IR 05000348/1996011
| ML20134J386 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 10/11/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134J375 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-96-11, 50-364-96-11, NUDOCS 9611150190 | |
| Download: ML20134J386 (7) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
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Docket Nos:
50-348, 50-364 i
License Nos:
50-348/96-11. 50-364/96-11 Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Facility:
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Location:
600 North 18th Street Birmingham. AL 35291-0400 I
i Dates:
October 7 - October 11, 1996 l
Inspectors:
L. Stratton. Safeguards Inspector j
Approved by:
Paul E. Fredrickson, Chief Special Inspection Branch
Division of Reactor Projects l
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9611150190 961101 ADOK:K 050Cygg8 DR j
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-348/96-11. 50-364/96-11 This routine announced inspection was conducted in the area of plant su] port by a regional safeguards specialist.
The specific area evaluated was t1e
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Physical Security Program for Power Reactors.
I Long term temporary compensatory measures implemented at the Service e
Water Intake Structure (SWIS) are still ongoing.
However, the licensee plans to incorporate these measures into their NRC approved physical security plan (PSP) as part of their protection strategy of the SWIS.
(S1.1)
Alarm stations were properly operating and alarm station operators were i
e knowledgeable in their duties.
Communication functions were acceptable and performing within the commitments specified in the licensee's PSP.
(S2.2)
Testing and maintenance of security related equipment was timely and well documented.
Protected area lighting was excellent.
(S2.4)
The licensee's firing range and training and qualification program were e
well managed and appropriate to carry out the commitments specified in their contingency and training and qualification (T&Q) plans.
(S5.1)
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REPORT DETAILS
1 S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
S1.1 Comoensatory Measures
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a.
Insoection Scooe (81700)
The inspector evaluated.the licensee's ongoing compensatory measures
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j implemented for the assessment of the protected area at the Service
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Water Intake Structure (SWIS).
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Observations and Findinas i
In a meeting on September 25. 1996, the licensee discussed with the
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-inspectors.a proposed permanent modification to protect the SWIS in i
accordance with 10 CFR 73.55.
However, after a walkdown and further i
discussion, the licensee was informed that crucial elements of 10 CFR
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73.55 were omitted. The inspectors informed the licensee that the modification appeared to be a decrease in effectiveness from their NRC
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approved Physical Security Plan (PSP) and would have to be submitted as a 10 CFR 50.90 change to their PSP.
c.
Conclusions U)on further discussion, the licensee determined that an acceptable s1 ort-term correction to the SWIS problem would be to implement the i
current compensatory measure into their PSP under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p).
Inspector Followup Item (IFI).94-016-01 will remain open pending the licensee's PSP change.
i S2 Status of Security Facility and Equipment S2.2 Alarm Stations and Communications
a.
Insoection Scooe (81700)
The licensee's established security alarm' stations and security communications were observed by the inspector to verify compliance with regulatory requirements and commitments contained in the licensee's NRC i
approved PSP.-
b.
Observations and Findinos Review of security operational activities in the Central Alarm Station
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(CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and monitoring of security communications during the course of the inspection confirmed that the alarm stations were equipped in accordance with commitments contained in the PSP, and were capable of communicating and effectively controlling the security force during routine and contingency operations. Alarm station operators were observed to be adequately trained and capable of effective utilization of access control. intrusion detection, monitoring
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and communications equipment available in the alarm stations.
It was
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noted by the inspector that the CAS and SAS were independent and diverse l
to the extent that no single act could remove the capability of the
' security force to call for assistance or otherwise respond to a threat.
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There were no operational activities obsbrved in the alarm stations that would interfere with the execution of. response to alarms or other-contingencies.
Intrusion detection equipment and alarms annunciated audibly and visually, as required.
The alarm stations were continually
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manned by capable and knowledgeable alarm station operators.
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Conclusions i
Based on demonstrated operability of alarm station access control, intrusion detection monitoring and communications equipment, functional capabilities of alarm station operators and available procedural guidance..the inspector concluded that the licensee's alarm stations
functions and. communications systems were effective and adequate to meet regulatory requirements and commitments of the licensee's PSP.
