IR 05000348/1989002
| ML20235W032 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 02/24/1989 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Maxwell G, Miller W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235W024 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-89-02, 50-348-89-2, 50-364-89-02, 50-364-89-2, IEB-84-02, IEB-84-2, NUDOCS 8903100468 | |
| Download: ML20235W032 (14) | |
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e UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O"s
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REGION 81 k,
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101 MARIETT A STREET, N.W.
's AT LANT A, GEORGI A 30323
%,..,..,o Report Nos.: 50-348/89-02 and 50-364/89-02 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 36291 Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.:
NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility name:
Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: January 11, 1989 - February 10, 1989 Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama C
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Y Inspectors: c
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G.' F Maxwel'l Date Signed
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k 2l74lN wn W. H. Miller, Jr.
Date Signed
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Approved by:
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F. S. Cantrell, Section Chief Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine on-site inspection involved a review of operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observati o.1, monthly maintenance observation, drawing system verification, and licensee events reports.
Certain tours were conducted on backshift or weekends.
Backshift or weekend tours were conducted on January 11,15,16,17,24,25,26,31, and February 1,3,4,6,7,8,9, and 10.
Results: Within the areas inspected, the following violation was identified:
Failure to maintain changes to critical drawings - paragraph 6.a.
While operating at 100% power, on February 1, 1989, Unit 1 experienced an unexpected main turbine generator load rejection.
The cause of the sudden load reduction was attributed to a design change in the turbine DEH system.
The reactor operators' excellent performance during this transient stabilized the reactor at 50%
power - paragraph 3.b.3.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Licensee Employees Contacted R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager l
C. L. Buck, Plant Modification Manager L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager R. D. Hill, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations D. N. Morey, General Manager C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager J. K. Osterholtz, Operations Manager L. M. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support J. J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager L. S. Williams, Training Manager Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office personnel.
Acronyms and abbreviations used_throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at approximately 100% reactor power throughout the reporting period except on February 1 and February 2.
On those days reactor power was reduced to less than 50%. The power reduction occurred as the result of an unexpected main turbine generator load rejection. The cause of the sudden reduction was attributed to the turbine DEH System responding to a false signal which was generated within the main turbine DEH control circuitry.
Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at approximately 100% reactor power throughout the entire reporting period.
Unit 2 has operated connected to the electricel grid without interruption since December 27, 1987 (411 days).
The next refueling outage is scheduled to begin on March 24, 1989.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 92700)
a.
Plant Tours The inspectors conducted routine plant tours during this inspection period to verify that the licensee's requirements and commitments were being implemented.
Inspection were conducted at various times including weekdays, nights, weekends and holidays. These tours were
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performed'to verify that: systems, valves, and breakers required for safe plant operations were in their correct position; fire protection equipment, spare equipment and materials were being maintained and stored properly; plant operators were aware of the _ current plant status; plant operations personnel were documenting the status of out-of-service equipment; security and health physics controls were being implemented as required by procedures; there were no undocumented cases of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibration, abnormal hanger or seismic restraint movements; all reviewed equipment requiring calibration was current; and general housekeeping was satisfactory.
Tours of the plant. included review of site documentation and interviews with plant personnel. The inspectors reviewed the control room operators' logs, tag out logs, chemistry and health physics i
logs,.and control boards and panels.
During these tours the inspectors roted that the operators appeared to be alert, aware of changing plant conditions and manipulated plant controls properly.
The inspectors evaluated operations shift turnovers and attended shift briefings.
They observed that the briefings and turnovers provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew and verified that the staffing met the TS requirements.
Site security was evaluated by observing personnel in the protected and vital areas to ensure that these persons had the proper authorization to be in the respective areas.
The inspectors also verified that vital area portals were kept locked and alarmed. The security personnel appeared to be alert and attentive to their duties and those officers perfonning personnel and vehicular searches were thorough and systematic.
Responses to security alarm conditions appeared to be prompt and adequate.
Selected activities of the licensee's Radiological Protection Program were reviewed by the inspectors to verify conformance with plant procedures and NRC regulatory requirement.
