IR 05000348/2024012
| ML24345A005 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/2024 |
| From: | Alan Blamey NRC/RGN-II/DORS |
| To: | Coleman J Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR 2024012 | |
| Download: ML24345A005 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2024012 AND 05000364/2024012
Dear Jamie Coleman:
On October 31, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with Edwin Dean, III, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your program complies with NRC regulations and applicable industry standards such that the Reactor Oversight Process can continue to be implemented.
The team also evaluated the stations effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, and its use of industry and NRC operating experience information. The results of these evaluations are in the enclosure.
Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
One Severity Level IV violation without an associated finding is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional December 11, 2024 Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Alan J. Blamey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000348 and 05000364 License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000348 and 05000364
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000348/2024012 and 05000364/2024012
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2024-012-0011
Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility:
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant
Location:
Columbia, AL
Inspection Dates:
October 07, 2024 to October 31, 2024
Inspectors:
A. Alen Arias, Senior Project Engineer
E. Robinson, Resident Inspector
C. Scott, Senior Project Engineer
R. Smith, Reactor Systems Engineer
S. Temple, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Alan J. Blamey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Submit Licensee Event Report Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000364/2024012-01 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71152B The inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.73,
License Event Report for the licensee's failure to report a condition prohibited by the plants Technical Specifications (TS) within 60 days of discovery. Specifically, unit 2 containment isolation valve (CIV) HV-3067 failed to close during a surveillance test on October 17, 2023, and the licensee failed to report that unit 2 was in a condition prohibited by TS 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)
- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.
- Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems.
Specifically, the team evaluated the licensee's compliance with their Problem Identification and Resolution program, as described in procedure NMPGM-002, "Corrective Action Program," version 19.0 and NRC regulations. The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports, generated since the last problem identification and resolution inspection (February 2023). These reviews included failures; corrective and preventive maintenance issues, surveillances; reliability; and maintenance rule performance. The condition report reviews were expanded to five years for the component cooling water, auxiliary feedwater and essential room coolers. Also, as part of the assessment, the inspectors reviewed corrective actions for the following non-cited violations (NCVs), findings (FIN), and licensee-identified violations (LIVs):
o NCV 2023011-01. Failure to Maintain Preventive Maintenance Procedures.
o NCV 2023001-02. Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality associated with Handswitch for Unit 2A Containment Spray Valve.
o NCV 2023004-01. Violation of TS Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4.10, "Pressurizer Safety Valves."
o NCV 2023420-01. Security Cornerstone NCV documented in security baseline inspection report 2023420.
o NCV 2023441-01. Security Cornerstone NCV documented in security baseline inspection report 2023441.
o NCV 2023441-01. Security Cornerstone NCV documented in security baseline inspection report 2023441.
o NCV 2023010-01. Failure to Justify the Quality and Reliability for Agastat Relay.
o NCV 2023010-03. Failure to Meet the Conditions of Station Motor Operated Valves Program.
o NCV 2023010-05. Failure to Correct a Violation for Categorizing Motor Operated Valves in the Inservice Testing Program.
o NCV 2023010-06. Failure to Identify Corrosion on Motor Operated Valve 3209B.
o NCV 2023010-07. Failure to Include Cable Bend Radius Precautions in Work Orders for Class 1E batteries.
o NCV 2023010-08. Failure to Assure Thermal Overload Relays are Properly Sized.
o NCV 2024002-01. Violation of TS 3.7.1, "Main Steam Safety Valve."
o NCV 2024002-01. Inadequate Post Modification Testing of Feedwater Control System Upgrades.
- Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience,
- Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
- Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment 71152B Assessment 1) Corrective Action Program Effectiveness Problem Identification: The inspectors determined that the licensee was effective in identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) and that there was a low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating condition reports as described in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, "Corrective Action Program," version 19.0, and managements expectation that employees were encouraged to initiate condition reports. Additionally, site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues.
