IR 05000348/1998006
| ML20195G509 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 11/10/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20195G499 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-98-06, 50-348-98-6, 50-364-98-06, 50-364-98-6, NUDOCS 9811230016 | |
| Download: ML20195G509 (12) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ll Docket Nos.:
50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.:
50-348/98-06 and 50-364/98-06 Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility:
Farley Nuciear Plant, Units 1 and 2 -
Location:
7388 N. State Highway 95
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Columbia, AL 36319 Dates:
August 30 to October 17,1998 Inspectors:
T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident inspector J. H. Bartley, Resident inspector R. K. Caldwell, Resident !nspector H. L. Whitener, Reactor inspector (Section M3) '
Approved by:
Pierce H. Skinner, Chief Reactor Projects Brench 2 Division of Fieactor Projects
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Enclosure 9811230016 981110
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PDR ADOCK 05000348 G
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY '
Farley Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-348,364/98-06 This integrated inspection' to assure public health and safety included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a seven week
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period of resident inspection. ' In addition, the report includes 'a regional announced inspection of j
' the inservice test program.
Ooerations Jo'
Operator response to abnormal and routine plant conditions was strong, including a Unit 1 automatic reactor trip, a startup of Unit 1 following a steam generator tube repair activity, a shutdown of Unit 1 for refueling, and Unit 2 partialloss of cooling to the reactor coolant pumps (Section 01.1).'
. A Unit 1 automatic trip was caused by a card failure in the solid state protection system.
e-Overall facility response including operator and plant equipment, and root cause team follow up was appropriate (Section 01.2).
The minor departure process lacked pre-implementation independent review by system e
specialists, quality assurance, and the onsite safety committee. The lack of these reviews contributed to an error in developing a minor departure. A good questioning attitude by an operator identified this error and corrective actions were initiated
'(Section O2.2).
Licensee preparations for the Unit 1 cycle 15 refueling outage were adequate, although e
not all of the design change packages had been issued prior to commencing the outage, j
Self-critical department readiness evaluations were noted (Section O2.3).
Observed onsite and offsite safety committee performance was appropriate, and o
members displayed a good questioning attitude. (Section 07.1).
Maintenance
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The Inservice Test program and implementation was consistent with code requirements o
and followed code standards. The overall program was effective (Section M3.1).
I Plant Support Two instances of inattentive Security Guards were observed. These appeared to be
isolated cases which the licensee took appropriate actions (Section S1.1 and S4.1).
Actions observed during fire drills demonstrated good performance, and the drills were
an excellent training medium (Section F5.1).
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REPORT DETAILS Summary of Plant Status At the beginning of this reporting period, Unit 1 was in a forced outage for steam generator tube inspections and repair. The unit was returned to service on September 4, and achieved full power on September 7. The unit automatically tripped on September 9 due to a card failure in the solid state protection system and was restarted the following day. The unit was shut down October 17 to begin the scheduled cycle 15 refueling outage.
At the beginning of thir reporting period, Unit 2 was operating at or near full power. Unit load was reduced to H% on September 25 to perform routine steam generator r,econdary flushes. The unit was returned to full power ol September 28, and operated at 100% powcr foi the remainder of the inspection perioc.
l. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 Routine Observations of Control Room Ooerations (71707) (40500)
The inspectors observed that operating crew demeanor, communications, team work, and conduct were professional and effective. Operator attentiveness to annunciator alarms and response to changing plant conditions were prompt. The operating crew consistent y demonstrated a high level of awareness of existing plant conditions and ongoing p; ant F.ctivities. This included a response to a loss of thermal barrier cooling to the Unit 2 rerictor coolant pumps, a Urtit 1 automatic reactor trip, a Unit 1 startup from a steam generator (SG) tube repair shtudown, and a Unit 1 shutdown for refueling.
l The Technical Specification (TS) Action Statement (TSAS) and Limiting Conditions for j
Operttion (LCO) tracking sheets reviewed by the inspectors were consistent with plant l
condition: and TS requirements.
