IR 05000348/1993022

Insp Repts 50-348/93-22 & 50-364/93-22 on 930925-1022.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maintenance, Surveillance,Industry Technical Issues,Event Repts,Unit 2 Refueling Activities & Continuing Review of self-assessment

ML20058J906
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	11/17/1993
From:	Cantrell F, Morgan M, Ross T, Michael Scott NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058J896	List: IR 05000348/1993022 ML20058J894
References
50-348-93-22, 50-364-93-22, NUDOCS 9312140298
Download: ML20058J906 (13)

Text

- ._ - - - __

. t

'

UNITED STATES

/am neog% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '

J' ft REGloN 11

O 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SulTE 29J0 l

'

.. j ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 0199 l

\...../ Report Nos.: 50-348/93-22 and 50-364/93-22 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, In P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility name: Farley 1 and 2

,

Inspection Conducted: eptember 25 - October 22, 1993 xN ~

Inspectors:__ _UrfWrfy MMoss, Senior Resident Inspector M7/o DifteX1gned ;

/N ~ 2-- y

^

//k7b3 Mic . organ E dent Inspector Optefigned

/ i M9. / m n I'tichael4. Scott, Resident ' inspector nA7h Dat'e Stijned ;

!

Approved by: [ // MjU l Floyd S. Ahntrell, Chi'#f /' Date Signed Reactor Projects Section IB Division of Reactor Projects l

SUMMARY Scope: j f

This routine inspection involved on-site inspection of operations, [

maintenance, surveillance, industry technical issues, event reports, Unit 2 l refueling activities and a continuing review of licensee self-assessment. Deep backshifts were performed September 26, 27, 30 and October 2 and 14, 199 ;

Results:

The inspectors conducted routine tours and verified that selected tagging  ;

orders were properly implemented, paragraph 3.a. Various Unit 2 outage '

-

activities were observed, paragraph 3.b. Damage to three fuel assemblies were  !

noted, paragraph 3.b.3. The "2A" reactor coolant pump anti-rotational device  !

lubrication piping was suspect, paragraph 3.b.4. . Operational evolutions were . I observed, paragraph 3.c. Charging pump oil misting problems were resolved, a .

'

battery change-out was conducted and a reactor coolant pump rotor was removed, ,

paragraph 4.a. Inspector concerns with lack of proper scaffolding approvals i

9312140298 931119 PDR ADOCK 05000348 .

<

G PDR  :

!

'

.

, , . . . - - ,

- . , - - -,

. . - . - - . - . - . _ - - - - - - . - - -

_ . _ . _ - - - _ - . - _ . - . _ _ _

-

l

~

was identified, paragraph 4.b. Diesel generator operability, degraded bus '

voltage and reactor trip breaker surveillance testing was performed, paragraph 5. Examples of the implementation of the licensee's " STAR" error i reduction program was noted, paragraph No violations or deviations were identified. However, the staff identified concern regarding the lack of proper scaffolding approvals is considered an unresolved item (URI 93-22-01). Results of this inspection indicate that actions by management, operations, maintenance and other site personnel were adequat t

?

l

'

l l

I l

l l

- -

.. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - - - - ~ . - - - . . _ , _ - - . ~ - . . - - - . - - . - . . . . . . _ . . . . _ . . - . - _ _ . . - . . , _ , . . _ - . . . __ _ __

.

i I

i

.

REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

'

,

• Bayne, Supervisor, Safety Audit and Engineering Review

'

• C. Buck, Technical Manager

• R. Coleman, Modification Manager

• L. Enfinger, Administrative Manager

• Hill, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant

• J. McGowan, Manager, Safety Audit and Engineering Review (Birmingham)

M. Mitchell, Superintendent, Health Physics and Radwaste

• C. Nesbitt, Operations Manager ,

• J. Osterholtz, Assistant Geieral Manager - Plant Support

• L. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations

• J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager

• B. Yance, Plant Systems Performance Manager

• Attended the exit interview other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations personnel, security, maintenance, I&C and office personne On September 27, Mr. D. C. Fischer of NRR visited the site to observe Unit 2 check valve testin On October 4, Mr. J. R. Johnson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II, performed a pre-SALP tour with the resident inspector and discussed various plant activities with the licensee managemen Acronyms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap . Plant Status Units 1 and 2 Status Unit 1 operated at full power for the entire reporting period, except as necessary to accommodate Technical Specifications

