IR 05000348/1993021

Insp Repts 50-348/93-21 & 50-364/93-21 on 930830-0925.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint, Surveillance,Industry Technical Issues,Event Repts,Unit 2 Refueling Activities & Licensee self-assessment

ML20059E159
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	10/21/1993
From:	Cantrell F, Morgan M, Michael Scott NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20059E154	List: IR 05000348/1993021 ML20059E151
References
50-348-93-21, 50-364-93-21, NUDOCS 9311030114
Download: ML20059E159 (14)

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UNITED STATES

.f?p arah NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~

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-4 REGloN 11

$ E 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 W tj ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

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Report Nos.: 50-348/93-21 and 50-364/93-21 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, In P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility name: Farley I and 2 Inspection Conducted: August 30 - September 25, 1993 Inspectors: k T,ld dM to /d /93 ~

Michael J. Morgan, Actijig Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed V A? 13. %)b win hs Date Signed-MichaelA.gcott,ResidentInspector-Approved by:

F16yd M -

S.' Cantrell, Chief 2, /0 / _3 Date Signed Reactor Projects Section IB

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Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:

This routine inspection involved on-site inspection of operations, maintenance, surveillance, industry technical issues, event reports, Unit 2 refueling activities and a continuing review of licensee self-assessmen Deep backshifts were performed September 9 and 16, 199 Results:

The inspectors conducted routine tours to verify license requirements are being met, paragraph 3.a. While observing charging pump venting, inspectors observed oil in a drape under the room cooler, paragraph 3.b. On September 8-9, the #1 RCP seal leak-off increased, paragraph 3.d. On September 23, the licensee discovered that control room air conditioning "A" train suction and discharge dampers had not been closed, paragraph 3.e. On September 9, the "lD" service water pump exhibited higher than normal-vibration readings, paragraph 4.a. Technical issues were' addressed, including recent issues involving boroflex, paragraph 6. On September 24, Unit 2 reduced power and shutdown.to begin it's ninth scheduled refueling outage, paragraph 7. Prior to Unit 2 entering into a refueling outage, the_ inspectors evaluated plant status concerning directives on mid-loop operation, paragraph .

9311030114 931021 PDR O ADOCK 05000348 PDR

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. No violations or deviations were identified, however, two unresolved items .

were opened (paragraph 3.b and 3.e). Results of this inspection indicate that:

actions by management, operations, maintenance and other site personnel wer I adequate.

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted-l Licensee Employees

• Bayne, Supervisor Safety Audit and Engineering Review 1

• B. Bell, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent I j

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• C. Buck, Technical Manager R. Coleman, Modification Manager ~'

P. Crone, Operations L. Enfinger, Administrative Manager

• H. Garland, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent i l *R. Hill, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant  !

M. Mitchell, Superintendent, Health Physics and Radwaste  !

• C, Nesbitt, Operations Manager '

• J. Osterholtz, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support

• L. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations i J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager

• Attended the exit interview ]

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Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations I personnel, security, maintenance, I&C and office personne !

Acronyms and initializations used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap . Plant Status l Units 1 and 2 Status

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l Units 1 & 2 operated .at full power for most of the reporting period. On September 7, Unit 2 reduced powerito about 95 percent

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when the "2A" RCP first stage seal leakoff was noted to have i increased to " higher-than-normal" levels. On September 9, leakoff !

returned to within pre-elevation levels. Unit 2 was shutdown at I 11:15 p.m., September 24, for refueling outage "U2-RF9". NRC/ Licensee Meetings and Inspections During the week of August 30, Region II personnel from the Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), continued an operational performance inspection of the service water system (SWS) (Report 50-348,364/93-13).

On September 1, A. F. Gibson, Director of Reactor Safety, Region II was on site to review service water team inspection findings and to tour the site.

