IR 05000348/2024003
| ML24317A088 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley, 07200042  |
| Issue date: | 11/13/2024 |
| From: | Alan Blamey NRC/RGN-II/DORS/PB3 |
| To: | Coleman J Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| EPID I-2024-003-0016, EPID I-2024-001-0047 IR 2024001, IR 2024003 | |
| Download: ML24317A088 (29) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2024003, 05000364/2024003 AND 07200042/2024001
Dear Jamie Coleman:
On September 30, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant. On October 24, 2024, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with John Andrews, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Three findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Three of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant.
November 13, 2024 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Alan J. Blamey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000348, 05000364 and 07200042 License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000348, 05000364 and 07200042
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000348/2024003, 05000364/2024003 and 07200042/2024001
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2024-003-0016 and I-2024-001-0047
Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility:
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant
Location:
Columbia, AL
Inspection Dates:
July 01, 2024 to September 30, 2024
Inspectors:
A. Alen Arias, Senior Project Engineer
J. Bell, Senior Health Physicist
B. Bowker, Senior Reactor Inspector
P. Braaten, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Donithan, Senior Operations Engineer
V. Furr, Reliability and Risk Analyst
J. Hickey, Senior Project Engineer
B. Kellner, Senior Health Physicist
J. Montgomery, Senior Reactor Inspector
E. Morris, Project Engineer
D. Neal, Health Physicist
P. Niebaum, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Restrepo, Health Physicist
A. Rosebrook, Senior Reactor Analyst
S. Sandal, Senior Reactor Analyst
S. Temple, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Alan J. Blamey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure To Perform Adequate Detailed Categorization Results in RISC-1 Components Being Categorized as RISC-3 Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000348,05000364/2024003-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 37060 The NRC identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) for the licensee's failure to perform adequate detailed categorizations for multiple components within the emergency diesel generator (EDG) system.
Failure To Perform Adequate Defense-In-Depth Review Results in RISC-1 Components Being Categorized as RISC-3 Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000348,05000364/2024003-02 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 37060 The NRC identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) for the licensee's failure to perform an adequate defense-in-depth review for multiple components within the emergency diesel generator (EDG) system and chemical volume and control system (CVCS).
Failure to Evaluate Degraded SI Piping Support in the RWST Trench Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000348/2024003-03 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71152A The NRC identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to evaluate a degraded condition as required by procedure NMP-ES-021, Structural Monitoring Program for the Maintenance Rule. Specifically, the licensee failed to correctly categorize the degradation and ensure the loss of effective metal thickness due to corrosion of a piping support (SI-R298/299) would not lead to a structural failure of the support causing damage to the safety injection (SI) system.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000348,05000364/20 24010-01 Multiple Components Associated with HSS Systems Re-Categorized to LSS based on Defense-In-Depth or Manual Actions 37060 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the report period at or near rated thermal power (RTP). On August 21, the unit reduced power to approximately 71 percent due to loss of a circulating water pump. Power was restored to 100 percent RTP on August 23, 2024. The unit remained at or near RTP through the end of the report period.
Unit 2 operated at or near RTP for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk significant systems from impending Hurricane Helene on September 26, 2024 (FNP-0-AOP-21.0).
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 'A' motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump (AFW) system following pump inoperability for room cooler maintenance on July 23, 2024 (D175007)
- (2) Unit 2 'A' motor driven AFW pump while the 'B' motor driven AFW pump was inoperable during maintenance and testing on August 7, 2024 (A181010)
(3)
- 1 diesel driven fire pump while the #2 diesel driven fire pump was out of service for planned maintenance on August 20, 2024
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 1 control rod drive mechanism control system cabinets room (FA 1-041) on August 8, 2024 (FNP-1-FPP-1.0)
(2)
'1B' emergency diesel generator room (EDG) (FZ DGB-1B) on August 8, 2024 (FNP-0-FPP-2.0)
- (3) EDG building switchgear train 'A' room (FZ DGB-56A) on August 8, 2024 (FNP-0-FPP-2.0)
- (4) EDG building switchgear train 'B' room (FZ DGB-56B) on August 8, 2024 (FNP-0-FPP-2.0)
- (5) Unit 1 A charging pump room (FA 1-005) on August 13, 2024 (FNP-1-FPP-1.0)
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated external flooding due to intense precipitation mitigation protections for the Farley site on July 26, 2024 (FNP-0-AOP-21.0).
71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) Biennial Requalification Written Examinations The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered on July 2024.
Annual Requalification Operating Tests The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees annual requalification operating test.
Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.
Requalification Examination Security The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised.
Remedial Training and Re-examinations The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee, and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.
Operator License Conditions The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses.
