IR 05000348/1980034

IE Insp Repts 50-348/80-34 & 50-364/80-40 on 801006-10.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Planning,Coordination W/Offsite Support Groups & Emergency Facilities Equipment & Procedures

ML20002B275
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	10/30/1980
From:	Jenkins G, Perotti D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20002B269	List: IR 05000348/1950034 IR 05000348/1980034
References
50-348-80-34, 50-364-80-40, NUDOCS 8012110222
Download: ML20002B275 (10)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:g . -

,

8 ) o# % p

1. o

. UNITED STATES .-

• ,,

NUC' ?AR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

a$ REGION ll Q,

• f 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W, SUITE 3100 '

1. 4 g*

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-348/80-34 and 50-364/80-40 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35202 Facility Name:.Farley Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos. NPF-2 and CPPR-86 Inspection at Far ey Site near Ashford, Alabama Inspector: % /d 30 fd . J. P rydtD Da(e Si(gned k' - /6 36 M Approved by: f, tu , G.~ I{. ' A s, Section Chief, FFMS Branch Dat(e Si'gned SUMMARY Inspection on October 6-10,'1980 Areas Inspected-This routine announced preoperational inspection involved 33 inspector-hours on site in the areas of emergency planning, including coordination with offsite support groups, emergency facilities equipment and procedures, emergency training, follow-up on previous inspection findings and follow-up on IE Bulletin.

Results Of the five areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

. s012116' - . .

et; ~ - > , -2- >, DETAILS 1. - Persons Contacted Licensee Employees W. G. Hairston, Plant Manager J. Woodard,-Assistant Plant Manager

• K. McCracken, Technical Superintendent
• C. Nesbitt, Chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor
• W. Bayne, Laergency Planning Coordinator D. Herrin, Generating Plant Engineer II

~D. Mansfield, Start-up Superintendent

• L'. Williams, Training Superintendent J' Campbell, Corporate Emergency Planning Coordinator

.

• J. Kahle, Quality Assurance Engineer
• G. M. Grove, Quality Assurance Engineer
• H. M. McClellan, Generating Plant Engineer I L. Enfinger, Administrative Superintendent W. Grijentag, Chemistry and Health Physics Foreman Other licensee employees contacted included 2 technicians, I operator, and 1 office personnel.
• Attended exit interview.

2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 10, 1980, with.

those persons indicated in Paragraph I above. The.icensee acknowledged tFa inspector's comments regarding the outstanding items pertaining to Lait 2.

The licensee made the following commitments, via telecon on October 15, 1980: (1) Training on the chlorine repair kit and orientation on hazards of chlorine gas leaks would be completed by December 31, 1980 - Paragraph 7.d.

and (2)'an evaluation would be completed by December 15, 1980, on RCP-2S Post Accident Sampling Procedures, personnel to be trained, retraining requirements and when the training would be completed for the remaining Chemistry and Health Physics personnel - Paragraph 7.h.

3.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

4.

Inspection Criteria This inspection was conducted-against criteria which are not yet final.

Changes to Title 10, Part 50, Code of Federal Regulations, were published on ' August ' 19, 1980 (45FR55402) and will become effective on November 3, 1980. NUREG 0654/ FEMA-REP-1 was published January 1980, for interim use [[:

. _. - . -3- . , ' and comment and is currently being revised, to be published in final form in the near future. The Farley Nuclear Station Emergency Plan, Rev. 4, submitted August 13, 1980, hereafter referred to as the Emergency Plan, is currently under review by the NRC Emergency Preparedness Licensing Branch, which may require changes or Odditions to the Emergency Plan prior to the publication of a Safety Evaluation Report, or approval of the plan. The items identified in this report are not to be considered as encompassing all required corrective actions necessary to satisfy interim or final criteria for the emergency preparedness program at Farley Nuclear Station.

5.

Joint State of Alabama / Alabama Power Company Meeting to Discuss Farley Nuclear Station Emergency Exercise A meeting chaired by Alabama State Civil Defense was held on October 6, 1980, at the Houston County Emergency Operations Center in Dothan, Alabama.

In attendance were representatives from Alabama Civil Defense, Georgia Civil Defense, Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV (FEMA), Houston County Civil Defense, Alabama Radiological Health, Florida Burecu of Disaster Preparedness, Florida Radiological Health Services, Alabama Power Company Corporate Office, Farley Nuclear Station and NRC Region II. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the joint emergency planning exercise scheduled for November 19-20, 1980, at the Farlcy site. The exercise will be preceeded by a public meeting in Columbia, Alabama, on November 18, 1980. During the discussions, the levels of participation of the States of Georgia (Early County) and Florida were addressed. Federal representatives indicated that since Early County, Georgia, was within the ten-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), full participation, as required by the exercise scenario, was expected; however, the State of Florida would be expected to carticipate in a lesser role.