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On September 7, G. C. Lainas, Assistant Director for Region II Reactors, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR); S. S. Bajwa, Acting Director, Prc'ect Directorate 11-1, NRR; and T. A. Reed, Project Manager, Project Directorate II-1, NRR; visited the plan site as part of their preparation for the upcoming SALP boar On September 21, F. S. Ashe, NRR and two Brookhaven National Laboratory contractors came to the site to review various aspects of the FNP's electrical system and the current FNP probability risk assessment that deals with the syste Surveys /special inspection activities requested by the Region II office were performed during the inspection period and a review of licensee actions regarding NRC event number 26045 (Westinghouse Nuclear Service Advisory Letter 93-12) and spent fuel pool (SFP)

Boroflex survey performance are discussed in paragraph 6 of this repor . Operational Safety Verification (71707) Plant Tours The inspectors conducted routine tours to verify license requirements are being met. Tours included review of FNP documentation, interviews with personnel and on-going evaluations of licensee self-assessment. Major areas toured during the-assessment period included; 1) the "1B" D/G room and support-areas, 2) the Unit 2 SFP area, 3) the "1D" SWS pump area, 4) the Unit I charging pump rooms. During the tours, the following items were observed:

= Conduit clamps on heat trace cable "NHP-765", on the west side of the D/G building were noted to be missing. This is important to safety, but not safety-related. An MWR was written by the license = Grease was visible on motor exterior to MOV "Q2P16V519", SWS supply valve. The valve was in it's normally open position and posed no problems. An MWR was written by the license Unit 2 electrical penetration door "2334" closed but not

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locked. Once informed of the condition, operations immediately secured the door. The door, while not designated as a security door, should have been administratively controlled / locke = On the Unit 2 TDAFW pump skid the Woodward governor oil relief valve was weeping. This condition posed no significant problems. Also, a nipple entering the drive

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piston for steam emission valve drive piston was bent at an

~20 degree angl It was wet but showed no leakage. An MWR-was also written to correct both discrepancie = Several safety-related valves, i.e., the BIT inlet and CCW -

surge tank makeup, had lift eye bolts mounted in their MOV actuator thrust covers, (See NRC IN 93-37). FNP had earlier '

identified H0Vs for eyebolt replacement and they plan to walkdown Unit 2 containment, during the outage, in order to identify "other" MOV eyebolt problems. MWRs were being written as require .

= "2B" motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump room floor drain closed. The drain was plugged for train separation and the room had standing water in a depressed surface around the drai The drain was originally common piped with the "2A" MDAFW pump room drain, but during initial plant activities, it was plugged for train separation. The room door was sealed to .

preclude flooding into the room from other areas. The pump ;

room was very hot and muggy. A mop and bucket was in the area for use at the time of the tours on September 1 and 1 FNP is evaluating routing of the room drain through the "2B" pump room wall into an adjacent TDAFW pump room sump. This would reduce the buildup of water in the sealed room but would not alleviate potential system leakage buildup that might occur during pumping operatio The inspectors were concerned with the high m e turei high humidity conditions in the in the pump rooms and the impact to electrical equipment and, specifically, the pump nMor A/E drawings D-177186, Elementary Diagram - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 4160 V No.1, and D-181623, Connection Diagram

- 208/120V Space Heater Distribution. Panel, indicated motor heater wiring that could limit motor moisture intrusio ,

When investigated, there were no PMs that checked either .

heater or setpoint function. FNP is evaluating the need for !

routine surveillance testin ,

= During static venting of the Unit 1 RHR piping to the ,

charging pumps,.the inspector noted that boric acid had buildup on two portions of two cable trays "AHF-A15" and

"AED-Al2" under valve "Q1E21V464" in the charging pump hallway. The boric acid was dry, not heavily deposited on 4 the aluminum trays and it was loosely packed within the ,

electrical cables. There was no immediate operability concerns and no visible cable nor tray damage. FNP was ,

evaluating the condition and the need to clean the cabling at the end of the inspection perio :

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The problems noted above were not operationally limiting in nature. Licensee response was good and timely for the conditions l found, l b. Oil Hist in the "1C" Charging Pump Room - Unit 1 l While observing static pump venting, the inspector noted that a ,

drape had been installed under the room cooler for the space. The -'

drain from the drape had oil deposits and the ~ drape drain poly bottle also contained oil. This indicated that the oil had been spread around the room in an airborne fashion. The source of th oil appeared to be from the air vent oil breathers on the charging pump auxiliary oil pump and/or the charging pump speed change There was no immediate visual reason to believe that either the pump or support equipment was not operabl Upon questioning FNP about the oil mist, the inspector was told that there had been some work performed by engineering on the problem. The inspectors presented questions to licensee regarding impact of oil mist on heat transfer capability of the room cooler and motor operability. Since impact questions regarding the oil ,

mist on the pump skid, pump and motor were presented to the licensee at the end of the inspection period, and because the