]

surveillance requirement Unit 2 began the Cycle 9 refueling outage on September 25, which continued throughout the reporting perio NRC/ Licensee Meetings and Inspections I During the week of October 4, Region-II Operator Licensing and contractor personnel conducted onsite preparations to support initial senior reactor operator and reactor operator license examination I

- .- . - . . . . _ .

.

.

During the weeks of October 4 and 11, NRC non-destructive examination (NDE) personnel from Region I performed independent confirmatory evaluations of licensee NDE activities (Report 50-348,364/93-400).

During the week of October 11, Region II Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) personnel reviewed the observations of Region I NDE laboratory and other NDE work performed by the licensee (Report No. 50-348,364/93-24).

During the week of October 11, Region 11 Division of Reactor Safety and Safeguards (DRSS) personnel, performed an inspection of licensee health physics activities (Report 50-348,364/93-23).

During the week of October 18, Region II DRS engineering personnel, performed an inspection of licensee in-service inspection (ISI) activities (Report 50-348,364/93-25). l During the week of October 18, Region II Operator Licensing and !

contractor personnel, conducted initial senior reactor operator and reactor operator license examinations (Report 50-348,364/

93-301).

3. Operational Safety Verification (71707) Tours and Tag-Outs The inspectors conducted routine tours to verify license requirements were being met. Tours included review of '

documentation, interviews with plant personnel and an on-going evaluation of licensee self-assessment. Tour areas included:

Unit 2 containment; Unit 1 and 2 auxiliary buildings, Unit 2 battery rooms, Unit 2 main steam valve room, Unit 2 RHR rooms, Unit I auxiliary feed pump rooms; and the diesel generator (D/G)

buildin During the tours inspectors examined the following equipment tag-outs and the controls and conditions surrounding them:

m 2-93-2353-2 Unit 2 -'"2A" battery charger (replacement of the "2A" safety-related battery with new cells) ,

,

a 2-93-2340-2 "Q2P16V007A" "2A" heat exchanger CCW SW outlet ,

isolation

,

a 2-93-2029-2 "2B" D/G (electrical and support equipment)

a 2-93-2102-2 "2C" D/G (electrical and support equipment)

During the above tours no deficiencies were identified. The tag-outs / clearances were implemented appropriatel . . - - . - _ . - _ . .

,

!

.

,

3 b. Outage Activities (60710)  !

L 1) On September 30, inspectors observed the Unit 2 reactor  :

vessel head lift. The lift was performed in accordance with i the maintenance refueling procedure, FNP-2-MP-1.0. Actual -

,

lift weight met a predicted weight of 124,000 pounds. FNP ALARA activities and other health physics support activities  !

were good. The polar crane and support equipment operated properl ?

2) Fuel movement began October 1 and was completed October The inspectors observed licensea's defueling of the reactor vessel and transfer of fuel to the SFP. These activities '

were conducted in a deliberate and methodical manner. No reportable fuel mishandling events occurred; however, some i fuel assembly damage was identified by the licensee. This is  !

discussed belo i Vendor personnel, directly involved in fuel movement, ,

appeared to be knowledgeable and demonstrated adequate  :

control over the evolution. The inspectors also observed  ;

that an FNP SR0 was in containment directly monitoring all

, off-loading activitie j 3) During the weekend of October 2, the cycle 9 core was i unloaded and all fuel assemblies were placed in the SFP. A  !

visual fuel inspection was performed by the licensee in accordance with FNP-0-ETP-3636. Two of the assemblies, .

,

"Y39" and "2L35", had dark spots located at the left end of -

the uppermost fuel support grid (grid number 8) on assembly face .

!