The areas reviewed included: operation and management of the plant's health physics staff, "ALARA" implementation, Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) for compliance to plant procedures, personnel exposure records, observation of work and personnel in radiation areas to verify compliance to radiation protection procedures, and control of radioactive materials. No discrepancies were noted.
b.
Plant Events (1) Unit-2 Steam Leak On January 11, Unit 2 experienced a minor steam leak on a 6" diameter extraction steam piping spool piece. The leak occurred near a 90 degree elbow which was located between moisture separator reheat steam system valves numbered 510A and 504.
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These two valves a the associated piping is identified on the drawing for Extrac i Steam (D-200009, Revision 7).
Responsible licensee personne1' stated that this piping spool piece had been previously selected for " Erosion Corrosion" inspection during the next Unit 2 scheduled outage and that the similar Unit I spool. pieces have already been replaced using scheduled 40 stainless steel piping.
The Unit 2 piping. is 6" scheduled 40 carbon steel grade piping.
On January 12, the defective piping was replaced with 6" schedule 40 carbon steel piping.
Also other similar Unit 2 spool pieces were inspected by the licensee for potential pipe wall thinning.
Wall thinning was identified in a 6" pipe bend to Unit 2 moisture steam Reheater No. 18. This piping has been isolated and will be replaced during the forthcoming Unit 2 refueling outage.
(2) Venting Unit 2 Containment to Reduce Containment Pressure The mini purge exhaust system for the Unit 2 containment was removed from service on January 23 to replace fire damper 2-139-120-05 in the exhaust duct between 121' and 139' floor elevations.
The containment mini-purge system operates during power operation to continuously purge the containment atmosphere.
By January 24, the pressure inside containment had increased to approximately 1 psig.
The TS limits are -1.5 to +
3 psig.
To reduce the containment pressure the licensee issued a new procedure, FNP 2-50P-10.0 Appendix 1, Venting Containment to Reduce Containment Pressure when Containment Purge is Secured.
This procedure requires the use of the post accident venting system. The manual motor operated containment isolation valves to the ventilation system are opened and the vent system relieves the containment high pressure through the vent filter unit and out the exhaust stack.
The post accident venting system is a backup system to the electric hydrogen recombiners which are used to maintain hydrogen level inside containment to below the lower flammability limits.
Procedure FNP-2-S0P-10.0 Appendix 1 was implemented on January 24 at approximately 2:00 p.m.
Containment isolation valves 2-PACV-MOV-3530 and 3740 were opened and remained open until approximately 4:00 a.m. on January 25.
This was considered to meet the intent of TS Section 3.6.3 in that the valves were opened under administrative controls and the length of time that the valves were opened was considered to be intermittent.
On January 26 and again on Jequary 27 the containment pressure was again reduced from approxtnately.5 psig to 0 psig by using the post-accident venting sys'em to vent the containment. The mini purge system was restored to service the evening shift of January 27.
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i The inspectors reviewed this venting procedure and observed the operators implementing the procedure.
No discrepancies were noted.
(3) Unit 1 Main Turbine Load Rejection On February 1, Unit 1 experienced an unexpected main turbine generator load rejection.
The rejection resulted in a decrease in electrical power from 860 MW to 240 MW.
The operators took manual control of the main turbine generator and were able to stabilize the plant.
During the transient, reactor coolant temperature increased to 590 F and several steam generator safety valves lifted. The main steam dumps opened to absorb the sudden mismatch between reactor power and turbine power.
The plant was stabilized at about 50 percent reactor power and l
an investigation immediately began.
The responsible turbine control technicians found that the cause of the sudden load reduction was attributed the turbine DEH system responding to a false signal which was generated within the main turbine DEH control circuitry.
During the last Unit I refueling outage (March 1988) the main turbine generator DEH controls were upgraded to utilize the Westinghouse Modification 3 control circuits.
The inspectors were informed that the upgraded circuits contained certain generic protective features and circuits which were not used by the Farley Unit 1 protective systems.