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inspector was awaiting receipt of responses to the concern, this item is listed as an unresolved item (URI) 50-348/93-21-01, Oil Hist in Charging Pump Roo ,

c. Clearances and Equipment Tag Outs

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The inspectors reviewed the following clearances, portions of clearances, equipment tag-outs and caution tags during performance '

of inspection activities:

= 1-93-2206-0; Closed vacuum breaker isolation valve

"Q1P16V593"

= 1-93-1709; "1B" D/G Day Tank Fan "B" Off

= 2-93-1948-2; Radiation monitor "N2011RE11/12" door held open due to heat. Caution tag noted that radiation monitor performance could be affected when door was close d. Excessive "2A" Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) #1 Seal Leak-off -

Unit 2 On September 8, at 11:40 p.m., a control board operator noted that the #1 RCP seal leak-off had increased from 3.o gpm to about ,

gpm in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. Thc shift supervisor (SS) was told of l the problem and on September 9, at 1:35 a.m., the high #1 seal leak-off (~5.0 gpm) annunciator alarmed. At 1:38 a.m., a unit ramp-down was ordered by the SS and plant power was reduced from '

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99 to 95 percent power. The unit ramp-down was stopped at 2:00-a.m. and the seal leak-off flow increased to about 5.3 gpm and then stabilize A conference call was established between the vice president of nuclear operations and the plant operations manager. A decision was made at that time to begin an orderly shutdown of the unit should the leak-off increase to 5.8 gpm and, if the leak-off increased to 6.0 gpm, to trip the unit, secure the RCP and isolate the leak-off. RCP vendor representatives were contacted and the licensee received further, updated vendor bulletin information and guidance on operational items which could be considered for the higher than normal seal leakage. Night order entries were written to alert personnel of the problem and proposed guidance t mitigate sam As decided upon, by the RCP vendors and FNP management, I&C personnel installed instrumentation for detection of any-leak-off flows greater than 6 gpm. A management decision was made to maintain power at 95 percent until the scheduled Unit 2 refueling outage. On September 9th, at about 9:30 p.m., the "2A" RCP #1 seal leak-off flow decreased to 4.5 gpm and operation continued at about 95 percent powe e. Adverse Effect on Control Room (CR) Technical Specification (TS)

Pressurization Capability - Unit 2 On September 23 after having the "A" train CR air conditioner out for repairs, the licensee discovered that the "A" train suction and discharge dampers had not been closed resulting in control i room space pressurizing boundary being compromised. The work i resulted in the A/C compartment being open to the work space above ,

the control room. That area was enclosed but not sealed from l outside atmosphere. The open compartment provided a ventilation j path between the CR and atmospheric pressure. TS 4.7.7.e.3- 1 requires that, in an emergency, at least 1/8" of water pressurization be obtainable. Upon discovery by the licensee, the associated dampers "1-175-110-10" and "1-175-110-15" were closed on the "A" A/C system to seal the control room. The condition had ,

existed for approximately 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. At the end of the reporting period, the licensee planned to submit a Licensee Event Report (LER). While testing to understand the limitations of the condition, FNP found that they could not obtain a positive pressure. The operations staff attempted to determine the maximum control room pressurization that could be achieved while in this-errant alignment. With about a 2 foot square opening, created by a CR door being held open slightly and the "A" A/C compartment cover back in place, the positive pressure fell to less than the nominal required TS required limit. Upon test completion, the control room door was returned to it's original positio Elements of the licensee's STAR self-assessment program ;

contributed to the detection of the initial proble j

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l required pressurization during any emergency. condition and stated l

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an LER would be issued. The inspectors will review the LER,.This ;

item is identified as URI 50-364/93-21-02, Adverse effect on- I control room technical specification pressurization capabilit No other discrepancies were identified in this area. Results of inspections in the operations area indicate that operations personnel l

