IR 05000348/1980036
| ML20008E804 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1981 |
| From: | Andrews D, Jenkins G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20008E803 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-80-36, 50-364-80-48, NUDOCS 8103090755 | |
| Download: ML20008E804 (7) | |
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UNITED STATES
' ~g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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E REGION ll g
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101 MARIETTA ST N.W.. SulTE 3100
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos. 50-348/80-36 and 50-364/80-48
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Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35202
Facility Name: Farley Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8 Inspection at Farley Units 1 and 2 Inspector:
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Ab c[/
e D. L. Andrews D4te Signed Accompanying Personnel:
G.R. Jenkins M. J. Gaitanis J. Sears P. P. Psomas i
B. Zalcman D. J. Perrotti M. L. Smith 1/8/
Approved by:..
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'G. R. J s, Section Chief, FF&MS Branch Date Signed Inspection on November 17-21, 1980 Areas Inspected This special, announced inspection involved 188 inspector-hours on site in the area of a Coordinated Licensee, State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Exercise.
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Results l
In the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. P. Mcdonald, Vice President Nuclear Generation
- J. R. Campbell, Emergency Planning Coordinator
- H. O. Thrash, Manager, Nuclear Generation
- W. G. Hairston, Plant Manager
- K. W. McCracken, Technical Sun rintendent
- C. D. Nesbitt, Chemistry c '.sealth Physics Supervisor W. R. Bayne, Emergency P1-Coordinator Other licensee empioyees contacted included eight technicians, ten operators, four r.iechani c s,
four security force members, and three office personnel.
Other Organizations J. F. Hill, Georgia Civil Defense O. L. Oakes, Alabama Dept. of Civil Defense
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J. L. McNees, Alabama Dept. of Public Health J. V Aldridge, Houston and Henry Counties Civil Defense
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J. L. tucnardson, Federal Emergency Management Agency h.
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NRC Resident Inspector
- W. H. Bradford
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- J. P. Mul key
- Attended exit interview
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2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 20, 1980.
The exit interview was held concurrently with the critique of the emergency exercise.
In addition to those persons indicated in para-graph 1. above the exit interview / critique was attended by approximately
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26 other licensee employees.
Significant concerns discussed included the inadequacies of the Technical Support Center (paragraph 5 below)
and the transfer of functional control of offsite activities from the Technical Support Center to the Emergency Operations Facility (paragraph 10below).
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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2 4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
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The interim TSC, located in two offices adjacent to the control room, was utilized by the Emergency Director and his staff during the exercise to provide control and direction of plant operations and initial notifi-cation to offsite agencies.
The TSC was activated in the exercise and continued operation until exercise termination.
a.
Facilities and Equipment The space allocated for the interim TSC was determined to be in-adequate for the number of personnel required to function in that facility.
In addition to those present during this exercise, at least five NRC personnal would require space in the TSC curing an actual emergency condition.
The space inadequacy was identified during a
previous inspection (50-364/80-40)
and this exercise F
amplified previous concerns.
The interim TSC is considered inadequate to provide effective direction and control by the emergency organization.
The inspector toured the new TSC facility being constructed zGacent to the Unit 2 side of the control room This new facilt:y Ml? h: vi: increased spac2 and W uld accomodate wian e.cmpl eted.
This item shall remain open the awargency s.
r urtil tne complettu of se new TSC.
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.. nmuni cati on s (1) There were inadequate telephone lines available for the number of NRC and licensee staff projected to occupy this facility.
Those phones which were available were clustered together in one place so that effective use of the telephone systems was limited.
This problem should be alleviated upon the completion of the new TSC facility.
l (2) No rauto communication with monitoring teams or other groups l
was available within the TSC.
The radio used during the exercise was located in an adjacent Security Control Alarm station which required security access for each use of the
radio and contributed to the problem of inadequate communica-
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tions.
This problem should also be alleviated upon completion of the new TSC although positioning of the radio within the new TSC should be carefully considered to minimize interfering noise from other communications systems.
(3) The Emergency Notification Network (ENN) was used to provide initial notification and periodic update to state and local governmental organizations.
The ENN is a ' direct ring down line which connects the TSC to the primary offsite Emergency
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Operations Centers (E0Cs).
During the initial phase of the exercise there were some problems in communicating with the offsite agencies but these problems appear to have been resolved prior to the termination of the exercise.
