ML20134G396
| ML20134G396 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134G373 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-96-14, 50-364-96-14, NUDOCS 9702100395 | |
| Download: ML20134G396 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000348/1996014
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
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Docket Nos:
50 348, 50 364
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License Nos:
NPF-2, NPF 8
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Report No:
50 348/96 14, 50 364/96 14
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Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
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Facility:
Farley Nuclear Plant
Location:
7388 N State Hwy 95
Columbia, AL 336319
Dates:
December 9 13, 1996
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Inspectors:
W. Sartor, Exercise Team Leader
D. Jones, Plant Support Inspector
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G. Salyers, Plant Support Inspector
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Approved by:
K. Barr, Chief. Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
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9702100395 970124
Enclosure
ADOCK 05000348
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Farley Nuclear Plant
NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50 348/96 14, 364/96 14
Tbjs routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of
the biennial emergency preparedness exercise. This full scale plume exposure
exercise included the mobilization of Southern Nuclear Operating Company
(SNC), Alabama Power Company (APC), Federal, State and local personnel and
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resources adequate to verify the capability of partici]ating organizations to
respond to an accident scenario requiring response. T11s inspection report
addresses the response of the licensee's emergency response organization (ER0)
from its onsite facilities which included the Simulator Control Room (SCR),
the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), and the
offsite facilities to include the Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) and the
News Media Center (NMC). Observations addressing the offsite response by the
State and local personnel will be provided in a seaarate report provided by
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the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). T1e onsite evaluation
indicated overall good performance with the exception of two instances when
significant emergency information was not communicated to the appropriate
emergency manager in a timely manner.
Control Room Simulator
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The Unit 2 Shift Supervisor assumed the responsibilities as the
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Emergency Director following his declaring the Alert for the abnormal
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conditions on Unit 1.
The shift personnel properly implemented their
emergency procedures to mitigate the abnormal events.
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Technical Sucoort Center (TSC)
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The Emergency Director (ED) and his staff functioned well in
implementing the Emergency Plan and Procedures to provide an effective
accident response.
Operational Support Center (OSC)
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The OSC Manager was effective in managing resources as directed by the
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TSC.
Emeraency Operations Facility (E0F)
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The EOF staff provided effective support to the ED and/or the E0F
Manager in performing tasks in support of the Emergency Plan and
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Implementing Procedures that focused on the coordination and direction
of the offsite emergency response functions.
News Media Center (NMCl
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This facility was managed to provide timely information to the media.
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Report Details
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Summary of Exercise Events
This biennial emergency preparedness exercise was conducted from 7:00 a.m. to
12:42 p.m. on December 11, 1996.
Player critiques were conducted by the
licensee players in the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) following
termination of the exercise. The NRC exit meeting was conducted on
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December 13, 1996.
VI. Plant Support
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P4.
Staff Knowledge and Performance in EP
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P4.1 Exercise Scenario
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a.
Insoection Scope (82302)
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The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether
provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major
portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's plan.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
The scenario was challenging and progressed from an Alert to a Site Area
Emergency and then to a General Emergency. The scenario fully exercised
the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and
provided sufficient information to the NRC, State and local government
agencies for their full participation in the exercise.
c.
Conclusion
The scenario developed for this exercise was effective in testing the
integrated emergency response capability.
P4.2 Onsite Emeraency Oraanization
a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the functioning of the onsite emergency
organization to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency
response were defined and whether adequate staffing was available to
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respond to the simulated emergency.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
The inspectors noted that the responsibilities for emergency response
were clearly defined. The Unit 2 (the unaffected unit) Shift Supervisor
assumed the responsibilities of the Emergency Director (ED) and other
personnel assumed pre-established emergency responsibilities. The ED
declared the Alert emergency declaration and approved the notification
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message to the offsite government agencies.
Following the Alert
declaration, the ED also directed the call out of the emergency response
organization to staff the ERFs. Pre designated personnel then promptly
responded to staff and then activate the ERFs.
c.