Control Room Simulator The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during the following:
- control room operations and annunciator response on July 8, 2024
- Unit 1 residual heat removal valves in-service test (FNP-1-STP-11.6) on August 7, 2024
- Unit 1 operator response to loss of the 'B' circulating water pump and 17 cooling tower fans on August 21, 2024
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator response during a simulator exam involving manual actuation of safety injection (As Found 2404) on August 12, 2024.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 1 steam dump valve 'E' following valve failure on May 9, 2024 (condition report (CR) 11075442)
- (2) Emergency lighting currently under 50.65 a(1) monitoring for failed periodic performance tests on August 30, 2024
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 1 risk while the 'A' train high head safety injection system was inoperable for 'B' charging pump testing on July 24, 2024 (NMP-0S-010)
- (2) Unit 2 risk during the emergency core cooling valves in-service test and power operated relief valve block valve stroke time test on August 6, 2024 (FNP-2-STP-10.3)
- (3) Unit 1 risk in response to a loss of the 1B circulating water pump and 1C cooling tower on August 22, 2024
- (4) Fire suppression water system nonfunctional on August 26, 2024 (CR 11105034)
- (5) Planned maintenance on the unit 2 'A' auxiliary building 125-volt battery on August 28, 2024 (work order (WO) SNC1971860)
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 2 service water pump 'C' with reduced (i.e., partially clogged) motor lube and cooling water flow on June 28, 2024 (CR 11096792)
- (2) Unit 1 component cooling water pump motor with outboard bearing temperatures outside of specification ranges on July 9, 2024 (CR 11091856, 11091864)
- (3) Unit 2 turbine driven AFW pump failure to start as expected during performance of a quarterly surveillance test on July 11, 2024 (CR 11092442)
- (4) Unit 2 turbine driven AFW pump steam supply valve actual stroke time less than acceptable stroke time on July 11, 2024 (CR 11092378, Q2N12HV3226)
- (5) Unit 1 functionality of boration flow paths after the 'B' boric acid transfer pump breaker tripped on thermal overloads due to the pump's suction valve being closed on a pump start on July 29, 2024 (CR 11096969)
- (6) Unit 1 NI48B Gamma-Metrics startup rate indication unreliable on August 26, 2024 (CR 11103147)
- (7) Unit 2 'B' service water pump with an elevated bearing temperature identified on August 28, 2024 (CR 11105931)
- (8) Unit 2 'C' service water pump failure to run on September 3, 2024 (CR 11107428)
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Implementation of license amendment L-2024-LLA-0098 issued August 29, 2024, and associated technical specification changes for containment air temperature limits
- (2) Installation of a bypass jumper around cell #4 of the unit 2 'A' auxiliary building 125-volt battery on September 3, 2024 (SNC1986059)
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 B residual heat removal pump quarterly test following flow transmitter FT-605 calibration on July 10, 2024 (FNP-1-STP-11.2)
- (2) Unit 2 turbine driven AFW pump test after replacement of control switch Q2N23HS3304AA on July 13, 2024 (FNP-2-STP-22.16)
- (3) Unit 2 'A' emergency air compressor following planned maintenance on August 21, 2024
- (4) Unit 1 'B' circulating water pump run following a current transformer replacement on August 23, 2024 (SNC1988152)
- (5) Number 2 diesel driven fire pump following multiple planned maintenance activities on August 23 and 25, 2024
- (6) Testing of the unit 2 'A' battery following installation of a jumper around cell #4 on August 28, 2024 (SNC1986059)
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
- (1) Unit 2 turbine driven AFW pump steam supply valves test on July 11, 2024 (FNP-2-STP-21.3)
- (2) Unit 2 turbine driven AFW pump quarterly test on July 11, 2024 (FNP-2-STP-22.16)
- (3) Unit 2 'B' charging pump quarterly test on July 15, 2024 (FNP-2-STP-4.2)
- (4) Unit 1 auxiliary building battery quarterly verification test on July 16, 2024 (FNP-1-STP-905.4)
- (5) Unit 1 'B' residual heat removal pump quarterly test on July 18, 2024 (FNP-1-STP-11.2)
- (6) Diesel driven fire pump #1 testing on August 7, 2024 (FNP-0-FSP-201.1)
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 'C' charging pump quarterly in-service test on July 31, 2024 (FNP-2-STP-4.3, WO SNC1689272)
Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) FLEX (i.e., diverse and flexible coping strategies) operational tests of the 600-volt diesel generator (NSZ05B005A), steam generator FLEX pump (NSZ05P010C), and spent fuel pool booster pump (NSZ05P012B) during the week of July 29, 2024 (WOs SNC1522646, SNC1531953, SNC1523517)
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Required Emergency Preparedness Drill (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed an emergency response organization drill involving an anticipated transient without trip leading to a radiation release and a general emergency classification on July 9, 2024.
Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Licensed operator response during a simulator exam involving manual actuation of safety injection and represented a drill and exercise performance opportunity (As-Found 2404) on August 5,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive effluent systems during walkdowns:
- (1) Unit 2 plant vent stack (RE-29B) gaseous effluent monitoring system
- (2) Turbine building steam jet air ejector (RE-15A) gaseous effluent monitoring system
- (3) Unit 1 steam generator blowdown effluent line (RE-23B) liquid effluent monitoring system
- (4) Auxiliary building, radwaste, and containment purge ventilation system
- (5) Unit 1 liquid radwaste effluent line (RE-18) monitoring system
Sampling and Analysis (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)
Inspectors evaluated the following effluent samples, sampling processes and compensatory samples:
- (1) Unit 2 auxiliary building plant vent stack (RE-29B) weekly gaseous sampling
- (2) Unit 1 auxiliary building plant vent stack (RE-29B) weekly gaseous sampling
- (3) Compensatory samples taken for Unit 1 R-23B (Steam Generator Blowdown) out of service
Dose Calculations (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following dose calculations:
- (1) Gaseous waste release permit G-20240820-0435-C
- (2) Liquid waste release permit L-20240619-0390-C
- (3) Liquid waste release permit L-20240624-0395-C
Abnormal Discharges (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following abnormal discharges:
- (1) Unit 1 Recycle Holdup Tank gaseous release received elevated rad levels associated with R-29B, R-19, and R-10 ['spike release']. Gaseous Release Permit G-20210307-0230-B (CR 10780831)
71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
Environmental Monitoring Equipment and Sampling (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated environmental monitoring equipment and observed collection of environmental samples.
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensees radiological environmental monitoring program.
GPI Implementation (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of the Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI) program to identify incomplete or discontinued program elements.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024)
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024)
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
- (1) September 1, 2023 to June 30, 2024
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Evaluation of a degraded safety injection piping support in the refueling water storage tank (RWST) trench in accordance with the "Structural Monitoring Program for the Maintenance Rule" (CR10781010)
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in cooling tower fan shaft failures that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue (CR 11104178).
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
===60855 - Operation of an ISFSI Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2690, Inspection Program for Storage of Spent Reactor Fuel and Reactor-Related Greater-than-Class C Waste at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) and for 10 CFR Part 71 Transportation Packagings."
Operation of an ISFSI===
- (1) From July 22 - 26, 2024 the inspectors performed a review of the licensees ISFSI activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements. During the on-site inspection, the inspectors observed and reviewed licensee activities in each of the five safety focus areas including occupational exposure, public exposure, fuel damage, confinement, and impact to plant operations.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. Additionally, the inspectors performed independent walkdowns of the heavy load lifting equipment, the ISFSI haul path, and the ISFSI pad.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure To Perform Adequate Detailed Categorization Results in RISC-1 Components Being Categorized as RISC-3 Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000348,05000364/2024003-01 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 37060 The NRC identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation for the licensee's failure to perform adequate detailed categorizations for multiple components within the emergency diesel generator (EDG) system.
Description:
On June 30, 2021, the NRC approved Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) license amendments 233 and 230 (ML21137A247) which allows the implementation of 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors. In the license amendment request, FNP stated that they will implement the risk categorization process in accordance with NEI 00-04, Revision 0, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.201, "Guidelines for Categorizing Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Power Plants According to their Safety Significance." The categorization of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) is governed by fleet procedure NMP-ES-065-003, 10 CFR 50.69 Risk Informed Categorization for Structures, Systems, and Components.
The 10 CFR 50.69 categorization process divides safety-related and non-safety-related components into two subcategories - high safety significant (HSS) and low safety significant (LSS). This is done by performing reviews from 5 risk perspectives - internal events risk, fire risk, seismic risk, external risk, and shutdown risk. The results of the categorization assessments are reviewed by an Integrated Decision-Making Panel (IDP). The role of the IDP is to review the results of the assessment to ensure that system functions and operating experiences have been appropriately considered in the risk analyses.
For an SSC to be recommended to the IDP as LSS, it must have been identified as LSS by the reviews performed for the 5 risk perspectives noted above. Additionally, SSCs that are safety-related and considered to be LSS are evaluated in a defense-in-depth (DID)characterization process. If the DID review identifies that the SSC should be considered HSS, the IDP cannot re-categorize that SSC as LSS. The 10 CFR 50.69 categorization process also allows the optional steps of performing detailed categorization, which is additional engineering and system analyses to identify specific component-level function and importance for HSS components. This step can categorize a component as LSS if a failure of the component would not preclude fulfillment of a safety significant function associated with the SSC.
Relay QSR43A0501T3A is a time delay pickup relay in the EDG stop and trip circuit. This relay is actuated by, either EDG engine speed of greater than 460 RPM, or normal jacket water pressure. This relay is associated with the low lube oil pressure trip for the EDG, which is an essential engine protection trip. Relay QSR43A0501T3A blocks the low lube oil pressure trip until 14 seconds after engine speed is near normal. This time delay allows the EDG to start and get to rated speed without the trip unnecessarily stopping the EDG. After the 14 second delay, the low lube oil pressure trip becomes active.