Problem Prioritization and Evaluation: The inspectors reviewed condition reports (CRs),technical evaluations, and completed and/or planned work orders. With the exception noted below, the inspectors concluded that problems were, generally, prioritized and evaluated in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-GM-002-001, "Corrective Action Program Instructions," version 51.0. The inspectors determined that adequate consideration was given to structures, systems, and/or component's operability and associated plant risk. The inspectors determined that, in general, plant personnel had conducted cause evaluations in accordance with licensees CAP procedures, as described in NMP-GM-002-GL03, "Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions Guidelines," version 36.0, and cause determinations were appropriate, and considered the significance of the issues being evaluated.
Corrective Actions: The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents, interviewed licensee staff, and verified completion of corrective actions. With the exception noted below, the inspectors determined that, generally, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality (CAQ)were corrected. The team determined that the licensee was generally effective in developing corrective actions that were appropriately focused. The inspectors reviewed CRs and effectiveness reviews, as applicable, to verify that the significant conditions adverse to quality had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to preclude repetition were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and were effective. The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents for NRC findings issued since the last problem, identification, and resolution biennial inspection.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensees CAP complied with regulatory requirements and self-imposed standards. The licensees implementation of the CAP adequately supported nuclear safety.
2) Operating Experience The team determined that the licensees processes for the use of industry and NRC operating experience information were effective and complied with regulatory requirements and licensee standards. The implementation of these programs adequately supported nuclear safety. The team concluded that operating experience was adequately evaluated for applicability and that appropriate actions were implemented in accordance with applicable procedures.
3) Self-Assessments and Audits The inspectors reviewed a sample of completed self-assessments and audits conducted by both plant and nuclear oversight personnel. The inspectors determined that the licensee was effective at performing self-assessments and audits to identify issues at a low level, properly evaluated those issues, and resolved them commensurate with their safety significance. The self-assessments and audits were adequately self-critical and performance-related issues were being appropriately identified. The inspectors verified that CRs were created to document areas for improvement and findings and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations.
4) Safety Conscious Work Environment The inspectors interviewed a sample of plant employees from various departments and with varying roles/responsibilities within the organization. The inspectors determined that employees
- (1) were willing to raise nuclear safety concerns to their supervisor/manager or though the CAP,
- (2) were aware of alternative avenues for raising concerns such as the Employee Concern Program (ECP), and
- (3) had not experienced retaliation for raising safety concerns. Specifically, all individuals interviewed indicated that they would feel comfortable in raising safety concerns. All individuals felt that their management was receptive to receiving safety concerns and generally addressed them promptly and commensurate with the significance of the concern. Most interviewees were aware of the licensee's ECP and stated they would use the program, if necessary. When asked whether there have been any instances where individuals experienced retaliation or other negative reaction for raising safety concerns, all individuals interviewed stated that they had neither experienced nor heard of an instance of retaliation at the site. To supplement these discussions, the team reviewed the ECP case log and interviewed the ECP Coordinator to assess their perception of the site employees' willingness to raise nuclear safety concerns. Also, the team reviewed a sample of the most recent Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel meeting reports as well as the results from the most recent biennial safety culture survey and self-assessment from April 2023. The team determined that the processes in place to mitigate potential safety culture issues were adequately implemented.
Failure to Submit Licensee Event Report Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Not Applicable Severity Level IV NCV 05000364/2024012-01 Open/Closed Not Applicable 71152B The inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.73, License Event Report for the licensee's failure to report a condition prohibited by the plants Technical Specifications (TS) within 60 days of discovery. Specifically, unit 2 containment isolation valve (CIV) HV-3067 failed to close during a surveillance test on October 17, 2023, and the licensee failed to report that unit 2 was in a condition prohibited by TS 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves.
