IR 05000348/1997300
| ML20248L500 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1997 |
| From: | Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20248L484 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-97-300, 50-364-97-300, NUDOCS 9803230129 | |
| Download: ML20248L500 (13) | |
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Ete UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o - REGION 11 g j ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
- 61 FORSYTH STREET SW, SUITE 23T85
$, ATLANTA GEORGIA 30303 4 .....
Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License No NPF-2 and NPF-8 Report Nos.: 50-348/97-300 and 50-364/97-300 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant location: Columbia. AL Dates: March 24 - 27, 1997 Examiners: Michael E. Ernstes, Chief License Examiner Paul Steiner. License Examiner Paul E. Harmon, License Examiner (Trainee)
Approved by: 7/
. Thomas A. Peebles. Chief b
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Yd Date Signed f7 '
Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch Division of Reactor Safety
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i 9803230129 970422 PDR ADOcK 05000348 V PDR
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2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Farley Nuclear Plant NRC Examination Report 50-348/97-300 and 50-364/97-300 NRC examiners conducted an announced, operator licensing, initial examination in accordance with the guidance of Examiner Standards. NUREG-1021. Revision 7 Supplement I. encompassing the period March 24-27. 1997. This examination implemented the operator licensing requirements of 10 CFR S55.41. S55.43 and 555.4 Doerations
. Five Senior Reactor Operator Instant a)plicants received written and operating examinations. Only two of t1e five applicants passed the examination One of those two was a marginal pas . Plant housekeeping was considered to be marginally adequat (Section 02.1)
. A weakness was identified in the candidates' performance on the written examination, particularly on the Plant Wide Generic (PWG) Section. Poor performance on the PWG section was a repeat from the last examinatio (Section 05.1)
. All candidates were weak in communications skills. (Section 05.2)
. Examiners identified an IFI for failure to train operators adequately on the use of procedure place keeping aid This finding was a repeat from the last examination. (Section 05.4)
Results:
Candidate Pass / Fail I
SRO R0 Total Percent Pass 2 0 5 40 %
Fail 3 0 0 60 %
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Reoort Details Summary of Plant Status During the period of the examination. Unit 2 was at 100 percent power while Unit 1 was in a refueling outag I. Ooerations 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Control Room Observations a. Scope During administration of the examination, the examiners observed the conduct of operations by currently licensed operators in the control room during day shift on March 26, 1997. Step 4.2.1 of Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Administrative Control Procedure (ACP)-2.0. " Main Control Room Formality". Revision 0, stated that either the Unit Operator (UD)
or the Operator at the Controls (0ATC) will normally have their attention directed toward the Main Control Board (MCB).
b. Observations and Findinas Although the examiners were focused on the administration of the examination, they frequently observed the practice of the Unit 2 (the at power unit) OATC and UO sitting with their backs to the MCB in conversation with the Shift Supervisor (SS) on non plant related topics for up to five consecutive minute c. Conclusion The examiners' observation time in the control room was of limited scope in that only one crew was observed. Also, operator attentiveness was not the examiners' primary focus. However. )ased on the number of observations and the general control room atmosphere observed, the examiners concluded that the expectations, found in ACP-2.0. for control board attentiveness were not being me Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
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l 02.1 Housekeeoina (71707)
a. S.ggp_e During validation and administration of the walkthrough portion of the examinatica the examiners toured various portions of the Auxiliary Building and Turbine Building of both Unit 1 and Unit ENCLOSURE 1
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b. - Observations and Findinos j The examiners noted a general lack of cleanliness throughout both unit Unit 1 was in a refueling outage, and a lack of cleanliness could be l expected due to the intensity of maintenance activities. However, the cleanliness of Unit 2. which was not in an outage was considered to be poor.
