ML20059N350

Insp Repts 50-348/90-24 & 50-364/90-24 on 900827-31.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Actions in Response to NRC Bulletin 88-004, Potential Safety- Related Pump Loss

ML20059N350
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	09/14/1990
From:	Belisle G, Hallstrom G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059N349	List: ML20059N348 ML20059N350
References
50-348-90-24, 50-364-90-24, IEB-88-004, IEB-88-4, NUDOCS 9010120027
Download: ML20059N350 (5)

See also: IR 05000348/1990024

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A uey . NITED STATES

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'o,'  : NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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101 MARIETT A STREET, N.W.

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ATI.ANTA, OEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-348/90-24 and 50-364/90-24

Licensee: Alabama Power Company?

600 North 18th; Street

Birmingham, AL -35291-0400

Docket Nos.:.50-348 and 5-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8

Facility name: Farley 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted August 27'- 31, 1990

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Inspector:e ##7M meg 8d 28'am /I E

'G. A. Hallstron Date=5igned.

Approved by:

G. A. telisle, Chieff

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Date Signed

Test Programs Sectic9

Engineering Branch-

Division of Reactor Safety

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SUMMARY. ,f

Scope:

This routine. - announced inspection examined licensee < actions in response to.

NRC Inspection and' Enforcement Bulletin (IEB) 88.-041 " Potential Safety-Related

Pump Loss." The bulletin requested the L licensees : to . determine .ifL any

operational safety-related systems would result in; dead-heading, to evaluate

safety-related systems tcr flow, division,'and" toievaluate the minimum flow-

bypass lines ' for safety-related pumps with respect to' damage resulting from

operations and testing in the minimum' flow mode.j 4

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Resu'ts:

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i All actions in responn to the' bulletin had'been completed'by the licensee

prior 'to this inspectioi. All actions, were verified' toLbe satisfactory and

the' inspector informed.the licensee during the Exit on August 31, 1990, that.

Bulletin 86-04 was closed for Farley Units 1 and 2.  !

The licensee provided excellent support during this inspectior,. Necessary

calculations and other documentation had been collated and transported to the

site for ready availability and corporate engineering and architect-engineering

personnel were available on-site as'necessary to. expedite the inspection.

KnowleMeable responses _ to technical issues raised by the inspector wue

provioed. '

No violations or devictions were' identified.

901012002'7 9009'4 2

PDR ADOCK 05000348

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REPORT DETAILS- t

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

S. Casey, Systems Performance Supervisor

J. Cheney,.0perations Shift Foreman-

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• M. . Coleman,- Manager - Plant Modifications '

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• R. Hill, Assistant General Manager;- Operations

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• R. Mullins, Project Licensing Engineer -' Nuclear Support-

• J. Osterholtz, Manager ' Operations

• M. Scinson,- Assistant General Manager Support

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• J. Thomas, Manager.-. Maintenance. . ,

W. Van Landingham, Operations Unit' Supervisor, n

Other licensee . employees contacted = 'during' this inspection included' '

engineers, technicians, operators.and office personnel.- l

Other Organizations' 1

J. Ehman, BPC Nuclear _ Engineer - .

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J. Dudiak, Westinghouse Senior ? ump Engineer  ;

B. Magee, Westinghouse Senior. ',ystems. Engineer '

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D. O'Reilly, BPC Mechanical Engineer

NRC Resident Inspectors t

G. Maxwell, Senior Resident I ispector " i

• M. Morgan, Resident Inspector "

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I * Attended exit interview on August 31,;1990.

Acronyms and initialisms used throughout -this report areL11sted in the' a

final paragraph,

2. TI 2515/.105, IEB 88-04, Potential for Safety-Related. Pump Loss i

IEB 88-04 was issued May 5,1988, due to the potential for damage of

safety-related centrifugal pumps when operated in parallelrat low flow.

