used for combining normal p ating, off-normal, and accident loads for the HSM. 15.2.2.4 NAC-MPC VCC The American Concrete Institute Specificatio govern the N AC-MPC system VCC design 18 (1995) 15.2.2.5 NAC-UMS VCC The American Concrete Institute govern the NAC-UMS system 49 (1985) and ACI 318 (1995) ncb.. V>ta,r', n, respectively. 15.2.2.6 MAGNASTOR VCC 15.2.3 15.2.4 tions ACI-349 (1985) and ACI-318 (1995) design and construction, respectively. and NUREG-0612 govern the NAC-MPC,NAC-UMS and ansfer cask designs, operations, fabrication, testing, andling Building steel structures will be constructed to ~~~ Materials for the Cask Building Overhead Cranes will adhere to acture toughness requirements. The reinforced concrete structures in ndling Building are designed to AC! 349-13 and constructed to AC Page 15-6 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Coefficient of Thermal Expansion, a (x 10-6 in/in/°F) Density (lbm'in3) 15.3.4 Cas~ Handling Building Revision 3 Interim 5.9 0.29 1fl'h?:J~il$]f1iJ{t/i'iJYr.,g_.:jJ.tiil<Jing ifriJtJj/L~it/Jtf!e f1>>e Pf ret,Jf pr~!!,'CJ!!f Prete for foundatio 'aniJ,llah -:and titural steeltnempersfor 41/_ove-~otfii!,i,:;g;ture. The specifications and details that apply to these materials are

• n in Table 15-2. J Page 15-10 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim Table 15-1 Material Specifications/or Cask Handling Building Structure Structural Element Bolts for primary framing connections Page 15-12 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12

WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Revision 3 Interim Table 15-2 Material Properties for Cask Handling Building Structural Analysis and Design Structural Element !Property, "Structural Steel Me#Jhers dnd Plates l5.5 x 10-6 in/iin°F 0.150 kip7fi3 Page 15-13 All Indicated Changes are in response to RAI NP-7-12}}