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The examiners noted piles of trash in the elevator, unattended tools and cleaning equipment dirty walls and floors in office areas and similar observations throughout the plant. Discarded ear plugs and broken i safety' glasses were especially evident near entrances to areas designated as requiring personal safety equipmen f None of.the candidates indicated that the observed plant housekeeping I conditions were abnormal. All of the items mentioned above were visible to the candidates as well as the examiners However, the candidates appeared desensitized to the conditions and made no efforts to correct or report them. This lack of sensitivity can have serious consequence For exam)1e. while leading the examiner through the Auxiliary Building during t1e walkthrough examination, one candidate came upon a Wet Vac with yellow and magenta radioactive markings. There was a puddle of water draining from the Wet Vac hose to a floor drain.- The candidate-saw the water on the floor.- noted its source. stepped over it, and proceeded down the hall. A few seconds later the candidate returned down the hall and again consciously stepped over the spill. The examiner then stopped tho candidate and contacted Health Physics to attend to this potential contamination proble The examiners questioned station staff regarding the plant conditio The staff did not offer any explanation other than the ongoing refueling outage for the general appearance of the plant. However, similar conditions were observed during the preparatory week when the outage was not in progres c. Conclusion Plant personnel's lack of sensitivity to poor house keeping resulted in a failure to report a )otential contamination problem. The examiners did not observe any otler instance where the general lack' of plant cleanliness had a direct negative effect on either material conditio reliability, or availabilit Consequently, housekeeping observed during this period was considered to be marginally adequat ENCLOSURE 1 i
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03 Operations Procedures and. Documentation 1 a. Scope Candidates used a variety of plant procedures during the examination Examiners observed the candidates' use of procedures to detect procedure problems which had a potential impact on operators' performanc b. Observations and Findinas l
There was no procedural guidance for locating a Component Cooling' Water (CCW) leak. Operators had to rely on system knowledge for potential leak sources rather than a systematic procedure which encompassed all likely sources. (See paragraph 05.3) This contributed to a delay in isolating a simulated Reactor Coolant System (RCS) lea {
Procedure attachments were not available in the Unit 2 "A-man" shac One candidate experienced difficulty in locating a valve in the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (SFPC) System. He stated that an attachment is usually provided in System Operating Procedure (SOP)-54.0. "SFPC System." which contains valve location information. After spending a) proximately 20 minutes trying to locate a valve. the candidate went to t1e Unit 2 "A-Man" shack where full copies and attachments would normally be available. The candidate found Procedure 50P-54.0 but the attachment was not in the file with the procedure. The licensee pursed the matter and found that the master file did not require the attachment to be kept in ther )
c. Conclusion A lack of procedural guidance for. locating CCW leaks could delay the isolation of the. leak. The unavailability of complete procedures in the plant could delay operators in locating valves and consequently hinder certain evolution Operator Training and Qualifications 05.1 Written Examination a. Scope The licensee was- offered the o)portunity to develo) the written examination themselves under t1e pilot process of Revision 8 of NUREG-1021 " Operator Licensing Examiner Standards", but declined. The written examination was developed and administered by the NRC in accordance with NUREG-1021. Revision 7. Supplement I. The examiners conducted an item analysis of the written examination results to determine any generic training weaknesses.
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b. Observations and Findinos Prior to the examination. two representatives of the Training Department reviewed the written examination for technical accuracy and validit The licensee's thorough review of the examination assisted in developing a valid sampling of knowledge pertinent to the operation of Farley nuclear plant. The licensee had only one post examination comment concerning the validity of a particular written examination questio This comment had been identified by the licensee review team prior to the examinatio However, the NRC determined the question concerning the basis for a Technical Specification (TS) to be valid knowledge for a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) at FNP and included it in the examinatio Candidate performance on the examination was poor. Two candidates failed the examination. One candidate passed the examination with the exact minimum of 80%. The class average was 81%.
