IR 05000348/1998002
| ML20247J165 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247J133 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-98-02, 50-348-98-2, 50-364-98-02, 50-364-98-2, NUDOCS 9805210351 | |
| Download: ML20247J165 (20) | |
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REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Report No: bO 348/98-02 and 50-364/98-02 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) !
l Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP), Units 1 and 2 Location: 7388 North State Highway 95 Columbia. AL 36319 Dates: February 21 through April 11, 1998 !
Inspectors: J. Bartley, Acting Senior Resident Inspector R. Caldwell, Resident Inspector R. Carrion, Project Engineer (Sections 08.1 and M8.3)
R. Chou. Reactor Inspector (Sections E8.2 and E8.3)
Approved by: P. Skinner. Chief. Reactor Projects Branch 2 DivisionofReactorProjects l Enclosure 1
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9905210351 990509 PDR ADOC,K 05000349 G PDR TOTAL P.01
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos: NPF-2 and NPF-6 Report No: 50-348/98-02 and 50-364/98-02 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC)
Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP). Units 1 and 2 Location: 7388 North State Highway 95 Columbia. AL 36319 l Dates: February 21 through April 11. 1998 l Inspectors: J. Bartley. Acting Senior Resident Inspector R. Caldwell . Resident Ir spector R. Carrion. Project Engineer (Sections 08.1 and M8.3)
R. Chou. Reactor Inspector (Sections E8.2 and E8.3)
Approved by: P. Skinner Chief. Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects l
r Enclosure 1
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Farley Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-348/98-02. 50-364/98-02 This integrated inspection included uspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 7-week period of onsite resident inspector inspection and announced inspections by
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regional inspector Doerations e Control Room professionalism and communications remained goo Operating crew demeanor. team work and conduct were professional and effective. Operator attentiveness to Main Control Board (MCB)
annunciator alarms and response to changing plant conditions were promp The operating crew consistently demonstrated a high level of awareness of existing plant conditions and ongoing plant activitie MCB deficiencies were reduced to as low as five for both units, the lowest level yet (Section 01.1).
e Licensee response to elevated river levels due to heavy rain was appro]riate. Sufficient preparations were made and necessary equipment was o)tained as conditions worsened. Dedicated personnel were maintained on site to coordinate flood response efforts (Section 01.2).
e The Unit 2 shutdown was well controlled and coordinated. A non-cited violation was identified for failing to use Emergency Response Procedure peacekeeping aids in response to a manual reactor trip initiated for a dropped control rod (Section 01.3).
e Although the current freeze ]rotection procedure was significantly enhanced and implementation las improved considerably, licensee preparations for sub-freezing conditions were not sufficient to ensure all components would be protected (Section 02.5).
Maintenance e Maintenance and surveillance testing activities were generally conducted in a thorough and competent manner by qualified individuals in accordance with plant procedures and work instructions. Close coordination was maintained with the main control room during surveillance testing activities (Section M1.1).
e The 2B Emergency Diesel Generator maintenance work was performed by well qualified and knowledgeable personnel. Corrective action efforts were thorough (Section M1.2).
e Main Steam Safety Valve testing was performed by knowledgeable contractor personnel with good oversight by the assigned licensee personnel. Technical issues were resolved promptly and conservatively (Section M1.3).
Enclosure 1
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Enaineerina e The 1B Residual Heat Removal pum) seal leak was not accurately quantified by the licensee's leacage assessment program in a timely manner (Section El.1).
Plant Sucoort e Overall cleanliness of the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) remained good. Health Physics (HP) technicians generally provided positive control and support of work activities in the RCA. However, some examples of poor HP control of work were identified (Section R2.1).
e Plant personnel observed working in the RCA generally demonstrated appropriate knowledge and application of radiological control practices (Section R2.1).
e Security personnel activities observed during the inspection period were performed well. Site security systems were adequate to ensure physical protection of the plant (Section S1.1).
