IR 05000348/1998004
| ML20237B287 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 08/10/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237B284 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-98-04, 50-348-98-4, 50-364-98-04, 50-364-98-4, NUDOCS 9808180160 | |
| Download: ML20237B287 (17) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Report No: 50-348/98-04 and 50-364/98-04 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC)
Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP). Units 1 and 2 Location: 7388 North State Highway 95 Columbia. AL 36319 Dates: June 1 through July 11. 1998 Inspectors: T. Ross. Senior Resident Inspector J. Bartiey. Resident Inspector R. Caldwell, Resident Inspector Merriweather. Region II Reactor Inspector (S;ctions E3.1. E8.3. E8.4, and E8.5)
Approved by: P. Skinner. Chief. Reactor Projects Branch 2 1 Division of Reactor Projects i
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Enclosure 1
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9808180160 900010 i PDR ADOCK 05000348
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Farley Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-348/98-04, 50-364/98-04 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of onsite resident inspector inspection and announced inspections by regional inspector Ooerations e Control Room professionalism and communications remained goo Operating crew demaanor, team work and conduct were professional and effective. Operator attentiveness to Main Control Board annunciator alarms and response to changing plant conditions were prompt. The operating crew consistently demonstrated a high level of awareness of existing plant conditions and ongoing plant activities (Section 01.1).
e The inspectors concluded that the licensee's program for identifying problems remained effective and was being accomplished in accordance with administrative procedures. However, the inspectors observed a considerable number of Occurrence Reports related to tagorder execution primarily occurring during the Unit 2 refueling outage (Section 07.1).
e Four recent examples of failure to follow procedures appear to be similar to problems originally identified in 199E. Violation 50-34 /97-03-01 will remain open pending review of the licensee's corrective actions for these examples (Section 08.2).
Maintenance e Maintenance and surveillance testing activities were generally conducted in a thorough and competent manner by qualified individuals in accordance with plant procedures and work instructions. Close coordination was maintained with the main control room during surveillance testing activities (Section M1.1).
e An example of a poorly performed maintenance activity was identified during the conduct of a service test on the #1 service water battery by experienced electricians (Section M1.3).
Enaineerina e The licensee's design documentation for the Refueling Water Storage Tank level alarm setpoints did not clearly demonstrate that instrument loop uncertainty had been addressed (Section E3.1).
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e A Non-cited Violation was identified for use of non-conservative fluid temperatures in the Component Cooling Water and Spent Fuel Pool pipe stress analysis calculations (Section E8.3).
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Plant Suncort e Overall cleanliness of the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) remained good. Health Physics technicians generally provided positive control and support of work activities in the RCA (Section R2.1).
e A reactor vessel specimen transfer from the Spent Fuel Pool to the transfer cask was properly executed and adequately planned. Personnel were properly trained and briefed. Conducting the transfer underwater significantly reduced accumulated dose (Section R2.2).
- Security activities observed during the inspection period were performed well. Site security systems were adequate to ensure physical protection of the plant (Section 51.1).
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated continuously at 100% power for the entire inspection period, exceeding 400 days of continuous operation on July 9. 199 Unit 2 operated continuously at 100% power for the entire inspection perio I. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Routine Observations of Control Room Ooerations (71707 and 40500)
Following the guidance provided in Inspection Procedures (IP) 71707 and 40500, the inspectors conducted frequent inspections of ongoing plant operation The inspectors routinely reviewed the Technical Specification (TS)
Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) tracking sheets. All tracking sheets for Units 1 and 2 reviewed by the inspectors were consistent with plant conditions and TS requirement The inspectors observed that control room professionalism and communications remained goo Operating crew demeanor, team work and conduct were professional and effective. Operator attentiveness to Main Control Board annunciator alarms and response to changing plant conditions were prompt. The operating crew consistently demonstrated a high level of awareness of existing plant conditions and ongoing plant activitie Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 General Tours of Soecific Safety-Related Areas (71707)
General tours of safety-related areas were performed by the inspectors to observe the physical condition of plant equipment and structures, and to verify that safety systems were properly maintained and aligne Overall material conditions and housekeeping for Unit 1 and Unit 2 structures, systems, and components (SSCs) were generally good with the exception of the service water intake structure (SWIS) lower level. The SWIS lower level had s2veral component leak These leaks made detection of additional leaks difficult and contributed to corrosim of safety-related components. Additional equipment and housekeeping observations, including evidence of boric acid leaks from 1A Contairdnent
, Spray (CS) system, were reported to the responsible SS and/or l maintenance department for resolution. Seven deficiency reports were written as a result of the inspectors' observations of the 1A CS system.