Conclusion
The initial on duty Simulator staff and augmented call-out staff were
sufficient to respond and perform defined emergency responsibilities.
P4.3 Emeraency Classification System
a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed selected emergency response personnel to verify
that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in
use by the licensee.
b.
Observation and Findinas
The licensee's Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 9.0, Emergency
Classification and Actions, provided criteria for the classification of
an emergency based on plant conditions and radiological hazards. The
Unit 2 Shift Sumrvisor, as the interim ED, declared an Alert at 7:15
a.m. based on t1e failure of the reactor protection system to initiate
and complete a reactor trip. The Procedure was next used in the TSC by
the ED to classify a Site Area Emergency (SAE) at 8:55 a.m. with a
reactor coolant system (RCS) leak greater than 500 gpm, dose equivalent
iodine greater than 300 microcuries/ gram, and containment pressure
greater than 27 psig. The General Emergency was declared by the ED at
10:03 a.m., based on the loss of reactor coolant, fuel damage, and only
one train of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) equipment available to
mitigate plant conditions.
Concomitant with the decision to upgrade to
the General Emergency (GE), the containment began to leak which provided
the loss of the third barrier. This was also included in the emergency
description,
c.
Cpnclusion
The licensee's procedure for emergency classifications was effectively
used by the ED in his decision making. A conservative classification
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was initially being made for the GE as recommended by the NRC
participation in the exercise; however, the loss of the containment
barrier concomitant with the decision to upgrade to a GE permitted this
declaration to be in accordance with the approved Emergency Plan and
Implementing Procedures.
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P4.4 Notification Methods and Procedures
a.
Insoection Scoce (82301)
The inspectors observed the licensee's notification of State and local
governmental organizations and emergency personnel to determine whether
timely and substantive emergency information was provided in accordance
with procedures.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The initial Alert emergency notification to the States and counties was
made by the Communicator in the Simulator Control Room. The first
follow up notification and the initial upgrades to the SAE and GE were
made from the TSC. The remainder of the follow up notifications were
all made from the EOF. The inspector observed that the follow up
emergency information to the offsite agencies was driven by the
instructions of the Recovery Manager to his staff to provide follow-up
notifications on the quarter hours and facility briefings on the hour
and half hour. As a result of these instructions, the management of
emergency information to the offsite agencies was clock driven rather
than event driven. This method of operation almost resulted in
conflicting informatior. being transmitted from the E0F following the GE
notification from the TSC.
Specifically, in an attempt to remain on the
quarter hour schedule the EOF was )reparing Message 008, a follow up
message to the GE notification. T1e message was being prepared to
indicate no emergency release was occurring, whereas Message 007 (the GE
notification from the TSC) indicated a release was occurring and
included the containment leaking statement in their emergency
description.
The E0F Communicator noted the discrepancy in his
comaarison of Messages 007 and 008 and did not release the message
altlough it had been approved for release.
Discussions followed and the
message was corrected prior to release.
c.
Conclusion
The licensee demonstrated the ability to make initial and follow up
notifications to the States and counties in a timely manner with
essential information for the upgraded classifications.
Follow up
notifications could be improved to focus on providing emergency
information to offsite agencies as significant changes occurred rather
than providing updates strictly by the clock.
P4.5 Emeraency Communications
a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the flow of communications within the emergency
response organization and from and between the ERFs to determine whether
provisions existed for the prompt transmission of emergency
communications.
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b.
Observation and Findinas
The inspectors observed that the communications between the utility and
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offsite agencies and amongst the ERFs were effective for the prompt
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transmission of emergency information.