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Report Details Summarv of Plant Status l Unit 1 operated continuously at 100% power for the entire inspection period,
! exceeding 300 days of continuous operation as of March 31, 199 Unit 2 operated at 100% power until March 28, 1998, when the unit was shutdown for its 12th refueling outage (U2RF12) after 464 days of continuous operatio This established a new Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) continuous run recor U2RF12 is scheduled to be completed in 43 day I. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Routine Observations of Control Room Operations (IP 71707 and 40500)
Following the guidance provided in Inspection Procedures (IP) 71707 and 40500, the inspectors conducted frequent inspections of ongoing plant operation The inspectors observed that control room professionalism and communications remained good. Operating crew demeanor, team work and conduct were professional and effective. Operator attentiveness to MCB annunciator alarms and response to changing plant conditions were prompt. The operating crew consistently demonstrated a high level of awareness of existing plant conditions and ongoing plant activitie The inspectors routinely reviewed the Technical Specification (TS)
Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) tracking sheets filled out by the Shift Foreman (SFO). All tracking sheets for Units 1 and 2 reviewed by the inspectors were consistent with plant conditions and TS )
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01.2 Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) Due to Hiah River levels Insoection Scooe (71707)
An inspector responded to the site and observed the licensee's response to flooding conditions due to elevated river levels, Observations and Findinas On March 8, 1998 at 10:00 p.m. Central Standard Time (CST), FNP declared a NOUE due to high river water level and the subsequent flooding which prevented normal access to the River Water Intake Structure. The inspector observed preparations and subsequent actions taken. The '
inspector reviewed the applicable portions of FNP-0-A0P-21.0, " Severe Weather." Revision (Rev.) 14. The licensee adequately prepared for the i flood and obtained necessary equipment as conditions became worse. The licensee maintained good communications with Houston County, Alabama and Enclosure 1 i
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Eariey County. Georgia officials, ensuring adequate means were available to evacuate local population in case of an emergency if necessary. The NOUE was terminated on March 10.1998, at 3:40 p.m. CST when the river level had receded and normal access to the River Water Intake Structure was regaine Conclusions Licensee response to elevated river levels due to heavy rain was appro]riate. Sufficient preparations were made and necessary equipment was o]tained. Dedicated personnel were maintained on site to coordinate flood response effort .3 Unit 2 Shutdown and Drooped Rod Resoonse Insoection Scone (IP 71707)
An inspector observed the Unit 2 power reduction and reactor shutdown on March 28.1998, per FNP-2-UOP-3.1. " Power Operation." Rev. 37, and FNP-2-UDP-2.1. " Shutdown of Unit from Minimum Load to Hot Standby." Rev. 2 The inspector also observed the crew's response to a dropped control ro Observations and Findinas The Unit 2 rampdowri and reactor shutdown was well controlled and coordinated by the shift su3ervisor (SS). The inspector reviewed the official test copy of the slutdown procedure and found that the SS was maintaining procedure signoffs up-to-date. Minor equipment problems which occurred during the shutdown were responded to appropriatel At approximately 1:30 a.m.. the SS noted that Control Bank A. Rod K2, had dropped. Control Banks B. C. and D were already fully inserted and Control Bank A was near step 132. Reactor power was approximately 1 E-10 amps on the intermediate range nuclear instruments. The SS directed the Reactor Operator (RO) to continue driving Control Bank A into the core. An extra Senior Reactor Operator directed one of the R0s to use FNP-2-A0P-19. " Malfunction of Rod Control System." Rev.16 for guidanc During this period the crew, including extra licensed personnel assigned for the shutdown, discussed if they were required to trip the reactor for a misaligned rod while subcritical. At approximately 1:32 a.m.. the SS directed the R0 to trip the reactor based on A0P-19 step 2. The SS then entered EEP-0. " Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." Rev.19. The SS completed the immediate action steps and appropriately transitioned to FNP-2-ESP-0.1. " Reactor Trip Response.~ Rev. 1 The inspector observed that the SS performed the required steps of the emergency response procedures (ERP) and exited them appropriatel Enclosure 1
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. Although the inspector did not observe the crew make any ERP 3rocedural l- errors, the inspector observed that the SS did not use the ER)
l peacekeeping aids (i.e., procedural check-off blocks provided to mark when a step or 3 age was completed). The ins')ector discussed this observation wit 1 the SS after exiting the ER)s. The SS had been trained to use the peacekeeping aids during simulator training but did not use them-during this response because he did not want to mark up the procedures. Failure to use peacekeeping aids had been previously
. identified as a weakness during licensed operator training. The
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inspector reviewed FNP-0-SOP-0.8. " Emergency Response Procedure User's Guide." Rev. 3. and determined that step 3.15 stated, in part. that
" checkoff lines will be used to keep track of the steps or pages which have been completed." Failure to use peacekeeping aides constituted a violation of minor saftey significance and will be treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This is identified as NCV 50-364/98-02-01. Failure to Use ERP Peacekeeping Aid c .- Conclusions
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Unit 2 shutdown was well controlled and coordinated. An NCV was identified for failing to use ERP peacekeeping aids in response to a manual reactor trip initiated for a dropped control ro .4 Unit 2 Containment Walkdown (IP 71707)
On March 28, 1998, inspectors toured the Unit 2 containment shortly after entry into Mode 3. Overall, containment was clear of debris and had few oil and water leaks. Several coolant leaks had occurred during the cycle resulting in large' boron accumulations These leaks were not significant enough to have been detected during power operation. The inspectors also observed numerous small coolant leaks from Jipe cap valve packing and body to bonnet joints. The majority of t1ese leaks had been previously identified by licensee personnel during post-shutdown walkdowns of containment, however several had not. The inspectors provided the locations of the additional coolant-leaks to the Unit 2 S Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.-1 General Tours of Soecific Safety-Related Areas (71707)
General tours of safety-related areas were performed by the inspectors to observe the physical condition of plant equipment and structures, and to verify that safety systems were properly maintained and aligned.
