IR 05000348/1990020
| ML20059H098 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 08/23/1990 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Maxwell G, Miller W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059H096 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-90-20, 50-364-90-20, NUDOCS 9009140235 | |
| Download: ML20059H098 (12) | |
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' >*#4eg UNITED STATES
Ig NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.Wc
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ATLANTA, GEOROI A 30323 l
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i Report Nos.: 50-348/90-20 ated 50-364/90-20 l
- c Licensee:
Alabama Power Company l
600 North-18th Street i
f Birmingham, AL 36291
Docket Nos.:.50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.:- NPF-2 and NPF-8
Facility name:
Farley 1 and 2-
, Inspection Conducted: July 11 through August 10, 1990
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' Inspectors:
4N w[W f - 22 -9 o W G. F. Maxwell, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed
& f fh W. H. Miller, Jr., Resident Inspector-f-2 E -90
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Date Signed.
i Approved by:
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F. 5. Cantrell, Section Ch Division of Date Signed s
j, Reactor Projects SUMMARY
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Scope:;
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oThis routine onsite inspection involved a xreview of operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance
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observation, engineered safety syscem walkdown,' practice emergency exercise,
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licensee event reports, and action on previous inspection findings.
Certain tours were conducted on deep backshift or weekends, these tours were conducted
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' July 26 and August 6 (deep backshift inspections occur between 10 p.m. and 5 l
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a.m.).
'Results:
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During this reporting period Unit 1 experienced one significant power reduction
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and one reactor trip. On July 13 power was reduced to replace the 1A-condensate pump motor and to replace a leaking oil sight glass on the 1B -
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condensate pump motor. The unit was returned to full power on July 18. Unit I was manually-tripped on July 20 at 10:18 p.m. following the automatic trip of the'1A steam generator faed pump (SGFP). The SGFP tripped on overspeed due.to the failure of the speed sensor converter.
The rectar was manually tripped in l-anticipation of an automatic reactor trip.
The unit was retened to full power on July 25.
Unit 2 operated at approximately 100% throughout this reporting period.
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PDR-A M 05000343
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, The-licensee-is continuing to condu:t emergency exercise drills to nake sure
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that each. crew.is; fully trained and experienced to respond to plant emergencies
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(paragraph 6): Review of a plant incident report indicates that the Unit'l'
!t Shift Foreman Operating demonstrated outstanding performance;during an event
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'where Freon-22 was, inadvertently injected into the ' condensate system P
(paragraph 2.b(2)). The control room operator's alert observations and g
attention identified a plant transient.and manually tripped the. reactor prior to anHautomatic reactor trip (paragraph 2.b.(3)). The operations staff n
- continues to exhibit a high level of professionalism.
No violation or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Licensee Employees Contacted R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager R. M. Coleman, Modification Manager L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager S. Fulmer, Supervisor Safety Audit and Engineering Review R; D. Hill, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations D. N. Morey, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager J. K. Osterholtz, Operations Manager L. M. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support J. J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager L. S.. Williams Training Manager Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations personnel, maintenance and I&C persomiel, security force members, and office personnel.
Acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
,,her Inspections:
July 9-13 Report 50-348/364-90-21, local leak rate testing and
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followup inspection July 11-13, Report 50-348/364-90-19, routine security inspection
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July 17-19, Report 50-348/364-90-18, fitness for duty program
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evaluation 2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
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Plant Tours The inspectors conducted routine plant tours during this inspection period to verify that the licensee's requirements and comitments were being implemented. These tours were performed to verify that:
systems, valves, and breakers required for safe plant operations were in their correct position; fire protection equipment, spare equipment and materials were being maintained and stored properly; plant operators were aware of the current plant status; plant operations personnel were documenting the status of out-of-service equipment; there were no undocumented cases of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibration, abnormal hanger or seismic restraint movements; all reviewed equipment requiring calibration was current; and in general, housekeeping was satisfactory.
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Tours of the plant included review of site documentation and.
-interviews with plant personnel. The inspectors reviewed the control room _ operators' logs, tag out logs, chemistry and health physics logs, and control boards and panels. During these tours the inspectors noted that the operators appeared to be alert, aware of
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changing plant conditions and_ manipulated plant controls properly, The inspectors evaluated operations shift turnovers and attended r
shift briefings. They observed that the briefings and turnover provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew and verified that h
the staffing met the TS requirements.