When one of the pumps .is " stronger" than the other (i.e., has a higher H

developed head for the same flow) . it may 'cause " dead heading" of the

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weaker -pump; i.e., pump impeller' operation without fluid flow- This can

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. lead to pump damage due to cavitation and heat buildup. l

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The inspector examined.the licensee's responses to IEB 88-04 dated July 8

and November 30, 1988;- and March 23 and September 21, 1989, to determine-

whether actions taken were satisfactory. The - July 8,1988, letter

identified the following safety-related pumps:

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-SYSTEM . PUMPS MANUFACTURER

HHSI or 1 A , 18, 1C' Pacific Pump

CCP 2A, 28, 2C Pacific Pump-

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LHSI or 1A, 1B -Ingersoll-Rand j

RHR 2 A ,- _ 2 B , Ingersoll-Rand- .i

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CS 1A, 1B Goulds j

2A, 2B Goulds

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AFW

MDAFW-- 1A, 1B Ingersoll-Rand

2A,~2B Ingersoll-Rand:

TDAFW U1,'U2 Ingersoll-Rand 1

.CCW 1A, 1B,:1C Pacific Pump '

2A, 2B,._2C Pacific Pump j.

SW' 1A thru E Byron-Jackson l

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2A thru E Johnston Pump .

DGF0 (5 manual & 1-2A,1B,10,2B- -Goulds

5 automatic)- & 2C (manual)

1-2A,18,1C,28_ Goulds

& 2C (auto) I

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BAT 1A, 1B Goulds-

2A,:2B ' Crane Deming ,

SFPC U1 l'& 2 Goulds'

U21&2 'Goulds. J

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The inspector reviewed additional documents. _as. required to verify

licensee commitments contained in their response. i

Documents . associated with latest pump vendor recommendations and A-E -;

l calculations for the pumps listed above included:' '

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? a. Westinghouse correspondence; ALA.38-929, November 3,-1988, i

Westinghouse letter to Mr. J. D. Woodard regarding Auxiliary Pump -

Minimum Flow Evaluation ' for Farley- Units. I and 2 and calculations

No. P-EC-158, Auxiliary Pump Minimum Flow. Evaluation for ALA/APR l

Projects, Revision 0, and FSSE/SS ALA 1203, Farley Safeguards i

Pumps Operating Modes, Revision 0, which established minimum flows j

for thermal protection (thermal) and long. term protection (mechanical q

. minimum flow) in all postulated scenarios (including design ' basis  ;

accident conditions) anticipated during the lifetime of the RHR, j

HHSI, CS, and BAT pumps. The methodology involved was reviewed and 1

approved by the pump vendors involved.

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- Verification of. the acceptability of- thermal flow (50 gpm) for the

RHR pumps was complicated due to errors for the ef; iciency; parameter

in the associated pump-head curves. TheLinspector noted that'the

errors only affected the thermal, flowEcalculations and thatt 50 gpm -

was reasonable in comparison with the lowest-acceptable mechanical

minimum flow (373 gpm) which had .been . calculated..without use: of_

pump-head curves. Validity'of 50 gpm.was also established through -

examination of pump-head curves for an' identical pump at another -

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facility. However, the licensee' agreed that the errors in the-

present RHR pump-head curves would be corrected,

b. BPC correspondences V-4529 and AP-16514 and ' calculation No. -29.01,. h

Farley- Nuclear Power Plant, Units.1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 1

Minimum Flow Evaluation, Revision 0, together with vendor correspon- ,

dence established adequacy of the- original minimum flow orifices- J

for the AFW pumps. The calculation established preclusion of -  !

pump-to-pump interaction. Vendor concurrence was verified that the i

present pump minimum flow rates! of 100 gpm (TDAFW 0 3960 RPM). and. 'b

45 gpm (TDAFW 0 2000 RPM; i.e.. a possible speed when;all three AFWs i

are running during reactor. trip recovery) was acceptable 'for .,

-intermittent flow conditions; i'.e., pump' operation at these flows is i

limited to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. or less in .a. 24- hour time period. Standard- 1