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Overall material conditions for Unit 1 and Unit 2 structures, systems, and components (SSCs) were good, and safety-related system appeared 3roperly aligned. Minor equipment and housekeeping problems identified l Jy the inspectors during their routine tours were reported to the responsible SS and/or maintenance department for resolution.
j 02.2 Inspections of Safety Systems (71707)
Inspectors verified the operability of the following selected safety systems and/or equipment:
e Unit 2 Train A and B Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
. Unit 1 Train A and B Containment Spray (CS)
Accessible portions of the systems listed above were verified to be properly aligned. The inspectors also observed them to be adecuately raaintained arJ in good operating condition. The inspectors dic not identify any issues that adversely affected system operability. Minor deficiencies noted were discussed with the appropriate S .3 Verification of Safety Taocina (71707)
The inspectcrs verified that selected tagouts were implemented in accordance with procedural requirements. The inspectors reviewed and walked down selected devices tagged by the following tag orders (TOs):
e TO 98-0402-2 2C Steam Generator (SG) Sample Isolation e TO 98-0403-2 2B SG Sample Isolation e TO 98-0404-4 2A SG Sample Isolation e TO 98-0420-0 1-2A Diesel Generator e TO 98-0268-0 f6 River Water Pump e TO 98-0288-2 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Room Sump Pump The inspectors verified that devices entifired on the TOs were properly tagged and that the administrative aspects of filling out the tagging order forms were complete and correc .
The inspectors concluded that the reviewed safety tagging activities were correct and met the procedural requirements for personnel safety and equipment protectio .5 Freeze Protection Insoection Scope (71714)
An inspector walked down various freeze protection circuits (i.e. heat tracing) during a brief period of cold weather. Additionally, the I inspector observed Operation's implementation of the new procedure FNP-0-SOP-0.12, " Cold Weather Contingencies," Rev. Enclosure 1
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5 Observations and Findinas On March 11. 1998, outside temperatures had fallen to below 33 degrees Fahrenheit ( F) (actually about ~28 F). At the morning meetin Operations personnel reported that all freeze protection requirements were complete. However, during a walkdown subsequent to this meeting, the inspector observed that the following freeze protection circuits of safety-related systems appeared deenergized: Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Water Storage Tank vent (off the top of the tanks): Unit 1 and Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tanks (CST): and the Unit 1 vent stack radiation monitors (R-29A/B) (Unit 2's were on). The inspector also noted that the herculite wind protection installed around the Unit 1 CST make-up valve had been rendered ineffectual. The inspector questioned the on-shift crew about these items and the status of SOP-0.12. The official test copy of 50P-0.12 indicated that all items but the Unit 1 CST herculite problem had been identified by the previous crew. The SS and SFO were attempting to correct the discrepancies through the normal work planning process, but no compensatory actions were being take On March 12. the inspector conducted another walk down of freeze protection. The wind chill was approximately 0 F with an outside temperature of approximately 25 F to 27 F. The inspector observed that the Unit 1 CST freeze protection lights were still of Unit 1 CST herculite heat box for the make-up valve was ineffective because the sides were pulled up and the heat lamp was missing, and the Unit 1 vent stack radiation monitor freeze protection circuit was still of Shift personnel were not aware of these continuing items. When the SFO and SS were irformed of these problems by the inspector they had maintenance investigate the thermostat on the Unit 1 CST. Maintenance personnel determined that the thermostat was inoperable. No compensatory actions had been taken. During the ins)ector's morning review of licensee actions, it was apparent that tie previous night shift had done some additional walkdowns of freeze protectio It was the stated intent of SOP-0.12 to ensure that all procedural actions were completed before temperatures fell below 33 Even though Operations had