The inspector pointed out that the licensee's primary responsibility for coordinating exercise evolutions was with the State of Alabama and local agencies within the ten-n.ile EPZ.

The exercise scenario outline presented by the licensee's site representa-tives, involved a loss of coolant accident resulting in a site emergency and a subsequent stabilization of conditions on the first day, then a deterioration of conditi:ns resulting in a General Emergency on the second day. The inspector was ssted whether the site would have to go through the actual evacuation / accountability processes on both days since a large construction force would be on site. The inspector replied that a satis-facto ry evacuation / accountability on the first day would adequately demonstrate the licensee's capability to carry out these protective actions, and that a site evacuation could be simulated on the second day. At the conclusion of the meeting the inspector requested that the NRC be furnished a more detailed scenario, and agreed to furnish the licensee with a list of NRC personnel who would act as observers during the exercise.

6.

Coordination With Offsite Support Groups Section II.C.1 of the Farley Emergency Plan, Rev. 4, specifies that a.

written agreements have been reached with DOE Savannah River Operations Office, State of Alabama, State of Georgia and State of Florida.

k - l

em. . -. . .. - . '. ' -4-During a previous inspection (Reference IE Report 50-348/79-38-01) the - inspector identified the written agreement with the State of Georgia as an open item after determining that no written agreement with Georgia had been established.

b.

The inspector discussed the written agreements with state and loca' agencies with a licensee representative. The inspector asked about the written agreement with the State of Georgia and about the current agreement letters which should be updated for Southeast Alabama Medical Center - 1972, University of Alabama Medical Center - 1972, and Dothan Fire Department - 1978. The inspector wa: informed that a draft of.

the Georgia written agreement was reviewed and sent back with comments to.the Georgia Department of Natural Resources a few weeks ago. Prior to the exit meeting, the inspector reviewed documentation which verified that the original contract with the University of Alabama Medical Center was set up for an initial term of ten years commencing October 26, 1976.

The inspector informed the licensee that the updating of the agreement c.

letters with Southeast Alabama Medical Center and Dothan Fire Department would now be included in the previously identified open item regarding the written agreement with Georgia (50-348/79-36-01, 50-364/80-EP-03).

7.

Follow-up on Previously Identified Open Items a.

Item 50-348/%-11-01, 50-364/80-EP-01 pertains to a concern in the verifici. ton of accountability that was identified by an NRC inspector dur%g an evacuation exercise held on May 27, 1980.

During this ir.spectien the inspector reviewed the 1980 Emergency Plan Drill Evalua- ' ion, dated July 2, 1980, which recommended that terminology used in . reporting personnel accountability should be clarified to minimize confusion and the number of calls required to report the accountability.

From discussions with licensee representatives, the inspector determined that Emergency Implementing Procedure, EIP-10, Evacuation and Person;al Accountability, had not been revised as yet.

However, a licensee representative stated that initial input for the revision would be prepraed by October 15, 1980.

At the exit meeting the inspector acknowledged that most of the EIPs, including EIP-10, were currently under review and revision to conform to the new criteria. The inspector ir. formed the licensee that this matter would remain an open item pending revision to EIP-10.

b.

Item 50-348/80-11-02, 50-364/80-EP-02 pertains to a communication problem between the offsite emergency monitoring team and the Technical Support Center (TSC) that was identified by an NRC inspector during an evacuation exercise held on May 27, 1980. During this inspection the inspector reviewed the 1980 Emergency Plan Drill Evacuation, dated July 2,1980, which recommended that communications between the control room and the radiation monitoring team should be improved. The inspector also reviewed Rev. 4, EIP-4, Chemistry and Health Physics Support to Y .i

__ _ . . . -5- .

the Emergency Plan, which requires the survey team to relay data to the TSC via radio. The inspector acknowledged that this step will improve the communication technique for getting survey data from the field to the Emergency Director at the TSC.

The inspector informed the licensee that this matter f.s closed.

c.

Item - 50-348/79-36-02, 50-364/80-EP-04 pertains to inventory of food supplies in the control room. The inspector verified that EIP-16, Emergency Equipment and Supplies, now includes routine inventory of food supplies in the control room. The inspector informed the licensee that this matter is closed.

d.