The inspectors also noted good
exchange of information between members of the ERO in most instances,
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with two noted exceptions. The first exception was the decision by the
Unit 1 Shift Supervisor to evacuate the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary
Building. Although this was a protective action taken for onsite
personnel, the interim ED was unaware of this decision until asked about
it by the on-call ED prior to turnover. The second exception was the
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failure of the Recovery Manager to be aware of the leaking containment
at the time of the GE. This almost resulted in an incorrect follow up
notification being provided as discussed in paragraph P4.4 above. This
was also important information to the Recovery Manager as the lead
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manager in the EOF where the responsibilities for providing dose
assessment information were located. A major responsibility to be
provided to offsite agencies from the EOF following the GE was a dose
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assessment for the ongoing release. His failure to be timely informed
of the release by either the TSC or his own staff was a significant
oversight. These two instances of significant emergency information not
being communicated to the appropriate emergency managers in a timely
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manner was identified as an exercise weakness.
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Ins)ector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50 348, 364, 96 14 01:
Exercise
Wea(ness Significant emergency information was not communicated
to the appropriate emergency manager in a timely manner.
c.
Conclusion
With the noted exceptions, provisions existed for the prompt
communications among principal response organizations to emergency
personnel, and they were effectively used during the exercise to provide
timely information and coordinate emergency response.
P4.6 Public Education and Information
a.
Insoection Scope (82301)
An inspector observed how information concerning the simulated emergency
was made available to the public.
b.
Observations and Findinas
SNC and APC established its News Media Center in Dothan, AL. The news
information from the licensee appeared to be timely and accurate.
c.
Conclusions
The NMC and its staff were activated and organized in a manner that
provided for the dissemination of timely and accurate information to the
public.
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P4.7 Emeraency Facilities and Eauioment
a.
Inspection Scoce (82301)
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The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of
selected ERFs to determine whether adecuate emergency facilities and
equipment were available and maintainec to support an emergency
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response.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
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Control Room Simulator
An inspector observed that the on shift
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designated crew in the Simulator acted promptly to initiate the
. emergency response. The simulator was static for this exercise:
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however, the facility and equipment appeared to support the crew as they
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responded to the scripted messages.
The TSC was promptly activated with assigned
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emergency response personnel. The facility layout provided for the
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necessary communication between the TSC Manager and his staff.
Operational Support Center
The activetion of the OSC was not observed
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by the NRC inspection team.
Periodic brief observations during the
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exercise indicated the facility and equipment su) ported the OSC Manager
in his management of re-entry teams as directed ay the TSC.
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Emergency Operations Facility - The E0F was activated and functioned
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well as personnel worked effectively with the available equipment.
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c.
Conclusion
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The ERFs were organized, equipped, and maintained in a manner that
provided for the emergency response.
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P4.8 Protective Responses
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a.
Inspection Scope (82301)
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The inspectors observed the protective actions implemented for onsite
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personnel and the protective action recommendations provided by the
licensee to the offsite agencies.
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b.
Observations and Findinos
Protective action recommendations (PAR) made by the Unit 1 Shift
Supervisor early in the accident sequence were appropriate but should
have been coordinated with the interim ED. Offsite protective action
recommendations were timely and appropriate.
The licensee monitored the
changing _ conditions following the initial PARS and modified the PARS
when appropriate.
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c.
Conclusion
The licensee demonstrated the ability to implement protective measures
for onsite personnel (with the noted exception) and to make the required
PARS for the protection of the public.
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P4.9 Exercise Critiaue
a.
Insoection Scope (82301)
The inspectors observed the facility critiques immediately following the
exercise and portions of the controller / evaluator organization critique
process to determine whether weaknesses noted in the licensee's
emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee
management.
b.
Observations and Findinas
The licensee conducted effective player critiques following exercise
termination.
From the player comments and the controller / evaluator
observations, the controller / evaluator staff determined the performance
of the emergency organization responding to the simulated accident to be
satisfactory. A good summary of this performance and sup>orting
observations was provided to licensee management on Decem)er 13, 1996,
just prior to the NRC Exit Meeting.
c.
Conclusion
The controller / evaluator organization did a good job of analyzing
exercise performance.