The licensees categorization for the EDGs identified function R43-2.3, Provide engine trip protection under emergency operation as a safety significant function. However, the licensee failed to map this function to relay QSR43A0501T3A. The licensee performed the optional detailed categorization to downgrade this relay from HSS to LSS. Since this function (R43-2.3) was not mapped to the component (relay QSR43A0501T3A), the licensee did not evaluate whether failure of this relay would preclude fulfillment of function R43-2.3. As designed, failure of this relay could, in fact, preclude fulfillment of function R43-2.3 because functionality of this relay is required for functionality of the low lube oil pressure trip. The trip logic combines 3 inputs into an AND logic gate. One of those inputs is the output from relay QSR43A0501T3A, which serves to confirm that the EDG is running. Therefore, if this relay fails to engage, the trip logic would never be satisfied, even if a valid low lube oil pressure condition was sensed. The team also identified additional examples of this error, involving the low lube oil pressure alarm relay for the EDGs. Similarly, functionality of this relay is required for functionality of the low lube oil pressure trip. The licensee failed to map function R43-2.3 to this relay, and thus, failed to evaluate whether failure of this relay would preclude fulfillment of function R43-2.3.
Additionally the licensees detailed categorization evaluation reviewed the effect of the failure of relay QSR43A0501T3A on another safety significant function - R43-2.2, Provide control circuitry for emergency mode operation. Using detailed categorization, the licensee downgraded the relay from HSS to LSS, stating, Failure would not impact the ability to provide control circuitry for emergency mode operation. The relay is an alarm relay only. This statement is incorrect. As explained above, this relay is directly associated with the low lube oil pressure essential engine protection trip. While the EDG is in standby, the EDG would have low lube oil pressure - thus, satisfying 2 of the 3 inputs for the essential trip. The third input is from relay QSR43A0501T3A. As noted previously, this relay is actuated by, either EDG engine speed of greater than 460 RPM, or normal jacket water pressure. The relay also contains an output time delay of 14 seconds, which provides a momentary block of the low lube oil pressure trip. This time delay allows the EDG to start and get to rated speed without the trip unnecessarily stopping the EDG. If the relay fails to provide the 14 second time delay and, instead, engages too soon, the EDG could trip before reaching rated speed. Therefore, failure of this relay is not an alarm relay only, and failure of this relay could, in fact, preclude fulfillment of function R43-2.2 because failure of this relay could prevent the EDG from starting and running in emergency mode.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program to develop corrective actions to restore compliance and to conduct an extent of condition review.
Corrective Action References: CR 11049354
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Inspectors determined the licensee's failure to identify all system functions that relay QSR43A0501T3A supports, and failure to adequately evaluate the possibility of changing the initial risk of HSS to LSS was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, because the component was erroneously categorized as RISC-3, the licensees procedures would allow the removal of requirements that must remain in place for RISC-1 SSCs, such as 10 CFR 50 Appendix B quality assurance requirements, inclusion in maintenance rule per 10 CFR 50.65, and reporting requirements to meet 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, the issue screens to Green based on answering "Yes" to Question A.1, "If the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, does the SSC maintain its operability or PRA functionality?"
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, the licensee did not use a systematic, rigorous, or thorough process to perform the categorization reviews for the affected components.
Enforcement:
Violation: Farley operating license conditions (OLCs) 2.C(8) for Unit 1 and 2.C(25) for Unit 2 states, in part, that SNC is approved to implement 10 CFR 50.69 using the processes for categorization of Risk-Informed Safety Class (RISC)-1, RISC-2, RISC-3, and RISC-4 SSCs using PRA models to evaluate risk associated with internal events as described in SNC's submittal letter dated June 18, 2020, and all its subsequent associated supplements as specified in License Amendment No. 233 dated June 30, 2021. Section 3.1.1 of the June 18, 2020 submittal states that SNC will implement the risk categorization process in accordance with NEI 00-04, Revision 0, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.201.
SNC implements procedure NMP-ES-065-003, 10 CFR 50.69 Risk Informed Categorization for Structures, Systems, and Components to meet the requirements of NEI 00-04, and therefore, its licensing requirement.
Section 4.3.2 of NMP-ES-065-003 states, in part, Develop a list of functions performed by the system. Section 4.3.5 states, in part, For each component, identify the system function(s) that the component supports.
Section 4.10.7 of NMP-ES-065-003 states, in part, Evaluate the possibility of changing the initial risk of HSS to LSS if the failure of the component would not preclude the fulfillment of the HSS function. Exercise caution and conservative judgment before such risk reduction allowances are taken. Ensure that appropriate justification is documented.
