ML20059N350
| ML20059N350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/1990 |
| From: | Belisle G, Hallstrom G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059N349 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-90-24, 50-364-90-24, IEB-88-004, IEB-88-4, NUDOCS 9010120027 | |
| Download: ML20059N350 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000348/1990024
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. NITED STATES
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- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETT A STREET, N.W.
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ATI.ANTA, OEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.: 50-348/90-24 and 50-364/90-24
Licensee: Alabama Power Company?
600 North 18th; Street
Birmingham, AL -35291-0400
Docket Nos.:.50-348 and 5-364
Facility name:
Farley 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted
August 27'- 31, 1990
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Inspector:e
- 7M meg 8d 28'am
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'G. A. Hallstron
Date=5igned.
Approved by:
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G. A. telisle, Chieff
Date Signed
Test Programs Sectic9
Engineering Branch-
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY.
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Scope:
This routine. - announced inspection examined licensee < actions in response to.
NRC Inspection and' Enforcement Bulletin (IEB) 88.-041 " Potential Safety-Related
Pump Loss."
The bulletin requested the L licensees : to . determine .ifL any
operational safety-related systems would result in; dead-heading, to evaluate
safety-related systems tcr flow, division,'and" toievaluate the minimum flow-
bypass lines ' for safety-related pumps with respect to' damage resulting from
operations and testing in the minimum' flow mode.j
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Resu'ts:
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All actions in responn to the' bulletin had'been completed'by the licensee
prior 'to this inspectioi.
All actions, were verified' toLbe satisfactory and
the' inspector informed.the licensee during the Exit on August 31, 1990, that.
Bulletin 86-04 was closed for Farley Units 1 and 2.
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The licensee provided excellent support during this inspectior,.
Necessary
calculations and other documentation had been collated and transported to the
site for ready availability and corporate engineering and architect-engineering
personnel were available on-site as'necessary to. expedite the inspection.
KnowleMeable responses _ to technical issues raised by the inspector wue
provioed.
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No violations or devictions were' identified.
901012002'7 9009'4
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ADOCK 05000348
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REPORT DETAILS-
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Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
S. Casey, Systems Performance Supervisor
J. Cheney,.0perations Shift Foreman-
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- M. . Coleman,- Manager - Plant Modifications
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- R. Hill, Assistant General Manager;- Operations
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- R. Mullins, Project Licensing Engineer -' Nuclear Support-
- J. Osterholtz, Manager
' Operations
- M. Scinson,- Assistant General Manager
Support
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- J. Thomas, Manager.-. Maintenance. .
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W. Van Landingham, Operations Unit' Supervisor,
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Other licensee . employees contacted = 'during' this inspection included'
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engineers, technicians, operators.and office personnel.-
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Other Organizations'
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J. Ehman, BPC Nuclear _ Engineer -
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J. Dudiak, Westinghouse Senior ? ump Engineer
B. Magee, Westinghouse Senior. ',ystems. Engineer
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D. O'Reilly, BPC Mechanical Engineer
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NRC Resident Inspectors
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G. Maxwell, Senior Resident I ispector
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- M. Morgan, Resident Inspector
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- Attended exit interview on August 31,;1990.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout -this report areL11sted in the'
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final paragraph,
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TI 2515/.105,
IEB 88-04, Potential for Safety-Related. Pump Loss
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IEB 88-04 was issued May 5,1988, due to the potential for damage of
safety-related centrifugal pumps when operated in parallelrat low flow.
When one of the pumps .is " stronger" than the other (i.e., has a higher
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developed head for the same flow) . it may 'cause " dead heading" of the
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weaker -pump; i.e., pump impeller' operation without fluid flow-
This can
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lead to pump damage due to cavitation and heat buildup.
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The inspector examined.the licensee's responses to IEB 88-04 dated July 8
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and November 30, 1988;- and March 23 and September 21, 1989, to determine-
whether actions taken were satisfactory.
The - July 8,1988, letter
identified the following safety-related pumps:
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-SYSTEM
. PUMPS
MANUFACTURER
HHSI or
1 A , 18, 1C'
Pacific Pump
2A, 28, 2C
Pacific Pump-
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LHSI or
1A, 1B
-Ingersoll-Rand
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2 A ,- _ 2 B ,
Ingersoll-Rand-
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1A, 1B
Goulds
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2A, 2B
Goulds
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MDAFW--
1A, 1B
Ingersoll-Rand
2A,~2B
Ingersoll-Rand:
U1,'U2
Ingersoll-Rand
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.CCW
1A, 1B,:1C
Pacific Pump
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2A, 2B,._2C
Pacific Pump
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SW'
1A thru E
Byron-Jackson
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2A thru E
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DGF0 (5 manual &
1-2A,1B,10,2B-
-Goulds
5 automatic)-
& 2C (manual)
1-2A,18,1C,28_
Goulds
& 2C (auto)
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BAT
1A, 1B
Goulds-
2A,:2B
' Crane Deming
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- SFPC
U1 l'& 2
Goulds'
U21&2
'Goulds.
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The inspector reviewed additional documents. _as. required to verify
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licensee commitments contained in their response.
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Documents . associated with latest pump vendor recommendations and A-E
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calculations for the pumps listed above included:'
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correspondence; ALA.38-929,
November 3,-1988,
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Westinghouse letter to Mr. J. D. Woodard regarding Auxiliary Pump -
Minimum Flow Evaluation ' for Farley- Units. I and 2 and calculations
No. P-EC-158, Auxiliary Pump Minimum Flow. Evaluation for ALA/APR
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Projects, Revision 0,
and FSSE/SS ALA 1203, Farley Safeguards
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Pumps Operating Modes, Revision 0, which established minimum flows
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for thermal protection (thermal) and long. term protection (mechanical
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. minimum flow) in all postulated scenarios (including design ' basis
accident conditions) anticipated during the lifetime of the RHR,
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The methodology involved was reviewed and
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approved by the pump vendors involved.
