IR 05000348/1993017
| ML20056G892 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 08/10/1993 |
| From: | Maxwell G, Morgan M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056G890 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-93-17, 50-364-93-17, NUDOCS 9309070280 | |
| Download: ML20056G892 (9) | |
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k UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON
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y a-o REGION 11 l
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.: 50-348/93-17 and 50-364/93-17 Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P.O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 Docket Nos.:'- 50-348 and-50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 l
Facility name:- Farley~ 1 and 2
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Inspection Conducted: June 29 - July 30, 1993 Inspectors:
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Y[./ K5 George F. Maxwell, Seniof. Resident Inspector D&te/ Signed
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Mic J. Nor ~,
esident Inspector 06te/ Signed
Approved by: 6e hw
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t/s /M Fldyd S. Cantrell, ChiWf Da'te / Signed
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Reactor Projects Section IB Division of Reactor Projects
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SUfMARY_
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i Scope:
This routine, resident inspection involved on-site inspection of operations,
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maintenance... surveillance, industry technical issues, follow-up of facility events and a continuing evaluation of licensee self-assessment. A deep
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backshift was performed July 2,1993.
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Results:
On July 1, the "2B" Circulating Water pump tripped due to a lightning strike, paragraph 3.a. On July 21, a systems operator during the filling of an auxiliary feedwater pump room sump, operated an ESF valve without permission
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l from the shift supervisor, paragraph 3.b. On July 6, maintenance personnel L
installed D/G air compressor valves incorrectly, paragraph 4.b.
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industry technical issues were addressed by the licensee, paragraph 6.
During this reporting period, two incidents occurred which reduced the safety margin controls for radiation protection. Use of the " STAR" program guidelines by licensee personnel prevented further problems, paragraph 7.
Licensee action taken on a previous inspection finding was appropriate, paragraph 8.
No violations or deviations were. identified. Results of this inspection indicate that actions by management, operations, maintenance and other site personnel were adequate.
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'9309070280'930812
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PDR ADOCK 05000348 O
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REPORT DETAILS l
1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
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- W. Bayne, Supervisor Safety Audit and Engineering Review
- C. Buck, Technical Manager
- R. Coleman, Modification Manager
- P. Crone, Superintendent, Operations Support L Enfinger, Administrative Manager
- R. Hill, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant
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M.'Mitchell, Superintendent, Health Physics and Radwaste C. Nesbitt, Operations Manager
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i J. Osterholtz, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
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- J. Powell, Unit Supervisor - Plant Operations i
- L. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations L
J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager
- R. Tyler, Acting Maintenance Manager
- Attended the exit interview
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Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations personnel, security, maintenance, I&C and office personnel.
From July 26 - 27, F. Cantrell, Section Chief, Reactor Projects Branch
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IB, observed resident inspector activities, interviewed licensee personnel and toured the facility.
From July 27 - 29, T. Ross, Senior Project Manager, NRR, visited the plant site and met with resident NRC and facility. personnel in i
preparation for assuming the Senior Resident Inspector, Farley, position in October, 1993.
Acronyms and initializations used throughout this report are listed in
the last paragraph.
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2.
Plant Status a.
Units 1 and 2 Status Units 1 & 2 operated at full power for most of the reporting
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period. However, Unit 2 reduced power to 70 percent during repair activities to restore "2B" circulating water pump motor function.
This motor was damaged during a lightning strike July 1,1993.
(See Paragraph 3.a.).
Full power was restored July 5 at 8:52 a.m.
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b.
NRC/ Licensee Meetings and Inspections During the week of July 5, Region II Security & Safeguards personnel conducted a routine inspection of FNP site security procedures, staff and training (Report 50-348,364/93-18).
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During thh rek of July 12, Region II Radiological Control
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= personnel. conducted a routine unannounced inspection of the
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plant's radiation protection practices, staffing, organization and l
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training (Report. 50-348,364/93-16).
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On July 15, NRR and Region II management met with Southern Nuclear
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Operating Company (SNC) personnel to discuss SNC's present programs for " error reduction" at Farley, configuration management
and their on-going program for plant motor operated valves
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'(Meeting Summary Letter E.W. Merschoff letter to SNC dated l
July 23,1993).