Site security was evaluated by cbserving personnel in the protected and vital areas to ensure that these persons had the proper authorization to be in the respective areas. The inspectors also
- verified that vital area portals were kept locked and alarmed. The security personnel appeared to be alert and attentive to their duties, and those officers performing personnel and vehicular searches were thorough and systematic. Responses to security alarm conditions appeared to be prompt and adequate.
Selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were reslewed by the inspectors to verify conformance with plant procedures and NRC regulatory requirements.
The areas reviewed included: operation and management of the plant's health physics staff, "ALARA" implementation, radiation work permits for compliance to plant procedures, personnel exposure records, observation of work and personnel in radiation areas to verify compliance to radiation protection procedures, and control of radioactive materials, b.
Plant Events and Observations (1) Condensate Pump 1A Motor - Unit 1 On July 13, at about 8:30 p.m. reactor power was ramped down to about 65% to allow maintenance to be performed on the motor for condensate pump 1A. The motor was removed and. replaced with a rebuilt motor. The rebuilt motor was coupled up to the pump and tested. The motor's lower bearing failed shortly after the test and the lower The motor was uncoupled from the pump (but was left began.
~ bearing was replaced. The motor was tested uncoupled this time) and the lower bearing failed again.
ie On July 16, APC0 management directed maintenance to re-install
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the original motor which had been removed and replaced with the rebuilt motor. The motor was re-installed and tested. During the test run the motor upper bearing oil reservoir developed a cooling water leak. This was evidenced by an increase in the upper bearing reservoir level and water accumulation in the upper bearing oil.
The source of the water leak was located and
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repairs were completed. Also, the motor was found to have a
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minor oil leak on the upper bearing. The inspectors were
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informed that this minor leak only occurs when the motor is
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running. The manufacturer's representative was notified and is
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evaluating the cause of the oil leak. Operations placed this i
y" conJensate pump back into service as a stand-by pump which could
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be run for a brief period, should the need occur. On July 18 i
the plant was returned to 100% power.
l (2) Plant Insident Report IR 1-90-171 - Unit 1 The inspectors evaluated the human performance information which the licensee has documented as a part of the proposed corrective action for IR 1-90-171. The incident report was initiated following the inadvertent injection of Freon-22 into the condensate system.
Some of the proposed corrective actions noted were: MWRs for leak enecking transmitters need to provide more detail; chemistry i
procedures should more clearly state purpose and how to use the listed chemicals in procedure 0-M-049. Chemical Product Control Program; chemistry personnel should be more aware.of the importance
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of believing an indication until it has been proven erroneous; also,
chemistry managenent needs to establish a policy for the role of the chemistry foreman during situations involving identified chemistry parameter excursions.
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During'the incident the Shift Foreman Operating.(SF0) went to the e
secondary chemistry lab, looking at all records and meters for cation J
conductivity. The SF0 recognized that a trend had developed to indicate a source for the increased conductivity reading. He identified the source as being Freon-22. Action was then taken to isolate the Freon-22 and begin the secondary system clean-up. The prompt and decisive action by the SFO is an example of outstending performance by the operations staff.
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(3) Manual Reactor Trip - Unit 1
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On July 20 at approximately 10:20 p.m. the Unit I reactor was manually tripped following the loss of steam generator feed pump (main feed pump) 1A. The steam generator feed pump tripped due to an
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overspeed trip signal generated by the electro-hydraulic control system for feed pump 1A. The operator at the control observed the
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pump trip and subsequent rapid decrease in steam generator level.
l Manual actions were promptly initiated to trip the unit prior to the initiation of an automatic trip signal. The operators' alert observations and attention to detail during this event once again demonstrates the professionalism of the plant's operations staff.
Approxiraately 15 minutes following the reactor trip, the source range instrumentation received a power up signal. However, one of the two source range monitors (N31) failed to come on scale.
The detector
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voltage was normal but there was no count rate indication.
Subsequent investigation found that the detector was in need of replacement. The inoperable detector was replaced with a new detector.
j Following this event, the licensee conducted a comprehensive review to evaluate the cause of the feed pump 1A trip. This evaluation
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U found that the trip was apparently caused by a failed speed sensor converter which caused the speed control circuitry in the control
system to sense a sudden drop in feed pump feed.
The circuitry
responded immediately to open the feed pump governor valves which
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caused a rapid speed or RPM increase of the feed pump. At approximately 5600 RPMs the turbine mechanical overspeed trip device actuated and the feed pump turbine tripaed as designed. The normal RPM of the pump is approximately 4500 R)Ms. The defective components of the feed pump speed control system were replaced. The turbine was disconnected from the pump and satisfactorily tested following repairs before returning the feed pump to service.
uH feed pump 1A was returned to service on July 24 at 3:45 p.m. and Unit L
1 was returned to full power on July 25 at about 1:25 a.m.