V. Manaoement Meetinas
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Exit Meeting Summary
The Team Leaders presented the inspection summary to members of licensee
management at the conclusion of the inspection on December 13. 1996.
The summary indicated fully satisfactory performance with the exception
of the exercise weakness addressing the flow of key emergency
information.
No proprietary information is contained in this report.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSON CONTACTED
Licensee
R. Coleman, Maintenance Manager
R. Hill, Nuclear Plant General Manager
J. Horn, Outage Planning Supervisor
W. Lee, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
.R. Lero, Shift Supervisor
D. Morey, Vice President, Nuclear
C. Nesbitt, Assistant General Manager, Support
R. Vanderbye, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
J. Walden, Senior Instructor
W. Warren. Engineering Support Supervisor
P. Webb. Technical Training Supervisor
R. Wiggins, Planning and Scheduling Supervisor
L. Williams, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 82301:
Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors
IP 82302:
Review of Exercise Objective and Scenarios for Power Reactors
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50 348, 364,/96 14-01:
IFI
Exercise Weakness Significant emergency
information was not communicated to the
appropriate emergency manager in a timely
manner.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
APC
Alabama Power Company
Emergency Director
E0F
Emergency Response Facility
ER0
Emergency Response Organization
Federal Emergency Management Agency
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General Emergency
g mi
Gallons Per Minute
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Inspector Follow up Item
NHC
News Media Center
Operational Support Center
Protective Action Recommendation
psig
Pounds Per Square Inch Gravity
Site Area Emergency
Simulator Control Room
Southern Nuclear Company
Attachment (10 Pages):
Objectives, Initial Conditions, Narrative Summary, and Sequence of Events
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1996 FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT-
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ANNUAL EXERCISE OBJECTIVES
December 11,1996
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1.
Participating Organizations
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Full Participation:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC), Alabama Power Company
o'C), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), State of Alabama, State of
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5 argia, Houston / Henry County, and Early County.
Partial Participation: s ate of Florida
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II.
Purpose
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A.
To meet the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E,44CFR350.0 and NUREG-
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0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1.
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B.
To conduct a full ccale plume exposure exercise which willinclude the mobilization of SNC,
APC, Federal, State and Local personnel and resources adequate to verify the capability of
participating organizations to respond to an accident scenario requiring response.
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111.
Southern Nuclear Operating Company and Alabama Power Company Objectives
A.
On-site
1.
Demonstrate that control room staff can assess the event, classify the event, take
corrective measures to control the event and activate emergency response
procedures.
2.
Demonstrate that plant staff can activate and staff the Technical Support Center
(TSC) and perform accident response activities including:
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a. Dose Assessment
b. Off-site notification and protective action recommendations
c. Reclassification of emergency status
d. Personnel Accountability for all personnel on-site
e. Radiation Monitoring Team (RMT) Dispatch and Control (if required)
f. Site access control and admittance of essential personnel
g. Dispatch and control of re-entry teams
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3.
Demonstrate the capability to turn over EOF functions to the EOF staff when the
EOF is activated and staffed.
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4.
Demonstrate that plant staff can activate and staff the Emergency Operations
Facility (EOF) and perform accident response activities including:
a. Assuming the dose assessment function and the RMT direction and control
function from the TSC staff.
b. Coordinating logistics, engineering functions, licensing functions and manpower
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c. Preparing and coordinating news releases and activating the NMC.
Emergency Communication Organization staff assigned to the EOF and NMC will be prepositioned in
the Dothan Area to reduce transport time and thus allow for sufficient time to exercise the facilities.
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1996 FNP Annual Exercise Objectives
Page 2
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Demonstrate the capability to augment EOF staff with non-essential plant
personnel.
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Demonstrate the adequacy of the plant's communication system including:
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a. Communication links to Corporate Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
b. News Media Center (NMC)
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c. Interplant communications
d. Communication links to state and local authorities
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7.
Demonstrate the capability to perform radiological monitoring.
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B.