. Item 50-348/79-36-03, 50-364/80-EP-05 pertains to training of chemistry technicians on the chlorine repair kit and an orientation in the hazards of chlorine gas leaks.

Through discussions with training representatives the inspector determined that this specific training had not been conducted as yet. From a review of Administrative Procedure-AP-45, Training Program, Appendix F, the inspector determined that the chlorine training had been included in the initial training program for chemistry personnel. However, the initial training phase covers a span of three years and the inspector expresced a concern that this training should be accomplished as soon as possible. Ac the exit meeting the inspector stated that the training should be completed before the end of the year. On October 15, 1980, the inspector received a commitment from the plant manager that the training would be done by December 31, 1980. This matter remains an open item pending completion of training and review of training records.

Item 50-348/79-07-01, 50-364/80-EP-08 pertains to including the routing e.

of revisions - to EIPs to the appropriate site personnel under the provisions of Administrative Procedure AP-27.

During a previous inspection, the inspector expressed a concern about the distribution of revisions to EIPs to appropriate personnel (i.e., liceased operators, chemistry and health physics personnel, etc.) in a timely manner.

During this inspection, the inspector verified that AP-27, Paragraph 7.e, contains provisions for routing of EIP revisions to the appro-priate personnel.

The inspector reviewed selected entries in the procedure change notice log which verified that EIP revisions were being routed in accordance with the provisions of AP-27. The inspector informed the licensee that this matter was closed.

8.

Follow-up on IE Bulletin 79-18, Audibility Problems Encountered on Evacuation of Personnel From High Noise Areas The inspector verified, through document review and discussions with a.

licensee representatives, that a survey for Unit I was completed and a production change request (PCR No. 79-566) was submitted and approved to correct the identified audibility deficiencies. A licensee repre-sentative stated that the parts to be installed were on site. APCo letter of December 12, 1979, in response to IEB 79-18, states that { " Implementation will begin as soon as design and materials are available.

Inaccessible areas will be corrected at the first refueling outage following receipt of design and materials (anticipated to be October 1980)."

- -. -. - -. ..

r . . . -6- .- b.

The inspector reviewed Unit 2 Preoperational Test Procedure No. 015-5 001, Communications. The objective of the procedure was to demonstrate tne operability and effectiveness of the Plant Emergency Alarm System.

Test Data Deficiency Sheet No. 2 identified that the Plant Emergency Alarm failed to be adequate in some areas of the plant. Subsequently operating change request, OCR 2-3847, was issued and answered by 2 BE-848-1 to correct the problem.

The system is to be retested, following corrective actions, during Phase III testing under Procedure ETP-96.

c.

The inspector informed the licensee that this matter would be considered an open item for both Units 1 and 2 pending completion and review of Units 1 and 2 corrective actions and review of Unit 2 retest ETP-96 (79-PU-18).

9.

Emergency Facildies, Equipment and Procedures a.

Unit 2 Process and Area Monitoring Systems - From discussions with licensee start-up personnel and review of previous inspections (Reference IE Reports 50-364/80-17, 50-364/80-18 and 50-364-80-35) the inspector determined that installation nd preoperational testing of the area and process monitoring systems was not completed.

The inspector informed the licensee that with one exception, al emergency-type radiation monitors identified in Appendix C of the Emergency Plan apparently were being reviewed by other inspectors from NRC Region II.

The containment gaseous monitor (R-12) has not been reviewed as yet.

The inspector informed the licensee that this matter is identified as an open item against Unit 2 only, pending completion and review of the required precperational tests and verification by an inspector of the readouts in the control room (50-364/80-40-01).

b.

Hot Shutdown Panel Licensee representatives from the start-up group informed the inspector that system preoperational tests completed during hot functional testing phase verified the control of vital components of the particular system from the hot shutdown panel.

However, turnover of the hot shutdown panel to power production had not yet been completed. Addi-tionally, the inspector identified six procedures that had not yet been placed at the panel - EIP-8 and 18, UDP-2.1, S0P 2.3 and STP 29.1 and 29.2.

These procedures are similar to those in place at Unit I hot shutdown panel, with inventory control under the provisions of EIP-16.

The inspector informed the licensee that this matter is identified as an open item against Unit 2, pending final turnover of the panel to power productiou, placement of required procedures at the panel, and revision to EIP-16 to include routine inventory of Unit 2 shutdown panel procedures (50-364/80-40-02).

. _ -.