(4) Attempted Start of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump -
Unit 1 On July 26, the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump attempted to start while electrical maintenance personnel were replacing a
time-delay relay ("AGASTAT") associated with the pump's control l
circuits. However, the pump turbine did not attain full speed. The turbine did not reach full speed because all-of the steam supply valves were not opened, as they were not required to open under these conditions.
The licensee evaluated the circumstances and conditions associated with this condition. AnIncidentReport(IR-1-90-212)was
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drafted to document _ the incident and to assure that appropriate j,
corrective action is taken.
Current information indicates that the solenoid for a steam supply I
ll valve for the pump!s turbine was de-energized when the electrical
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leads were lifted from the "AGASTAi" which was being replaced.
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the solenoid was de-energized it allowed the steam supply valve (HV L
l 3226) to open, providing a path for a limited amount of steam to the l"
turbine. This steam supply valve, for the turbine-driven pump, oper.s when its' electrical solenoid valve is de-energized.
o The incident was initially reported to the NRC as a 10 CFR 50.72 (non-emergency notification) by the Unit I shift supervisor.
However, subsequently the NRC was informed that this incident should not have been reported as an event requiring NRC notification.
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3.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors witnessed maintenance surveillance test activities on safety-related systems and components to verify that these activities were performed in accordance with TS and licensee requirements. These
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observations included witnessing selected portions of each surveillance, e
review of the surveillance procedures to ensure that administrative controls and tagging procedures were in force, determining that approval was obtained prior to conducting the surveillance test, and the
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individuals conducting the ?.est were qualified in accordance with plant-approved procedures. Other observations included ascertaining that test instrumentation used was calibrated, data collected was within the specified requirements of TS, any identified discrepancies were properly noted,'and the r.ystems were correctly returned to service. The following specific activities we 2 observed:
0-STP-25.2 River Water Pumps 6,7,8,9,10 Quarterly Inservice Test.
0-STP-54.1 Fire Pump Functional Test (Motor Driven and Diesel Driven Pump No. 1).
0-STP-80.7 Diesel Generator 1C 24 Hour Load Test.
1-STP-21.1 A C Source Verification.
1-STP-152.1 Main Feedwater IB Overspeed Trip Mechanical Test.
2-STP-80.5 Diesel Generator 28 Auto Start Test.
2-STP-80.8 Diesel Generator 2B 1000 kw Load Rejection Test.
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2-STP-114.1 Moderator Temperature Coefficient Determination for Boron
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Equal to or Less Than 300 ppm.
Surveillance procedures 2-STP-114.1 conducted on Unit 2 on July 18 found-3,0x10-4deltak/k/gturecoefficient(MTC)tobemorenegativethan-the-moderator temper F with the boron concentration of the RCS less than the TS 3.1.1.3 limit of -3.9x10-4 delta k/k/,wh!ch is less negative than 300 ppm. The actual reading was -3.071x10-4
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F. However, TS 4.1.1.3b
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requires the MTC to be measured at least once per 14 days during the
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remainder of the cycle when the MTC reading is more negative than-3,0x10-4.
The reading of the MTC on August 1 was found to be -3.145x10-4
which was within the TS limits. The MTC will continue to be read each 14 days until the end of this fuel cycle, unless the TS is revised to relax this requirement.- The licensee has submitted a TS change request to reduce the frequency of these measurements.
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On August 6 diesel generator 2C was being tested in accordance with
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procedure STP-80.2. The diesel was started at 1:30 p.m. and at about.4:00
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p.m. a diesel generator 2C trouble alarm was received in.the control room.
The diesel building system operator checked the local alarm panel for diesel 2C and noted that the high bearing temperature alarm, outboard
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bearing temperature above 185 degrees F, was activated. The system i
operator notified the control room and the reactor operator tripped the
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diesel as required by procedure ARP-19.2 Diesels IC and 2C Local Alarm Panels. The inspectors reviewed.the circumstances associated with this event and noted that ARP-19.2 list the maximum safe bearing temperature for diesel generators 1C and 2C to be 185 degrees F.
However, when these diesels are operated in hot summer weather the diesel bearings sometimes exceed 185 degree F.
This phenomenon has been discussed by the licensee
with the vendor and by letter dated May 1, 1981 the vendor indicates that~
a maximum bearing temperature of 200 - 205 degrees F is satisfactory for
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Procedure ARP-19.2 was revised, during this inspection period,'to include the vendors recommendations.