Investigation revealed that the false signal which was received by the DEH control circuit was initiated by one of the generic circuits which was installed but not required or utilized in the Farley protective systems.
The licensee staff made changes to the DEH runback circuit, these changes should preclude a similar false turbine runback signal from being processed by the DEH control circuit.
An extensive evaluation is being conducted by both Westinghouse and the licensee staff to identify any other instances where changes
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may be necessary in the turbine DEH controls.
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The inspectors reviewed the event documentation and interviewed
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operators who were on duty in the control room when the event i
occurred. The inspectors determined that the operators performance during and after the event was in accordance with procedures and their actions were correct and prompt.
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result of their actions the effects of the transient were
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minimized.
The reactor did not trip and the reactor protective l
systems or features were not activated. The operators should be
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commended for their excellent performance during this plant transient.
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On February 2, after completing the change to the affected DEH l
control circuit, the unit was returned to full power operation.
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(4)
Fire Drill On January 24 the inspectors observed an in-process fire brigade drill exercise.
The exercise required that the control room announce over the PA system that a fire was reported in Unit I auxiliary building.
The fire brigade assembled and reported to the scene of the proposed fire within minutes. At the scene the brigade members were found to be suited in the required fire fighting clothing and equipment.
The fire was found to be in the electrical train "B" D.C. switchgear room number 226.
The brigade members utilized caution when attempting to gain access to the room and once inside they followed recommended practices to contain the fire.
In a short time the fire was contained and subsequently extinguished.
The drill was condJcted in a very professional manner both by participating fire brigade members and by those utility personnel who were evaluating it.
(5) New Fuel Inspection During the week of January 30 the inspectors witnessed the receipt inspection of new fuel for Unit 2 fueling cycle 7.
Refueling of Unit 2 is scheduled to begin on March 24, 1989.
The fuel inspection was being performed using procedure
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FNP-0-FHP-3.0, Receipt and Storage of New Fuel.
No procedural violations were noted.
(6) Lightning Protection On January 31, the inspectors noted several missing and damaged air terminals for the Unit 1 & 2 auxiliary building lightning protection system. This condition was reported to the licensee.
The licensee promptly conducted a comprehensive inspection of the system and identified a number of discrepancies. MWRs were issued to correct the discrepancies and make the required repairs.
The inspectors will re-examine the lightning protection system during future inspections to verify that the necessary repairs have been made, and the system is being properly maintained.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors witnessed the licensee conducting maintenance surveillance test activities on safety-related systems and components to verify that the licensee performed the activities in accordance with TS and licensee
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requirements. These observations included witnessing selected portions of
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each surveillance, review of the surveillance procedures to ensure that administrative controls and tagging procedures were in force, determining that approval was obtained prior to conducting the surveillance test and the individuals cerducting the test were qualified in accordance with plant-approved prc-edures.
Other observations included ascertaining that test instrumentation used was calibrated, data collected was within the specified requirements of TS, any identified discrepancies were properly i
noted, and the systems were correctly returned to service. The following I
specific activities were observed:
1-STP-16.7 Containment Spray System Valve IST 2-STP-20.1 Penetration Room Filtration Alignment Verification 2-STP-22.0 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Test 1-STP-33.08 Solid State Protection System Train B Operability Test 1-STP-62.0 Main Turbine Valves Operability Test 0-STP-80.1 Diesel Generator 1-2A Operability Test 1-STP-80.1 Diesel Generator 18 Operability Test 0-STP-80.2 Diesel Generator 2C Operability Test 2-SlP-80.1 Diesel Generator 2B Operability Test 0-STP-80.5 Diesel Generator 2C o to Start Test u
0-STP-80.7 Diesel Generator 2C 24 Honr Load Test 0-STP-80.10 Diesel Generator 1000 KW Load Rejection Test 1-STP-201.20A RSC TE 432 B & D Loop Calibration and Functional Test 2-STP-605.3 Auxiliary Building Battery Weekly Verification 0-STP-622 Service Water C02 System Weight Check 1-STP-914 Load Test on 1B Battery Charger 2-50P-37.1 Appendix C Align Battery C Charger to B Train Battery The inspectors noted during the licensee's performance of surveillance procedure 2-STP-605.3 that the data taken on the date of the last battery equalizer charge and voltage and current readings were recorded on the procedure data sheets prior to performing the specified inspections and tests.