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generally conducted assigned activities in accordance with^ applicable procedure . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703) ,

The inspectors reviewed various FNP preventative / corrective maintenance activities, to determine conformance with facility procedures, wnrk requests and NRC regulatory requirement The following maintenance activities were observed:

! MWR-215365, Changeout of the "lD" SWS pump On September 9, the existing "1D" pump exhibited higher than 1 normal vibrations, (3.0 mils alert range) during surveillance testing. A motor that had been removed from the "1C" location for higher than normal bearing temperatures, was reinstalled in the

"1D" SWS location. The "lC" motor was the only motor available and was thought to be a viable motor because the maximum motor temperature rise experienced was less than the limits provided by the pump vendo ,

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readings in accordance with MP-84.0, Vibration Measurements for Safety-Related Pumps. On the first attempt, the discharge vacuum breaker valve, "QlP16V633", failed to close completely and about 40 gpm exited the valve's open end. Because operations was not o hand for the pump start, maintenance personnel contacted the CR for pump shutdown. No SWS equipment was damaged by the spray and data collection was aborted. With the vacuum breaker valve isolated, the "lD" pump was restarted and data collecte Operations tagged the defective valve and stood by to observe the tes The maintenance and engineering support group (HESG) was also present for this ru Vibration was still higher than l normal, (2.93 mils); however, the motor was left in place with the '

pump secure as a contingency. This was acceptable under the T Repair of the spare motor being overhauled at the vendor's i facility was expedited. On September 15, FNP attempted a :

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mechanical adjustment on the installed "lD" pump to pipe bellow Based on the higher that normal vibration seen at the pump, the ,

licensee determined that the vibration may have been a product of l loose fasteners (licensee incident report 93-182).

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7 The licensee tighten the bellows to a working torque of 300 in lbs. and retested the motor. The resultant vibration data was normal, (i.e., out of the alert range) and after a period of observation, the pump / motor combination was returned to service September 17. Work performed was satisfactory and in accordance with guidance contained in the MWR and the pump technical manua MWR-275375, Cover work request for "N-44" quarterly surveillance The inspectors observed that under this MWR, a Unit 1 "N-44",

nuclear instrumentation channel subcomponent was replaced (see paragraph 5.c of this report). The component failure did not cause channel trip functions to become inoperable and all work performed appeared to be satisfactory and in accordance with the MWR. A surveillance was performed following the repair, (see paragraph 5.b. of this report).

No violations or deviations were identified in this area. One URI was identified involving oil mist in the charging pump room (paragraph 3.b.)

Except as indicated, the results of inspections in the maintenance area ;

indicate that both operations and maintenance personnel conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedure l l

5. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

Inspectors witnessed surveillance test activities performed on safety-related systems and components in order to verify that such activities j were performed in accordance with facility procedures and regulatory j requirement !

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The following surveillance activities were observed: STP-80.1; Diesel Generator 18 Operability Test The inspectors reviewed the completed-test results for this STP and found that the test was conducted as prescribed and indicated in the procedure and that the D/G was operable. The inspector toured the D/G area after the test and the space was in order and no other concerns were apparen STP-228.8; Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range Channel i N44 Calibration and Functional Test - Quarterly The inspector observed the quarterly calibration and testing of the power range channel N44. The complex calibration / test was l performed smoothly with good coordination between I&C and operations personnel and with minimal impact to normal plant activitie The instrument was return to service and caused no unit perturbation .- _ .,.

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8 i FNP-0-ETP-3610; Monthly Surveillance Flux Maps (Unit 1, Hap #305)

The inspector observed the performance of the flux mapping and !

data reduction efforts. I&C supported map chart preparation for the reactor engineering group. The mapping was. performed without '

problem or unwarranted control room disturbances. Data reduction .i was slowed by computer link problems with a vendor in Atlant l The site groups were aggressive in supporting reactor engineering- 4 in returning the data link and data reduction was completed in a timely manner. During the Unit 2 outage, a PCN installation will allow on-site mapping data reduction, (i.e.; data link problems are to be eliminated). FNP-1-SOP-7.0; Residual Heat Removal System - Appendix 1 and Appendix 2: RHR.to Charging Pume "A" Train Suction Venting, and, *