initiated each procedural action prior to freezing weather. and were in the process of correcting identified deficiencies, the procedure was not comaleted until the third night. In particular, steps 4.0 [ verification tlat turbine building penetrations for Main Steam and Main Feed Water are sealed] and 7.0 [ verification that dampers and heaters in fire protection clapper houses were operable) were not initialed for until the last day of sub-freezing weather. Step 4.0 had been accom)lished on one of the units: however. it required a design change paccage (DCP) to be installed on the other unit. The process for initiating a design change was started and then the step was initialed-off. Although o)erators systematically processed identified discrepancies, t1e assigned prioritization did not ensure that freeze protection circuits for vulnerable safety-related systems were corrected or compensated for in a timely manner. 'he guidance in 50P-0.12 did not Enclosure 1
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distinguish between safety related and non-safety related freeze protection circuits. During the several nights of sub-freezi' g weather, no SSC's were identified as frozen by the licensee or inspectors.
j For the past two winters the licensee has had difficulties in devising and implementing an effective cold weather protection program as documented in Inspection Reports 50-348,364/96-15 and 50-348.364/97-1 The current freeze protection procedure was significantly enhanced and im)1ementation has improved considerably; however based on the actions tacen. safety-related components would not have been protected during extended periods of severe col Conclusions Licensee preparations for sub-freezing conditions were not sufficient to ensure all components would be protected during extended sub-freezing weathe Miscellaneous Operations Issues (IP 92901 and 92700)
0 (Closed) licensee Event Report (LER) 50-348/97-003-00: Failure to Comoly with Technical Specifications 4.5.3.2 and 3. (Closed) LER 50-348/97-003-01: Failure to Comoly with Technical Specifications 4.5.3.2 and 3. The inspectors reviewed the actions taken by the licensee to meet its commitments to remedy the event and 3reclude its recurrence, including incorporating lessons learned from t1is event into the annual requalification training for appropriate operations personnel. Based on the inspectors' review of the licensee's corrective actions, these LERs are close .2 (Closed) LER 50-364/97-002-00: Inaoorooriate Interpretation of Penetration Room Filtration System Power Sucoly Requirement Violation (VIO) 50-364/97-130-04014 addressed this issue. This LER is closed based on the licensee's completion of corrective actions discussed in Section 0 .3 (Closed) VIO 50-364/97-130-04014: Failure of Licensee to Properly Alian the PRF System Durino Fuel Handlina
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The licensee responded to this VIO in correspondence dated May 28, 199 and initiated Corrective Action Report (CAR) 2281. The inspector reviewed the licensee's written response and completed CAR, and verified implementation of corrective actions. The inspector also verified the corrective actions were consistent with those for LER 50-364/97-002-0 This VIO is close Enclosure 1
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l II. Maintenance
[ M1 Conduct of Maintenance
! M1.1 Maintenance and Surveillance Testina Activities (61726 and 62707)
Using the guidance provided in IP 61726 and IP 62707. the inspectors observed and reviewed portions of selected licensee corrective and
- preventive maintenance activities, and routine surveillance testing including detailed reviews of the following
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e FNP-2-STP-60 Main Steam Line Safety Valve Operational Testing-by Furmanite e FNP-0-STP-8 DG 2C Operability Test e WO M00203005 Replace 2B RHR Heat Exchanger head gasket e FNP-2-ETP-4443 2A Containment Spray Pump Piping Vibration Testing e FNP-2-STP-1 A Containment Spray Pump Quarterly Inservice Test e FNP-0-MP-1 Emergency Diesel Generators 1-2A, 1B and 2B Refuel (18 Months) Inspection e FNP-0-STP-2 Control Room Pressurization / Filtration Operability Test e FNP-2-STP-22.16 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Quarterly Inservice Test (Tavg ? 547 F)