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02.2 Inspections of Safety Systems (71707)
Inspectors verified the' operability of the Control Room Ventilation System. Accessible portions of the system were verified to be properly aligned and maintained in good operating conditio Quality Assurance In Operations 07.1 Effectiveness of Licensee Control in Identifying. Resolvina. and Preventina Problems (71707 and 40500)
The resident inspectors reviewed selected Occurrence Reports (ors) with emphasis on orc that occurred during the recent Unit 2 refueling outag This review was to ensure that plant incidents which affected or could have potential'y affected safety were properly documented and processed in accordance wl'.h FNP-0-AP-30. Preparation and Processing of Incident Reports. Revisior. 2 The inspectors concluded that the licensee's program for identifying problems remained effective and was being accomplished in accordance with FNP-0-AP-3 Plant personnel and management exhibited an appropriate threshold for identifying problems. initiating ors. and assigning formal root cause teams. Each new OR received prompt attention and was regularly discussed in the morning status / plan of the-day meetin Pro)osed corrective actions of individual ors were a)propriate for tie circumstances involved. However, the inspectors o) served a considerable number of ors related to tagorder execution primarily occurring during the Unit 2 refueling outage. In additio ors initiated during the second quarter of 1998 indicated that there were considerably more personnel error-related incidents than anticipate This observation was discussed with Operations managemen Since these ors had recently occurred, the inspectors were unable to determine the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions for resolving these items. This issue is identified as Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-348,364/98-04-01. Multiple Tagorder Implementation Errors, pending additional revie Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901 and 92700)
0 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-348/97-003-02: Failure to Comoly with Technical Specifications 4.5.3.2 and 3. Revisions-0 and 1 of this LER were closed in IR 98-02. No new issues or corrective actions were identified in Revision 2 of the LE i J _
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08.2 (Ocen) Violation (VIO) 50-348. 364/97-03-01: Multiole Examoles Of Failure To Follow Procedures The licensee responded to this violation by letter dated May 28, 199 An inspector review of the licensee's response and associated Corrective Action Report (CAR) No. 2277 identified two concerns.
l In 1997, the licensee conducted a broadness review on procedure adherence in response to this violation. Due to an apparent editorial error in the executive summary of the broadness review. the licensee l inaccurately characterized the success of past corrective actions to address procedural adherence problems. The licensee's previous
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corrective actions were based on a broadness review conducted in 1995 in response to VIO 50-348, 364/95-18-05. The inspector's review of summary data from the 1997 broadness review found that the licensee's previous corrective actions were not successful in the following areas identified
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by the 1995 broadness review: 1) not performing procedural steps in the designated sequence: and 2) not performing a required procedural ste The May 28. 1997. letter inaccurately characterized that the corrective actions were effective for item 1). This issue was discussed with license supervision who acknowledged this inaccuracy. Neither the VIO re!:ponse or CAR actions addressed how the unsuccessful corrective actions for these two procedural adherence problem areas would be resolved Both of the 1995 and 1997 broadnese reviews, and associated corrective actions, were in response to NRC violations of licensee personnel failing to follow procedures. In addition to VIO 50-348, 364/97-03-01, the 1997 broadness review addressed the NRC concern that 3rior corrective actions have not been completely effective. T1e licensee's response to VIO 50-348, 364/97-03-01 acknowledged this concern and the 'l corrective actions were intended to address persistent violations for failure to follow procedures. However recent examples suggest that these corrective actions were also not fully successful. The following are four recent examples of failure to follow procedure:
On April 25. 1998, a reactor operator (RO) failed to perform the pre-test valve alignments of Table 2. page 5. of FNP-2-STP-40.0 " Safety Injection With Loss of Offsite Power Test." Revision 29. Consequently. five Unit 2 safety-related valves were not in their proper pre-test position and had to be retested on April 2 On May 4.1998, an hourly fire watch was not performed for rooms 462 and 2462 in the non-radiological side of the Auxiliary Building. The fire watchstander consciously decided not to perform the hourly fire watch due to inclement weather. This was contrary to step 4.2.2 1 of FNP-0-AP-39. " Fire Patrols and Watches." Revision 1 ;
On May 15. 1998, a senior reactor operator (SRO) failed to
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initiate a TS Limiting Cono. tion of Operation (LCO) tracking i
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sheet for the Unit 2 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater l (TDAFW) pump as required by step 5.4.1 of FNP-2-STP-22.16.
! " Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Quarterly Inservice
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Test" Revision 28. In addition, an RO failed to reopen and lock the TDAFW to 2C steam generator flow control valve isolation valve (02N23V017C) as required by step 5.40 and 5.41 of STP-22.16. .This meant that the Unit 2 TDAFW pump was inoperable-during the Mode 3.to Mode 2. and Mode 2 to
. Mode 3. transitions on May 15 contrary to the requirements of TS 3.0.4~(see Section 08.3).
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On July 1.1998, electricians failed to record individual cell voltages required by step 7.8 of FNP-0-STP-90 " Service Water Building Battery Service Test." Revision Also, electricians failed to reduce battery load to 3 amps as recuired by Step 7.6. Furthermore, the electricians failec to adhere to the precautions of step 5.1 for personnel safety equipmen The first three examples were identified by the license However, all four examples appear to be similar to procedural adherence problems
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criginally identified in 199 Consequently, due to additional procedural adherence problems, this violation will remain open pending review of the licensee's corrective actions for these example .3 (Closed) LER 50-364/98-05: TS 3.0.4 Not Met Durina Mode Chanae Due To Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumo Beina Inocerable An ins)ector reviewed this LER and associated OR 2-98-191. A violation of Tec1nical ~ Specification requirements was identified; however, this licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non- 1 Cited Violation.(NCV).' consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This is identified as NCV 50-364/98-04-02 TS 3. Not Met During Mode Change Due To Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Being Ino)erable Based upon verification of corrective actions described in tie LER, and issuance of this NCV.. the LER is close II. Maintenance
.M1 Conduct of Maintenance
.M1.1- Maintenance and Surveillance Testina Activities (61726 and 6&707)
Using the guidance provided in IP 61726 and IP 62707, the inspectors observed and reviewed portions of selected licensee corrective and preventive maintenance activities, and routine surveillance testing including detailed reviews of the following:
e FNP-0-STP-60.0. Emergency Communications Operability Test. Rev. 44 e- FNP-1-STP-4.2. 1B Charging Pump Quarterly IST. Rev. 29 e FNP-2-STP-23.7. CCW System Flowpath Verification. Rev.12 e WO# M98003932. 2B SWS Pump Replacement l
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i 5 All observed maintenance work activities and surveillance testing were performed in accordance with work instructions. procedures and applicable clearance controls. Safety-related maintenance and surveillance testing evolutions were properly planned and execute Licensee personnel demonstrated familiarity with administrative and L radiological controls. Surveillance tests of safety-related equipment were consistently performed in a deliberate manner in close
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communication with the Main Control Room (MCR). Overall, operator !