.-. _ _ _ _ _ - .. .

i-7-r.

, c.

Emergency Kits (1) During a previous inspection (Reference IE Report No. 50-348/79-36) emergency kits and equipment were inspected and verified at the main control room, first aid room, alternate control room, plant emergency vehicle,.switchhouse, and medical center. During this inspection the emergency kits and equipment at the Health Physics office, radiation monitoring kit, ambulance kit and fire kit at the Central Security Control (CSC), four selected stretcher ! cabinet locations, service building maintenance shops and self-containe/ breathing apparatus (SCBA) at the auxiliary building entryway were inspected and verified to be available and operable by 'the inspector.

Types of emergency equipment selected for inspection included respirators, SCBA, communication equipment, self-reading pocket dosimeters and dosimeter chargers, survey meters and air samplers. With two exceptions, indicated below, the equipment and supplies met the requirements of Appendix A to the Emergency Plan and equipment inventory lists in EIP-16.

(2). The matter of maintaining silver zeolite cartridges in tue radia-tion monitoring kit stored in the CSC is discussed in Paragraph 9.g. below.

(3) The matter of equipment and supplies at the near-site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and inventory of same is discussed in Paragraph 9.f., below.

d.

Operations Support Center (OSC) Section I.7 of the Emergency Plan identifies the control room, central security control, service building auditorium and maintenance shop as Operations Support Centers, Section 'I.6 also identifies these same locations as assembly areas for all plant personnel. Section VI.B.1 of the Emergency Plan describes the OSC to which the various members of the -Emergency Organization will report.

Section V.C.3 of the Emergency Plan describes the protective features and emergency equipment, if any,.for each of the designated OSCs and also identifies the switch-house as the alternate OSC.

The inspector reviewed four of the five designated OSCs and - selected EIPs, :ad verified that these centers were established as specified in the Emergency Plan.

e.

Technie Support Center (TSC) m The inspector reviewed the designated interim TSC and noted that there was not enough space for five key members of the Emergency Organization to function effectively as required by Section VI.B.1 of the Emergency Plan.

In addition, no radio was present in the TSC. EIP-4, Step 4.3.6 requires the survey team to relay data to the TSC via radio. It was pointed out to the inspector that a radio was available nearby in a room within the control room complex. However, this room serves as the Security Central Alarm Station (CAS) and is under security access L. - >

, .-- _ - --

, c % - - -8- . X control. The inspector questioned - the availability and range of the - < - CAS radio ;in ~ communicating with. Emergency Honii.uring Teams sin the.

field. tan" attempt ~ was made.to contacc an environmental survey: team which-was in the field at the. time in a radio equipped vehicle. When no-contact was made,:a licensee representative stated the vehicle'was

probably'out ofJrange. At -the exit' meeting the inspector identified ~ ' the TSC as an open item (50-364/80-40-03).

. ' - f.

. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).

.The inspector reviewed the designated interim EOF, the start-up-office, and ' noted that the facility.did not have ' provisions for contacting offsite monitoring teams in the field; EIPs, maps, etc., as required by Appendix E of.the plan; no status board, visual aids; and no back-up _ communication ~ system.. The licenseen acknowledged the inspector's comments and stated that the preparation of tae interim EOF was.being worked on.

The Inspector pointed. out that final TSC and EOF were-dated requiremeats with facility design to be submitted to NRC by January 1,.1981, and full implementation of the updated facility.by April 1,.1982.

The inspector informed the licensee that the interim EOF was an open item. (50-364/80-40-04).

g.

Environmental Monitoring Facilities and Equipment - As required by NUREG 0654, Part II, Section' I.9, the Emergency Pla;- Section V1.D.3 describes the capability of the Emergency Monitoring..am to measure radioiodine in-the presence of noble gas and background radiation to - as low as 5 x 10 a Ci/cc. However, one important component of the air p sampling equipment, a silver zeolite cartridge, was~ missing from~ the Emergency Monitoring kits at the CSC when inspected cn October 7, 1980.

It was explained to the-inspector that these cartridges were relatively expensive and would be issued at the time the Emergency-Monitoring Teams (EMT) were dispatched to-the field. The inspector pointed.out ' the need for maintaining this equipment all in.one place so as to. preclude any delays in initial rapid determination of offsite concentrations of radioiodine. The inspector asked about the procedu're used in the sampling and measuring.of radioiodine in the field and training of required EMT personnel. The inspector-was informed that no procedure or training requirement had been established. At the , exit-meeting the inspector informed the licensee that this matter was an-open Item (50-364/80-40-05).

h.