The procedure required this data to be listed after the STP-605.3 inspections and tests had been conducted.
The failure to follow the procedure steps in this instance has no safety significance and no violation is being issued. However, the licensee has instructed the electrical maintenance foremen to either follow the procedural steps in the performance of surveillance inspections and tests or issue a Temporary Change Notice (TCN) to the procedure as stipulated by the plant administration procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
The results of the inspections in this area indicate that the program was effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance activities to verify the following: maintenance personr.el were obtaining the appropriate tag out and clearance approvals prior to commencing work activities, correct documentation was available for all requested parts and material prior to
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use, procedures were available for all requested parts and material prior to use, procedures were available and ' adequate for the work being conducted, maintenance personnel performing work activities were qualified to accomplish these tasks, no maintenance activities reviewed were violating any limiting conditions for operation during the specific evolution, the required QA/QC reviews and QC hold points were implemented, post-maintenance testing activities were completed, and equipment was properly returned to service after the completion of work activities.
Activities reviewed included:
MWR 137499 Changing oil in emergency diesel generator governor MWR 190471 Repaired steam leak on valve Q1N12LV3608 MWR 180995 Changed fuel injector nozzle for number 8 cylinder on emergency diesel generator 1B
MWR 163443 Replaced Unit 1 CST fill valve level controller N1P11F501 with new controller (Fischer 4194 HA & Bartton 197 DP Unit)
MWR-171986 Test HFA relay for fire protection system JB 2T-20 MWR-183527 Replace existing Unit 1 fire damper 2-139-120-05 with new Pullman fire damper MWR-183533 Replace existing Unit 1 fire damper 2-139-120-05 with new Pullman fire damper MWR-190129 Replace of NAS card for LY460 controls (RCS letdown isolation and pressurizer heater cutoff) - Unit 2 MWR-190533 Repair / calibrate Unit 1 RCS RTDs which are out of tolerance MWR-190886 Repair leaks on spent fuel pool pump 2B MWR-190977 Restore annunciator Z-72 on Unit 2 main control board (electrical ground to control rod drive cooling fan)
WA-W000300137 MET tower standby generator quarterly operability test (EMP-1351.01)
The inspectors observed in-progress work being controlled by MWR 171986 and MWR 171985.
These two MWRs required work to be conducted on "HFA" relays in accordance with maintenance procedure FNP-0-MP-68.0.
This procedure requires inspecting each of the approximately 535 G.E. type
"HFA" electrical relays. The program includes removing each of the relays I
from their electrical circuits, recording the relay name plate data, physically inspecting them for possible binding and physical damage,
inspecting their contacts and relay armature and adjusting the contacts as
required.
The licensee's methods selected to inspect, test, adjust or replace the relays was made using IE Bulletin 84-02 as a guide.
The inspectors reviewed this process and had no further questions at this time.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Resident' Action Item 88-01, Drawing System Verification (71710 & 39702)
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Critical Drawings The inspectors conducted. a drawing system verification.
The verification was conducted in -accordance with RII Regional Office Notice'2203.
The inspection points which were considered during the
verification included:
Review of plant critical drawings utilized in
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the control' room and the TSC; checking ;to see if cri.tical drawings
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identified instances where the drawings were affected by an
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-outstanding design changes or plant modifications; check to determine if there was a procedure for updating the drawings which were maintained in the control room and the TSC and determining if these locations received any special priority over less critical locations; verification that the licensee does ensure that drawing discrepancies are promptly corrected, when identified; verification that periodic audits are performed on critical drawings; and a hand-over-hand system walkdown on accessible portions of a selected system, to verify that the associated drawing reflected the as built condition of the plant.