'

The fuel venaar using high resolution underwater TV equipment in the SFP, performed a detailed examination of o the indications. This examination revealed a tear on the q left end of the uppermost grid on face 2 of both assemblie .

,

The grid, at this outside point of the fuel assemblies, is '

made of a thin sheet of. zircaloy. Although fuel rods at the

-

corners of both assemblies were exposed by the grid damage, no fuel rod damage was detected. FNP's inspection efforts consisted of determining the cause of the grid damage to l

"2L35" and "Y39", and the effort also was made to determine-if any other assemblies were damaged. This required-examination of adjacent fuel assemblies. During this- 1 expanded examination, the licensee identified a third  !

damaged fuel assembly, "2L47". "2L47" had a deep scratch / gouge on fuel rod "1A", the rod located at. the  !

corner of assembly faces 1 and 4. The elevation of rod damage was between the seventh and eighth grid ,

_p- _ y. .- .- -- _ ,. m - - - -

_ _ ._ __ .. . __ _

'

.

. t

,

!

4 i

,

Inspectors reviewed FNP's in-process examination activities l and follow-up documentation (FNP Incident Report 2-93-242).

'

Radio-chemistry analysis of the reactor coolant, conducted ,

during fuel cycle 9 operation, did not identify any unusual fission product leakage. This further supports the l

licensee's contention that grid damage did not breach the '

fuel cladding. This event did not require a report under 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.7 .

!

FNP had planned to reuse all three assemblies during cycle ;

10, (fuel is generally used for 3 cycles prior to being considered " depleted"), however, after consultation with_the )

fuel vendor, the licensee decided that the risk of fuel rod l failure did not justify reusing the assemblie "Y39" had l been in the core for two cycles while "2L35" and "2L47" had been in for one cycl The core loading pattern was redesigned u. < three other available assemblies. This redesigned core will have slightly less energy than the original cycle 10 fuel load design and, thus, the Unit 2 cycle 10 "end-of-life coast-down" is projected to increase from -3 days to -16 day The licensee was unable to determine root cause of the observed grid damage; however, studies of cycle 8 and 9 core loading and unloading sequences revealed that several opportunities existed for grid damage to occur. FNP and the vendor determined that the most probable opportunity 1 occurred during the Unit 2 cycle 9 fuel load, when an adjacent assembly was loaded next to "2L35", and when "Y39" was loaded into the core. There was also a remote possibility that damage occurred in the upender;.however, FNP personnel inspected the upender and found it to be in excellent condition with no sharp / protruding edges that could had snagged an assembly grid. The gouge in "2L47" may have been caused by loading of the adjacent assembly or could have been the result of fretting by debris from i "2L35". FNP's investigation was still in progress at the end of the inspection period.

,

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plans and concluded that they met regulatory requirements and their action were conservativ j 4) On October 22, the inspectors observed nonsafety-related lubrication piping passing through to the "2A" reactor coolant pump (RCP) anti-rotation device. Copper piping sweat joints were loose and, in one case, the " repaired" !

sweat joint was simply a coating of solder spread over the '

piping and threaded joint. The shift supervisor was immediately contacted.and told of this problem. FNP's  ;

investigation of this problem was still in progress at the J l

!

i

.

end of the inspection period. The inspectors are following resolution of this concern and will determine proper

'

resoltuion prior to restart of Unit Operational Evolutions (71707) t 1) The inspectors observed portions of the Unit 2 shutdow This included securing of the RCPs in accordance with FNP-2-SOP-1.1, Reactor Coolant System, paragraph 4.2. During pump shutdown no relief valves lifted and no unusual alarms came in. Operator actions were deliberate and purposeful and once the RCPs were secured, plant cooldown continued using FNP-2-UOP-2.2, "Cooldown of the Unit from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown", for guidanc l 2) On October 4, with the vessel defueled, the licensee lowered i RCS level to mid-loop in accordance with U0P-4.3, the unit

"Mid-loop Operations", procedure. Inspectors observed this evolution from the control room and pre-requisites for mid-loop were met prior to reducing RCS level. Good evolution control was demonstrate ) On October 5, FNP personnel erroneously secured "2A" CCW !