Off-Site
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Demonstrate that the corporate staff can be activated and staff the EOC in a timely _
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. fashion.
2.
Demonstrate that Corporate Headquarters Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
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staff can provide support for:
a. Activation of facilities
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b. Logistics (as required)
c. Engineering and Licensing (as required)
d. Support organization notification
e. Briefing of company management
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f. News release preparation
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3.
Demonstrate that the Public Information Organization can respond to media and
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public inquiries, establish a rumor control center, and issue and coordinate news
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releases,
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IV.
State and Local Objectives
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See Attachment 1 (Any State or Local objective that cannot be demonstrated due to
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conditions inconsistent with the scenario will be demonstrated in a separate drill.)
(Reference Extent of Play Agreements between the States and FEMA.)
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V.
Joint Objectives (SNC, APC, NRC, State of Alabama, State of Georgia, State of Florida,
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Houston / Henry County and Early County)
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A.
Demonstrate that all parties can coordinate news re! eases and conduct a joint news
conference.
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B.
Demonstrate that adequate technical information can be exchanged among involved
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agencies.
VI.
Exercise Limits
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The plume exposure exercise will be conducted on December 11 and will begin prior to 8 A.M Central and
conclude by 2:30 P.M. Central.
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anexob96. doc
8/29/96
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1996 ANNUAL EMERGENCY EXERCISE
INITIAL CONDITIONS
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DECEMBER 11,1996
1.0
INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS
1.1
Unit 1
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100% power steady state,874 MWs,174 days on-line.
IC RCP lower oil reservoir has possible oil leak.
Boron concentration 810 ppm.
A train is the on-service train.
1 A Aux Building Main Exhaust fan is out of service due to motor winding
ground.
1.2
Unit 2
100% power and steady state,872 MWs,282 days on-line
Boron concentration 390 ppm
A train is the on service train
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2.0
UNIT 1
a)
LCO for IB Charging Pump
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2.2
UNIT 2
None
INITIAL CONDITIONS PAGE 1
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3.0
MAINTENANCE ITEMS
3.1
UNIT 1
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l A Auxiliary Building fan motor removal in process. Motor to be shipped for
rewinding.
1B Charging pump is tegged out for speed changer reduction gear repair.
Estimated maintenance completion is 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. Pump was declared inoperable 6
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hours ago.
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3.2
UNIT 2
Operations is receiving new fuel.
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4.0
METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS
Wind Speed:
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3.0 mph at 150 feet
3.3 mph at 35 feet
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Wind direction from:
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7 degrees at 150 feet
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10 degrees at 35 feet
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Delta T
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-1.34 degrees channel 1
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-1.34 degrees channel 2
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INITIAL CONDITIONS PAGE 2
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1996 ANNUAL EMERGENCY EXERCISE
NARRATIVE SUMMARY
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December 11,1996
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The exercise stans at 0700. At 0705 the IC RCP trips resulting in a main turbine trip.
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The reactor fails to trip automatically (ATWT) but is manually tripped by the Control
Room crew by opening the.CRDM MG set breakers from the Main Control Board. Rods
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F2, F6, H6, and M4 fail to fully insert. Emergency boration is started per the Emergency
Operating Procedures (EOPs).
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Following the reactor trip, radiation monitors RE-4, 6, 7,11,12, and 24A/B alarm
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resulting in Containment Purge automatic isolation. Actions of AOP-32 are begun based
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on possible indications of high RCS activity (Approximately 3% clad failure has occurred
due to the high power to flow condition when the 1C RCP tripped).
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At approximately 0720 the Control Room staff should declare an ALERT emergency
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based on Emergency Implementing Procedure (EIP) 9.0. Plant staff will start taking
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actions for an Alert emergency and the TSC and EOF staffs will be called in to the plant.-
Within 75 minutes of the Alert declaration, the TSC and EOF should have minimum staff
in place and start turning over to perform designated functions. The EOC in Birmingham
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will also have staff available to support plant operations.