l technicians, and craftsman were observed to be . knowledgeabl experienced, and trained for the tasks performe M1.2 Unit 1 Data 'A' Diaital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) ReDair insoection Scone (62707)
The ins)ector observed the pre-job and radiological brief. reviewed a) plica)le procedures, interviewed personnel, and observed portions o t1e containment entry associated with this work activit Observations and Findinas On July 5.1998, the Data Channel 'A' DRPI failed. Operations personnel performed a quadrant power tilt ratio calculation, a power distribution surveillance, and established an Administrative Limiting Condition of i Operation (LCO) to maintain the Data Channel 'B' operabl The licensee determined that the power supply had failed and a containment entry was necessary to repair the power supp y. On July , the inspector observed the pre-job and radiological -briefs for the containment entr The briefs were conducted with all assigned personnel at one time. The inspector noted that all personnel appeared
, informed of the job and the hazards and there was an open exchange of information during the brie The inspector reviewed Radiation Work Permit 1-98-1490 and observed the first containment entry. All personnel were appropriately dressed-out and carried the proper equi) ment. Proper radiological controls and postings were observed by-tle inspecto The repair of the power supply required four containment entrie The 1 accumulated dose for the repair was approximately 130 mrem which was within the expected amoun Conclusions The replacement of the Unit 1. Data Channel 'A' DRPI power supply was properly coordinated and executed. Proper radiological controls were observe _
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M1.3 Service Water System Battery Service Test a. Insoection Scone (62707)
On July 1. an inspector observed two electricians performing a service test on the #1 service water system (SWS) battery in accordance with FNP-0-STP-906.4 Revision 4, ~ Service Water Battery Service Test."
b. Observations and Findings During the conduct of STP-906.4. the inspector observed the following l discrepancies:
- Electricians were not recording individual cell voltages data as required by steps 7.8 thru 7.10. After discussion with their supervisor, the electricians began to take the required dat . Battery load was not reduced to 3 amps after the first minute as required by step 7.6. Instead, the continuous load was left at about 4.5 amps for almost an hour of the two hour test. The electricians appeared unfamiliar with operation of the load bank, and demonstrated difficulty in adjusting the discharge amperag After consultation with electrical shop personnel, they were able to adjust the discharge rate to 3.1 amp {
. Safety precautions specified in step 5.1 regarding protective i clothing were not used even though readily available. It was noted that the individual taking specific gravity measurements was wearing rubber glove Despite these discrepancies, the service water battery performed as expected and met required acceptance criteria. The higler discharge rate and the missed individual cell voltages data did not adversely affect the test due to robust performance by the battery. Both electricians were sufficiently careful during the test that no acid spills occurred. These procedural adherence discrepancies will be included in the additional review for VIO 50-348, 364/97-03-0 c. Conclusions An example of a poorly performed maintenance activity was identified during the conduct of a service test on the #1 service water battery by experienced electricians.
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M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (92902) l l
l M Inspector Follow-uo Item (IFI) 50-364/98-03-03 Rod Control Fuse Failure This IFI was inadvertently listed in the Open Items for IR 50-348, 364/98-03. This was an editorial error as the item did not exist in the report details, t _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . - _ _ _ _ _ _
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M8 2 (Closed) VIO 50-348. 364/97-14-03: Inadeauate Corrective Actions for Maintaining Main Steam Valve Room Cork Seal Floodina Barrier The inspector verified the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated January 23, 1998, to be reasonable and complete. This violation is close III. Enaineerina E3 Engineering procedures and documentation E3.1 Refuelina Water Storace Tank (RWST) Low-Level Switchover Insoection Scoce (37550)