01.2 Unit 1 Reactor Trio and Restart (71707) (9370?)
(Closed) Licensee Event Reogr_1(LER) 30-348/98-01 Reactor Protection System Card Failure Caused Turbine trio Ed ConseauentReayAr Trio On September 9, the Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped from 100% power when the turbine-generator unexpectedly tripped. Both steam generator feedwater pumps (SGFPs) also tripped. The unit responded normally ta the trip. The licensee determined the cause to be a failed universal electronic circuit card in the solid state protection system (SSPS) for the B train. The card was associated with the steam generator high level turbine trips. The card was sent offisite for failure analysis. The unit was restarted on September 10, and achieved 100% power on September 12.
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The inspectors evaluated the control room po st-trip conditions, emergency operating procedure (EOP) implementation, operator pecformance, and equipment response. The inspectors concluded that operations and other licensee personnel reacted well to the trip. The root cause investigation was thorough. The LER was thorough and detailed.
Based on this review, the LER was closed.
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Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 General Tours and Inspections of Safety Systems (71707)
l General tours of safety-related areas were performed by the inspectors to observe the physical condition of plant equipment and structures, and to verify that safety systems
were properly maintained and aligned. The intpectors verified the operability of selected, safety systems and equipment. The inspectors noted that radiation monitoring I
system problems were tracked and discussed daily. The inspectors also verified that selected tagouts were implemented in accordance with procedural requirements.
O2.2 Operator Work-Arounds and System Minor Departures (71707) (40500)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation programs for identifing, documenting, controlling, and clearing issues that departed from expected system design and operation. These programs include the work-around, minor departure, lifted lead and jumper, and temporary alteration programs. A work-around exists if equipment is not functioning / performing as designed. A minor departure is an approved temporary modification to an existing design. Administrative procedures exist for each program.
The procedure for the work-around program was recently implemented.
The inspectors noted that there were 35 active minor departures and 39 open work-arounds. In 1996, there were 56 open work-arounds, thus some progress has been made. Most of the open minor departures (23) were related to temporary Furmanite repair of non-safety related steam and water leaks. The inspectors also noted that the work-around list did not have an expected closure date for the open items, nor did the licensee trend these issues. This was discussed with licensee management who indicated they would review this item.
An error in developing minor departure 98-2552 for the Unit 1 B train charging pumps prevented both of the B train pumps from starting on an automatic initiation signal. An operations shift foreman recognized the error and it was immediately corrected by racking out the 1C pump motor breaker. The inspectors noted that the minor departure process did not include a pre-implementation independent review by engineering system specialists, quality assurance personnel, or the onsite safety committee. The lack of such reviews contributed to the error in developing the minor departure. The licensee was reviewing this programmatic issue. The inspector concluded that the licensee's programs for operator work-arounds and design minor departures were adequat.-...
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O2.3. Preparations for the Unit 1 Cycle 15 Refuelina Outaae (60705)
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plans and preparations for the fall 1998 Unit 1 j
cycle 15 refueling outage, including planned maintenance work, inspections, (
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modifications, and testing. Periodic outage meetings were held by the licensee and each department held a readiness review meeting. The inspectors noted that these meetings were self-critical and actions were taken to address deficient issues. The inspectors i
concluded that the licensee was adequately prepared for the outage although not all of the design change packages had been issued prior to' commencing the outage.
Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Inadeauate Procedural Compliance (71707)
On August 17, the Outside System Operator reported a hydrogen vent stack fire had occurred and he had extinguished it per Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) FNP-0-34.0, " Hydrogen-Oxygen System," step 4.10. When the fire was reported, the Shift Supervisor did not enter Abnormal Occurrence Procedure (AOP) FNP-0-AOP-29.0,
" Plant Fires," Revision 17, as required. The inspectors reviewed three documented cases of hydrogen vent stack fires in 1998. For two of these cases, the AOP was not entered at all and for one case the AOP was entered 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> late. In all three cases, I
the fire brigade was not assembled as required by the immediate steps of AOP 29.0.