The problems with the ENN system were attributed to lack of experience and familiarization with this system and a licen-see representative stated that this matter would be looked into and appropriate action taken to prevent future diffi-culties in the use of the ENN system.
(50-348/80-36-01; 50-364/80-48-01).
(4) The Emergency Plan indicates that one line of the five inplant (Gaitronics) telephone communications system lines be used solely for communications among emergency personnel during an emergency condition.
Line 5 was designated as the emergency circuit during this exercise.
Throughout the exercise it was noted that there was continuing use of line 5 by other thar. those directly involved in the emergency organ-
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ization.
A licensee representative stated that this problem was primarily due to training general employees in emergency procedure and that the designation of the emergency circuit would be reiterated to all plant personnel.
(50-348/80-36-02; 50-364/80-48-02).
(5) It was noted that implementing procedure FNP-0-EIP-8 contains erroneous information ancerning contacts with state agencies, telephone numbe u E(; the address of the Region II NRC office.
This erronocas inforr W on may have caused some delay in the
'intial notificotsu process.
EIP-8 information is vital to effective anc prcmpt communications and @ould be kept up to date at all times. (50-348/80-36-03, 50-36W-4-03).
6.
Site Assembly and Accountability During t% site assembly and ao 1tability portion of the exercise it was noted chat the alarm system could not be heard in the maintenance
shop.
The plant alarm and warning systec problems have been previously identified and are being followed by IE Bulletin 79-18 (79-BU-18).
A licensee representative stated that ? anned corrective actions would be reviewed to ensure that the maintenar.ce shop was inc', 'ded.
The accounta-bility of all personnel was not reported until about 35 minutes after the initiation of the alarm.
The accountability procecure wac completed in about 23 minutes but a report was not made to the Emergency Directer due to some section leaders' misuncerstanding that missing personnel had to be located prior to reporting.
A licensee representative stated that this problem would be corrected through additional training and indoctrination of personnel involved in the accountability procedure reporting. (50-348/80-36-04; 50-364/80-48-04).
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7.
Fire Brigade and Repair Party Response The initial fire brigade response to the situlated fire was rapid and team members appeared to be familiar with their assigned duties.
The fire team members were properly attired, including self contained breathing apparatus, and appeared to have adequate equipment.
Sub-sequent fire team members sent to the scene for assistance simulated various aspects of preparedness including wearing fully operational self contained breathing apparatus.
The repair party team dispatched to the site of the emergency condition were similarly well equipped; however the Health Physics team accompanying the repair party wore no protective equipment.
The inspector noted that the degree of simulation during emergency events should be well established prior to an exercise and that all personnel should be informed of the areas in which simulation of certain items is acceptable.
Simulation of all protective clothing and respiratory protective devices does not provide a realistic response time nor functional capabilities of the emergency teams.
In addition, the repair team made an initial entry into a simulated high radiation area, under uncertain conditions, without an accompanying health physics technician.
Under the type of conditions being simulated this practice is unacceptable.
The above areas should be amplified to all plant emer-gency personnel during training classes and drills.
(50-348/80-36-05; 50-364/80-48-05).
8.
Assessment Actions The offsite dose assessments and projections were performed in the TSC.
It was noted that the procedure for these assessments needs additional information, sucn as isopleths for various meteorological conditions and curves relating to protective action levels which can be used as overlays on area maps.
Additionally, the State of Alabama was using a different dese alculational cdel which yieMe.1 dif fering values than
o those calculated in the TSC.
Those differing methods coupled with
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unclear reporting of values caused some confusion in the offsite centers.
l A licensee representative stated that the present dose calculational model has been identified as inadequate and a revision and upgrade is in progress. The final model will be discussed and correlated with State
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personnel to insure that comparative results will be obtained in future
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calculations.
Clear and effective communications among the various emergency response organizations will be upgraded through training and dri1is. '.50-348/80-36-06; 50-364/80-48-06).
9.
Offsite lionitoring-Teams l
I An inspector noted that the offsite monitoring team had been indoc-trinated in monitoring at pre-selected '.ocations depending on meteoro-l-
logical conditions.
It was noted that upon arrival at the preselected point the team made no effort to scan the local area in an attempt to
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find the highest exposure rate and " characterize" the plume dimensions around the monitoring point.