The post-examination item analysis showed performance on the Plant Wide Generic (PWG) questions as a weakness. The candidates" average score on these PWG questions was 71%. Plant Wide Generic questions test candidates on administrative, supervisory, and configuration control topics. Some of the topics, on which multiple candidates were unable to answer questions correctly included:
. TS overtime limit . Emergency Plan Notification . Emergency Director duties
. Dosimetry
. Calculation of expected exposure Poor performance on PWG topics was substantiated during Section A of the walkt1 rough examination. Candidates could not identify the different I security level areas at FN Additionally, one candidate demonstrated a i serious lack of familiarity with radiological control procedures. (See paragraph 02.1)
c. Conclusion Candidate performance on the written examination was a weaknes Performance on the PWG portion of the examination continued to be a particularly weak area. The PWG section of the written examination is one of the principal methods for testing knowledge needed to perform licensed Senior Operator duties as described in 10 CFR 55.43. " Written examination: Senior Operator." Poor performance on the PWG portion of I tne written examination was highlighted as a problem during the last Initial Examination in Examination Report 50-346/95-300. when the class l scored 78% on the PWG section of the written examinatio ENCLOSURE 1
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l 05.2 Communications and Command and Control l
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a. Scope i
The examiners evaluated the candidates' communications, command, and control skills during five simulator scenarios. Plant 3rocedures-FNP-0-
! ACP-1.0 " Operational Communications." Revision 1. and :NP-0-AP-1 " Conduct of Operations-Operations Group." Revision 26. detailed FNP performance expectations in these area b. Observations and Findinas
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Section 4.2 of ACP-1.0 states: "All 31 ant managers, superintendents.
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supervisors and foreman are responsi)le for assuring compliance with the requirements of this 3rocedure." As SRO during the simulator scenarios, the candidates were t1e control room su)ervisor and therefore responsible, not only for complying wit 1 the Operational Communications Procedure, but for ensuring compliance by the cre Candidates did not give specific information in their communication Section 5.1.3 of ACP-1.0 states: "Be specific when identifying equipment. Being specific ensures that the information is detailed enough so that the correct component is identified." Candidates failed to supply sufficient detail in their directive For example, during a loss of off-site power scenario, the SR0 ordered the 0ATC to " Start that
' SW pump" without specifying which pump to start. In another event, the SR0 directed the 0ATC to remove a 60 gpm letdown orifice from service by stating. "Go ahead and take a 60."
One candidate, in the SRO position, informed the crew that the Steam Generator (SG) tube leak rate had increased from 300 to 900 gpd by announcing "Looks like its getting lots worse". The candidate did not specify what parameter had changed or by how much. One of the crew members stopped to inquire what was getting wors The candidates did not consistently repeat orders back to the sender nor require acknowledgement. Section 5.1.5 of ACP-1.0 directs the sender of information to solicit acknowledgement and feedback from the receiver to ensure receipt and understanding of the message or instruction. In general., the candidates only used repeat-backs and acknowledgement during the first few minutes of the scenario and reverted to informal communications as the scenario progressed. SR0s did not solicit repeat backs of orders from the board operator Some SRO candidates did not demonstrate proper command and contro Section 3.1.6 of AP-16. stated that during accident situations the SS shall direct the actions of the control room operators. The SS should not become totally involved in any single operation which distracts him or her from the rest of the operations recuired in the Control Room.
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Some directives given by the SR0s to boarc operators were open ended, i
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leaving recovery decisions to the control board operators discretio For example a directive to the OATC to. "Either turn on heaters or dial the controller to 70%". In another example, an SR0 directed the OATC
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to. " Borate in Small Increments", without giving an amount. In another event the SRO was simultaneously referring to three Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) and an Annunciator Response Procedure (ARP) without informing the crew of what procedure was in effect. Three minutes after the start of the event the SRO simply asked the crew. "What do you-all want to do?"