0perating Procedure, (S0P) 22'.0, Auxiliary Feedwater System,

Revision 21, was modified to . include proper operator caution - '

regarding the TDAFW pump at' low flow. -The 50,gpm provided by MDAFW.

orifices was determined to' be ' adequate for continuous low. flow  ;

operation. I

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Other design--drawings and test results were' also1 reviewed to verify  ;

adequacy of miniflow bypass lines and orifices-associated with the above /

pumps. Operation - of' CS pumps at minimum flows with pump-to-pump '

interaction is limited to 1 minute durir.g surveillance tests per

FNP-1/2-STP-16.6, Spray and Phase B Actuation Test, ~ Revision' 9. HHSI  ;

miniflow orifices limit flow to 60 , gpm ' ~and preclude pump-to-pump .

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interaction since they provide almost all the greater than 2000 pound

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pressure drop through the miniflow lines. ~ RHR pump-to-pump -interaction. is

precluded through use of independent minimum:-flow lines and the CVCS Boric ,

Acid System 0perations procedure (S0P 2.6, J ChemicalL and? Volume Control '

System Boric Acid System, Revision:15)', prohibits . starting and operating

both BAT pumps through the same miniflow line. CCW . bypass miniflow lines

are no innger used since CCW pumps are~either secured or operated at full

flow (including during surveillance tests. per FNP-STP-1/2- 23.1 - 23.3,

Component Cooling Water Pump (A-C) Quarterly Inservice Test, Revisions 9, j

8 and 9). SW miniflow capacity is assured through provision of three i

bypass lines fr>m the common ~ header for the 5 SW ) umps.' Each bypass line

has a 130-psig relief valve. S0P 24, Service' Water System, Revision'29,

requires verification of relief valve lift.at proper setpoint as-well as

SW pump operation which precludes pump-to-pump interaction.

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DGF0 pumps . ,

have no miniflow lines but are prevented 'from parallel- operation. by t

S0P 42, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System,

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Revision 14. Operation of more-than one SFPC pump at a time is prohibited ,

-by ' S0P 54, Spent _ Fuel Pit Cooling. and Purification System, Revision 11, 1

which also. requires that the inservice pump be= operated near ~its best

l - 'raulic efficiency (54_-psid across the pump).

Historical documents reviewed to establish confidence that nc damage-to._

the above pumps has occurred due _ to_ hydrau',1c _ instability orginadequate _ '

minimum flow bypass line capacity included; 1988,1989, .and'.1990 LERs 1

(both units), summaries of MW0s written against1the above pumps from  ;

installation to date, and sunrnaries of ASME, Section XI, . quarterly-pump- -

tests from 1988 to date. Details of all cases of impeller replacement or- l

repair (10 occurrences for the above pumps) were examined and noidamage l

~ associated with hydraulic instability was identified. -

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After examinationJof the above documentation and-field verification the

inspector' concluded that licensee ' actions in response' to IEB 88-04 were  !

satisfactory. _

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3. Exit Interview-

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August '1,1990, with 1

'those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspector described the

areas inspected- and discussed in detail the' inspection findings. .The

inspector informed the licensee that bulletin 88-04 was. closed.for_ Farley

Units 1 and 2. No dissenting comments were received:from the licensee.

Proprietary information was' reviewed in the course of this inspection,-but

is not included in this report..

4. Acronyms and Initialisms Used in This Report'

A-E Architect-Engineer

L AFW Auxiliary Feedwater System

l ASME American Society of Mechenical Engineers r

BAT Boric Acid Transfer System'

CCP Centrifugal Charging. Pump.

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CCW Component Cooling Vater System

CS .Contair, ment Spray System

DGF0 Diesel Generator Fuel 0il Transfer System

gpm gallons per minute .

HHSI High Head Safety Injection' System-

IEB Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin  !

LER Licensee-Event' Report

LHSI . Low Head Safety Injection System L

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MWO Maintenance Work Order

MDAFW Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System

RHR Residual Heat Removal System l

SFPC < Spent Fuel Pool Cooling l

S0P Standard Operating Procedure l

SW Service Water System l

TDAFW Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System l

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