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At 0742 rod F2 falls to 122 steps.
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The 1A Charging Pump trips at approximately 0835. The 1A CCW pump and IC
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Charging Pump are started by the Control Room crew to restore normal charging and seal
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injection flow. Rod H6 falls to 50 steps. Repair teams are dispatched to investigate and
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repair the 1 A Charging Pump.
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At approximately 0841 indications of increasing charging flow lead the Control Room
crew to enter AOP-1 to determine if an RCS leak exists. At approximately 0843 the crew
has indications that RCS leakage is in excess of 50 gpm.
At 0845 the crew observes a rapid decrease in pressurizer level, a corresponding increase
in Containment pressure, increasing Containment radiation levels and Safety Injection
automatically actuates. The cause of the transient is a large break loss of coolant accident
on the 1A Reactor Coolant loop which causes fuel cladding failure to increase to
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approximately 50%. Containment pressure peaks at 41 psig. Following implementation
of the EOPs the crew determines that the 1 A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump, l A
Containment Spray pump, and the IB and IC Containment Fan Coolers have tripped
indication. Rods F2, F6, H6, and M4 indicate fully inserted.
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At approximately 0852 the staff should determine the need to upgrade the emergency
classification to a SITE AREA EMERGENCY based on EIP-9.0. Once declared the
NARRATIVE SUMMARY PAGE 1
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plant staff should begin taking actions for a Site Area emergency per the Emergency
Implementing Procedures (EIPs) while the crew continues actions per the EOPs.
By approximately 0940 the crew completes alignment of the Emergency Core Cooling
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System (ECCS) to the cold leg recirculation mode. Steam Generator depressurization per
EEP-1.0 begins.
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At approximately 0945 the Reactor Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) indicates
that water level has been restored in the reactor vessel.
At approximately 1000 the crew begins alignment of the Containment Spray System to
the recirculation mode.
At 1002 indications of release from containment to the
environment through the penetration room are observed concurrent with loss of flow
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indication from FT-958B (B Train Containment Spray Flow Transmitter). The release
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path to environment is via a B Train Containment Spray pipe break at FT-958B due to the
thermal transient caused by placing the Containment Spray system on recirculation. By
approximately 1007 Plant staff should declare a GENERAL EMERGENCY and begin
taking actions for a General emergency based on EIP-9.0.
It is anticipated that the leak from the Containment Spray system cannot be stopped prior
to the end of the exercise due to high dose rates in the areas where work would need to be
performed.
The News Media Center (NMC) will be activated and staffed by representatives from
SNC, APC, the State of Alabama, the State of Georgia, the State of Florida,
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Houston / Henry County, Early County, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
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Media and public interest will be simulated and news releases will be prepared and
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released.
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The exercise will terminate once the radiation monitoring teams have tracked the plume,
the EOF has been s'taffed and is performing EOF activities and the NMC has conducted a
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press conference. The termination will be coordinated with the States of Alabama,
Georgia, and Florida ifeccumng prior to 1300 Central time.
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NARRATIVE SUMMARY PAGE 2
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1996 Annual Exercise
-
Seanence of Events
,
Min
Event
Action / Expected Response
0700
Initial Conditione
100% Power,810 ppm (MOL), Control Rods at 228 steps
IB Charging Pump tagged out for work on speed changer
reduction gear
0705
EEP-0 entered
i
First Out Annunciator is gel - ONE LOOP LO FLOW OR
RCP BKRS OPEN RX TRIP
.
FRPS.1 entered
!
.
Crew trips CRDM MG set breakers
l
Main Turbine trips automatically
from MCB to trip the reactor
j
Reactor does not trip automatically and does not trip using the
Roving SO called to open Unit 1
e
l
MCB handswitches
l
Reactor Trip Breakers locally
All rods are fully inserted except rods F2, F6, H6, and M4
Crew begins emergency boration
e
F2=2!o
.
.
F6"lG.
e
H6tl68
.