Discussions with the licensee indicated that management was aware of this issue and had initiated actions. The licensee revised AOP 29.0 to provide greater flexibility in how l
I to deal with hydrogen vent stack fires. The inspectors reviewed the applicable corrective actions and concluded that they were sufficient and complete. Consistent with Section -
Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this licensee-iderf.ified and corrected violation is -
being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) and is identified as NCV 50-348, 364/98-06-01, inadequate Procedural Compliance.
The inspectors also reviewed operations procedural compliance during refueling outages with respect to system operation. Discussions with operations management and operators indicated that some confusion exists in operations concerning management expectations and procedural requirements with regard to operating individual system components during outages, when system line-ups are significantly altered from normal operations. Licensee management is taking, actions to eliminate this confusion.
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07 Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1. Safety Committee Meetinas (40500)
The inspectors attended selected onsite safety committee meetings of the Plant
Operations Review Committee and the offsite safety committee meeting number 98-3 of l
the Nuclear Operations Review Board. The inspectors concluded that the safety committee members displayed a good questioning attitude and the meetings were safety focused.
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Miscellaneous Operations issues (90712) (92700)
08.1 (Closed) LER 50-348. 364/97-05-02: Failure to Perform Nuclear instrumentation Surveillance Reauirements Prior to Mode 2 and 3 Entry
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This event has been previously documented in NRC inspection Reports (IR) 50-348, 364/97-05 and 50-348,364/98-05. The cause of this LER was an inconsistency in the TS for which the licensee had submitted and received a TS amendment. The inspectors reviewed the updated LER and determined no new issues were identified.
08.2 (Closed) LER 50-348. 364/97-03-03: Failure to Comotv with Technical Soecifications s
4.5.3.2 and 3.5.2
- (Closed) LER 50-348.364/97-03-04: Failure to Comolv with Technical Specifications 4.5.3.2 and 3.5.2 Previous revisions of this LER are documented in IR 50-348,364/98-02 and 50-348, 364/98-04. The cause of these LERs was due to an inconsistency within the TS for which the licensee had submitted and received a TS amendment. The inspectors reviewed the updated LERs and determined no new corrective actions or issues were identified.
II, Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments (61726) (62707)
The inspectors witnessed or reviewed portions of selected maintenance and surveillance test activities in progress. For those maintenance and surveillance activities observed or reviewed, the inspectors determined that the work was properly performed in accordance with approved maintenance work orders and met TS requirement _
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M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation M3.1 Inservice Testino Proaram a.
Insoection Scope (73756)
The inspectors performed a review of the inservice testing (IST) program and reviewed portions of the third ten-year interval Program Manual to verify that components were identified in the program and that the required testing, frequency of testing, test parameters, and justification for deferrais were specified. A limited scope review was performed for the auxiliary feedwater system.
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Observations and Findinas The licensee's third ten-year interval began December 1,1997 and was based on tha 1990 edition of the ASME Section XI Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code (Code).
The Code of Federal Regulations,10 CFR 50.55a, endorses the 1989 ASME B&PV Code,Section XI, Subsections lWP (Pumps) and IWV (Valves) which in turn reference the ASME/ ANSI Operation and Maintenance (OM) Standards,1987 edition with 1988 addenda. By letter dated March 20,1997, the NRC issued a Safety Evaluation which allowed the licensee to adjust Unit 2 to the test interval of Unit 1 and use the ASME OM-1990 Code. The licensee's inservice testing is described in two manuals: FNP-1-M-094," Pump and Valve inservice Testing Program and FNP-1-M-095, " Pump and Valve Inservice Testing Plan." The inspectors found the third ten-year interval program and
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plan documents consistent with ASME OM Code-1990 standards. Elements of the Code and OM standards were incorporated into Program documents and into
implementing plant procedures. Required systems included in the IST program were identified and pump and valve tables identified the components, type of tests, test frequencies, test procedures, deferral justifications, and relief requests.
The inspectors reviewed the auxiliary feedwater system program and plant drawings to verify that the valves affecting the flow path of this system were tested in the IST program. These valves were in the program. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed test performance data to verify the test frequency for the quarterly tested pumps and valves for 1998. Some valves in the auxiliary feedwater system are considered impractical by the licensee to be tested at power and adequate cold shutdown or refueling outage l
justifications were included in the program manual. Operability of a number of these valves was verified at cold shutdown or refueling outages when full design flow was established to the steam generators.