The uspectors assessed the adequacy of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) switchover procedures and associated RWST level instrumentation (i.e., alarms, setpoints, and etc.). Observations and Findina The taspectors reviewed ap)licable procedures that specified operator actnns for initiation of ECCS switchover from the RWST to the containment sump during a safety injection. The Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) used setpoints of.12.5 feet and 4.5 feet of tank level. These values had been evaluated by the licensee in the E0P Setpoint document and found to be acceptable. However, the inspectors could not determine from review of the E0P Setpoint documents if these setpoints included margin for instrument loop uncertainty. This concern invo'/ad all those setpoints associated with the RWST level, including the technical specification minimum level alarm setpoint of 38' 4". The inspectors also found that an uncertainty calculation or scaling document did not exist for the RWST level instrumentation. The licensee stated that a similar concern was identified during their recent review for Generic Letter 97-04 and that steps had been taken to develop an uncertainty calculation for the RWST level instrumentation. This item will be identified as IFI 50-348.364/98-04-03. RWST Level Uncertainty Calculation Conclusions The licensee's design documentation for the RWST level setpoints did not j clearly demonstrate that instrument loop uncertainty had been addresse E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)
E (Closed) Escalated Enforcement Item 50-348. 364/98-03-05: HSDP loss of Function (92903)
The NRC reviewed this issue and determined that it was a'VIO of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. III.L.7. However, the NRC also determined that this was an old design issue, and in accordance with Section VII.B.3 of f
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[ 8 NUREG-1600. " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for Enforcement Actions," determined enforcement discretion was warranted. The enforcement discretion was granted by the NRC in correspondence dated July 10. 1998. This EEI is close E8.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-348.364/97-201-12: Stress Analysis Igmoerature The inspector concluded that the use of non-conservative temperatures in l theComponentCoolingWater(CCW)andSFPgipestresscalculationswasa l violation of the licensee's Operations Qua rity Assurance Program. UFSAR Section 17.2.3.1. which states that design control measures will com
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l with the requirements of American National Standard Institute (ANSI) ply l N45.2.11-1974. ANSI N45.2.11 states, in part, that applicable design l inputs shall be identified. This licensee identified violation is being treated as a Non-cited Violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the
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NRC Enforcement Policy. This item is identified as NCV 50-348.364/98-
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04-04. Use of Non-Conservative Fluid Tem)eratures in the CCW and SFP l Pipe Stress Calculations. The licensee lad corrected the CCW and SFP
- pipe stress calculations and was conducting a root cause evaluatio This unresolved item is close E8.3 (Closed) VIO 50-348.364/97-11-02: Failure to Perform Adecuate IST of TDAFW Check Valves on Cessation or Reversal of Flow l
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The inspectors verified that the corrective actions described in the licensee's response dated December 17, 1997, were implemented and complete. The inspectors found that the Inservice Testing Program and Plan documents. FNP-1(2)-M-095. Olve Inservice Test Plan for Units 1
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and 2. were revised to show that Auxiliary Feedwater check valves V002D.
l -F and -H had a safety function to close in the reverse direction. The l Unit 1 and 2 surveillance test procedures, FNP-1(2)-STP-22.29, were l revised incorporating requirements to verify that the check valves would close on reversal of flow. The inspector verified that the revised i procedures have been satisfactorily compieted on both units. The l violation is closed.
l l E8.4 (Closed) VIO 50-348.364/97-11-03: TDAFW Battery Installation and Check l
Valve Test Deficiencies The inspectors verified that the corrective actions described in the licensee's response dated December 17, 1997. were implemented and com]lete. The inspectors found that the licensee had rebuilt the Unit 2 TDA W Pump Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) battery rack in accordance with the design drawings and had inspected all other safety-related battery installations to verify that they were installed in accordance with design. Deficiencies identified as a result of the inspections were documented by the licensee on work orders and corrected. A total of three deficiencies were identified, two involved the Unit I and 2 TDAFW Pum) UPS battery racks and one involved the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building 3attery rack. These deficiencies did not affect operability of the batterie _ __ _ _
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The inspector examined both Unit 1 and 2 TDAFW UPS Battery racks and found both to be consistent with the design drawings with all previously