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Changes in SNC Personnel
'On July 21, SNC's board of directors named Mr. D. N. Morey General LManager,~ Plant Support as Vice President of the Farley Project.
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Operational' Safety Verification (71707)
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The inspectors conducted routine tours to verify license requirements i
are being met. Tours included review of site documentation, interviews j
with plant personnel and an on-going evaluation of licensee self-
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assessment.
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i a.
Circulating Water (CW) Pump Trip Due To Lightning Strike - Unit 2 i
On July 1, at about 4:22 p.m. (CST) the "2B" CW pump tripped due i
to a lightning strike. This loss of the CW pump caused a reduction in condenser vacuum and plant operations personnel
immediately reduced mit 2 power to about 60 percent in order to
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stabilize the plant. Electrical maintenance personnel immediately
investigated, and reported an instantaneous overcurrent trip i
condition on the associated CW pump breaker "DB04".
management decided to increase and, again, stabilize plant power j
at about 70 percent (the maximum nominal power obtainable with one
.CW pump operating). The inspectors observed portions of CW pump
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motor removal, replacement and testing activities and noted that these activities were performed satisfactory and in accordance with prepared work orders and vendor manual directions. On July 5, at 3:00 a.m. operation of the "2B" CW pump was restored and at 8:52 a.m. the unit's output was increased to 99 percent, which is currently Unit 2's full power operating mode.
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b.
Unauthorized and Inappropriate Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System
Drain Valve Operation - Unit 2 On July 21, at 4:30 a.m. (CST), a system operator (S0), during filling operations of the turbine-driven AFW (TDAFW) pump room sump, operated an ESF valve, the "2B" motor-driven AFW (MDAFW)
suction oipino drain valve, without permission from the shift
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supervisor (SS). Also, during the filling operation, about 60 gallons of non-radiological, condensate storage tank water, backflowed into the "2B" MDAFW pump room area.
The S0 was instructed to fill the TDAFW pump room sump with water for testing; however, the source of water to be used was not specified or a procedure (or written instruction) provided.
Upon receiving these instructions, he proceeded to the TDAFW pump room and determined that the sump had a sealed cover. He did not discuss with or request additional instructions from any crew member or the SS on how to fill the sump or what source of water to use. The SO noted that one of the inlets to the TDAFW room sump was the ESF-designated "2B" MDAFW pump condensate suction piping drain. The 50 decided to fill the sump by opening the drain valve and to stop filling the sump when he noted overflow via the sump vent. He asked the control board operator to call him when the "high sump" alarm was received; however, no other part of his plan was discussed. His method of filling the TDAFW pump room sump proved to be inadequate because of the height of the vent in relation to the drain line and the as-built piping configurations.
The drain water enters the sump via a larger HDAFW pump room drain pipe, and because the MDAFW pump room drain pipe is lower than the TDAFW room sump vent, water will backflow into the MDAFW pump room without the sump overflowing through TDAFW the sump vent. At the end of the reporting period an investigation of this incident by the licensee and the inspector was "on-going". Also, while immediate corrective actions for the event had been performed by the licensee, oths long-term actions had not been fully determined. There.7re, until the inspectors can fully evaluate the full extent of licensee corrective actions proposed and final event disposition, this item is identified as unresolved item (UNR) 50-364/93-17-01, Unauthorized AFW system drain valve operation.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
With the exception of the above mentioned unresolved item, results of inspections in the operations area indicate that operations personnel conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedures.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors reviewed various FNP preventative / corrective maintenance activities, to determine conformance with facility procedures, work requests and NRC regulatory requirements.
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Portions of the following activities were observed / reviewed:
a HWR-271138; Unit 1 main turbine thrust bearing temperature indication - erratic operation - troubleshoot The inspector reviewed documentation for associated troubleshooting efforts and noted that a proper release of the
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I component was obtained from the SS. The inspector noted that the l
L leads were lifted at the system monitoring panel - the "Omniguard" i
panel - and an input signal was placed into the circuitry for
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testing.
It was determined by the technician that the l
l thermocouple was defective and should be replaced when the proper
i parts were available. The circuitry was restored to normal and j
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another MWR (#273147) was written for thermocouple replacement during the next unit outage. The work performed was satisfactory and in accordance with directions contained in the MWR and the
"Omniguard" panel servicel/ technical manual.