Contrary to the above, since September 19, 2022, the licensee failed to identify all system functions that relay QSR43A0501T3A supported. And, contrary to the above, the licensee failed to adequately evaluate the possibility of changing the initial risk of relay QSR43A0501T3A from HSS to LSS.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure To Perform Adequate Defense-In-Depth Review Results in RISC-1 Components Being Categorized as RISC-3 Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000348,05000364/2024003-02 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 37060 The NRC identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation for the licensee's failure to perform an adequate defense-in-depth review for multiple components within the EDG system and chemical volume and control system (CVCS).
Description:
The 10 CFR 50.69 categorization process divides safety-related and non-safety-related components into two subcategorieshigh safety significant (HSS) and low safety significant (LSS). This is done by performing reviews from 5 risk perspectivesinternal events risk, fire risk, seismic risk, external risk, and shutdown risk. Additionally, systems, structure and components (SSC) that are safety-related and considered to be LSS are evaluated in a defense-in-depth (DID) characterization process. As a part of the categorization process, the licensee also utilized the optional steps of performing detailed categorization, which is additional engineering and system analyses to identify specific component-level function and importance for HSS components. This step can categorize a component as LSS if a failure of the component would not preclude fulfillment of a safety significant function associated with the SSC.
DID characterizations are only required for SSCs that are categorized as LSS. The DID evaluation conservatively assumes that the proposed LSS SSCs being evaluated, and any redundant identical LSS SSCs in the system, do not perform their function, and assures that safety significant functions are still maintained by redundant SSCs. The licensee performed their categorization process in an order where the DID review is performed before any detailed categorization is done, and therefore, before initially HSS components are downgraded to LSS via detailed categorization. As a result, for multiple SSCs across multiple systems, the licensee failed to perform DID characterizations for components that were downgraded to LSS via detailed categorization. The licensees approved risk categorization process (NEI 00-04, Rev. 0) requires that DID categorizations be performed for safety-related SSCs that are identified as LSS.
As an example, for the EDG, relay QSR43A0501T3A (also discussed in the previous performance deficiency) was downgraded from HSS to LSS via detailed categorization. The licensees evaluation identified this relay as supporting safety significant function R43-2.2, Provide control circuitry for emergency mode operation. The licensees DID evaluation did not review this function at all. The DID evaluation did contain an entry for this component as an LSS component that supports an HSS function. However, this entry only repeated the basis used to downgrade the component via detailed categorization (which, of note, was an inadequate basis to downgrade the component, as detailed in the previous performance deficiency). Simply repeating the basis for downgrading a component via detailed categorization does not align with the DID categorization process detailed in Chapter 6 of NEI 00-04 or Section 4.8.1 and Attachment 1 of licensee procedure NMP-ES-065-003, 10 CFR 50.69 Risk Informed Categorization for Structures, Systems, and Components. Further, had the licensee properly performed the DID evaluation in alignment with NEI 00-04 and procedure NMP-ES-065-003, the results would yield that, because there are not enough redundant SSCs to support function R43-2.2, the risk associated with relay QSR43A0501T3A would be screened as HSS via the DID evaluation.
Inspectors also noted other specific examples of this same type of analysis failure associated with the EDG engine-driven jacket water pumps, the EDG diesel-driven jacket water pumps, and for two emergency boration valves in the CVCS. Inspectors reviewed the results of licensees risk categorizations for multiple systems and noted that the practice of not performing DID characterizations for components that were downgraded to LSS via detailed categorization is systemically present across all system evaluations.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program to develop corrective actions to restore compliance and to conduct an extent of condition review.
Corrective Action References: CR 11049354
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Inspectors determined the licensee's failure to adequately assess the role of the components in preserving defense-in-depth related to core damage was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, because the component was erroneously categorized as RISC-3, the licensees procedures would allow the removal of requirements that must remain in place for RISC-1 SSCs, such as 10 CFR 50 Appendix B quality assurance requirements, inclusion in maintenance rule per 10 CFR 50.65, and reporting requirements to meet 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, the issue screens to Green based on answering "Yes" to Question A.1, "If the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, does the SSC maintain its operability or PRA functionality?"
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, the licensee did not use a systematic, rigorous, or thorough process to perform the categorization reviews for the affected components.
Enforcement:
Violation: Farley operating license conditions (OLCs) 2.C(8) for Unit 1 and 2.C(25) for Unit 2 states, in part, that SNC is approved to implement 10 CFR 50.69 using the processes for categorization of Risk-Informed Safety Class (RISC)-1, RISC-2, RISC-3, and RISC-4 SSCs using PRA models to evaluate risk associated with internal events as described in SNC's submittal letter dated June 18, 2020, and all its subsequent associated supplements as specified in License Amendment No. 233 dated June 30, 2021. Section 3.1.1 of the June 18, 2020 submittal states that SNC will implement the risk categorization process in accordance with NEI 00-04, Revision 0, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.201.