The SRO candidates were often too closely involved in completing tasks and lost the big picture. It was not uncommon for an SR0 to read an ARP while the plant was in a transient. Also, an inconsistency existed on whether or not the AOPs. ARPs. and Emergency Response Procedures (ERP)s should be read aloud. The SR0 candidates were frequently at the control boards vice maintaining their overview from the SS's are c. Conclusions Some candidates were weak in their command and control. All candidates were weak in communications. The poor performance in these areas contributed to the degradation of plant conditions during simulator scenarios . Weaknesses in command control and communications resulted in one candidate failing and the marginal performance of another candidat Communications ability had declined since the last Initial Examination in which all crews demonstrated good communication skills. (NRC Examination Report 50-346/95-300)
05.3 Control lloard Ooerations a. Scope The examiners evaluated the candidates' control board operations skills during simulator scenarios and JPMs. The guidelines of NUREG-1021. Form ES-303-4. "SRO Competency Grading Worksheets For Integrated Plant Opp 4.jons." were used as a basis for the evaluatio b. Observations and Findinas Candidates induced unnecessary transients on SG water level through incorrect manipulation of the Feed Regulating Valves (FRV)s. A simulator scenario with a failure of an input to the Steam Generator Water Level Control (SGWLC) system required candidates to take manual control of FRVs. Upon selection of an operable input, candidates returned FRVs to automatic control without matching SG level to the program level. On three separate occasions, candidates matched feed flow to steam flow and then placed the FRV in automatic control before actual level had returned to program level. The level error caused the
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FRV to receive a large open demand signal from SGWLC and raised SG level above the deviation alarm setpoint due to overshoo Procedure ARP- (JB2), explains in a NOTE that:
For large Flow Errors it may take up to two and one half minutec for the Feed Flow Control System to reset to normal. Closely monitor SG Level when returning the Main FRV to Automatic Control."
Candidates did not operate the Feed Flow Control System within this guidelin Candidates exhibited symptoms of negative training on identifying an RCS to CCW leak in the letdown heat exchanger. A Job Performance Measure (JPM) presented the candidates with an increasing CCW surge tank level and challenged them to identify and isolate an RCS to CCW leak in the letdown heat exchange All candidates initially eliminated letdown leakage as a possible source based on a lack of change in letdown flow indication. Training Instructors indicated that when presented in training on the simulator, a 25 gpm leak value was always used for an RCS to CCW leak in the letdown heat exchanger. A 25 gpm drop is readily identifiable on the letdown flow indication since the detector is located downstream of the letdown heat exchanger. In this JPM candidates were presented with a small leak of about 1 gpm. When candidates did not see the 25 gpm change in letdown flow that they expected, they eliminated a letdown leak as a source. There was no procedure to systematically determine the source of a CCW lea Candidates relied on system knowledge to determine possible source c. Conclusions Candidates' inability to return SGWLC to automatic could result in unnecessary transients on SG water level and the Main Feed Syste Candidates' inability to identify the source of an RCS to CCW leak could delay isolation of an RCS leak.
l 05.4 Procedure Use a. Scope i
The examiners evaluated the candidates' compliance with and use of plant L 3rocedures during the simulator scenarios and JPMs. The guidelines of 1UREG-1021. Form ES-303-4. "SR0 Competency Grading Worksheets For Integrated Plant Operations." were used as a basis for the evaluatio FNP criteria regarding ARP usage was in FNP-0-ACP-1.0, " Operational Communications."
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b. Observations and Findinas Candidates did not com)lete all actions of the ARPs. Step 5.8.3.1 of ACP-1.0 states that "Jpon an unexpected alarm. the operator should ensure the action of the applicable ARP is performed" For example, one SR0 directed the UO to restore instrument air (IA) to containment and handed the candidate FNP-1-ARP-1.2 (BK1). "High Penetration Room Pressure" The crew did not verify the Automatic Actions listed in the ARP had occurred. Doing so would have isolated a penetration room isolation valve which had failed to close. The UO only performed the Supplementary Actions associated with restoring IA to containment. Had the crew systematically followed all of the guidance in the ARP, the crew would have gained control of primary plant systems in a quicker and more controlled manner. The use of ARPs during this examination contrasted the candidates' performance on the last examinatio Examination report 50-346/95-300 noted that candidate performance on the !
simulator was enhanced by their use or the ARPs for all alarms which were not expecte During simulator scenarios, the SRO candidates did not ;ead the Cautions and Notes to the crew. Candidates did not read all steps of the ERPs and A0Ps aloud. They would often read ERPs and AOPs to themselves. If they believed there were no actions to be taken, they proceeded with the i next ste j
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The candidates did not check off completed steps in the AOPs. ARPs. SOPS !
and some of the ERPs. During the simulator scenarios. SR0s occasionally !
failed to complete steps due to losing their place in the procedur ,
FNP-0-AP-16. " Conduct of Operation." Revision 25. Section 5.2 states !
that. " sign-offs are executed when specified by the associated procedure or when included as an integral part of the procedure (such as a blank i beside the step). After the completion of each item, the o)erator !
completing the step initials the item prior to performing t1e next i step." The Training Department's failure to incorporate the aro)er use of place keeping aids in their training and evaluations was ligilighted ;
during the-last Initial Examination (NRC Examination Report 50-346/95-300).