pump flow to the inservice SFP heat exchanger. The l condition existed for approximately three hours and SFP l temperature rose approximately 40' and peaked between 135

^

and 140*F. Cooling was re-established prior to any fuel damage. The event is discussed in detail in Inspection Report 50-348,364/93-2 No violations or deviations were identified in this area. Results of inspections in the operations area indicate that operations personnel cnnducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedure . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors reviewed various FNP preventative / corrective maintenance activities, to determine conformance with facility procedures, work requests and NRC regulatory requirement ;

a. Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed:

a MWR-252983 (PCN 92-2-8068); Unit 2 "2A" battery replacement '

Inspectors observed contractor installation of several new cells l for the "A" battery train and battery rack modifications. Workers wore appropriate safety clothing to handle the batteries and proper care was exhibited regarding importance of and the power contained in these freshly charged cells. Racks had to be modified to receive the smaller cells and to install new rack insulation. Work performed was satisfactory and in accordance with the MWR and work packag ;

I

.

m MWR-270598; "2A" RCP rotor removal Inspectors observed the RCP vendor's removal of the "2A" RCP rotor for refurbishment. The containment's polar crane was used to remove the rotor to a stand for decontamination. FNP personnel were able to lower surface contamination from approximately 90,000 dpm to around 25,000 dpm. The rotor was wrapped / packaged for shipment to the RCP vendor facility and was scheduled for return later in the outage. Rotor movement / removal activities were performed satisfactory and in accordance with the MWR, vendor technical manual and work packag m MWR-224741; "lA" charging pump motor inspection The inspectors observed that the end bells of the pump motor were partially removed for inspection of windings / associated internal (Inspection Report 50-348,364/93-21, Paragraph 3.b. discussed oil misting in the pump rooms). The motor windings exhibited some minor oil / dust buildup. The buildup did not clog cooling passages nor was it sufficient to impend heat transfer. A light, partial coating found on the coupled end of the motor was not wet but did have a slight sheen. Windings that were epoxy coated were not impregnated with the oil and exhibited no degradation from the oil / dust combination. FNP proceeded with internal cleaning after the resident inspector had noted the motor condition. Activities were performed satisfactory and in accordance with the MWR and the pump motor technical manua m MWR-274450; "10" charging pump motor inspection On October 20, FNP personnel inspected the "lC" charging pump and noted that internal condition was satisfactory. With the resident inspector present, motor windings and rotor were examined for oi Although there was slightly more oil present than seen in the "lA" pump motor, the amount was insufficient to create problems. The debris found in the motor would not reduce air flow nor jeopardize motor function. The charging pump motor inspections, coupled with the observation of the "lC" pump room cooler coils, satisfied the inspector that there was no negative impact due to the apparent oil mist; consequently, Unresolved Item (URI) 50-348/93-21-01,

" Oil Hist in the Charging Pump Room" is closed. FNP personnel are planning to develop a PCN for modifications that will reduce the present oil misting problem. Activities performed were satisfactory and in accordance with the MWR and the pump motor technical manua m MWR-253038; "2A" AFW room cooler coil replacement (Part of PCN B90-2-6987; SW piping replacement)

The modification was a straight-forward replacement, "in kind", of the "2A" AFW room cooler coil. SW carbon steel piping to the coils was replaced with stainless steel piping. The coil was

'

I

,

located in an overhead (concrete mezzanine) area and was mounted using steel bolting and bracketing assemM ies. Hand rails were removed without damage and during both removal and replacement, i the coils were rigged / handled without damage to other component '

Replaced coil piping had silt / mud / Wil mixtures adhering to the ,

piping walls. Piping was partially occluded with the mud / rust depending on diameter and flow characteristics / velocity. Smaller instrument piping, which exhibited higher stagnation, was more occluded while the larger piping with higher flows was less. The system was operable up to the time of tag-out. FNP was actively i pursuing more information about this phenomena and the inspectors will continue to monitor SW performance characteristics. Vendors involved satisfactorily performed the modification and activities performed were satisfactory and in accordance with the MWR and work packag m MWR-253037; "2A" CCW room cooler replacement (Part of PCN B90-2-6987; SW piping replacement)

