IR 05000348/1980005
| ML19344D763 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1980 |
| From: | Bradford W, Andrea Johnson, Upright C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19344D760 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-80-05, 50-348-80-5, NUDOCS 8004280143 | |
| Download: ML19344D763 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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. s REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST,, N.W SUITE 3100 o
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report No. 50-348/80-05 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35202 Facility Name: Farley Docket No. 50-348 License No. NPF-2
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Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama Inspected by:
bdk4 hm_2d 3//0/ FO A. H. Johns @ti h
Ddte Signed
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Eho/20 W. H. Bradturd (
Date signed Approved by: [
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t CT M. UprighE, ing ction Chief, RONS Branch JTategigned SUMMARY InspectiononFebruary19-22,Id80 Areas Inspected
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This special, announced inspection involved 58 inspector-hours on site in the areas of small break loss of coolant procedures and training.
Results
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Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were
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identified.
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees i
- W. G. Hairston, Plant Manager
- D. N. Morey, Operations Superintendent
- R. D. Hill, Operations Supervisor
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- R. M. Coleman, Engineering Supervisor
- L. S. Williams, Training Supervisor
- J. W. Hill, QA Engineer
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- M. E. Harbour, QA Engineer
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Other licensee employees contacted included shift supervisors, shift foremen and control operators.
NRC Resident Inspector W. H. Bradford
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 22, 1980 with those persons indicated in paragraph I above.
Inspection findings presented in these details were discussed including licensee commitments in paragraphs 5 and 6.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items
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Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Small Break Loss of Coolant-operator Interviews i
The inspectors reviewed and discussed, with licensee plant management, their emergency procedure E0P-1.0 " Loss of Reactor Coolant".
Westinghouse guidelines, procedure development, procedure content, and reactor operator training given to tenminate or mit(gate the consequences of small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA) were also discussed.
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t g-2-Upon completion of the above plant management interview, the inspectors interviewed six licensed operators, which included one shift supervisor (SRO), one shift foreman (SRO), and four reactor operators (SRO's and R0's).
The licensed operator interviews were performed to determine the adequacy of the appropriate procedures from a functional standpoint and the effec-tiveness of the training program.
The following areas were covered:
a.
Understanding of small break LOCA.
b.
Diffentiation between loss of coolant accidents (LOCA's) and other depressurization events.
c.
Familiarity with the SBLOCA procedures.
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d.
Operator knowledge of appropriate related procedures.
Knowledge of transient response characteristics necessary to guide the e.
licensed operator to the correct procedure.
f.
Evaluation of any individual or generic deficiencies.
g.
Walk-throughs of the procedures including system-related espects of the procedures to ensure that the licensed operator actions could be performed, h.
Confirmation that apprgpriate procedure immediate actions were memorized.
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Understanding of procedure subsequent actions and precautions that ensure plant safety.
j.
Ab'ility to determine break locations.
k.
Recognition of the importance of primary and backup heat sinks.
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Ability to recognize adequate subcooling and core voiding, importance of subcooled versus saturated conditions, indications of inadequate core cooling and implementation of natural circulation.
Recognition of possible instrumentation abnormalities including those m.
encountered during the THI transient and environmental considerations.
Based on the operator interviews in the above areas, the inspector determined that the licensee's SBLOCA procedurks were adequate. However, based on these licensed operator interviews and walk-throughs of the SBLOCA and
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other reactor coolant depressurization events the inspectors recommended the following procedure changes in emergency procedure E0P-1.0, Loss of Reactor Coolant:
All caution statements should be bracketed to avoid operators confusion a.
while performing the procedure steps.
b.
Note in step 6.0 of E0P-1.0 should also be added to step 7.0 as an aid to the operator, After step 6.16.8 of E0P-1.0 reference to other procedures should be c.
added for operator guidance.
The licensee agreed to implement the above procedure changes (a, b and c).
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Add a " diagnostic chart" to aid in clarifying symptoms and channeling actions toward the correct procedure.
Add sign offs or check off spaces to appropriate steps to aid in e.
helping track procedure steps.
The licensee ageed to take these recommendations (d and e) under advisement while completing their operator procedure walk-throughs as discussed in paragraph 6.a.
f.
Compile a notebook of licensee-collected data of environmental effects on critical instrumentation and place this notebook in or near the control room for operations use.
The licensee agreed to take this recommendation (f) under advisment as to possibly adding this to the Shift Technical Advisor's package.
These items (a through f) will be carried as an open item, pending future inspections (348/80-05-01).
6.
Small Break Loss of Coolant and TMI Lessons Training The inspectors raviewed licensee training on the SBLOCA procedures to verify that training included transient analysis and a walk-through of procedures in the control room by each licensed operator and senior operator.
In additon, training records were reviewed to confirm that all licensed personnel had attended training sessions that had been completed prior to the inspection.
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g-4-Based upon review of the training program, in conjunction with operator interviews, the inspectors determined that the licensee's training program was adequate in the areas inspected. However, the inspectors recommended
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the following additions to the training program:
The licensee had completed more than half of the operator procedure a.
walk-throughs before this inspection. The licensee stated that the remainder of the walk-throughs would be completed by February 29, 1980.
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b.
Add the approximate tailpipe temperature expected if the PORV or code safety valves were to stick open, because this was misleading to the TMI operators in that the temperature was lower than expected due to the cooling affect of the passing steam. Also, add the use of pres-
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surizer surge line temperature as further indication of an empty pressurizer.
The licensee agreed to investigate this information and factor into the training program if applicable.
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c.
In completing the walk-throughs, as stated in item a.
above, the
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licensee will determine if further training is needed (based on operator feedback) in the area of subcooling meter and applicable charts.
d.
The licensee stated that Westinghouse had been requested to review the training program package in the area of transient analysis and accident scenarios for possible training program improvements.
These items (a through d) will be carried as an open item, pending future inspections (348/80-05-02).
7.
Small Break Loss of Coolant-System Considerations The inspectors reviewed system-related aspects of procedures to insure that operator actions required subsequent to an SBLOCA could be performed.
System considerations in the following areas were reviewed:
Instrumentation to carry out operator actions in the SBL CA procedure.
a.
b.
Power operated relief valve position indication.
Equipment response to safety injection reset.
c.
d.
Safety injection effects on co,ntainment isolation.
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Real-time consideration of SBL0CA procedure actions, including adequate e.
time to switch over from injection t'o :r(circulation modes.
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Protection of:high head safety injection pump against deadheading in i
the recirculation modes.
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No problems were identified with~ system considerations reviewed.
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