' identified deficiencies corrected. With regard to the second example of l the violation involving the TDAFW Pump check valve tett deficiencies, the licensee revised the Unit 1 and 2 surveillance test procedures FNP-
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1(2)-STP-22.13 to correctly test and measure the forward flow through
! TDAFW Pump check valve 01N23V003 and 02N23V003, respectivel The test l
was satisfactorily completed en both units. The inspector reviewed the test results and found them to be acceptable. The violation is close E8.5 (Ocen) IFI 50-348. 364/97-15-05. Pumo Seal Desian Weaknesses for Ma.ior Lafety-Related Pumos (37551)
The inspector reviewed the status of the corrective actions assv:iated with the root cau>e evaluation surroundirig the 1A CCW pump inbo6rd seal overheating failure. This was previously discussed in NRC Inspection l Report 50-348, 364/97-15. section E The licensee had obtained the mechanical seal vendor's concurrence to increase the clearance around the secondary " disaster" bushings and
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plans were in progress to correct the CCW pump seals. The inspector reviewed the associated technical manuals and interviewed personnel and concluded the design weaknesses discussed'in the root cause analysis l were of minor significance during normal operation.- after seal L installation and pump run-in were complet The inspector could not determine the status of the root cause corrective actions associated with the broadness review. Although the CCW pump issues appeared to be in the process of being resolved, the i Residual Heat Removal pum) and Centrifugal Charging Pump seals, which were also questioned by t1e evaluation did not appear to have been fully addressed. The type of failure involved minimizes the operational concern of the insufficient clearance between the shaft seal and '
auxq;ary packing retaining ring identified in the root cause. however, the concern regarding a potentially incorrect seal design for fluid application (considering fluid additives and contaminants), especially for the RHR pumps during long-term recirculation, still needs to be addresse IV. Plant Support 1 l
R2 . Status of Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls Facilities and i Equipment I R2.1 Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA). Units 1 and 2 (71750)
Overall cleanliness of the RCA remained good. Plant personnel observed working in the RCA generally deraonstrated appropriate knowledge and application of radiological control practices. Health physics {
technicians generally provided positive control and support of work '
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R2.2 Soecimen Removal from the Soent Fuel Pool (SFP) to Shinoina Cask Insoection Scoce (62707. 71750)
The inspectors reviewed applicable procedures, interviewed personnel, and observed significant portions of the specimen transfe Observations and Findinas On 24 June 1998, the licensee transferred the reactor vessel specimen from the Unit 2 SFP to the transfer cask. This specimen was removed from the reactor during the.last outage and was being delivered to a vendor for analysi The transfer of the reactor vessel specimen from the SFP required coordinated support of Operations. Engineering Support. Health Physics, and Maintenance 3ersonnel. Engineering Support coordinated the evolution using RWP 2-98-0710 and FNP-0-FHP-5.19. " Handling of-Irradiated Samples." Rev. 7 Personnel, material, and equipment which entered the foreign material exclusion area were properly accounted for. All personnel observed were
. properly dressed out for their specific activit Equi 3 ment required for the job were properly stationed and tools were checced for proper operation arior to use. Personnel performing the tasks were knowledgea)le of the job and appeared properly trained for their assigned tasks. Several minor planning issues arose during the evolution which the team adequately resolved as the job progresse The transfer was accomplished underwater in order to reduce the dose received. A transfer conducted in May 1994 accumulated 126 mre During this transfer the accumulated dose was 43 mrem. Surface and general radiation dose rates were maintained at reasonably low levels, Conclusions The reactor vessel specimen transfer from the SFP to the transfer cask was properly executed and adequately planned. Personnel were properly trained and briefed for the job. Conducting the transfer underwater significantly reduced accumulated dos S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Routine _0 observations of Plant Security Measures (71750)
Using the guidance provided in IP 71750. the inspectors verified that '
)ortions of site security program plans were being properly implemente )isabled vital area doors were properly manned and controlled. Security personnel activities observed during the inspection period were performed'well. Site security sysMs were adequate to ensure physical l protection of the plant.