SNC implements procedure NMP-ES-065-003, 10 CFR 50.69 Risk Informed Categorization for Structures, Systems, and Components to meet the requirements of NEI 00-04, and therefore, its licensing requirement.
Section 4.8 of NMP-ES-065-003 states, in part, Assess the role of the components in preserving defense-in-depth related to core damage, large early release, and long-term containment integrity. If the defense-in-depth assessments for either core damage or containment integrity cannot confirm the low safety significance of a particular component, then categorize the component as preliminarily HSS.
Contrary to the above, since September 19, 2022, the licensee failed to adequately assess the role of the components in preserving defense-in-depth related to core damage.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
The disposition of this finding and associated violation closes URI:
05000348,05000364/2024010-01.
Failure to Evaluate Degraded SI Piping Support in the RWST Trench Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000348/2024003-03 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71152A The NRC identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to evaluate a degraded condition as required by procedure NMP-ES-021 Structural Monitoring Program for the Maintenance Rule. Specifically, the licensee failed to correctly categorize the degradation and ensure the loss of effective metal thickness due to corrosion of a piping support (SI-R298/299) would not lead to a structural failure of the support causing damage to the unit 1 safety injection (SI) system.
Description:
While reviewing a condition report (CR 11057365 - Need 1R32 WO generated for visual inspection of ALA2-4600-SI-R298 and ALA2-4600-SI-R299) NRC inspectors questioned the degradation evaluation performed on a unit 1 safety injection (SI) system piping support. The support is located downstream of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) in the RWST piping trench and is the supply for the safety related high head safety injection emergency core cooling system.
On March 8, 2021, while performing an in-service inspection pressure test, the licensee documented degradation (signs of material loss due to corrosion) on piping support SI-R297 (CR 10781010), which was unrelated to the test. The support had degraded significantly at the base plate and the anchorage. Procedure NMP-ES-021, Attachment 5 Engineering Element Categories Guidelines, Element 2) Steel Structures including Pipe Supports, Inspection Attribute 4. Corrosion, pitting, flaking, or visible oxidation on members, categorizes Acceptable with Deficiencies as Corrosion causing a loss of metal thickness up to 10%. Inspection Attribute 4 further categorizes corrosion causing a loss of metal thickness of >10% as Unacceptable. On March 8, 2021, an engineering evaluation determined that, based on the configuration of the support and the way the support carries load, it could still perform its function in the present condition, and it was judged to be acceptable with deficiencies without reference to the evaluation and acceptance criteria listed in NMP-ES-021. During a review of photos from original identification of the degradation and a walkdown performed in April 2024, NRC inspectors estimated approximately 30% loss of material on portions of the SI-R298/299 piping support.
Engineering also judged that the support should be replaced as soon as practical since it could affect the ability of the support to fully perform its function if left to corrode further.
Engineering recommended completing this repair during the 1R30 refueling outage (start date of March 21, 2021) or performing reinspection of the support during the next refueling outage (1R31 start date of September 17, 2022). Work Order (WO) #SNC1146984 was generated March 10, 2021, to Clean and paint degraded items or repair the pipe support as required.
This work was never accomplished. Planner Notes entered into the WO on November 22, 2021, summarized that the support components appeared to be severely degraded and recommended replacement. A Log Note entered into the WO by engineering on July 7, 2022, states that a design change is required and corrects the identification of the support to be SI-R298/299. This Log Note also recommends performing repairs in 1R32 (start date April 7, 2024) and states the Current support is still capable of supporting its design load in the degraded condition but should be repaired as soon as practical. Again, this assessment did not reference the evaluation and acceptance criteria listed in NMP-ES-021. No subsequent inspection or evaluation in 1R30 or 1R31 was documented to support this recommendation.
Also, for evaluation of steel components (including component supports), NMP-ES-021, Section 4.4.1.b. requires that the extent of allowable corrosion should be based on the strength of the remaining effective metal thickness or by direct measurement of remaining load capacity (e.g., tensile testing of bolts), as compared to the design allowable values.
Appropriate means SHALL be used for verifying remaining wall thickness (e.g., ultrasonic testing, calipers, micrometers, use of divers for remote underwater measurements, etc.).
The inspectors reviewed past CRs and WOs and identified that, since March 8, 2021, the degradation of the SI-R298/299 piping support had been mis-categorized, the remaining material thickness was not recorded and evaluation for the extent of allowable corrosion as compared to design allowable values had not been performed.
On April 24, 2024, the licensee provided a document titled RWST-10 (White Paper SI-R298-299.pdf) which documents the piping hanger adequately supports the design loads assuming potentially conservative losses of material in the column and base plate. Actual material loss was never evaluated against design capacity.
Corrective Actions: WO SNC1762213 was completed on May 21, 2024, to replace support SI-R298/299 with a newly designed gang support, SI-R299, that moved the load path from the floor to the wall of the RWST trench.