The licensee's overall pump and valve testing program consists of the Inservice Testing Program Manual, the Inservice Testing Plan Manual, the implementing plant proceduras and the Surveillance Test Data Book. The inspectors reviewed the following elements of the program for adequacy: Program Manual, Testing Plan Manual, Plant Procedures, Surveillance Test Data Book, and Schedulin.
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the inservice testing program and plan were consistent with the ASME OM-1990 code requirements. The everall program was effective.
Ill. Enaineerina E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (90712) (92700)
E8.1 (Ocen) LER 50-348/98-02: Steam Generator (SG) Tube leakaae
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i The licensee submitted a voluntary LER to address the 1B SG leakage observed prior to and during a shutdown in August 1998. This issue is documented in NRC IR No. 50-348,364/98-05. The resident inspectors reviewed the LER and discussed it with licensee engineers and management, and with NRC personnel. The licensee identified a 75 gallons per day (gpd) administrative limit on the 1B SG primary to secondary leakage until completion of the cycle 15 refueling (scheduled for October 1998.)
Observed SG leakrates after restart from the August 1998 outage were in the range of 10-30 gpd as indicated by radiation monitors and sample results. The LER will remain open pending further NRC review during the fall 1998 refueling outage.
E8.2 (Closed) LER 50-348/98-03: Waste Gas Decav Tank (WGDT) Hvdroaen and Oxvaen Concentrations Exceeded The inspector reviewed the LER and related OR, discussed the issue with licensee personnel, and evaluated the significance. Although the WGDT exceeded flammability threshold levels, no ignition sources were present, and no explosive limits were exceeded. Corrective actions were reviewed, and determined to be adequate. This TS violation constitutes a violation of minor significance and was not subject to formal enforcement action.
E8.3 (Closed) LER 50-364/98-06: Containment Penetration Over Current Protection Device Eneraized This LER was a minor issue and was closed.
E8.4 (Closed) LER 50-364/98-02: Turbine Auto Stop Trio (AST) Oil Pressure Switches Found Out of TS Limits The inspector reviewed this LER and discussed it with the licensee. No additional information was identified. This LER was a minor issue and was closed.
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IV. Plant Support R2 Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment R2.1 Radioloaically Controlled Area (RCA) Tour (71750)
Overall cleanliness of the RCA remained good. Plant personnel observed working in the RCA generally demonstrated appropriate knowledge and application of radiological control practices. Health physics technicians generally provided positive control and support of work activities in the RCA.
S1 Conduct of Safeguards Activities S1.1 Routine Observations of Plant Security Measures (71750)
The inspectors verified that portions of site security program plans were being properly implemented. Disabled vital area doors were properly manned and controlled. With the exception noted below in section S4.1, security personnel activities observed during the inspection period were performed well. Site security systems were adequate to ensure physical protection of the plant.
S4 Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance S4.1 Inattentive Security Guard (71750)
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While touring the protected area on September 8, the inspectors observed that the security guard posted in the Primary Access Point (which was not in service) appeared to be drowsy and was having difficulty maintaining surveillance of the area. The inspector informed the security supervisor, who in turned relieved the security guard.
The licensee determined the security guard should have requested relief and took corrective action. The licensee also determined that, although not fully attentive to duties, no one could have passed by the guard without being observed. The inspectors concluded that adequate corrective actions had been taken. It was also noted that on July 14, another inspector had observed a security guard inattentive to duty while posted as a compensatory action during maintenance on a vehicle barrier system (VBS). The VBS was locked at the time and again the licensee took immediate and thorough corrective action.
Although these instances appeared to be isolated, the inspectors discussed these issues with security and plant management. Since no security program violations were noted, no further NRC action was warranted.