Description:
Inspectors reviewed condition report (CR) 11015905 and the past operability review (POR) for the failure of unit 2 CIV HV-3067 (component cooling water return from excess letdown and reactor coolant drain tank heat exchangers) to close as required during FNP-2-STP-40.0B, B Train Safety injection with Loss of Offsite Power Test, on October 17, 2023. The licensee uses FNP-2-STP-40.0B to verify that automatic CIVs, which are not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuate to the isolation position as required by surveillance requirement 3.6.3.3. The limiting condition for operation (LCO) for TS 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves, requires each CIV to be Operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
With a containment penetration with one CIV inoperable (Condition A), the TS requires, in part, that the affected penetration be isolated by at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve or closed manual valve within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after discovering the inoperable CIV (Required Action A.1). If this action is not met, the TS requires that the unit be placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
The licensees POR determined that the valves failure to close was not reportable even though maintenance troubleshooting found that the valves hands switch opening contact failed in the closed position. This resulted in the opening leg of the valves control circuit remaining energized, bypassing the automatic closing function/logic of the circuit. The inspectors reviewed the circuit and wiring diagram for the hand switch, the as-found condition, and failure mechanism (electrical contact sticking due to heat/welding from arcing during switching operations on an aged or degraded contact surface) and determined that the failed contact became stuck closed was introduced the last time the hand switch was cycled to open the valve. From a review of available plant data and records, the inspectors determined the valve was most likely cycled open prior to or during the previous unit 2 cycle when the unit was in an operating mode requiring the valve to be operable. The inspectors concluded that the failure was reportable because there was firm evidence that the valve was inoperable for a time longer than allowed by TS LCO 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, prior to the test failure on October 17, 2023. The inspectors determined that the POR did not consider the
- (1) effects of the as-found condition,
- (2) the failure mechanism,
- (3) and the time frame that the degraded condition was present prior to surveillance failure on October 17, 2023 to determine if the issue resulted in a condition prohibited by TS as required by NMP-AD-031-GL01, Past Operability Review Section 4.2.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program and initiated actions to reevaluate the POR and submit an LER.
Corrective Action References: Technical Evaluation (TE) 1164897
Performance Assessment:
The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency. Failure to evaluate the effects of the as-found condition of unit 2 CIV HV-3067 (CCW return from excess letdown), following its failure on October 17, 2023, to determine if the condition existed for a time longer than allowed by TS was a performance deficiency and contrary to NMP-AD-031-GL01, Past Operability/Functionality Review, Ver.
2.0. The performance deficiency is minor because the failure to report is not viewed as a precursor to a significant event, would not lead to a more significant safety concern, nor was it associated with a cornerstone attribute, and it did not adversely affect the associated cornerstone objective.
Enforcement:
The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider the regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation which impedes the NRCs ability to regulate using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.
Severity: The inspectors determined this violation was a Severity Level (SL) IV violation because it aligned with examples d.9 provided in Section 6.9, Inaccurate and Incomplete Information or Failure to Make a Required Report, of the Enforcement Policy, dated January 12, 2024. Section 6.1.d.9 of the enforcement policy states, in part, that a failure to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.73 is a SL IV violation. Because the violation is a traditional enforcement violation, no cross-cutting aspect was assigned.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.73 Licensee Event Report, states in part that the licensee shall report any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's TS within 60 days after the discovery of the event. Technical Specification 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves, Limiting Condition for Operation requires each CIV to be Operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Contrary to the above, from December 16, 2023, the licensee failed to report to the NRC within 60 days of the discovery that the unit 2 CIV HV-3067 was inoperable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 for a time longer than allowed by TS 3.6.3. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee entered the violation into the corrective action program as TE 1164897 and initiated corrective actions to reevaluate the POR.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Minor Performance Deficiency 71152B Technical Support Center Door functionality Minor Performance Deficiency: Section 2.1 of Attachment 2 of procedure NMP-GM-002-001, "Corrective Action Program Instructions," Rev. 52.0, requires that, for deficient conditions of structures, systems and components (SSCs), the operations review identify if the affected SSC is described in the current licensing bases (CLB), which includes the technical requirements manual (TRM), and to include an analysis related to the deficient condition and the SSC's ability to perform its safety function. Additionally, Section 3.2 of the NMP-GM-002-001 states that a condition adversely affecting performance in the emergency preparedness (EP) program, including EP facilities and equipment, should be screened as a Priority 2 issue (higher priority). This ensures tracking and completion of corrective actions.