The licensee has esublished 151 critical drawings for Unit 1 and 123
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for Unit 2.
The inspectors selected 16 Unit 1 drawings and 15 Unit 2 drawings for verification The drawings selected were those
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utilized in. the control room by operations personnel.. Each drawing was found to be the most current revision and was marked to indicate
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.any plant changes not yet incorporated.
A similar selection was made from the drawings utilized in the TSC.
Thirty one drawing aperture cards were chosen and each was found to be current.
Applicable drawing cards were marked to indicate any plant changes not yet incorporated.
Of the total number of critical drawings (approximately 274) the inspectors identified 16 critical drawings affected by plant changes which had not been incorporated.
Site Administrative Procedure FNP-0-AP-4 Control of Plant Documents and Records, Sections 8.7.3 and 8.7.4 requires that copies of outstanding plant changes be distributed to those holding controlled copies of the affected drawings. The inspectors evaluated the plant change documents (PCNs)
which were required to be maintained for the control room and the TSC.
In general the required PCNs should be located in the control room and the TSC. Of the eleven selected, only one was found for the control room and only three were found for the TSC.
Failure to control changes to these critical drawings is considered a violation of 10 CRF 50, Appendix B Criterion VI and is identified as a violation 348,364/89-02-01, Failure to Maintain Changes to Critical Drawing _
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The licensee has provided an up-to-date copy of the PCNs which affect-critical drawings that are 'provided in the control room,-TSC1and'E0F.
i Procedures have been issued to require an audit each quarter to verify that the required PCNs are available.in these areas.
This Laction should prevent future recurrence. ~This violation meets the criteria specified in Section V of the NRC Enforcement Policy for.not issJing a Notice of Violation and is not' cited.-
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b.
System Walk-downs-(1) Diesel Generators Walk-down inspections of the air start systems, fuel oil a
systems, jacket coolant systems, intercooler water systems and lube oil system for diesel generators 1-2A and'2C were conducted during the week of January 30 by the inspectors to verify that the critical drawings reflected the as built conditions.
The drawings using the walk-downs were:
0-170800 Sheet 2 Rev. 7 D-170801 Sheet 2 Rev. 6 D-170802 Sheet 2 Rev. 3 D-170803 Sheet 2 Rev. 4 D-170804 Sheet 2 ~Rev. 7 D-170805 Sheet 2 Rev. 8 D-170806 Sheet 2 Rev. 8 D-170807 Sheet 2 Rev. 8 D-170808 Sheet 2 Rev. 4 D-170809 Sheet 2 Rev. 4 The following conditions were noted:
Drawings' D-170800 & D-170801:
The drawings show a three-way valve to pressure gage PI-545 and PI-565. However two isolation type-valves are installed for each gage.
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Drawings D-170804 & D-170805: The drawings indicate a number of orifice flow restrictors are installed in the piping systems.
However these orifice devices do not appear to be installed.
Draving 0-170805 indicates vent valves are installed between valves Q1P21V501 and Q1P21V502 and auxiliary coolant pump P-509.
These vent valves are actually installed between valves 501 and 502 and the diesel engine skid.
Drawings D-170806 & D-170807:
A number of check valves and relief valves installed in the system are not provided with identification numbers.
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Drawings D-170808 & D-17809:
The installed diesel fuel day tanks are provided with a number of pipe penetrations, such as the fill connections, which-are shown on the drawings.
Also, the arrangement of the vent pipe and manhole cover plates shown on the drawings do not conform to the as built conditions.
These items do not appear to represent significant safety issues.
However, the licensee is evaluating these items to determine'if the drawings should be revised. The licensee has a tagging program in effect and the tags found missing are to be replaced.
(2) Auxiliary Feedwater System During the week of January 16, the inspectors performed a walk-down inspection of the auxiliary feedwater system for Unit 1 to verify that the critical drawings reflected as built plant conditions.
Drawings D-175007 Rev. 17 was used for this walk-down.
No discrepancies were noted.
Other than the above identified violation no additional violations were identified.
7.