Only one offsite team was dispatched and in view of the simulated wind direction together with the time required L
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to cross the river it was felt that at least two offsite monitoring teams should have been dispatched, one for the Alabama side of the river and one to standby on the Georgia side of the river.
Licensee representatives disagreed to some extent with this comment during the critique but agreed to consider the problem. A licensee representative stated that additional offsite monitoring equipment was readily available and a second team could have been dispatched from the site if conditions warranted. The matter of monitoring methodology for offsite team personnel will be taken care of by additional training.
(50-348/80-36-07; 50-364/
80-48-07).
10.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The EOF was activated in the late afternoon on the first day of the exercise and was fully staffed by the morning of the second day.
The EOF is an interim facility and is located in a portable building which houses the start up office.
a.
Facilities and Equipment The EOF appeared to have adequate space for the number of personnel assigned to that facility but it was noted that additional personnel would be expected in an actual emergency situation. There did not appear to be adequate equipment available, such as visual aids, map overlays and activities logs.
Although a status board was provided it was not kept current for plant and offsite conditions. A licensee representative stated that equipment in the EOF would be evaluated and those items considered necessary for operations would be supplied.
This area was, identified during a previous inspection (50-364/80-40-04).
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Communications
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Adequate telephone and radio communications appeared to be available except that EOF personnel had no direct radio contact capability with the radiation monitoring teams.
This M-k of communication with the monitoring teams was identified by the previous inspection item noted in paragraph 10.a. above.
The speaker associated with the ENN system ' caused an unacceptable noise level and interfered to some extent with operations within the EOF.
Additionally it appeared, at times, that there was insufficient staff present to effectively man all communications systems being utilized. Some of the personnel manning the telephones' ar tred to be unfamiliar wf :h the Alabama State classification 's3 em for emergencies.
A licensee representative agreed that some iodification to the EOF communication system arrangement is probably necessary and stated that this area would be evaluated and corrective action taken.
(50-348/80-36-08; 50-364/80-48-08).
The matter of the EOF organ-ization was controversial and is discussed further in paragraph 10.c.belo..
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EOF Operations During the critique it was noted that although the EOF was fully staffed during the general emergency phase of the exercise there was not a shift in functional control of offsite activities from the TSC to the EOF.
The Emergency Director and the TSC staff maintained everall control of all emergency operations including radiological effluent and environs monii.oring, assessment and dose projections and interface with offsite Federal, State and local emergency response organizations.
This is in apparent conflict with the licensee's Emergency Plan Sections I.C.8, V.C.2, VI.C, and guidance provided in NUREG 0654, Rev.
1,Section II.H.2 and NUREG 0696.
At the exit interview / critique a licensee management representative stated that Alabama Power Company's concept of operations was that the EOF would not assume operational control of any emergency activities until such time as the emergency phase was terminated and the recovery phase was initiated.
Subsequent to the exercise several telephone conversations were held with Alabama Power Company officials in which their position concerning the functional responsibilities of the EOF staff were clarified.
A licensee management representative stated that due to the marginal facilities in the interim EOF, functional control of all emergency activities would remain with the TSC staff.
Upon completion of the permanent EOF, now under construction, those functional controls described in the references noted above would be performed by the EOF staff when that facility is activated and fully staffed during an emergency or exercise. (50-348/80-36-09; 50-364/80-48-09).
11. Offsite Emergency Operations Centers NRC observers were stationed at the Houston County Emergency Operations Center (EOC)', which also. serves as the Alabama State EOC, and the Early County, Georgia EOC to observe operations at those facilities with respect to their interactions with Alabama Power Company. It was noted that there was some confusion precipitated by the reporting of incomplete parameters and units, and there were some delays in receiving information from the licensee during the initial phases of the exercise due to apparent problems with the ENN system. These problems should be resolved through evaluation and corrective actions as noted in paragraph 5.b.(3) above.
12.
Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario appeared to be adequate to activate and test all facets of the licensee's emergency organization but it was not clear that the stated exercise objective relative to testing the Recovery Organization was met.
An offsite observer noted that the simulated exercise condition offsite provided only limited opportunity to fully exercise ingestion pathway activities.
Licensee's emergency planning personnel should solicit input from all affected organizations and pro-vide approved scenarios to official observers well in advance of a coordinated exercise.