Contrary to the above, inspectors identified that the operations review for condition report (CR) 11105063, which documented a non-functional latch on a technical support center (TSC) pressure boundary door (N2V15DOOR2480), failed to
- (1) identify that the affected door was controlled by TRM 13.13.1, "Emergency Response Facilities," and therefore, (2)failed evaluate and include (in the CR) an analysis on the impact of the deficient door condition on the TSC's ability to satisfy its habitability requirements.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. Specifically, the licensee was able to demonstrate that the TSC remained functional. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as CR 11117901.
Minor Violation 71152B Failure to Investigate a Tripped Thermal Overload for a Unit 2 CCW Valve Minor Violation: 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, states, in part, activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with instructions, procedures, or drawings. Licensee procedure FNP-0-SOP-0.0, General Instructions to Operations Personnel, Ver. 169., step 4.10.5.a states that electrical maintenance should be contacted to investigate and reset the thermal overload (TOL).
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to accomplish safety-related procedure FNP-0-SOP-0.0, to investigate the trip of the TOL for the unit 2 reactor coolant pump motor oil coolers CCW return valve HV-3046 before resetting the TOL on April 26, 2022. The inspectors determined an investigation to understand the cause of the TOL trip was necessary to ensure that a deficient condition did not exist that could impact the valve's ability to perform its function to close on a containment isolation signal. Specifically, the TOL for HV-3046 is not bypassed during accident conditions and the valve had not been functionally tested after the TOL was replaced during the unit 2 outage (April 10 to May 3, 2022) as part of a modification to increase the motor torque capability of the valve.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. Specifically, plant data showed that the valve had been operated successfully since the TOL was reset.
Enforcement:
This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as condition report 11124172.
Observation: Replacement of Aging Rotary Selector Hand Switches 71152B In 2019 the licensee initiated a maintenance strategy to conduct a one-time replacement of GEMCO rotary selector hand switches in the main control and emergency power boards after the site experienced an increased failure rate of the switches due to age-related degradation (i.e., high contact resistance and mechanical failure). These switches are used in control circuits for both safety-related and non-safety-related applications. Depending on the application and failure mode of the hand switch, its failure can and has affected the reliability of safety-related equipment. Given the large number of switches used at the site, the licensee developed a replacement plan that included selection criteria to prioritize the order of replacements based, in part, on the risk importance of the supported equipment. At the time of this inspection the licensee had replaced approximately 332 of 993 hand switches. While the licensee appeared to be replacing hand switches consistent with its replacement plan, the inspectors noted that the preventive maintenance (PM) replacements were not formally tracked by either the licensees PM program or the corrective action program (CAP) to ensure that the replacement of hand switches were tracked to completion in a timely manner.