All observed maintenance work activities and surveillance testing were performed in accordance with work instructions, procedures, and applicable clearance controls. Safety-related maintenance and surveillance testing evolutions were properly planned and execute Licensee personnel demonstrated familiarity with administrative and radiological controls. Surveillance tests of safety-related equipment were consistently performed in a deliberate manner in close communication with the Main Control Room (MCR). Overall operator I technicians and craftsman were observed to be knowledgeable, experienced, and trained for the tasks performe M1.2 2B Diesel Generator 18-Month Outaae (IP 62707)
The inspector reviewed the work packages and observed portions of the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 18-month outag The 2B EDG maintenance work was performed by qualified arid knowledgeable personnel. Maintenance supervision was constantly on-station to oversee l
work activities and review work status. Workers were diligent in
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i maintaining foreign material exclusion covers over open components. The licensee continued its practice of having a COLTECH representative on-site during major EDG outages. which aided in resolving technical issues in a rapid manner. Post maintenance testing was satisfactorily complete M1.3 Unit 2 Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Testina (62707)
The inspector examined the test instrumentation and test rig attachment, interviewed contractor and licensee test personnel, and observed actual MSSV lift testing of three Unit 2 MSSVs per FNP-2-STP-608.1 " Main Steam Line Safety Valve Operational Testing by Furmanite." Rev. 1 This testing, required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1. was satisfactorily performed. The licensee uployed contract test personnel who had performed MSSV testing during previous outages. The inspector found that the contractor personnel very knowledgeable with good oversight by the assigned licensee personne M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (IP 92902)
M (Closed) VIO 50-348. 364/97-130-01014: Failure to Prescribe Documented 10struction or Procedures to Imolement PRF Testina and Operation (Closed) VIO 50-348. 364/97-130-02014: Failure of Licensee to Perform Adecuate Testina of PRF System (Closed) LER 50-348. 364/97-001-00: Technical Specification Ventilation System Deficiencies The licensee responded to the two VI0s by correspondence dated May 2 , and initiated Corrective Action Reports (CAR) 2278 and 2279. An inspector reviewed the licensee's written response and completed CAR and verified implementation of corrective actions. The inspector also verified the corrective actions were consistent with those for LER 50-348, 364/97-001-00. These V10s and the LER are close M8.2 (Closed) Insoector Follow-uo Item (IFI) 50-364/97-11-01: RPS Resoonse Time Testina The inspectors discussed this issue further with Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and the licensee and reviewed additional time response testing of the Foxboro pressure transmitter. The inspectors concluded that the slower response rate did not adversely impact the plant's ability to respond to large and small break loss of coolant accidents. This IFI is closed.
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M8-3 (Closed) VIO 50-348/97-01-01: Failure To Follow PRF Operability Test Procedure Based on the inspector's review of the licensee's corrective actions as described in a written response dated April 10. 1997, and CAR 2264, this VIO is close M8.4 (Closed) IFI 50-364/98-01-02. Containment Soray Pumo Testina l Insoection Scooe (62707)
The inspectors observed CS pump testing, reviewed the test results, and l interviewed responsible licensee personnel. The inspectors also
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reviewed the 2A Containment Spray Pump Operability Determination and the partial response to Request for Engineering Assistance (REA)98-171 Observations and Findinas After reviewing the initial CS pump vibration data, the licensee
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conducted additional testing which included taking vibration readings on
! the eductor and mini-flow piping. On March 19. 1998. vibration data for
- a detailed pipe vibration / fatigue analysis was taken and a preliminary analysis was conducted. An o>erability determination was made coincident with the test whic1 concluded the 2A CS pump was operable and could perform its intended safety functio On April 8. 1998. Southern Company Services, Inc. responded, in aart.