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No violations or deviations were identified. The results of the inspections in this area indicate that the program was effective with i
respect to meeting. the safety objectives.
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Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The. inspectors reviewed maintenance activities-to verify the following:
maintenance personnel were obtaining the appropriate tag out and clearance i
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approvals prior to commencing work activities; correct documentation was available for all requested parts and material prior to use; procedures i
were available for all requested parts and material prior to use; procedures were available and adequate for the work being conducted;
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maintenance personnel performing work activities were qualified to
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-accomplish these tasks; activities reviewed were not violating any limiting conditions for operation during the specific evolution; post-maintenance testing activities were completed; and that equipment was properly returned to service after the completion of work activities.
Activities reviewed included:
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MWR 158286 Investigate and correct load swings on diesel generator IC from 2900 kw to 3200 kw.
MWR 214248 Install 1/4" vent line from accumulator to day tank vent for diesel generator 1-2A (slow start elimination modification).
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MWR 214120 Installation of exclusion area fence in drumming room - PCN i
B88-2-4832.
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MWR 222498 Anchor Bolt Tests in accordance with Procedure PMP-1145, Qualification Testing of Hilti " KWIK Bolt II" bolts.
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WA 92405 Service Water Wet Pit Cleanup in Accordance with Procedure
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ETP-1007, Service Water Wet Pit Cleanup On August'23 the inspector's witnessed the cleaning operations of the
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service water pump suction pit performed under work authorization 92406.
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This pit was cleaned to remove the clam shell builduo.
A total of 9 cubic
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yards of clam shells was removed from the pit.
Very few clam shells were found adjacent to the pumps. This pit is cleaned every two years as part *
of the clam elimination program.
In 1988 a total of 12 cubic yards of clam shells was removed and in 1986 a total of 16 cubic yards was removed.
It appears that the clam prevention program has been beneficial in reducing the accumulation of clams shells in the service water suction pit.
No violations or deviations were identified. The results of the inspections in this area indicate that the program was effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives.
5.
Engineered Safety System Inspection Unit 1(71710)
The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the accessible portions of the Unit 1 containment spray system to verify operability. Major components were checked for leakage and general conditions that could degrade performance or prevent fulfillment of functional requirements were inspected. Particular attention was directed towards verifying that hangars and supports were in place and properly made up and that the
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primary valves and electrical breakers were correctly aligned. Equipment identification tags were reviewed and found to be in place. Calibration of gauges and instrumentation was also found to be current.
Satisfactory housekeeping and cleanliness were found to be maintained in the vicinity
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of the equi) ment. During the evaluation the inspectors used:' drawing
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D-175038, sleet 3; the manufacturers technical manual, site document l
U0169164; and system *hecklist 1-SOP.9,0A for containment spray system.
The system was found to be operable in accordance with the TS and FSAR.
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No violations or deviations were identified, j
6.
Practice Emergency Exercise (82301)
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The resident inspectors participated as team members in a practice emergency exercise which was conducted on August 6.
The practice exercise
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, started at 5:00 a.m. and consisted of a simulated seismic event which l:
L caused a loss of the "A" train emergency 4160V buses.
The loss of
electrical power in conjunction with the loss of charging and CCW pumps
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resulted in a loss of RCP seal cooling.
Fifteen minutes after seismic
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event, the RCP seals failed causing a loss of reactor coolant accident and an Alert classification. An aftershock at 6:30 a.m. resulted in an CRDM rupture and subsequent declaration of a Site Area Emergency. At 7:15 a.m.
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another aftershock caused the failure of the personnel hatch and leakage from containment to the environment. A general emergency was declared at p
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8:45 a.m.
Drill activities continued in the TSC until approximately 2:00 p.m. and in the E0F until about 2:30 p.m.
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O Following the drill a critique was held to discuss the strong points and o
area, in need of improvements which were identified during the exercise.
k To assure.that the plant staff is fully trained and experienced to handle
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emergency activities each of the three "on call" emergency response crews are being provided with additional training.