Inspectors observed portions of this cooler replacement. The space ,

was normally cooled by two overhead coolers fed by the two trains )

of SW and the coolers were mounted to ceiling stanchions from the i ceiling of the room. The "2A" cooler was mounted over the "2A" CCW heat exchanger at the east end of the room. This is away from the rigging shaft used to get new coils into the space. To reach the installed position, the "2A" coil had to be rigged across SW :

piping and in between the "2A" and "2B" CCW heat exchanger In preparation for the lift / transport by chainfalls, FNP generated a rigging assessment (#93-0306) and an evaluation in accordance with procedure FNP-0-GMP-6.4, " General Guidelines and Precautions for Rigging". Due to the conservative constraints of the ,

assessment, the 4,100 pound "2A" coil was allowed to be moved over l active SW piping which was carrying the SFP heat load. The other i CCW heat exchangers were 00S for maintenanc Instructions i involved with the cooler transport met the requirements of available NRC guidanc NUREG-612 guidance discusses fuel movement and lifts over spent fuel, and discusses general lift requirements. Section 5.1.4 of the NUREG allows lifts over safe shutdown equipmen l The lifting evolution was discussed with operations prior to the i actual lift. According to FNP personnel, a dummy load was used )

the previous summer to test the load pathway and an associated ,

lift evaluation required at least two chain falls on the load l during the transport. The inspector observed at least three chain 1 falls on the load as the cooler coil was moved and the vendor I performed the lift in a very controlled manner. The evolution required use of specific ceiling lift. points and, in the opinion of the inspector, the load was subject to very little risk from direct damage and any damage to surrounding SW piping. A non- l

!

_ _ . . . - _ _ . . _ _ _ .

,

'

i

8 licensed operator was in the space for other duties but was available for response, if necessary. The inspector deemed the preparations adequate and activities were satisfactorily performed !

in accordance with the MWR and work packag ,

!

= MWR-253078; Containment penetration 32 and 60 SW piping ;

replacement (Part of PCN B87-2-4106; SW piping replacement) ;

The licensee replaced the 6-inch SW piping for the RCP Inspectors observed portio ns of the piping installation / testing; specifically, centainment penetrations 32 and 60. Observed work was well-controlled and area ventilation / lighting was adequat Workers were dressed appropriately and adequate radiological preparations were take Upon completion of welding, testing of penetration 60 was l performed and observed by the inspector. Test personnel were l knowledgeable and professional in their conduct and all associated l test equipment was calibrated and in good working order. A satisfactory test was performed in accordance with FNP-2-STP-627,

" Local Leax Rate Testing of Containment Penetrations", Attachment D. The penetration, with the special test device attached, held 50 psig for approximately 20 minutes with zero leakage. Activities were satisfactorily performed in accordance with the MWR and work packag Use of scaffolding and scaffolding concerns During the outage, the licensee deployed a large number of scaffolds to support the performance of ongoing work activitie j i

General Maintenance Procedure FNP-0-GMP-60, " General Guidelines l And Precautions For Erecting Scaffolding," establishes specific l safety requirements and maintenance instructions for controlling !

erection and use of scaffolds. The inspectors examined 20 scaffold installations in the vicinity of safety-related equipment, and discovered that permits for six scaffolds were incomplete. In each case, the responsible job foreman / supervisor l'

'

had failed to sign the applicable scaffolding permit which -l approved the scaffold for use. All six scaffolds were in use at '

the time of this inspection. GMP-60 specifically requires job foremen / supervisor approval of scaffolds, in vicinity-of safety- 1 related equipment, prior to use. FNP management was notified of ;

this deficiency and was investigating the problem at the end of !'