, to Farley Nuclear Plant's REA 98-1719. Unit 2 Containment Spray 3 ump L Sodium Hydroxide Eductor Piping Vibration. This interim response was to provide preliminary results of an in-process vibration analysis. Two distinct vibrations were identified and neither were determined to adversely impact the structural integrity of the eductor pipin However, management decided to replace the 2A CS pump eductor piping due to' it having relatively greater vibration induced fatigue, believed to be caused by its piping configuration. The piping replacement was scheduled for the current Unit 2 Outag Conclusign Based on the preliminary results from the vibration / fatigue analysis and 4 the replacement of the 2A CS pump eductor line, no apparent safety concerns about the Unit 2 CS pumps exists. This IFI is considered close Enclosure 1
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M8.5- (Closed) IFI 50-348. 364/97-005-02.' Foreian Material In Containment ECCS Sumps On A)ril' 9.1998, an inspector observed the boroscope inspection of the 2B RiR sump and piping. 2A and 28-CS sumps and piping had already been examined by the licensee. The only item of significance found was a 2" x 1/32" wire in the 2B CS sump )iping, which was removed. The entire boroscope run' indicated the 2B RHR sump was free of debri The licensee also conducted a detailed physical examination of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) sump screens, comparing as-built to design drawings. The Unit 2 ECCS sump screens were determined to have the same type of problems identified for Unit 1 (see Inspection Report (IR) 50-348.364/97-05, section M1.7). Unit 2 ECCS screens had gaps greater than the 1/8" x 1/8" gaps allowed. However, the sump inspections did not identify any significant debris inside the scree On April 10, 1998 the inspector watched a videotape of the 2A RHR sump boroscope inspection. This inspection identified that some paper and tape residue was in the pipe. believed to have been part of a gas seal for welding. The area was cleaned-up and re-inspected. The second boroscope video was reviewed and showed the bulk of the residue and paper had been remove The licensee will complete the design modifications to repair the ECCS sump screen gaps this outage. Based on the licensee completion of the ECCS sump inspections, determination that were clear of significant debris, and plans to correct the sump screen gaps. this IFI is closed.
! v III. Enaineerina El Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Primary leakaae Outside Containment a. Insoection Scooe (IP 37551 and 92903)
The inspector reviewed the implementation of FNP-0-M-101. " Borated Water Leakage Assessment and Evaluation Program." Rev. 0, and the current M-101 ECCS leakage database. -The inspector also interviewed Engineering Support (ES) personnel responsible for im)lementing the M-101 program and observed the leak quantification of t1e IB RHR pump performed on April.13. 199 b. Observations and Findinas During a routine tour on February 13. 1998, an inspector noted water had accumulated on the top of the IB RHR pump bowl around-the seal packag Deficiency Report (DR) 546099. dated September 16. 1997, was posted on Enclosure 1 ,
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the door and stated " leak between Jum) and motor." The inspector identified the standing water to t1e Jnit 1 SS for cleanu The inspector reviewed tne M-101 database to verify that the IB RHR seal leakage was listed. However, the database listed the IB RHR pump as having no active leakage. This was contrary to the inspector's observation of standing water on top of the pump casing. On February 24, 1998, the inspector met with ES personnel to discuss the 1B RHR pump seal leakage and the possibility that it was an active leak when the pum) was running. The ES personnel stated that they would quantify the leacage when the Jump was run for surveillance purposes. On March 1 the leak was roug11y quantified by Operations Jersonnel to be approximately 1 quart in 27 minutes. This leacage assessment did not use any type of measuring device to accurately quantify the leak rat The total leakage from all ECCS sources allowed by the program was approximately 4 quarts per hou The inspector discussed the March 19 leak measurement with ES managemen The inspector also identified that the M-101 program did not provide specific directions to evaluate leaks under actual operating conditions. In response to the inspector's concerns, the licensee accurately cuantified the leakage at 0.14 gallon per hour on April 13 and includec the measured leakage as part of the M-101 database of total leakag c. Conclusions The IB RHR pum) seal leak was not accurately quantified by the licensee's leacage assessment program in a timely manne E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (IP 92903)
E (Closed) LER 50-348. 364/94-005-01: Missile Protection for Condensate Storace Tanks The ins)ectors' reviewed the interim corrective actions and documented their caservations in IR 50-348. 364/97-03. The licensee installed missile protection per DCPs 97-1-9172 and 97-2-9173. The inspectors documented observations of the DCPs in progress in IR 50-348, 364/98-0 The inspectors walked down the completed missile shields on March 2 . The missile shields appeared to be adequate to protect the CST q connections and instrumentation against design basis missiles. This LER is close E8.2 (00en) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-348. 364/97-009: Lack of missile protection for service water flow switches The licensee's engineers found that the flow switches for controlling j the diesel generator isolation valves were installed outside the diesel generator building on both units. The flow switches were installed in Enclosure 1