FS Fire Protection Staff Training and Qualification F5.1 Fire Drills (71750)
During this inspection period, the licencee conducted several fire drills to test the site fire brigade response. The drills were conducted, observed, and critiqued by operations and
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training personnel. The fire brigade's performance was evaluated as satisfactory. Drill comments were discussed and documented appropriately.
The inspectors observed several fire drills from the scene and the control room, and
attended the post-drill critique. The inspector concluded that licensee performance was l
satisfactory, and that the drills were an excellent training medium.
F8 Miscellaneous Fire Protection lasues l
F8.1 (Closed) Insoector Follow-uo item (IFI) 50-348. 364/98-01-09: Excessive Underaround Ei.re Main Leakaae (71750)
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's study of the frequency and nature of underground leakage at the site. Additionally, the licensee conducted a walkdown of the
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underground fire main system and identified and documented several potential leak sites. The licensee's plan to monitor, investigate and repair system leaks was
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considered adequate.
V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the
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conclusion of the inspection on October 20,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented, j
- The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
Partial List of Persons Contacted
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R. V. Badham, Safety Audit Engineering Review C. L. Buck, Jr. Unit Superintendent
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C. D. Collins, Operation Support Superintendent
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R. M. Coleman, Maintenance Manager G. P. Crone, Engineering Support Performance Supervisor K. C. Dyar, Security Manager T. H. Esteve, Planning and Control Superintendent R. S. Fucich, Engineering Support Manager i
S. Fulmer, Plant Training and Emergency Preparadness Manager
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J. S. Gates, Administration Manager l
D. E. Grissette, Assistant General Manager - Operations
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J. G. Horn, Outage Planning Supervisor J. R. Johnson, Operations Manager D. H. Jones, SNC - Configuration Management Manager R. A. Livingston, Chemistry Superisor
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R. C. Lulling, Planning Supervisor R. R. Martin, Maintenance Team Leader M. W. Mitchell, HP Superintendent R. L. Monk, Engineering Support Supervisor C. D. Nesbitt, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
' J. E. Odom, Unit Superintendent W. D. Oldfield, Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor L. M. Stinson, Plant General Manager - FNP R. J. Vanderbye, Emergency Prepardness Coordinator G. S. Waymire, Technical Manager R. L. Winkler, Engineering Group Supervisor, Plant Modification and Maintenance Support
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B. R. Yance, Plant Modification and Maintenance Support Manager Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, j
operators, mechanics, and electricians.
Partial List of Opened, Closed, and Discussed items
Closed Type item Number Description and Reference LER 50-348/98-04 Reactor Protection System Card Failure Caused Turbine l
trip and Consequent Reactor Trip (Section 01.2).
NCV 50-348, 364/98-06-01 Inadequate Procedural Compliance (Section O4.1).
LER 50-348,364/97-05-02 Failure to' Perform Nuclear instrumentation Surveillance Requirements Prior to Mode 2 and 3 Entry (Section 08.1)
LER 50-348,364/97-03-03 Failure to Comply with Technical Specifications 4.5.3.2 and 3.5.2 (Section 08.2)
LER 50-348,364/97-03-04 Failure to Comply with Technical Specifications 4.5.3.2 and 3.5.2 (Section 08.2)
LER 50-348/98-03 WGDT H2 and O2 Concentration Exceeded (Section E8.2)
LER 50-364/98-06 Containment Penetration Over Current Protection Device Energized (Section E8.3)
.LER 50-364/98-02 Turbine AST Oil Pressure Switches Found Out of TS Limits (Section E8.4)
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IFl 50-348,364/98-01-09-Excessive Underground Fire Main Leakage (Section F8.1)
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Tyng item Number Descriotion and Reference LER 50-348/98-02 SG Tube Leakage (Section E8.1)
List of Inspection Procedures (IP) Used
' IP 40500:
Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Prevent Problems IP 60705:
Preparation for Refueling IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations
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IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations IP 71707:
Plant Operation IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities IP 73051:
!nservice inspection - Review of Program IP 73756:
Inservice inspection IP 90712:
In office Review of Written Reports IP 92700:
Onsite Followup of 'Nritten Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor
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IP 93702:
Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors l
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