RHR to Charging Pump "B" Train Suction Venting, respectively ,

I The inspector observed the venting of all procedure listed vents -l for the RHR and charging pumps. The process allowed for ;

observation of hydrogen gas buildup in certain section'of piping; i however, no gas was vented from the piping during the evolutio l Health physics support was excellent. The operators involved, '

positively identified valves prior to manipulation. The valves were properly returned to normal line-up after the venting and the operators kept the control room informed of their activitie No violations or deviations were identified in this area. The results j of inspections in the surveillance area indicate that personnel l conducted assigned activities in accordance with applicable procedure l 6. Industry Technical Issues - Resident-Inspector Inquires and FNP Response j Issue: NRC Event Number 26045 [Re-transmission of Westinghouse l Nuclear Service Advisory Letter (NSAL) 93-12]

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The NSAL described conditions where charging pumps could be !

susceptible to pump runout during hot and cold leg simultaneous

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injection during a large break LOC FNP Response: The licensee was not susceptible to the specific concerns of the letter. The licensee's applicable procedures, FNP-1-ESP-1.4, Transfer to Hot leg Recirculation, and, FNP-1-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation did not allow simultaneous use of both charging pump flow paths during a large break LOCA. The inspectors reviewed the procedures and discussed operational details with licensee and did not have any problems with their conclusion Issue: Recently, several licensees have experienced extensive degradation of boroflex material in their SFPs (See NRC IN 87-43).

This problem continues (See EPRI TR 101986, February 1993) and a

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9 I regional survey addressed this licensee's SFP boroflex status, i FNP Response: The licensee reported that they did not have the boroflex degradation problem experienced by some of industry. The i

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inspectors reviewed the FNP's information, design drawings, and chemistry sample results and concurred with the licensee's conclusion . Scheduled Refueling Outage "U2-RF9" - Unit 2 (60710) l l

On September 24, at about 11:15 p.m., the plant reduced power and shutdown to begin it's ninth scheduled refueling outage. On September 25, at about 8:00 a.m., the inspectors assessed the condition of valves / components in containment and observed no abnormal / adverse conditions. The containment did not show signs of significant RCS leakage or NSSS equipment problems. There were no signs of boron deposits on either the reactor vessel head or vessel head bolt The following major activities are scheduled to be conducted during the outage

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"2C" S/G "J" Nozzle Inspection =

S/G Pressure Pulse Cleaning

= S/G Eddy Current Testing = S/G Sleeve Welding l

= S/G Direct Tube Repair & Tube Pull = S/G Plug Removal

= S/G Support Plate Inspection = RHR Suction Valve !

Inspections !

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"A" RCP Refurbishment

"A"/"B" RCP Seal )

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= "B"/"C" RCP Motor Inspections = MOV Actuator ,

Refurbishments !

= MOV Functional Tests = MOV " Delta P" Testing

= "A"/"B" PZR Safety Removal / Testing = Main HP Turbine Inspection

= Main Generator / Exciter Inspection = "A" MFP & Turbine Inspection

= "C" Condensate Pump / Motor Inspection = "2B" D/G Inspection i

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= PORV Internal Inspections = "A" CW Pump Motor Changeout

= "2B" RHR Pump Gasket Replacement = DC Buss Cleaning / Battery i Replacement l This outage is scheduled to last for 54 day ;

8. Loss of Decay Heat Removal AND Mid-Loop Operations (60705 and TI I 2515/103) l Prior to Unit 2 entering into the present outage, the inspectors !

, evaluated the plant's status concerning the NRC's directive on mid-loop l l operation, TI 2515/103, and pre-refueling activitie The inspectors observed portions of the following activities:

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= Content of procedures for new fuel handling, transfer of new fuel to the SFP and SFP " grid map" verificatio = Controls for transfer of new fuel and other pre-refueling i

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activitie = Controls for definition of lines of supervision, shift manning, training, communication requirements, and radiation monitorin The following refueling related procedures were reviewed:

= 1-50P-1.ll, "Mid-Loop Operations" j

= l-SOP-14.1, " Containment Closure"  ;

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= 0-00P-4.1, Appendix 1, " Shutdown Safety Assessment" (This ;

procedure was used in past outages and listed as FNP-0-SOP-100.0) )

= 1-MP-1.0, " Maintenance Refueling Procedure" The inspectors observed that various FNP personnel have:

= Conducted reviews of their mid-loop procedures and applicable emergency operating procedures.