Post-Accident Sampling As required by NUREG 0654, Part II, Section I.2, the Emergency Plan, i Section VI.D.1 describes the capability for obtaining and measuring i reactor coolant, containment atmosphere and plant vent stack to assess j the' severity ~of core damage and potential' radiological ~ consequences - using.the procedures.-outlined in RCP-25, Chemistry and Health Physics Activities During~a Radiological Accident (Short-Term). RCP-25 includes 15 different Chemistry and Health Physics Procedures to be used following an, :a ccident.' From discussions with licensee representatives-' the ' inspector determined that the equipment needed for these analyses was , - L '

g av . ., - d-9-e . .available and'in most cases was that used in the normal day-to-day ~ operations in the C&HP group. From a review of.the &HP Qualifica-C . tion Status Log Book, the inspector identified C&HP. personnel who had not been ' qualified.on' RCP-25. The inspector was. informed that this group ~ included ten new personnel, six chemistry technicians, one counting. room technician and one individual employed by Chem-Nuclear, Inc. The inspector was unable identify which C&HP personnel were n required to be ' qualified in the individual RCP-25 procedures. The inspector stated thsu an evaluation should be made as to the ^&HP personnel' required to be trained in the various procedures within RCP-25, retraining requirements and 'when initial training would be conducted for ~ the - remaining personnel.

On October 15, 1980, the inspector received.a commitment from the plant manager that the evaluation would ~be completed. by December 15, 1980. This matter was identified by the inspector as an open item-(50-364/80-40-06).

i.

LEmergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EIP) - The inspector discussed EIPs currently in use with the Emergency Planning Coordinator. The inspector.was informed that with few exceptions, all the EIPs are now - under review and will be revised to implement the Emergency F]an. In - some cases new procedures will be established. The inspector informed the licensee that since all the EIPs were under review and major revisions would ensue, no evaluation could be made as to their adequacy.

The inspector informed the licensee that the matter of 'EIPs would' be considered an open item-pending review and revision of existing EIPs and - preparation of new EIPs to comply with new emergency planning - criteria (50-364/80-40-07).

10.

Emergency Plan Training En.ergency Plan training was discussed briefly with licensee representatives.

As yet no training schedule was set for training in the Emergency Plan and EIP revisions. The inspector informed the licensee that this area would be an open item and -that the training program should encompass training for all individuals / groups specified in NUREG 0654, Part II, Section 0.4 (50-364/ 80-40-08).

11.

Review of Emergency Team Staffing During Implementation of the Farley Site Strike Contingency Plan - Week of October 6-10, 1980 At approximately 11:45 a.m. on October 8, 1980, the Earley Site Strike a.

Contingency Plan was implemented because of a work stoppage involving maintenance and operations. personnel and laborers assigned to the C&HP Department. At this time some C&HP personnel were reassigned work in the Maintenance Department because of'the manpower shortage felt as a result of the work' stoppage. The plant shift fire brigade inclodes-l one C&HP technician, and the Emergency Monitoring Team which is identified by Paragraph I.C.4 of the ~ Emergency Plan, Rev. 3, dated December ~ 31, 1979, as a C&HP technician or qualified vendor technician serving as team leader and any plant employee or qualified vendor personnel serving as his assistant.

i

- -- g._ _ . . , -.

-10-b.

The inspector discussed the manning of the fire brigade and the emergency-monitoring team (EMT) with licensee supervisory personnel and reviewed C&HP shift schedules to verify that.the requirements of the Emergency Plan were met under~ the conditions present at the site during-the implementation of the contingency plan.- The inspector was informed that-the normal shift fire brigade includes a fire team leader (shift supervisor) and four fire ' fighters (ore security guard, one C&HP - technician, one auxiliary operator, (AO) and one equipment operator, (EO)). Two positions were affected by the work stoppage - A0 and E0.

The remaining three positions continued to be manned from the designated groups. The inspector was informed that the A0 and E0 positions would be filled by licensed operators who were qualified fire fighters (shift supervisors and foremen). The inspector asked about the manning of the EMT. The inspector was.aformed that each crew had qualified C&HP technicians.

The inspector reviewed a rearranged C&HP shif t schedule based on three eight-hour shifts which had at least one qualified EMT leader on each crew.

c.

_The work stoppage ended on Friday morning, October 10, 1980.

The inspector determined that during the period of October. 8-10, 1980, the emergency response capability for each shift had apparently been maintained.

. u__ }}