Instead, the licensee relied on informal processes and engineering personnel to track this long-term action plan. As a result of the inspectors observation, the licensee initiated an action (TE 1165139) in their CAP to create a long-term correction action to track the one-time replacement of GEMCO hand switches.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 31, 2024, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Edwin Dean, III, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
(CRs)
10654581, 10655866, 10724605, 10742170, 10745515,
10746634, 10749486, 10769006, 10769167, 10769828,
10770238, 10770873, 10773034, 10773474, 10774470,
10781625, 10786095, 10786153, 10790413, 10790762,
10791056, 10797992, 10797993, 10802928, 10804747,
10804747, 10826832, 10829296, 10829345, 10829353,
10831443, 10831614, 10832454, 10834583, 10835850,
10837942, 10839282, 10845242, 10847222, 10849302,
10865217, 10876335, 10888193, 10889042, 10893201,
10895126, 10898654, 10898665, 10899773, 10900227,
10901095, 10901394, 10901394, 10901394, 10902518,
10902596, 10902686, 10903125, 10903302, 10903303,
10903304, 10905224, 10908794, 10909734, 10911213,
10911830, 10912005, 10912893, 10914378, 10916909,
10917144, 10929287, 10930682, 10932215, 10942253,
10943126, 10943842, 10944529, 10945392, 10946654,
10947134, 10947138, 10947138, 10947159, 10950176,
10950773, 10951769, 10951769, 10951771, 10953841,
10958287, 10959579, 10962571, 10963702, 10964176,
10965226, 10965389, 10966957, 10966990, 10967396,
10967483, 10969169, 10969180, 10970991, 10971653,
10971739, 10972328, 10972363, 10973610, 10978004,
10978095, 10978259, 10978264, 10978600, 10979341,
10979644, 10980144, 10981459, 10981482, 10984277,
10990467, 10990467, 10990499, 10993845, 10996736,
10997667, 10998050, 10998310, 10999402, 10999957,
11000233, 11001177, 11001240, 11001653, 11002196,
11002540, 11003908, 11003991, 11004223, 11004303,
11005557, 11007792, 11007841, 11009897, 11010960,
11012189, 11014154, 11015905, 11016184, 11016771,
11017018, 11017434, 11017438, 11018596, 11018629,
11018662, 11019039, 11020588, 11021084, 11021357,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
11027925, 11029055, 11031116, 11031506, 11031935,
11032019, 11032783, 11033064, 11033774, 11035403,
11035728, 11036252, 11038240, 11039584, 11044834,
11045150, 11046466, 11050885, 11054408, 11055891,
11056555, 11057174, 11059316, 11060796, 11064063,
11064655, 11067126, 11067152, 11067918, 11069261,
11070102, 11070102, 11070166, 11070861, 11070886,
11070970, 11070973, 11073295, 11074181, 11074566,
11074566, 11075097, 11075510, 11078998, 11078999,
11080742, 11080743, 11082660, 11085016, 11086383,
11087764, 11088107, 11088109, 11088110, 11088730,
11088986, 11088989, 11089964, 11090219, 11092442,
11093701, 11094442, 11094451, 11094587, 11096969,
11096986, 11096986, 11097087, 11097472, 11097847,
11099833, 11100273, 11101243, 11103320, 11103324,
11103589, 11103727, 11103848, 11104061, 11105063,
11117901, 11053935, 1007792, 10996872, 11082243,
11106449, 10971739, 10999957, 10954076, 10986931,
11071432, 10962571, 10967773, 10980342, 10966977,
10979536, 10967483, 10979515, 10967853, 10967778,
10996872, 10967713, 10967713, 10962571, 10967853,
10967773, 10980342, 10966977, 10979536, 10967483,
10979515, 11022542, 10996870,
Corrective Action
Report (CARs)
278884, 278955, 279316, 279318, 279319, 279409, 279409,
279415, 282175, 282229, 282422, 285481, 289097, 295668,
301493, 315751, 321023, 323730, 373881, 427034, 492010,
494368, 506551, 507376, 520964, 529355, 534840, 543611,
549666, 555402, 574566, 578969, 626296, 727434, 744903,
745320, 555402, 425304, 476737, 481906, 278911, 614668
2778059-01
(Vendor Drawing) Caterpillar C9 250KW (Sheet 1)
D-17034
Fire Protection - Piping Layout of Yard Mains
18.0
D-175002
P&ID - Unit 1 Component Cooling Water System (Sheets
1/2/3)
49/26/14
Drawings
D-175007
P&ID Auxiliary Feedwater System
36.0
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
D-175033
P&ID Main Steam and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems
28.0
D-175039
P&ID - Chemical and Volume Control System (Sheet 3)
19.0
D-205014
Unit 2 HVAC: P&ID - Non-Rad Area and Equipment Rooms
(TSC)
11.0
D-205039
Unit 2: P&ID - Chemical and Volume Control System (Sheet
2)
31.0
D-207851
Elementary Diagram for Solenoid Valve SV-3067B
Engineering
Evaluations
Technical
Evaluations (TEs)
1063065, 1063582, 1081994, 1084034, 1091306, 1094468,
1095572, 1095573, 1095806, 1095859, 1097489, 1098108,
1100177, 1100177, 1100177, 1100195, 1102602, 1102698,
1102699, 1103590, 1103593, 1103848, 1108520, 1108521,
1108522, 1108522, 1108581, 1108599, 1109428, 1109786,
1109788, 1109788, 1109788, 1110145, 1110166, 1113499,
1113773, 1114374, 1115870, 1115874, 1115875, 1115876,
1115877, 1117280, 1120964, 1121483, 1121810, 1122314,
22319, 1122340, 1122590, 1122847, 1122848, 1122999,
23000, 1123004, 1123387, 1124475, 1126957, 1127228,
28469, 1128513, 1129170, 1130400, 1131214, 1131751,
1132323, 1133293, 1133337, 1134225, 1136038, 1136452,
1136480, 1136719, 1136890, 1136897, 1136905, 1137202,
1137316, 1137603, 1139412, 1139438, 1140239, 1140698,
1141557, 1142963, 1143734, 1144130, 1144201, 1146825,
1147098, 1147220, 1147290, 1149533, 1150052, 1152277,
1153717, 1153717, 1153744, 1153916, 1154504, 1154519,
1154519, 1154525, 1154525, 1154728, 1155111, 1155168,
1155336, 1155394, 1155504, 1155672, 1155704, 1155704,
1155779, 1155780, 1156391, 1156600, 1156606, 1157182,
1157199, 1157200, 1157291, 1157293, 1157483, 1157484,
1157599, 1157732, 1160040, 1160517, 1160520, 1160521,
1160953, 1461888, 1150531, 1113004, 1131210, 11080434,
1136992, 1131436, 1131429, 1161220, 1129125, 1111784,
1089115, 1160692, 1111784,
Miscellaneous
FORM 1 - Analysis & Design Worksheet (Needs Analysis
Considerations for Action Tracking No. TE 1123397)
04/11/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Nuclear Oversight Audit of Emergency Preparedness Fleet-
09/19/2022
NOS Audit of Fire Protection Fleet-FP-2023
09/21/2023
May 16th Off Year Exercise Report
06/14/2023
EP Staff Training
10/28/2024
Nantel S-EP-5750 (Generic EP Controller Training
Attendance Records)
10/28/2024
NANTEL Generic EP Controller Training
1.0
Nuclear Oversight of Emergency Preparedness, Fleet-EP-
24 (DRAFT)
09/11/2024
Unit 2 C Charging Pump Gearbox (Speed Changer) Axial
Vibration Trend
11/2018 -
05/2024
Unit 2 C Charging Pump Gearbox (Speed Changer) Oil
Analysis Wear Metals Trend
10/2021 -
10/2024
New Security Camera Acceptance Test
04/3/2024
Internal OpE Crew Learning, Crew HU Clock Reset
(CR11022542)
11/30/2023
1-FNP-1-253-003
Engineering Evaluation of UT Inspected Component (1-253-
003 - CCW Min-Flow Elbow)
04/17/2018
A181010
Functional System Description: Auxiliary Feedwater System
38.0
CDA-FNP-SP45-
008-4Q23-VUL
Vulnerability Evaluation/Remediation
2/01/24
CDA-FNP-SP45-
014-4Q23-VUL
Vulnerability Evaluation/Remediation
2/01/24
CNOS-21-351
21 Fleet Maintenance Audit (Fleet-MNT-2021)
2/15/2021
CNOS-22-288
Fleet-EA-CHEM-2022 Audit Package
11/21/2022
CNOS-23-158
23 Radiation Protection Audit (Fleet-RP-2023)
06/09/2023
FLT-LP.2023-4-
C1
Emerging Issues L0CT 22-24 Segment 23.4
1.2
FNP-0-SP-22.2-
F09/F10/F11
New Camera Testing (As-Installed)
04/03/2024
Inspection Report
24-016
Security Camera Upgrade Project: Low Light Camera
Performance Validation
03/26/2024
N23-F01 (MR)
Inject on demand at rated flows and pressure for credited
05/23/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
accident conditions (NFPA 805 credited)
NMP-ES-012-F01
Heat Exchanger Inspection Report (1A CCW)
01/29/2024
NMP-ES-012-F01
Heat Exchanger Inspection Report (1B CCW)
03/4/2024
PO No.
SNA10331218
Oil Sample Analysis Report for Unit 2 C Charging Pump
Speed Changer. Sample taken on 9/5/2024 under WO
SNC2017597
9/6/2024
Preventive
Maintenance
Change Requests
(PMCRs)
107154, 107984, 107985, 108242.