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S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S2.1 Primary Access Portal (PAP) Entry Scan Ooerations and Maintenance (71750)
The inspector observed testing of the PAP Entry Scan detectors on June 12. 199 Based on this testing observation. the inspector verified that the licensee was maintaining. testing. and operating the detectors per the vendor's recommendations and security plan. The inspector reviewed the security plan and the manufacturer's technical manua U517654. "Model 85 Entry Scan and Metal Detector Operation and Installation Manual." Revision The licensee was ger.; rally cornplying with the vendor's recommendations even though the security plan did not require implementing the instructions of the vendor. However, the inspector identified that several preventative maintenance items were being aerformed at longer ,
intervals than recommended. This was brought to tie attention of the Security Manager. The security and maintenance staff researched the differences and concluded the current maintenance schedule was adequately maintaining the detectors based on the historically low failure rates and the frequent (once per shift) operational test The inspector concluded that the licensee's maintenance schedules, in conjunction with frequent operating tests, were adequate to ensure reliable operation of the PAP Entry Scan detector F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment F (Closed) tlRT 50-348. 364/98-0J-10: Pre-Action Sprinkler System Failures (92904)
The inspectors continued to follow up on this issue as documented in IR 98-03. The inspectors have concluded that this is not a compliance issue. This URI is closed. This issue will continued to be reviewed and is identified as IFI 50-348. 364/98-04-05. Pre-Action Sprinkler System Failure F2.2 LGlosed) VIO 50-348/97-10-08: Installation of Half-hour Kaowool Fire Barriers Without ADDendix R Exemotion (92904)
The licensee responded to this violation in letters dated November and January 23. 1998. The licensee also initiated CAR 2303. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and the CAR. and verified the corrective actions were implemented. This VIO is close V. Manaaement Meetinas and Other Areas
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X1 Exit Meeting Summary l The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on July 13, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
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The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during i l the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary i
i information was identified PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. Badham, SAER Supervisor C. Collins. Operations Superintendent M. Coleman. Maintenance Manager
, P. Crone. ES Performance Supervisor l K. Dyar. Security Chief R. Fucich. ES Manager S. Fulmer. Plant Training and Emergency Preparations Manager S. Gates. Administration Manager D. Grissette. Assistant General Manager - Operations R. Johnson. Operations Manager
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D. Jones. SNC - Configuration Management Manager R. Martin. Maintenance Team Leader M. Mitchell. HP Superintendent R. Monk. ES Supervisor C. Nesbitt Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
'!. Oldfield. Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor M. Stinson. General Manager - FNP G. Waymire. Technical Manager G. Wilson SNC Corporate Senior Engineer R. Winkler. Engineering Group Supervisor. PMMS B. Yance. PMMS Manager NRC l
J. Zimnerman. NRR Project Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37550: Engineering IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls In Identifying. Resolving. and l Preventing Problems i IP 61726: Surveillance Observations I
IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities l IP 92700: Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities IP 92901: Follow-up - Operations IP 92902: Follow-up - Maintenance IP 92903: Follow-up - Engineering IP 92904: Follow-up - Plant Support
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSE Type Item Number Description d.J Reference Ooened IFI 50-348. 364/98-04-01 Multiple Tagorder Implementation Errors (Section 07.1)
IFI 50-348.364/98-04-03 RWST Level Uncertainty Calculation (Section E3.1)
IFI 50-348. 364/98-04-05 Pre-Action Sprinkler System Failures (Section F2.1)
Closed LER 50-348/97-003-02 Failure to Comply with Technical Specifications 4.5.3.2 and 3. (Section 08.1)
LER 50-364/98-05 TS 3.0.4 Not Met During Mode Change Due To Turbine Driven Auxiliary
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Feedwater Pump Being Inoperable (Section 08.3)
NCV 50-364/98-04-02 TS 3.0.4 Not Met During Mode Change Due To Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Being Inoperable (Section 08.3)
VIO 50-348, 364/97-14-03 Inadequate Corrective Actions for Maintaining Main Steam Valve Room Cork Seal Flooding Barriet' (Section M8.2)
EEI 50-348. 364/98-03-05 HSDP Loss of Function (Section E8.1)
URI 50-348.364/97-201-12 Stress Analysis Temperature (Section {
E8.2)
NCV 50-348.364/98-04-04 Use of Non-Cons.ervative Fluid Temperatures in the CCW and SFP Pipe Stress Calculations (Section E8.2) I VIO 50-348.364/97-11-02 Failure to Perform Adequate IST of TDAFW Check Valves on Cessation or Reversal of Flou (Section E8.3)
VIO 50-348.364/97-11-03 TDAFW Battery InstaDation and Check Valve Test Deficiericies (Section E8.4)
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l URI 50-348. 364/98-01-10 Pre-Action Sprinkler System Failures l (Section F2.1)
VIO 50-348/97-10-08 Installation of Half-hour Kaowool Fire Barriers Without Appendix R Exemption (Section F2.2)
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Discussed
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VIO 50-348. 364/97-03-01 Multiple Examples Of Failure To Follow Procedures (Section 08.2)
IFI 50-348. 364/97-15-05 Pump Seal Design Weaknesses for l Major Safety-Related Pumps (Section E8.5)
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