- M4=228
0707
FH1 - RMS HI RAD annunciates due to R-6,11, and 12
Crew evaluates the alarms per FH1 and
alarming
AOP-32:
Chemistry contacted to sample RCS for
(Controller note: Alarms are due to normal RCS leakage inside
activity per CCP 1300
CTMT and existing letdown / charging flowpaths; no new
leakage path is responsible for these radiation monitors)
Chemistry contacted to sample all SGs
for activity
(3% Clad Failure due to high power to flow ratio)
HP should be contacted to survey
e
Auxiliary Building
0708
FH4 - RE24 A OR B HI RAD annunciates due to R24A & B
Crew verifies actions of FH1 completed
alarming
Containment Purge automatically isolates
(Controller note: When CTMT purge is
e
isolated R24A and B will return to near pre-
(Controller note: Alarms are due to normal RCS leakage inside
event levels)
CTMT and existing letdown / charging flowpaths; no new
leakage path is responsible for these radiation monitors)
0710
System Operator opens RX Trip Breakers locally and reports to
Crew verifies breakers open on the MCB
the Control Room
0712
Crew transitions back to EEP-0
Unit 2 Shift Supervisor begins classification
of the emergency event per EIP-9.0.
0713
Crew transitions to ESP-0.1
0714
FH1 - RMS HI RAD annunciates due to R4 alarming
Crew evaluates the alarm per FH1
0715
Turbine Building SO contacted to isolate the
Turbine Building
0720
FH1 - RMS HI RAD annunciates due to R7 alarming
Crew evaluates alarm per FHl.
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1996 Annual Exercise
%
Sequence of Events
0720
Crew expected to declare ALERT based on
EIP-9.0, Guideline 3, step 5.0, " Failure of
the reactor protection system to initiate and
complete a trip which brings the reactor
suberitical(ATWT)".
When ALERT declared appropriate
notifications and ERO activation should be
made:
Contact Emergency Director
Contact Recovery Manager
!
e
Contact Emergency Support Manager
e
Activation of TSC/ EOF /EOC via CAN
e
ECO activated by EC (NMC pre-
e
activated)
ARCD, GEMA, and NRC notified per
e
EIP-9.
0729
e Crew transitions to UOP 2.1
Maintenance contacted to determine
e
AOP-4.0 referenced
0733
Per procedure crew places steam dumps in steam pressure mode
Counting Room notified to perform CCP-
and in doing so open atmospherics
645
J
0734
DG4 - l A BAT LVL LO-LO alarns
Crew stops emergency boration
0742
F2 rod falls to 122 steps
0750
Crew may secure l A RCP per UOP 2.1 if
Operations Manager desires (Controller
intervention required to prevent securing the
RCP to maintain data package integrity)
0835
1 A Charging Pump trips and IB is not available
Crew recognizes that the l A Charging Pump
has tripped and starts I A CCW pump and 1C
H6 rod falls to 50 steps
Charging Pump manually
Rover and A-man requested to
e
investigate DF06 and Charging pump
problem, respectively.
SS will evaluate Tech Specs for
.
applicability for the failure
-0839
FH1 -RMS HI RAD anunciates due to R2 alarming
Crew refers to ARP FH1
HP notified
0841+
Indications of PZR level control problems
Crew enters AOP-1.0
Pressurizer level slowly lowering
Crew may manually increase charging
e
VCT auto makeup starts
and/or reduce letdown
,
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1996 Annual Exercise
- 4
Seauence of Events
0841+
Rover reports overcurrent trip flag on
I A Charging pump
A-man reports no abnormal conditions
indicated at the l A Charging pump
0843
Crew determines that leak rate might be in
excess of 50 gpm
0843
MK4 - LIQ GAS PROC PNL ALARM alarms
A-man contacted to investigate cause of the
i
alarm (WHT level rise)
0845
Pressurizer level and RCS pressure rapidly decreasing
Crew reenters EEP-0
l
Safety Injection horn sounds
GB4 - PRZR LO PRESS RX TRIP /SI is first out annunciator
i
.