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l S2.4 Testina and Maintenance
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Insoection Scoce (81700)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's testing and maintenance program to verify compliance with the provisions specified in the licensee's PSP.
b.
Observations and Findinos The inspector verified, through document review, that the licensee implemented a testing and maintenance program that ensures that the physical protection related ecuipment and security related devices were properly installed, tested anc maintained properly. and were replaced in a timely manner when determined to be defective or marginally. effective.
On the evening of October 8. 1996, the inspector toured the protected'
area with a security officer equipped with a light meter, to determine if lighting was at least 0.2 footcandle, as required by the licensee's PSP. All areas observed were in compliance with regulatory requirements. Those few areas that were determined to be less than 0.2
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footcandle were properly compensated with additional lighting or i
security officers. The inspector noted that the licensee had a dedicated testing and maintenance team (PT-5) to perform security
l related seven day, cuarterly, and post maintenance tests.
Documented
work orders verifiec that security related requests were responded to in i
a short period.
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Conclusions Through document review, interview with licensee representatives, and direct observation. the inspector concit.ded that licensee's testing and maintenance program., was satisfactory and met the requirements specified in their PSP.
SS Security Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification S5.1 Security Trainina and Oualification a.
Insoection Scooe (81700)
The inspector reviewed the security training and qualification (T&O)
program to ensure that the criteria specified in the licensee's T&O pl_an were being met, b.
Observations and Findinas The inspector toured the licensee's firearms range and noted an elevated platform to better simulate plant conditions.
Records reviewed of qualified officers were well documented and met the criteria specified in the licensee's T&Q plan. Officers interviewed appeared knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities, 31an commitments, and implementing 3rocedures.
The ins)ector found the tlat armed response personnel had Jeen instructed in tie use of deadly. force as required by 10 CFR 73.
Training documentation verified that members of the security organization were requalified every 12 months in the performance of their assigned duties, both daily operational and contingency. This included the completion of a physical. fitness requirements and the firearms course.
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Conclusions Through document review, interview with security force members and direct observation, the inspector concluded that licensee's T&O program met the requirements specified in 10 CFR 73 and the licensee's T&Q_ plan.
S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards Issues S8.1 Action of Previous InsDection Findinas (92904)
(DISCUSSED)
IFI 94-016-01.
This IFI remains o)en pending the licensee's submittal of a 10 CFR 50.54(p) PSP clange that incorporates their compensatory measures currently implemented at the SWIS.(further discussed in 51.1).
(CLOSED) VIO 96-01-01. The licensee's corrective action for their failure to physically check randomly selected vital areas was reviewed by the inspector. The licensee had modified Security Procedure (SP)
FNP-0-SP-22. Testing of Security Systems," Revision 6 dated April 2.
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1996, to incorporate a checklist of identified vital areas that would randomly be checked within a one month timeframe.
The inspector verified these checks were being performed by reviewing documentation of vital area checks for the months of April through September. All areas checked matched access reports for those individuals who had entered the area. This violation is closed.
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Manaaement Meetinos X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 11. 1996.
The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
In addition, the licensee noted that a 10 CFR 50.54(p) PSP change would be forthcoming to incorporate the compensatory measure currently being utilized at the Service Water Intake Structure. The inspector acknowledged the licensee's ce;nment.
Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is '10t contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee W. Cooley. Assistant Security Supervisor. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP)
R. Culver. Engineer. Southern Nuclear Company (SNC)
L. Enfinger. Administrative Manager. FNP L. Grantnan. Security Training Coordinator. FNP C. Hillman Security Manager. FNP G. Siliba. Engineer. SNC J. Sims. Engineer. SNC
NRC R. Caldwell. Resident Inspector D. Thompson. Security Inspector T. Ross Senior Resident Inspector i
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED j
l IP 81700:
Physical Security Program for Power Reactors i
IP 92904:
Action on Previous Inspection Findings l
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ITEMS OPEN. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Discussed 50-348, 50-364/94-016-01 IFI Long Term Compensatory Measures Closed 50-348. 50-364/96-01-01 VIO Failure to Physically Check Vital Areas i