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l order to control excessive flow volumes in case of service water line breaks. However, the switches installed outside the diesel generator building are vulnerable to-tornado missile damage. - During tornado impact or damage, the switches could send an erroneous signal to close the valves. This would cut off the service water supply to the diesel generators. The. loss of the cooling water due to service water line closures could render one or more of the Emergency Diesel Generators inoperable. The cause of this condition was'due to inadequate desig The lack of missile protection for these switches was an oversight on the part of the design organizatio The resolution of the problem stated in the LER was to remove the switch connection on the isolation valves for both units. The licensee determined that the flow switches were designed to control flooding inside the diesel generator building by limiting the flow to not more than 7000 gpm and cutting off the water supply if the service water line breaks. The licensee concluded in the LER that the switch devices could be removed because no breaks or cracks would occur because the service water lines were not high energy lines. The service water line was designed with an o)erating temperature 120 F and pressure 100 ps The definition of the ligh energy _line is that the line operating temperature is over-200 F or pressure over 275 ps The inspector reviewed the LER, discussed the problem with the licensee's engineers,.and walked down the diesel generator building to evaluate the proble Although the service water lines to the diesel generators were not considered as high energy lines, they should be considered as moderate energy lines in accordance with NRC Standard Review Plan Section 3.6.1 for line cracks. The definition of the moderate energy line is that the line operating temperature is below 200 F or the line operating pressure is below 275 psi for the safety-related systems. Therefore, the switches could be removed since they were installed for the line breaks. However, an evaluation of the flooding inside the diesel generator building due to line cracks may be require The licensee will evaluate the potential flooding problem due to line crack This LER remains ope E8.3 (Closed) Violation 50-348. 364/96-10-01: Failure to construct and maintain a RMS sample line and pipe supports in accordance with approved configuration control procedure This violation was discussed in NRC Inspection Reports (IR) 50-348, 364/96-07, 09 and 10. The Radiation Montioring System (RMS) issue was reviewed and closed in IR 50-348.364/97-14. The portion of the violation regarding pipe su) ports identified that discrepancies were found between the field as-auilt condition and drawings or document Enclosure 1
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The licensee evaluated the discrepancies identified by the inspector and revised or added the related calculations or drawings to resolve the discrepancies as required. The inspector reviewed the evaluation and the incorporation of the calculations and drawing In addition, the licensee walked down various pipe supports to inspect and record the discrepancies between the field as-built condition and the drawings for any support load increases during the stress reanalyses-in order to reveal the discrepancies and qualify the supports. Similar discrepancies as identified by the inspector on the previous inspections were found by the licensee's inspectors during the walkdown. The licensee evaluated the discrepancies and revised or added the calculations ~ and drawings as recuire The inspector randomly selected 10 of 47 supports for review anc walkdown. The inspector identified two minor discrepancies during the review and walkdown. The licensee immediately evaluated these discrepancies and resolved the The current practice of the pipe support welding inspection program is to inspect 10 percent of the welds in each sup) ort. The licensee was committed to performing a self assessment of tie structural welding program. fire protection program, and Siping support program in the second half of 1998. The purpose of t1e self assessment is to verify the adequacy of the current practices involving welding inspections and
.to identify how these problems occurred. Based on the actions taken or ,
to be taken by the licensee to resolve the discrepancies, this violation 1 is close IV. Plant Supoort
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l R2 Status of Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls Facilities and Equipment i R2.1 Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA). Units 1 and 2 (71750)
Overall cleanliness of the RCA remained good. Plant personnel observed working in the RCA generally demonstrated appropriate knowledge and application of radiological control practices. Health physics technicians generally provided positive control and support of work activities in the RCA. However, the inspectors identified some examples of poor HP control of work such as allowing inappropriate use of labcoat dressout and unsecured hoses and equipment crossing contaminated area boundaries. These were immediately identified to the responsible HP technician for correction and discussed with HP supervision for long term corrective actio Enclosure 1
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S1 Conduct of Securia and Safeguards Activities l
S1.1 Routine Observations of Plant Security Measures (71750)