! the reporting period. The inspectors had previously identified a similar problem with scaffolds erected near safety-related equipment in Inspection Report 50-348,364/92-20. This issue is considered an Unresolved Item (URI) 50-364/93-22-01 " Incomplete i Scaffold Permits", pending licensee review and corrective action i

__. .

9 l

5. Fonthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

Inspectors witnessed surveillance test activities performed on safety-related systems and components, in order to verify that such activities I were performed in accordance with facility procedures and NRC regulatory requirement The following surveillance activities were observed:

a FNP-0-STP-80.2, Diesel Generator "lC" Operating Test The "lC" D/G test was satisfactor Licensed /non-licensed operators performed the test as written and the resident ,

inspectors reviewed the run log of the test for negative trend '

While the D/G was in operation, the non-licensed operator and resident inspector noted a small lube oil leak on the D/G, above the fuel rack distributor and lagged portion of the exhaust system prior to entry in to the turbocharge The leak (approximately 1 drop every 2 minutes) was not abnormal for this type of componen The operator wrote an MWR for an upcoming outage. The inspector observed satisfactory SW valve manipulation for the "lC" D/G.

,

a FNP-1-STP-80.16, Degraded Grid Voltage and Loss of Voltage Protection Relays Operability Test (D/G Loading Sequencer BlF and Auxiliary Panel Sequencer Bus IF)  ;

Operators were very methodical in their accomplishment of critical tasks and the procedure was thorough in checks and cross check The test was performed adequately and test results were satisfactor m FNP-1-STP-33.2B, Reactor Trip Breaker Train "B" Operability Test l The test was satisfactorily accomplished with minimal ris The inspector accompanied the lead licensed operator during test performance. 1&C support was very gotd and the procedure for the test was well-written. The test was executed in an excellent manner, the operators conducted their independent verification functions professionally and a good turnover of activities was performed. Attention to detail was very goo m FNP-2-STP-905.1; Auxiliary Building "2B" Ba' ary Load Profile Test After the installation of the new "2B" battery bank, as discussed in paragraph 4.a., a battery load profile test was satisfactorily performed. Test equipment performed adequately with one small failure in a load bank breaker. Compensation for the load bank breaker was executed and the testing was completed. The new cells behaved as expected with good voltage retention. The on-hand battery specialist provided excellent coverage throughout the test.

t

'

. >

'

have reduced air flow nor jeopardized motor functio Modifications are being planned that will reduce the oil misting problem. This item is close e (Closed) Unit I and 2, Tl 2515/115, Verification of plant record ,

As part of a recent NRC effort to determine the quality of both drawings and records at region facilities, the inspectors determined that both drawings and records, used at FNP, are adequate for plant operatio This item is close . Exit Interview Inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period and on October 25, with the General Manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee was informed that items contained in paragraph 8 were close ITEM NUMBER DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE 50-364/93-22-01 (URI) Incomplete scaffold permits 1 Acronyms and Abbreviations AFW -

Auxiliary Feedwater AP -

Administrative Procedure CCW -

Component Cooling Water CR -

Control Room D/G -

Emergency Diesel Generator DRP -

Division of Reactor Projects DRS -

Division of Reactor Safety DRSS - Division of Reactor Safeguards and Security  ;

ESF -

Engineered Safety Features FHP -

Fuel Handling Procedure FNP -

Farley Nuclear Plant FP -

Fire Protection GMP -

General Maintenance Procedure

'

HP -

Health Physics ISI -

In-service Inspection I&C -

Instrumentation and Controls LC0 -

Limiting Condition for Operation MOV -

Motor-Operated Valve MWR -

Maintenance Work Request NDE -

Non-Destructive Examination 00S -

Out Of Service PCN -

Plant Change Notice RCS -

Reactor Coolant System RHR -

Residual Heat Removal SFI -

Shift Foreman Inspecting

._. .-

.

12 .i SFO -

Shift Foreman Operating '

SFP -

Spent Fuel Pool l S/G -

Steam Generator SNC -

Southern Nuclear Operating Company !

S0 -

Systems Operator _

SS -

Shift Supervisor  !

SNC -

Southern Nuclear Operating Company l STAR - "Stop", "Think", "Act", " Review" !

STP -

Surveillance Test Procedure *

SW -

Service Water System UDP -

Unit Operating Procedure .

URI -

Unresolved Issue

l t

i T

?