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FNP-0-MP-84.0; Vibration Measurement for Safety Related Pumps -
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"lA" Containment Spray (CS) Pump
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The inspector observed set-up for and portions of the CS pump l
vibration measurement. Readings obtained were reviewed by the inspector and noted to be within expected ranges. Work performed was satisfactory and.in accordance with the procedure.
m MWR-272534; "lB" D/G Jacket Water Piping Thermocouples (T/C)
The inspector reviewed the mounting of temporary T/Cs to the "lB" D/G inlet and outlet jacket water piping in order to support the requirements of.a systems performance group test procedure. The T/C and wiring were wrapped around the piping and covered with
"Kaowool" insulation. These T/Cs are to be removed sometime in August, after completion of testing. Work performed was satisfactory and in accordance with directions contained in the MWR package.
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"lB" D/G "A" and "B" Train Air Compressor Low Pressure (LP)
Suction and Discharge Valves Installed Incorrectly On July 6, during a followup of the maintenance inspection conducted on the "lB" D/G air compressors, it was noted by maintenance supervision that the mechanics involved had installed the "A" and "B" train air compressor LP suction and discharge valves incorrectly. The suction valves were installed in the discharge port areas and the discharge valves were installed in I
the suction port areas on both compressors. The valves were l
immediately removed and reinstalled into their correct ports. The D/G was " tagged-out" for other maintenance during the repair of
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the compressors and was inoperable throughout the above incident.
The problem was identified as " inattention to detail" and the maintenance personnel involved were reminded of the importance of
"doing the job right, the first time".
Elements of FNP's " STAR" program were also addressed during subsequent coaching sessions and the individuals involved stated that the problem was simply a
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j mistake. Although adequate guidance for valve replacement was in
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place, procedures used are being revised to further ensure correct j.
identification / placement of the valves. Training has been tasked l
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with "re-emphasizing" the importance of ensuring " attention to detail" during maintenance of these compressors. The inspectors observed that the actions taken by FNP management were correct and in accordance with approved fat.ility administrative and " conduct of maintenance" procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area. The results of inspections in the maintenance area indicate that both operations and maintenance personnel generally conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedures.
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Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
Inspectors witnessed surveillance test activities performed on safety-related systems and components in order to verify that such activities were performed in accordance with facility procedures and NRC regulatory and licensee technical specification requirements.
The following surveillance activities were observed / reviewed:
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1-STP-1.0 Operations Daily / Shift Surveillance Requirements 2-STP-1.0 Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 The inspectors routinely observed operator activities while parameters were monitored, documented and evaluated.
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1-STP-16.1; Containment Spray Pump Quarterly Inservice Test The inspectors observed chemical sampling, pump / motor oil level checks, " rack-in" of the pump breaker, pump start and other items associated with the quarterly inservice test of the "IA" CS pump. The inspectors found that the test was satisfactory, and conducted as prescribed in accordance with the approved plant procedure.
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1-STP-62.0; Unit 1 Governor Valve Operability Testing The inspectors reviewed documentation associated with a satisfactory " cycling" of the governor valves. Valve operability was determined to be satisfactory and in accordance with approved plant procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area. The results of inspections in the surveillance area indicate that personnel conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedure _.
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Industry Technical Issues - Resident Inspector-Inquires and FNP Response
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Part 21 Report From Rosemont Aerospace - Model 1154 Series H L
Pressure Transmitters Shipped To 15 Customers May Not Comply With
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l Design Specifications Problem: Rosemont Aerospace reported on May 27, 1993, that 399 pressure transmitters which may not meet specifications were assembled and shipped to 15 customers. It was not known, at the time of the report if any of the transmitters were being used in j
safety systems.
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FNP Response:
Licensee engineering personnel contacted Rosemont
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and were told that none of the referenced transmitters in the f
notice, were shipped-to FNP.
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Part 21 Report From MKW Power Systems - Potelitial Defect With
Square "D" Pressure And Temperature Switches Problem: MKW Power Systems, a group which supplies switches to utilities for use in D/G alarms and shutdown circuitry, noted that some Class 9025, Type "G" switches - manufactured between September,1991 and May,1993, may have potential problems with
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the adhesive used to secure the switch operating rod.