Using the guidance provided in IP 71750 the inspectors verified that
)ortions of site security program plans were being properly implemente )isabled vital area doors were properly manned and controlled. Security personnel activities observed during the inspection period were performed wel Site security systems were adequate to ensure physical protection of the plan F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment F2.1 Fire Main Ruoture (71750)
On April 6,1998, the fire main ruptured at the southwest corner of the 2A cooling tower. Both diesel driven fire pumps automatically started on low header pressure, the motor driven fire pump was already running to support cooling tower washdown. The ruptured pipe was in a cross-connect line so the licensee was able to isolate the failed section without losing any suppression systems. The area around the pipe was pumped down and the inspection of the failed pipe revealed a 12 to 14 foot long longitudinal split. The inspectors verified the licensee's initial corrective actions and verified that they performed the appropriate compensatory actions of the Fire Protection Pla This rupture, as was one documented in IR 50-348. 364/96-06. caused the fire suppression water system tank level to drop below the required minimum rendering the system inoperable. It remained inoperable for approximately 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> until level was restore The inspectors identified numerous other indications of underground fire main leaks as documented in IR 50-348. 364/98-01. The inspectors will continue to follow up on the licensee assessment and corrective actions to ensure fire main integrity as tracked by IFI 50-348, 364/98-01-0 Excessive Underground Fire Main Leakag V. Manaaement Meetinas and Other Areas X1 Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Commitments A recent discovery of a licensee o)erating its facility in a manner contrary to the UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing the inspections discussed in this re) ort the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices procedures and/or parameter Enclosure 1 e _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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X2 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on A)ril 14. 1993, after the end of the inspection perio The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licens R. Badham, Supervisor SAER
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P. Crone. Engineering Support Performance Supervisor T. Esteve. Planning & Control Supervisor R. Fucich. ES Manager S. Fulmer. Plant Training and Emergency Preparations Manager S. Gates. Administration Manager l D. Grissette. Operations Manager 1 R. Hill General Manager D. Jones. Configuration Management Manager T. Livingston. Chemistry Superintendent R. Martin, Maintenance Team Leader l C. McCoy. Vice President - Vogtle M. Mitchell. HP Superintendent C. Nesbitt Assistant General Manager. Plant Support W. Oldfield, Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor M. Stinson Assistant General Manager. Operations G. Waymire. Technical Support Manager G. Wilson. SNC Corporate Senior Engineer R. Winkler. Engineering Group Supervisor. PMMS NRC J. Zimmerman. NRR Project Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls In Identifying Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71714: Cold Weather Preparations Enclosure 1 l i
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IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92700: Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor Facilities IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance IP 92903: Followup - Engineering ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Tvoe Item Number Description and Reference Closed NCV 50-364/98-02-01 Failure to Use ERP Peacekeeping Aids (Section 01.3).
LER 50-348/97-003-00 Failure to Comply with Technical Specifications 4.5.3.2 and 3. (Section 08.1). I LER 50-348/97-003-01 Failure to Comply with Technical Specifications 4.5.3.2 and 3. (Section 08.1).
LER 50-364/97 00i-00 Inappropriate Interpretation of Penetration Room Filtration System Power Supply Requirement (Section 08.2)
VIO 50-364/97-130-04014 Failure of Licensee to Properly Align the PRF System During Fuel Handling (Section 08.4).
VIO 50-348, 364/97-130-01014 Failure to Prescribe Documented l Instruction or Procedures to l
Implement PRF Testing and Operation l (Section M8.1).
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VIO 50-348, 364/97-130-02014 Failure of Licensee to Perform .
Adequate Testing of PRF System ,
(Section M8.1). j LEP, 50-348, 364/97-001-00 Technical Specification Ventilation System Deficiencies (Section M8.1).
IFI 50-364/97-11-01 RPS Response Time Testing (Section M8.2).
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VIO 50-348/97-01-01 Failure To Follow PRF Operability l Test Procedure (Section M8.3).
IFI 50-364/98-01-02 Containment Spray Pump Testing (Section M8.4).
IFI 50-348. 364/97-005-02 Foreign Material in Containment ECCS Sumps (Section M8.5).
LER 50-348. 364/94-005-01 Missile Protection for Condensate Storage Tanks (Section E8.1).
VIO 50-348, 364/96-10-01 Failure to Construct and Maintain a RMS Sample Line and Pipe Supports in accordance with approved Configuration Control Procedures (Section E8.3).
Discussed LER 50-348, 364/97-009 Lack of Missile Protection for l Service Water System Flow Switches I (Section E8.2).
IFI 50-348. 364/98-01-09 Excessive Underground Fire Main Leakage (Section F2.1). i
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