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= Received training on various mid-loop items and procedures during the last requalification cycl = Verified that at least two independent, continuous temperature indications will be operable during mid-loop operation Made provision for "other" level indications with the use of the reactor vessel level indication system (RVLIS) and the installed ultrasonic level indicators.

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l The inspectors reviewed FNP's procedures for reduced inventory i l operations and noted that they contain specific precautions against j l evolutions which could cause perturbations in the RCS while at reduced inventory. While at mid-loop, work which may cause perturbations-is to be stoppe The plant is scheduled to be in a "defueled" condition during l

, installation of the S/G nozzle dams and, although " fueled" at the time l of nozzle dam removal, the time spent at mid-loop _is to be minimized.

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During mid-loop operations, at least two means of adding inventory to the RCS will be available. In addition to the RHR pumps, one of three ,

i charging /HP injection pumps will be available and can be aligned to ;

I borate the RCS. If problems should develop with these pumps, gravity feed from the RWST to the RCS will be possible. Five (5) offsite sources of power and 5 D/G's should be available and emphasis has been placed on the availability of vital powe l UDP-4.1, Appendix 1, Shutdown Safety Assessment, will be used to ,

evaluate, on a shift basis, the plant condition when in Modes 5, 6,. or l

"defueled". In addition to monitoring power availability, S0P-100, notes reactivity, core cooling, containment integrity, and RCS inventory and integrity conditions throughout the refueling perio The inspectors found that the licensee has the necessary controls in :

place and inspection indicates that management, operations and maintenance personnel have prepared for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in accordance with applicable procedure . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during'managemect interviews throughout the report period and on September 29, with the plant manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio ITEM NUMBER DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE-50-348/93-21-01 (URI) 011 mist in charging pump room 50-364/93-21-02 (URI) Adverse effect on control room technical specification pressurization capability 10. Acronyms and Abbreviations A/C -

Air Conditioning AFW -

Auxiliary Feedwater AP -

Administrative Procedure CCW -

Component Cooling Water

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Control Room CST -

Condensate Storage Tank CW -

Circulating Water D Direct Current D/G -

Emergency Diesel Generator DRP -

Division of Reactor Projects DRS -

Division of Reactor Safety EPRI -

Electric Power Research Institute l ESF -

Engineered Safety Features FHP -

Fuel Handling Procedure HP -

High Pressure I&C -

Instrumentation and Controls KV -

Kilovolts LC0 -

Limiting Condition for Operation LER -

Licensee Event Report LOCA -

Loss of Coolant Accident MDAFW - Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater MFP -

Main Feedwater Pump .

MOV -

Motor-0perated Valve MWR -

Maintenance Work Request i NSAL -

Nuclear Service Advisory Letter NCV -

Non-cited Violation NOV -

Notice of Violation NRR -

Nuclear Reactor Regulation PM -

Preventative Maintenance ^

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PCN -

Plant Change Notice PORC -

Plant Operations Review Committee :

PORV -

Power Operated Relief Valve i PZR -

Pressurizer i RCP -

Reactor Coolant Pump  !

RHR -

Residual Heat Removal RPM -

Revolutions Per Minute ,

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Radiography Test ,

RVLIS - Reactor Vessel Level Indication System -!

SF0 -

Shift Foreman Operating I SFP -

Spent Fuel Pool S/G -

Steam Generator SNC -

Southern Nuclear Operating Company I S0 -

Systems Operator S0P -

Systems Operating Procedure SS -

Shift Supervisor STAR -

"Stop", "Think", "Act", " Review" STP -

Surveillance Test Procedure SWS -

Service Water System TDAFW - Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater TR -

Technical Report TS -

Technical Specificction UDP -

Unit Operating Procedure URI -

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