l
All rods indicate fully inserted
'
0846+
Containment pressure rapidly increasing
EEP-0 immediate actions completed and
crew continues in EEP-0
RX Vessel Level Indication System (RVLIS) = 0%
1 A RHR pump discovered tripped
j
e
i
(Containment pressure peaks at 41 psig)
Crew secures RCPs and verifies Phase B
actuation
(Core damage increases to 50% clad failure due to rapid RCS
depressurization and subsequent core uncovery)
1 A CTMT Spray pump discovered
tripped
IB and IC Fan Coolers discovered
e
failed - will not run in slow speed or re-
start in fast speed
0852
SPDS indicates
Crew completes EEP-0 and transitions to
Red Path on P1 exists
FRP P.1
e
Orange path on 21 exists
Staff expected to declare a SITE AREA
EMERGENCY based on EIP-9.0,
Guideline 2, step 1.1 "RCS fault - A major
loss of primary coolant",
Activation of the EOF should be made if
e
not already done
Plant Emergency Alarm (PEA) should
e
be sounded starting the protected area
accountability
Notifications to ARCD, GEMA, NRC,
and ESM commence
0854
Crew transitions to FRP Z.1
0855
Emergency Notification Form should be complete
0856
Crew transitions to EEP-1
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1996 Annual Exercise
- ~
Sequence of Events
0857+
Procedural requirements will be relayed to TSC for
Crew requests TSC to close ECCS
accomplishment via reentry
disconnects
TSC requested to evaluate RCS sample
requirements and initiate needed sampling
actions
0907
EIP-9.0 upgrade notifications should be complete
0922
Protected area accountability should be complete
0929
CH2/CH3 annunciates indicating RWST LO Level
Crew enters ESP-1.3 to align for cold leg
recirculation
0933
CTMT pressure decreases to less than 4 psig
0938
Crew completes ESP 1.3 and returns to EEP-
I until RWST LO-LO level
0942+
Crew begins SG depresurization
0945
RVLIS indicates level restoration
TSC contacted by crew to determine RX
Vessel vent requirements and long term
cooling requirements
0956
CH4/CH5 annunciate indicating RWST LO-LO level
Crew begins to realign the CTMT Spray
system to recirculation mode per ESP-1.3
1002
CTMT Spray realignment to recirculation is completed
Crew refers to ARP FHI and notifies HP.
FT-958B transmitter fails low
FH1 - RMS HI RAD annunciates due to R14, R21, R22, and
R29 alarming.
1007
(Release is from the B train CTMT Spray system once CTMT
Plant statT should decide to upgrade the
Spray is aligned to take suction from the CTMT sump. A
emergency classification to GENERAL
thermal transient due to placing Containment Spray on sump
EMERGENCY based on EIP-9.0 Guideline
recirculation results in pipe failure at FT-958B in the 100'
1, step 1.2 " Fission Product Barriers - Loss
Piping Penetration Room. Securing the Spray pump will stop
of two of three fission product barriers with
,
the pumping of CTMT sump water into the Penetration Room
a potentialloss of the third"
but will not stop the release. CTMT atmosphere back leakage
(Dose projections should indicate a need to
from the CTMT Spray header into the Penetration Room will
declare a Site Area Emergency bwd
continue due to Penetration Room isolation check valve 8822B
radiological release).
being partially stuck open.)
Make appropriate notifications pr EIP-
e
9.0.
Make protective action
recommendations
Sound PEA (if not previously actuated).
e
Have the News Media Center (NMC)
activated (if not previously activated).
Plant Staff may send recrury :am(s) to
.
locate the source of the leak trom the
containment
1022
EIP-9.0 upgrade notifications should be complete
TSC is expected to continue actions
necessary to stop release. (All actions will
be unsuccessful due to habitability).
l 1300
Scenario termination
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