Corrective Action References: WO SNC1762213
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to correctly categorize the degradation and establish the extent of allowable corrosion based on the strength of the remaining effective metal thickness as required by licensee procedure NMP-ES-021, Structural Monitoring Program for the Maintenance Rule was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, continued degradation of the piping support could impact the safety related safety injection system. In response to the identified concern, the licensee performed a potentially conservative evaluation of the support and determined that the sub-components could still have performed their intended function in the degraded state.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, Section A Mitigating SSCs and PRA Functionality, the inspectors determined the violation to be Green because the degraded condition did not affect operability or represent a loss of the PRA functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform an evaluation as required by procedure NMP-ES-021 Structural Monitoring Program for the Maintenance Rule.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances.
Procedure NMP-ES-021, Attachment 5 Engineering Element Categories Guidelines, Element 2) Steel Structures including Pipe Supports, Inspection Attribute 4. Corrosion, pitting, flaking, or visible oxidation on members, categorizes Acceptable with Deficiencies as Corrosion causing a loss of metal thickness up to 10%, and Inspection Attribute 4 further categorizes Corrosion causing a loss of metal thickness of >10% as Unacceptable.
Section 4.4.1.b. requires that the extent of allowable corrosion should be based on the strength of the remaining effective metal thickness or by direct measurement of remaining load capacity (e.g., tensile testing of bolts), as compared to the design allowable values.
Appropriate means SHALL be used for verifying remaining wall thickness (e.g., ultrasonic testing, calipers, micrometers, use of divers for remote underwater measurements, etc.).
Contrary to the above, since March 8, 2021, the licensee categorized the corroded RWST piping support (SI-R298/299) as acceptable with deficiencies, although it had a loss of metal thickness of >10%. Additionally, the licensee failed to verify the remaining effective metal thickness by appropriate means and establish the extent of allowable corrosion based on the strength of the remaining effective metal thickness. Specifically, the licensee failed to correctly categorize the corrosion and evaluate the loss of effective metal thickness due to corrosion of support SI-R298/299 to ensure the degraded condition would not lead to a structural failure that could impact the safety related safety injection system.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On August 22, 2024, the inspectors presented the RP Public Radiation Safety inspection results to Edwin Dean III, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 12, 2024, the inspectors presented the Licensed Operator Requalification Program inspection results to Edwin Dean III, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 24, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to John Andrews, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
THIRD PARTY REVIEWS Inspectors reviewed World Association of Nuclear Operators and Institute on Nuclear Power Operations Peer Review report that was issued February 2022.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
FNP-0-AOP-21.0
Severe Weather
53.0
Procedures
A181010
Functional System Description - Auxiliary Feedwater System
39.0
Fire Plans
FNP-0-FPP-2.0
Protected Area Pre-Fire Pans
4.0
Fire Plans
FNP-1-FPP-1.0
Unit 1 Auxiliary Building Pre-Fire Plan
4.1
Procedures
FNP-0-SOP-0.4
Fire Protection Program Administration and Fire Protection
Impairment Requirements
130.0
Corrective Action
Documents
11075442
05/10/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
1154829
Perform MRule Eval for CR 11075442 (Peer Check Review
Required)
06/05/2024
Work Orders
SNC1061903
1R32 N1N36V501E (CAT 2) 1E STM DUMP VLV l Perform
Diagnostic Test, Quick Open Test and Positioner
Replacement
04/30/2024
Procedures
NMP-0S-010
Protected Train/Division and Protected Equipment Program
10.0
Drawings
D-175039
Chemical and Volume Control P&ID (Sheet 3)
Ver. 19.0
Drawings
D-207188
Elementary Diagram - Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
Pump Train "C"
Engineering
Evaluations
RER
SNC1043699
1B Service Water Pump Motor Lube and Cooling Flow
08/26/2019
Engineering
Evaluations
TE 1158056
IST evaluation for issue in CR 11092378
Miscellaneous
Support/Refute Matrix used for troubleshooting issue in CR
11092442
Procedures
FNP-2-STP-22.16
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Quarterly
Inservice Test
73.1
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
(CRs)
11094508, 10776116, 10951392
Drawings
D-205039
Chemical and Volume Control System P&ID (Sheets 1 and
6)
Vers. 30 and
Procedures
NMP-OS-019-161
Farley Unit S SIG-1, 600V Alternate Power
Ver. 3.1
Work Orders
SNC 1900438
Work Orders
SNC1190961
FLEX PM: Perform 600V FLEX Diesel Generator Operational 08/05/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Inspection
Work Orders
SNC1355547
FLEX PM: Perform SG FLEX Pump Operational Inspection
08/08/2023
Work Orders
SNC1355549
FLEX PM: Perform SFP FLEX Pump Operational Inspection
08/08/2023
Work Orders
SNC1457869
Install 600 Volt Flex and Grounding Pigtails
08/01/2024
Calculations
SM-95-0721-008
Analysis of Offsite Gaseous & Liquid Effluent Dose Impact
Due to Power Uprate
Revision 2
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports Reviewed during the course of the
inspection: CR 10780831, 10830477, 10834373, 10855140,
10910657, 10948255, 10976390, 10991614, 11003291,
11010615, 11036727, and 11100072
Various
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 10427754
Calculation Verification Required [SM-95-0721-008]
11/6/2017
Corrective Action
Documents
TE 1152438
Implement procedural changes for verifying/removing SGBD
releases for reporting in the ARERR
4/17/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
TE 997628
Update filter testing program and spawn necessary spawn
work orders.
