IR 05000364/1980026

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IE Insp Rept 50-364/80-26 on 800730-0801.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Follow Pipe Support & Piping Sys Insp Procedures
ML19339A823
Person / Time
Site: Farley 
Issue date: 08/29/1980
From: Ang W, Herdt A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19339A818 List:
References
50-364-80-26, NUDOCS 8011050381
Download: ML19339A823 (4)


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UNITED STATES y

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NUCLEAR HEGULATORY COMMISSION

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f REGION ll 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., sulTE 3100 C

%,.....f ATLAN1 A, GEORGIA 30303 Report No. 50-364/80-26 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35202 Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 License No. CPPR-86 Inspection at Farley Nuclear Plant near Dothan, Alabama Inspected by:

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Date Signed 8 d 9-b Approved by:

i A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RCES Branch Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on July

,1980 to August 1,1980 Areas Inspected This routine announced inspection involved 21 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of pipe support baseplate designs using concrete expansion anchor bolts (IEB 79-02); and seismic analysis for as built safety-related piping systems (IEB 79-14).

Results Of the two areas inspected, one item of noncompliance was found in both areas (Infraction - Failure to follow pipe support and piping system inspection proce-dures - Paragraph 5 and 6).

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DETAILS

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1.

Persons Contacted

  • J. A. Mooney, Project Manager

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  • W. C. Petty, QA Manager
  • R. L. George, Project Engineer l

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  • J. G. Hegi, QC Engineer
  • R. S. Fucich, Project Engineer
  • J. C. Bozeman, Engineer NRC Resident Inspector
  • W. Bradford
  • Attended exit interview l

2.

Exit Interview l

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 1,1980, with those persons indicated in Paragraphiabove. The noncompliance concerning failure to follow pipe support inspection procedures (paragraphs 5 and 6)

was discussed with the licensee.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

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Not inspected.

4.

Unresolved Items

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Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Pipe Support Baseplate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts (IEB l.

79-02)

On January 7, 1980, the licensee provided a response to IEB 79-02.

The licensee's response and implementing procedures were reviewed with the.

licensee to verify licensee compliance with IEB 79-02 requirements and

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licensee commitments. The licensee indicated that a revision to the IEB 79-02 response will be issued to confirm that a safety factor of 5 exists

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for self drill type concrete expansion anchors.

The following pipe supports were. inspected to verify licensee compliance with IEB 79-02 requirements and licensee commitments:

i Main Steam System

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2MS-R812, 2MS-R813, 2MS-R814, 2MS-R815, 2MS-R505

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Residual Heat Removal System 2RH-R95, 2RH-R96, 2RH-R97

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During the inspection of support 2MS-R505, the following items were noted:

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a.

Concrete around a bolt for the support was damaged. This condition had not been previously reported.

Paragraph 5.3 of FQCP 5.4.2.1A requires that damage to concrete be reported.

b.

An unused concrete expansion anchor was installed within 4-1/2 inches of a one inch concrete expansion anchor of the pipe support. This condition had not been reported. Paragraph 6.14.2 of FQCP 5.4.2.1A requires that bolt spacing less than five inches for one inch diameter bolts be reported. The above two noted conditions appear to be-in noncompliance of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V and shall be identi-fied as examples for infraction 80-26-01 " Failure to follow pipe

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support and piping system inspection procedures."

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Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety Related Piping Systems,(IEB 79-14)

On January 15, 1980, the licensees provided a response to IEB 79-14. The licensee's response and implementing procedures were reviewed with the licensee to verify licensee compliance with IEB 79-14 requirements.

The following drawings were selected and portions of the piping system

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shown on the drawings were inspected to verify licensee compliance with IEB 79-14 requirements and licensee commitments:

SK - N11 - CV - 029 - Main Steam Piping, Auxiliary Building SK - B13/E11 - CV-2-017 - Residual Heat Removal Piping, Reactor Building The following pipe supports installed for the piping noted above were also inspected:

2MS - R812, 2MS - R813, 2MS - R814, 2MS - R815, 2MS - R505 2RH - R - 95, 2RH - R96, 2RH - R97

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l Dimensional discrepancies (ex. baseplate dimensions were not correctly recorded) were noted between the actual installation and the "As-Built" sketches for pipe supports 2MS-R814, 2RH-R96, 2RH-R95, 2RH-R97.

FQCP i

5.4.2.1 Addendum 1, paragraph 5.1.2 requires that QC inspect the hangers to assure that all the design requirements on the sketch are satisfied. This appears to be in noncompliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V and shall be identified as the second example for infraction 80-26-01 " Failure to follow pipe support and piping system inspection procedures."

Valves QV-003F and QV-003C had valve operators. FNP-QCP-4.01 Appendix B

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paragraph 4 requires that if-the valve has an extended operator, the orientation of the operator be verified to be correct. This portion of the valve checklist for valves QV-003F and QV-003C were marked "N/A".

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-3-appears to be in noncompliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V and shall be identified as the third example for infraction 80-26-01 " Failure to follow pipe support and piping system inspection procedures".

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