Each crew will receive at least one table top exercise and at least one practice exercise during
August 1990. The next annual emergency drill will be conducted October
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24 -1990.' The current emergency training and drills should improve the licensee's per#ormance in the event of an emergency activity.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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LicenseeEventReports(90712)
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ThefollowingLicenseeEventReports(LERs)werereviewedforpotential
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generic problems to determine trends, to determine whether information i
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consider whether the corrective action discussed in the reports appears
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appropriate. The licensee action was reviewed to verify that the events had been reviewed and evaluated by the licensee as required by the
. Technical Specifications; that corrective action was taken by the licensee; and that safety limits, limiting safety setting and LCOs were not exceeded. The inspectors examined the incident reports, logs and records, and interviewed selected personnel. The following reports are l
considered closed:
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Unit 1(50-348)
LER/90-01 Fire watch not established within the time required due to personnel error.
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LER/90-05 Manual reactor trip after trip of the 1A steam generator feed pump.
Unic2(50-364)
LER/90-01 Reactor trip during startup cause by procedural
inadequacy.
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l LER/90-02 Missed fire watch due to personnel error.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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ActiononPreviousInspectionFindings(92701)
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(0 pen)
Inspector Followup Iteni 348,364/90-10-02, Licensee's i
evaluation of RCDT system valves for high temperature application.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation on this item, APC0 correspondence from D. S. Mask, NMS to D. E. Mansfield dated July 16,
1990.
This evaluation found that the plant no longer operates the
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RCDT pumps continuously as contemplated by the original plant design.
r The pumps are now manually operated in the event of high tank level or pressure. The RCDT tank for each unit is located in containment and is.provided with a high pressure and a high tank level alarm.
One pump is manually started to maintain tank parameters in the required ranges. This method of operation results in the liquid in the recirculation line originating from high temperature valve leakoffs being above the design temperature rating of several valves in the system. When the RCDT pumps operated continuously the recirculation 'subcooled the liquid flowing through the system which cooled the liquids leaking into the system.
However, the high
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temperature inleakage into the RCDT system is able to sustain its saturation heated condition thus damaging the internal diaphram support sheets for some of the diaphram typt. valves. The licensee's
evaluation found that approximately 18 diaphram valves in the waste
process piping system from the RCDT to the recycle holdup tanks (RHT)
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per unit are designed for a maximum temperature of 200 degrees F.
The temperature in the RCDT system in the non-recirculation mode r
reaches this reading.
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To eliminate this concern the licensee has identified four options:
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Operated RCDT as originally designed in the continuous
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recirculation mode.
i Maintain RCDT level above recirculation line inlet into tank.
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Modify diaphram valves to meet high temperature application.
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Replace the valves with valves rated at a high temperature
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application.
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'Each option is being evaluated to identify the best solution and-i L
appropriate corrective action is to be implemented. This item i
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remain open pending resolution of the' corrective actions.
(b)
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 348/90-13-01, Water in lower tendon can.
Following the identification of water in the can for tendon No.
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V-59, the licensee detensioned the tendon and performed a detailed inspection and conducted a magnetic particle test on this tendon, No cracks or other problems were identified. The tendon was
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retensioned, regreased and returned to service. The results of this inspection and test will be documented by Southern Company (engineering) in a letter to the licensee concerning the recently completed five year tendon inspection program required by LER 85-05.
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This item is closed.
9.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were sumarized during management interviews throughout the report period, and on August 14, with the
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assistant plant manager and selected members the plant staff..The
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inspection findings were discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
Licensee was informed that the items discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8.b.
were closed..
10. Acronyms and Abbreviations Auxiliary Feedwater AFW
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Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP
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Administrative Procedure AP-
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APC0 -
Alabama Power Company Code of Federal Regulations CFR
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CVCS -
Chemical and Volume Control System Component Cooling Water CCW
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CRDM -
Control Rod Drive Mechanism Emergency Contingency Procedure ECP
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Emergency Plant Implementing Procedure EIP
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Environmental Qualifications EQ
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Engineered Safety Features ESF
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Engineering Work Request EWR
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Fahrenheit F
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FSAR -
Final Safety Analysis Report Gallons Per Minute GPM
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Inservice Inspection ISI
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Inservice Test IST
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LCO -
Limiting Condition for Operation Motor-Operated Valve MOV
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M0 VATS - Motor-Operated Valve Actuation Testing Maintenance Work Request MWR
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Nonconformance Report NCR
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC
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NRR NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Plant Modifications Department PMD
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Plant Change Notice PCN
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Radiation Control and Protection Procedure RCP
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RCDT -
Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Reactor Coolant System RCS
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Revolutions Per Minute RPM
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Safety Injection SI'
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SAER.-
Safety Audit and Engineering Review SSPS -
Solid State Protection System SPDS -
Safety Perameter Display System Surveillance Test Procedure STP
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Technical Specification TS
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WA Work Authorization
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