11/7/2017
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 11103440
NRC Identified a Name Discrepancy in 2023 Land Use
Census
8/20/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 11105187
NRC Minor Violation - FSAR Updates
8/26/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 11105190
NRC Minor Violation - ODCM Comp Measures
8/26/2024
Engineering
Changes
SNC1030353
Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) - Unit 1 Group 8A
(RE15s)
Revision 2
Engineering
Changes
Design Change
Package (DCP)
SNC 1030354
Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) - U2 Group 8B (RE15s)
Revision 2
Miscellaneous
Summary of Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM)
7/30/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Changes since June 1, 2021 [Revisions 29, 30, and 31]
Miscellaneous
List of Permitted Liquid and Gaseous Release Points
8/5/2024
Miscellaneous
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Annual Radioactive Effluent
Release Reports for 2021, 2022, and 2023
Various
Miscellaneous
FNP-0-ENV-
799.0,
Farley Nuclear Plant Environmental Data Review Sheet -
Land Use Census for 2021, 2022, and 2023
Various
Miscellaneous
Sample Number
DAW 083123-V
WMG Waste Characterization Report - Farley DAW 10 CFR
2/07/2024
Procedures
FNP-0-CCP-212
Liquid Waste Release Program
Version 22.0
Procedures
FNP-0-CCP-
213.0
Gaseous Waste Release Program
Version 57.5
Procedures
FNP-1-CCP-
643.0
Sampling Points For Potential Radiological Effluents
Version 54.0
Procedures
FNP-2-CCP-
643.0
Sampling Points For Potential Radiological Effluents
Version 57.0
Procedures
FNP-ODCM
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Version 29, 30,
and 31
Various
Procedures
NMP-AD-008
Applicability Determinations
Version 23.0
Procedures
NMP-AD-010
CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 52 Appendix D Screenings &
Evaluations
Version 18.0
Self-Assessments Fleet-EA-CHEM-
2
Nuclear Oversight Audit of Environmental Affairs and
Chemistry
11/14/2022
Self-Assessments TE 1113773
Check-In Self-Assessment (CISA) - Public Radiological
Safety Check-In Self Assessment Pre-NRC Baseline
Inspection
4/11/2024
Work Orders
SNC 1239049
Unit 1 A train Penetration Room Filtration Performance Test
per FNP-1-STP-952.0A
8/15/2024
Work Orders
SNC 1239105
Unit 1 A train PRF Charcoal Adsorber Sampling and Testing
per FNP-1-STP-952.1
8/15/2024
Work Orders
W/O #
SNC992767
FNP-1-STP-952.1, Farley Unit 1 Penetration Room Filtration
Charcoal Absorber Sampling and Testing
04/23/2020
Work Orders
Work Order
(W/O) #
FNP-1-STP-952.0A, Farley Unit 1 A-train Penetration Room
Filtration Performance Test
04/23/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
SNC992769
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 11103691
Loss of sample run time for the SSE Perimeter
environmental air stations
8/20/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 11105157
NRC Minor Violation - CR Generation
8/26/2024
Procedures
NMP-EN-002
Radiological Groundwater Protection Program
Version 10.0
71151
Corrective Action
Documents
CR11015356, CR11068073, CR11072528, and
CR11088156.
Various
71151
Miscellaneous
G-20240716-
0365-C
Gaseous Waste Release Permit - Unit 1 Plant Vent Stack
7/16/2024 to 7/23/2024 [Including quarterly and annual dose
limit calculations]
7/23/2024
71151
Miscellaneous
G-20240718-
0369-C
Gaseous Waste Release Permit - Unit 2 Plant Vent Stack
7/18/2024 to 7/25/2024 [Including quarterly and annual dose
limit calculations]
7/25/2024
71151
Miscellaneous
L-20240619-
0390-C
Liquid Release Permit - Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown
06/19/2024 to 06/26/2024 [Including quarterly and annual
dose limit calculation]
6/24/2024
71151
Miscellaneous
L-20240624-
0395-C
Liquid Release Permit - Unit 1 Steam Generator Blowdown
06/24/2024 to 07/01/2024 [Including quarterly and annual
dose limit calculation]
07/01/2024