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- Verification of. the acceptability of- thermal flow (50 gpm) for the
RHR pumps was complicated due to errors for the ef; iciency; parameter
in the associated pump-head curves.
TheLinspector noted that'the
errors only affected the thermal, flowEcalculations and thatt 50 gpm -
was reasonable in comparison with the lowest-acceptable mechanical
minimum flow (373 gpm) which had .been . calculated..without use: of_
pump-head curves.
Validity'of 50 gpm.was also established through -
examination of pump-head curves for an' identical pump at another -
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facility.
However, the licensee' agreed that the errors in the-
present RHR pump-head curves would be corrected,
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BPC correspondences V-4529 and AP-16514 and ' calculation No. -29.01,.
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Farley- Nuclear Power Plant, Units.1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps
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Minimum Flow Evaluation, Revision 0, together with vendor correspon-
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dence established adequacy of the- original minimum flow orifices-
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for the AFW pumps.
The calculation established preclusion of -
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pump-to-pump interaction.
Vendor concurrence was verified that the
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present pump minimum flow rates! of 100 gpm (TDAFW 0 3960 RPM). and.
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45 gpm (TDAFW 0 2000 RPM; i.e.. a possible speed when;all three AFWs
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are running during reactor. trip recovery) was acceptable 'for
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-intermittent flow conditions;
i'.e., pump' operation at these flows is
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limited to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. or less in .a. 24- hour time period.
Standard-
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0perating Procedure, (S0P)
22'.0,
Auxiliary Feedwater System,
Revision 21, was modified to . include proper operator caution -
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regarding the TDAFW pump at' low flow.
-The 50,gpm provided by MDAFW.
orifices was determined to' be ' adequate for continuous low. flow
operation.
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Other design--drawings and test results were' also1 reviewed to verify
adequacy of miniflow bypass lines and orifices-associated with the above
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pumps.
Operation - of' CS pumps at minimum flows with pump-to-pump
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interaction is limited to 1 minute durir.g surveillance tests per
FNP-1/2-STP-16.6, Spray and Phase B Actuation Test, ~ Revision' 9.
miniflow orifices limit flow to 60 , gpm ' ~and preclude pump-to-pump
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interaction since they provide almost all the greater than 2000 pound
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pressure drop through the miniflow lines. ~ RHR pump-to-pump -interaction. is
precluded through use of independent minimum:-flow lines and the CVCS Boric
Acid System 0perations procedure (S0P 2.6, J ChemicalL and? Volume Control
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System Boric Acid System, Revision:15)', prohibits . starting and operating
both BAT pumps through the same miniflow line. CCW . bypass miniflow lines
are no innger used since CCW pumps are~either secured or operated at full
flow (including during surveillance tests. per FNP-STP-1/2- 23.1 - 23.3,
Component Cooling Water Pump (A-C) Quarterly Inservice Test, Revisions 9,
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8 and 9).
SW miniflow capacity is assured through provision of three
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bypass lines fr>m the common ~ header for the 5 SW ) umps.' Each bypass line
has a 130-psig relief valve.
S0P 24, Service' Water System, Revision'29,
requires verification of relief valve lift.at proper setpoint as-well as
SW pump operation which precludes pump-to-pump interaction.
DGF0 pumps
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have no miniflow lines but are prevented 'from parallel- operation. by
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S0P 42, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System,
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Revision 14. Operation of more-than one SFPC pump at a time is prohibited
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-by ' S0P 54, Spent _ Fuel Pit Cooling. and Purification System, Revision 11,
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which also. requires that the inservice pump be= operated near ~its best
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'raulic efficiency (54_-psid across the pump).
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Historical documents reviewed to establish confidence that nc damage-to._
the above pumps has occurred due _ to_ hydrau',1c _ instability orginadequate _
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minimum flow bypass line capacity included; 1988,1989, .and'.1990 LERs
(both units),
summaries of MW0s written against1the above pumps from
installation to date,
and sunrnaries of ASME,Section XI, . quarterly-pump-
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tests from 1988 to date.
Details of all cases of impeller replacement or-
repair (10 occurrences for the above pumps) were examined and noidamage
~ associated with hydraulic instability was identified.
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After examinationJof the above documentation and-field verification the
inspector' concluded that licensee ' actions in response' to IEB 88-04 were
satisfactory.
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Exit Interview-
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August '1,1990, with
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'those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspector described the
areas inspected- and discussed in detail the' inspection findings. .The
inspector informed the licensee that bulletin 88-04 was. closed.for_ Farley
Units 1 and 2.
No dissenting comments were received:from the licensee.
Proprietary information was' reviewed in the course of this inspection,-but
is not included in this report..
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Acronyms and Initialisms Used in This Report'
A-E
Architect-Engineer
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Auxiliary Feedwater System
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American Society of Mechenical Engineers
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BAT
Boric Acid Transfer System'
Centrifugal Charging. Pump.
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Component Cooling Vater System
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.Contair, ment Spray System
DGF0
Diesel Generator Fuel 0il Transfer System
gpm
gallons per minute
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High Head Safety Injection' System-
IEB
Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin
LER
Licensee-Event' Report
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LHSI
. Low Head Safety Injection System
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MWO
Maintenance Work Order
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System
Residual Heat Removal System
SFPC
< Spent Fuel Pool Cooling
S0P
Standard Operating Procedure
Service Water System
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System
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