FNP Response: FNP MESG personnel contacted MKW Power Systems and were told that the switches described in the notice were
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those used at FNP.
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Eagle Signal Control Timers - Possible Binding Problems
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Problem: Another plant experienced timer reset problems due to l
binding in their D/G sequencer timers. These timers were i
manufactured by Eagle Signal Control.
FNP Response:
FNP found that they do not use these timers in any similar application and that those "on-site" timers manufactured
by Eagle Signal Control, are of a different model than that found
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at the referenced plant.
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Upon review,- the inspectors found FNP's response to the above issues l
were acceptable.
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FNP's Error Reduction Program (STAR) (40500)
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During this reporting period, the inspectors noted two incidents which reduced the effectiveness of the licensee's radiation program.
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following incidents, the application of " STAR" principles by licensee
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personnel prevented further problems:
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a.
While performing a review of STPs on the night shift, a chemistry technician noted an anomaly in the reported activity in a waste monitor tank. Upon further investigation, the technician
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discove ed that a permit generated for release of the tank had erroneous calculations due to improper data. The permit was
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subsequently corrected using the proper data and issued. This review of all associated release documentation, and by not simply
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"taking items for face value", identified a potential problem which could have gone undetected.
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Following a routine tour, an 50 noted that his radiation dose was higher, (not substantially, but relatively higher), than what he normally received from previous tours. He reported this
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discrepancy to the SS who then reported the incident to health l.
physics (HP) personnel. An HP technician followed the 50 on
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another tour and noted that a " hot spot" had collected in a
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recycle holdup tank drain line. This incident displayed a questioning attitude and improved communications / teamwork between FNP work groups.
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Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92700)
(Closed) Unit 2 NOV 50-364/93-04-01, Procedure violations with two examples due to personnel error. A corrective action report was prepared by the licensee. The personnel error for the unplanned safety injection of borated water on February 2, 1993, was noted as an operator failing to "self-check" his operation (closure) of the hot leg safety injection valve prior to opening the charging pump cross-connect valves. He also failed to sign-off appropriate steps as completed. The operator was " coached" on "self-checking" techniques and pr:;cedural
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compliance. The event was discussed with operations persor.nel. The
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procedure was revised to remove multiple steps which contributeo in the incorrect performance of the assigned task.
The personnel error for the unplanned injection of February 5, 1993 was
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noted as an operator failing to "self-check" his actions (involving light indications during instrument testing) and his failure to report
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-this unusual and unexpected conditions to the SS. The individual (
involved was disciplined for failure to use "self-checking" techniques
and for failure to effectively communicate with other members of the crew. The procedure was revised to include the expected lamp indications for all modes of plant operation. Training has included the elements of this event in their operator training program. This item is closed.
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9.
Exit Interview
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l The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management l
interviews throughout the report period and on August 4, 1993, with the
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plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by l
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the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee was informed that l
the item discussed in paragraph 8 was closed.
ITEM NUMBER DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE 50-364/93-17-01 (UNR)-
Unautherized AFW system drain
valve operation j
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Acronyms and Abtreviations AFW
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Auxiliary Feedwater Administrative Procedure AP
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Component Cooling Water
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Containment Spray System i
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D/G Emergency Diesel Generator i
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Division of Reactor Projects DRP
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Emergency Core Cooling System Emergency Preparedness EP
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ESF Engineered Safety Features
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Farley Nuclear Plant
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Health Physics
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Instrumentation and Controls
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Limiting Condition for Operation LP Low Pressure
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MDAFW -
Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater MESG Maintenance and Engineering Support Group
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Maintenance Work Request l
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Non-cited Violation Notice of Violation l
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NRC
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Nuclear Regulatory Cormission
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DATC -
Operator at the Controls i
PORY -
Power Operated Relief Valve
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S/G
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Steam Generator feedwater Pump SNC
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Southern Nuclear Operating Company
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Systems Operator SS Shift Supervisor
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Solid State Protection System STAR -
"Stop", "Think", "Act", " Review"
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Surveillance Test Procedure
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Service Water System T/C
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Thermocouple (s)
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Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater TS
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Technical Specification l
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Unresolved Item
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