SHR
System Health Report - Unit 1/2 Component Cooling Water
11/2023 -
10/2024
TE 1137202
Crew Learning
11/16/2023
Instruction Literature for Gemco 404 Switch
10/30/1975
U277513
Instruction Manual - CCSI Pumps (Pacific Pumps 2 1/2 RL,
Type IJ Safety Pumps)
14.0
Unit 1 - N23 and
Unit 2 - N23
System Health Reports for Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW System
09/30/2024
Operability
Evaluations
CR10740404, CR11082519, CAR276303, TE1144130,
CR10785864, TE1120051.
FNP-0-AOP-49.2
Complete Loss Of Service Water
9.0
FNP-0-ARP-2.2
Emergency Power Board Annunciator Panel W
43.0
FNP-0-ARP-2.4
Emergency Power Board Annunciator Panel Y (C2)
37.0
FNP-0-ARP-2.5
Emergency Power Board Annunciator Panel Z (C2 and E5)
49.0
FNP-0-CCP-25.0
Dose Equivalent Iodine-131 Determination
17.0
FNP-0-EIP-16.0
Emergency Equipment and Supplies
74.0
FNP-0-EMP-
1370.02
Installation And Repair Of Penetration Conduct Seals
2.2
FNP-0-EMP-
1512.02
Molded Case Circuit Breakers Inspection and Test
56.0
FNP-0-EPP-3.0
Emergency Communication Operability Tests 6.0
FNP-0-EPP-3.0
Emergency Communications Operability Testing
7.0
FNP-0-SOP-0.0
General Instructions for Operations Personnel
169.0/174.0
Procedures
FNP-0-SOP-0.4
Fire Protection Program Administration and FP Impairment
131.0
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
(FPIP) Requirements
FNP-0-SOP-37.3
Service Water Building 125V DC Distribution System
2.0
FNP-0-STP-60.7
Emergency Beacon Light Functionality Test - Auxiliary
Building 139' EL - Turbine Building 173"EL - Turbine Building
155'EL
9.1
FNP-0-STP-905.0
Auxiliary Building Battery Inspection (Q1R24E002A,
Q1R24E002B, Q2R24E002A, and Q2R24E002B)
3.1
FNP-0-STP-906.2
Service Water Building Battery Monthly Verification
FNP-1-AOP-1.0
RCS Leakage
30/31
FNP-1-AOP-19.0
Malfunction of Rod Control System
40.0
FNP-1-ARP-1.12
Main Control Board Annunciator Panel M (G1)
93.0
FNP-1-ARP-1.6
Main Control Board Annunciator Panel F
93/94
FNP-1-SOP-2.6
Chemical and Volume Control System: Boric Acid System
46.0
FNP-1-STP-10.3
Emergency Core Cooling Valves Inservice Test and PROV
Block Valve Stroke Test
2.0/43.0
FNP-1-STP-627.0
Local Leak Rate Testing of Containment Penetrations
63.0
FNP-1-STP-640.4
Auxiliary Feedwater Discharge to Steam Generators Lift
Check Valves Full Stroke Test
1.0
FNP-1/2-ARP-1.8
Sections A4, E2, E3, E4, and E5
55/48
FNP-1/2-UOP-1.1
Startup if Unit From Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby
115/113
FNP-2-AOP-1.0
RCS Leakage
30/31
FNP-2-AOP-28.2
Fire In The Control Room
33.0
FNP-2-ARP-1.12
Main Control Board Annunciator Panel M (G2)
68.0
FNP-2-ARP-1.4
Main Control Board Annunciator Panel D
56.0
FNP-2-ARP-1.6
Main Control Board Annunciator Panel F
FNP-2-ETP-
4181.0
TSC Systems Filtration Performance Testing
7.0
FNP-2-STP-10.3
Emergency Core Cooling Valves Inservice Test and PROV
Block Valve Stroke Test
39.0
FNP-2-STP-627.0
Local Leak Rate Testing of Containment Penetrations
69.0
FNP-2-STP-640.4
Auxiliary Feedwater Discharge to Steam Generators Lift
Check Valves Full Stroke Test
1.0
NMP-AD-012-F01