Evaluation of Licensee's Self-Assessment Capability (40500)
On January 26 the inspector attended a meeting of the Plant Operation Review Committee (PORC).
The required TS quorum, consisting of the vice chairman, three members and four alternate members, were present.
The following items were discussed:
Design Changes:
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B88-1-4828 Provide grating hold down plates for Unit 1 fuel transfer canal B88-2-4829 Provide grating hold down plates for Unit 2 fuel transfer canal B88-2-5055 Installation of loop seal in Unit 2 supply line from RHR system to prevent gas migration into charging pump system B88-2-5280 Installation of new cable trenches from Unit 2 auxiliary building to two yard pull boxes B88-1-5409 Reclassification of Unit 1 PCB transformers to non PCB transformers Minor Departures:
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MD84-657(Rev 3) Service water chlorine dioxide system MD88-1976 Steam generator 1B to blowdown heat exchanger solenoid valve MD88-1979 Inline sodium stream crossconnect - Unit 1
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MD88-1980 Inline sodium stream crossconnect - Unit 2 MD88-1982 Replace "3-way" solenoid valve with substitute valve of different model number MD89-1995 BIT surge tank low temperature alarm C45 Safety Evaluations:
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- MSIV bypass stroke times
- Revision to FSAR Q-list Procedure safety evaluation check list
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Procedures:
FNP-1-M-050(Rev. 21) Master List of Surveillance Requirements -
Unit 1 FNP-2-M-050 (Rev. 18) Master List of Surveillance Requirements -
Unit 2 The items. indicated by "*" were not approved but were returned to the appropriate plant group for additional information.
The remaining items were reviewed by the PORC and determined to involve no unreviewed safety questions. These items were approved.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Licensee Event Reports (92700)
The following Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed for potential generic problems to determine trends, to determine whether information included in the report meets the NRC reporting requirements and to consider whether the corrective action discussed in the report appears appropriate.
The Licensee action was reviewed to verify that the event has been reviewed and evaluated by the licensee as required by the technical specifications; that corrective action was taken by the licensee; and that safety limits, limiting safety setting and LCOs were not exceeded.
The inspector examined the incident reports, logs and records, and interviewed selected personnel.
The following reports are considered closed:
Unit 2 LER/88-09 Technical specification action statement requirement not met for an inoperable fire protection system LER/88-10 Special Report: Fire barrier non-functional for more than seven days No violations or deviations were identifie _ _ _
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9.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management
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interviews throughout the report period and on February 9, with the plant manager and selected members of his staff.
The inspection findings were discussed in detail.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
Licensee was informed that the item discussed in paragraph 8 was closed.
ITEM NUMBER DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE 348,364/88-02-01 Failure to maintain changes to critical (opened / closed)
drawings - paragraph 6.a.
10. Acronyms and Abbreviations Auxiliary Feedwater AFW
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Abnormal Operating Procedure AP Administrative Procedure
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Alabama Power Company CFR -
Code of Federal Regulations Component Cooling Water CCW
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DC Design Change
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Digital Electro Hydraulic Control System DEH
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Deviation Report DR
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Emergency Contingency Procedure ECP
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Emergency Plant Implementing Procedure EIP
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Environmental Qualifications EQ
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ESF -
Engineered Safety Features Engineering Work Request EWR
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Fahrenheit GE
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General Electric Gallons Per Minute GPM
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Inservice Inspection ISI
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Inservice Test Limiting Condition for Operation LC0
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Motor-0perated Valve MOV
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M0 VATS - Motor-0perated Valve Actuation Testing MWR -
Maintenance Work Request Nonconformance Report NCR
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC
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NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NRR
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Plant Modifications Department PMD
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Quality Assurance QA
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Quality Control
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RCP Radiation Control and Protection Procedure
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Safety Injection SAER -
Safety Audit and Engineering Review S/G Steam Generator
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SSPS -
Solid State Protection System Solenoid Operated Valve S0V
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Surveillance Test Procedure Service Water SW
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TS
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Technical Specification TSC -
Technical Support Center WA Work Authorization
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