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c. Conclusions
! The candidates in general, did not demonstrate a proficient use of '
3rocedures to the SR0 level of performance. This resulted in confused Joard operators, a disorganized o)erator response, and ultimately l
degraded plant conditions. The a)ility to use ARPs effectively had declined since the last examination. The repeated failure to train the operators adequately on using procedure place keeping aids impacted the candidate performance. This item will be tracked as IFI 50-348.364/97-300-01. failure to train operators adequately on the use of procedure place keeping aid ENCLOSURE 1
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08 Miscellaneous Operations Issues (00en) IFI 50-348/96-09-03, inconsistent application of remedial training documentation guidance. Farley procedure FNP-0-TCP-1 " License Retraining Program Administration." was revised to clarify expectations for completion and documentation of remedial training in the License Retraining Progra This item will remain open until its direct implementation can be observed next requalification cycl V. Manaaement Meetinas XI. Exit Meeting Summary At the conclusion of the site visit, the examiners met with representatives of the plant staff listed on the following page to discuss the results of the examination The examiners asked the licensee whether any materials examined should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee B. Badham Safety Audit and Engineering Review T. Blindaur Senior Plant Instructor P. Crone. Nuclear Operation Training Supervisor D. Grissette. Operations Manager R. Hill. General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant C. Nesbit. Assistant General Manager - Support J. Odom. Superintendent Unit 1 Operations L. Stinson. Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations NRC 1 J. Bartley. Resident Inspector B. Caldwell Resident Inspector T. Ross. Senior Resident Inspector-l
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Ooened
- IFI 50-345.364/97-300-01 Failure to adequately train operators on the use of procedure place keeping aid Closed NONE
- Discussed
. IFI 50-348.364/96-09-03 Requalification Remedial Training Documentatio LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ACP Administrative Control Procedure AOP Abnormal Operating Procedure ARP- Annunciator Response Procedure CCW Component Cooling Water CFR Code of Federal Regulations ERP Emergency Response Procedure ES Examiner Standard FNP Farley Nuclear Plant gpd gallons per day g am gallons per minute
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II Inspector Follow-up Item JPM Job Performance Measure MCB Main Control Board j NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission )
0ATC Operator at the Controls PWG Plant Wide Generic RCS Reactor Coolant System R0 Reactor Operator SFPC Spent Fuel Pool Cooling SGWLC Steam Generator Water Level Control -
SOP System Operating Procedure SRO- Senior Reactor Operator SS Shift Supervisor SW Service Water TCP Training Center Procedure UO Unit Operator l ENCLOSURE 1
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SIMULATOR FACILITY REPORT Facility Licensee: Farley Nuclear Plant Facility Docket No and 50-364 Operating Tests Administered On: March 25-27, 1997 ,
This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute, in and of themselves, audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information that may .
be used in future evaluations. No licensee action is required solely in response to these observation During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests the no configuration or fidelity items were observe '
Could not model LOCA in Penetration Roo l
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0 NRC RESOLUTION OF FACILITY COMMENTS Question #78 Comment not accepte This question was designed to test the candidates' knowledge of how the recent Technical Specification change had modified the assumptions regarding design basis accidents for Farley Nuclear Plant. Prior to the analysis supporting the Technical Specification change, the maximum allowable RCS activity was based on a steam line rupture with the maximum allowable primary to secondary leak. This assumed that no new leakage would occur during a steam line rupture transien However, the safety analysis now assumes that the secondary pressure transient induced by a steam line rupture will result in increased tube leakag Knowledge of an expected increase in 3rimary to secondary leakage has an explicit operationally-oriented ] asi The licensee review team identified this connent to the examination authors. prior to the examination administration. Following consideration of the review team's comments and further research, the Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch Chief elected to include the question in the examinatio ENCLOSURE 4
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