Operability Determination Support Basis (For CR10902518)
08/24/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
NMP-AD-012-
GL04
1.2
NMP-AD-031-
GL01
Past Operability / Functionality
2.0
NMP-DP-001
Operational Risk Awareness
26.1
NMP-EP-142
Emergency Notification
9.0
NMP-EP-142
Emergency Notification (Attachment 9)
9.0
NMP-EP-143-F09
Task Priority Chart
2.0
NMP-EP-143-F15
Farley Alternate Response Facility Checklist
1.0
NMP-EP-146
Emergency Response Organization
5.0
NMP-EP-146-F19
4.0
NMP-EP-146-F26
4.0
NMP-EP-146-F28
4.0
NMP-EP-146-F29
4.0
NMP-EP-146-F34
4.0
NMP-EP-147
Offsite Dose Assessment Automated MIDAS
7.0
NMP-EP-147-002
Farley Units 1 and 2 MIDAS-NU Dose Projections
6.0
NMP-EP-147-F09
FNP Plant Schematic (Systems -Structures - Components)
4.0
NMP-EP-300
SNC Emergency Preparedness Conduct of Operations
(Attachment 1)
30.0
NMP-EP-31 0-
F01
Emergency Notification - Version 5.0 Due to R-15
Modification
05/18/2022
NMP-ES-006-002
Preventive Maintenance Change Requests 2.0
NMP-ES-017-008
MOV Mechanical And Electrical Inspections
11.5
NMP-ES-074-005
Fleet Vibration Instruction
3.0
NMP-GM -003-
F18
Check-In Self Assessment (For EP 2/6-13/2023)
2/28/2023
NMP-GM-002-
001
Corrective Action Program Instructions
2.0
NMP-GM-002-
001
Corrective Action Program Instructions
2.0
NMP-GM-002-
F31
Human Performance Checklist (Unit 2 TSAFWP not Spinning
Up to 2000 RPM)
09/22/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
NMP-GM-003-
F18
Check-In Self-Assessment (CISA) (NRC Pre-Emergency
Preparedness Inspection, June 3-7, 2024)
07/02/2024
NMP-GM-003-
F18
Check-In Self-Assessment (CISA) (For Assessment of Fire
Training Program 11/27/23 - 12/18/2023)
2/19/2023
NMP-GM-003-
F19
Focused Area Self-Assessment (FASA) Plan and Report
(For Pre-NRC FP Team Inspection FASA 5/1-5/2023)
05/24/2023
NMP-GM-008
Operating Experience Program
25.0
NMP-GM-052-
F01
Performance Analysis Worksheet (CR10945545/TE1120957)
2.0
NMP-GM-052-
F01
Performance Analysis Worksheet (For CR10945545 and
TE120957) (DC Ground Source Determination &
Understanding of Installed Ground Detection Systems and
Troubleshooting Equipment)
2.0
NMP-MA-014-001
Post Maintenance Testing Guidance
5.10
NMP-MA-039
Ground Fault Analyzer Setup and Use
6.0
23 Farley NSC Biennial Assessments
CNOS-22-208
Fleet-Ops-2022 Audit Package
08/19/2022
Self-Assessments
Fleet-SEC-2024
24 Fleet Security Audit (Farley)
5/23/2024
Work Orders
Work Orders
(SNC)
391181, 481085, 712183, 743777, 834774, 902508,
1001786, 1026490, 1031959, 1070245, 1071278, 1072037,
1073097-20, 1073231, 1079913, 1121067, 1139298,
1152902, 1166666, 1176150, 1178040, 1182443, 1185079,
1185119, 1186189, 1223297, 1286348, 1304253, 1304253,
1304253, 1352853, 1358713, 1361610, 1361610, 1366328,
1366799, 1367737-01, 1371921, 1380019, 1390758,
1475515, 1475544, 1483287, 1499226, 1499227, 1499228,
1499229, 1499230, 1499231, 1499232, 1499233, 1499234,
1499235, 1499236, 1499237, 1499238, 1499239, 1532730,
1546227, 1555968, 1556051, 1587591, 1599677, 1599681,
1599827, 1680872, 1680892, 1710436, 1718435, 1781754,
1910845, 1998144, 1629442, 1595243, 1599196, 1820062,