IR 05000348/2023011
| ML23102A039 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/2023 |
| From: | Alan Blamey NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2 |
| To: | Brown K Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR 2023011 | |
| Download: ML23102A039 (24) | |
Text
April 13, 2023
SUBJECT:
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2023011 AND 05000364/2023011
Dear Keith Brown:
On March 2, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with Delson Erb, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for problem identification and resolution programs.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Alan J. Blamey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000348 and 05000364 License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8
Enclosure:
As stated.
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000348 and 05000364
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000348/2023011 and 05000364/2023011
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2023-011-0019
Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility:
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Columbia, AL
Inspection Dates:
February 13, 2023 to March 02, 2023
Inspectors:
A. Alen, Senior Project Engineer
L. Jones, Senior Reactor Inspector
S. Ninh, Senior Project Engineer
S. Temple, Resident Inspector
A. Wang, Project Engineer Trainee
Approved By:
Alan J. Blamey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/
oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Inadequate Service Water Battery Maintenance Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000348,05000364/2023011-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71152B A Green self-revealed non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1, Procedures was identified for the failure to maintain preventive maintenance procedure, FNP-0-STP-906.0 Service Water Building Battery Inspection (QSR42B0523A, B, C, D), version 20.0, that was appropriate to ensure adequate separation between safety-related battery cell jars and associated battery rack restraining rails during periodic rack torque checks. As a result, on January 6, 2021, the service water battery bank number 4 was rendered inoperable when the jars of four cells were found cracked with approximately 50-percent electrolyte level.
Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with a Containment Spray Suction Valve Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000364/2023011-02 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71152B A Green finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions was identified for the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the hand switch for the unit 2 A train (2A) containment spray suction valve from the refueling water storage tank. Specifically, the deficient hand switch resulted in inoperability of the 2A containment spray system in February 2022.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)
- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.
Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. Specifically, the team evaluated the licensee's compliance with their Problem Identification and Resolution program, as described in procedure NMP-GM-002, "Corrective Action Program," version 16.0 and NRC regulations. The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports, generated since the last problem identification and resolution inspection (February 2021), associated with the residual heat removal, service water, emergency diesel generators, and direct-current distribution (batteries, inverters, and distribution panels) systems. These reviews included failures; corrective and preventive maintenance issues, surveillances; reliability; and maintenance rule performance. The condition report reviews were expanded to five years for the residual heat removal and service water systems. Also, as part of the assessment, the inspectors reviewed corrective actions for the following non-cited violations (NCVs), findings (FINs), licensee-identified violations (LIVs),and minor violations (MVs):
o FIN 2021002-02. Inadvertent de-energization of 4-kilovolt (kV) bus 1J.
o LIV 2021001. Failure to operate within power limits.
o LIV 2022401. Security Cornerstone LIV documented in cyber security inspection report 2022401.
o LIV 2022404. Security Cornerstone LIV documented in security baseline inspection report 2022404.
o NCV 2021002-03. Exciter testing results in unit 1 reactor trip.
o NCV 2021002-04. Main steam safety valve lift pressure outside technical specification limits due to drift.
o NCV 2021004-01. Cask crane rail.
o NCV 2021010-01. Pressurizer safety valve lift pressure outside of technical specifications limits.
o MV 2022003. Failure to report operator medical condition to NRC within 30 days.
Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience. Specifically, the team reviewed issues identified through both NRC and industry operating experience that were documented in the licensee's Problem Identification and Resolution program and evaluated the licensee's compliance with their operating experience program, as described in NMP-GM-008, "Operating Experience Program," version 23.2, and NMP-AD-028, "10 CFR 21 Evaluations and Reporting Requirements,"
version 7.0.
Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments. Specifically, the team reviewed and evaluated condition reports generated as a result of completed self-assessments and/or audits required by the licensee's Quality Assurance Topical Report.
Safety-Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment 71152B 1) Corrective Action Program Effectiveness Problem Identification: The inspectors determined that the licensee was effective in identifying problems and entering them into the problem identification and resolution or corrective action program (CAP) and that there was a low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating condition reports (CRs) as described in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, "Corrective Action Program," version 16.0, and managements expectation that employees were encouraged to initiate CRs. Additionally, site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues.
Problem Prioritization and Evaluation: The inspectors reviewed CRs, technical evaluations, and completed and/or planned work orders. With the exception noted below, the inspectors concluded that problems were, generally, prioritized and evaluated in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-GM-002-001, "Corrective Action Program Instructions," version 43.0. The inspectors determined that adequate consideration was given to structures, systems, and/or component's operability and associated plant risk. The inspectors determined that, in general, plant personnel had conducted cause evaluations in accordance with licensees CAP procedures, as described in NMP-GM-002-GL03, "Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions Guidelines," version 32.0, and cause determinations were appropriate, and considered the significance of the issues being evaluated.
The inspectors reviewed CR 10773899, titled "Refueling water storage tank to unit 2 'A' train containment spray pump valve Q2E13MOV8817A will not reopen" initiated on February 12, 2021. The inspectors noted that the licensee did not identify or prioritize this condition as a condition adverse to quality (CAQ) (i.e., as a Severity Level 2 CR) in accordance with the corrective action screening instructions contained in procedure NMP-GM-002-001. As a result, the condition that led to the valve failure was not corrected in a timely manner, resulting in the inoperablity of the associated pump once again a year later. This issue was determined to be a finding with an associated non-cited violation, and it is documented in this report in the inspection results section.
Corrective Actions: The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents, interviewed licensee staff, and verified completion of corrective actions. With the exception noted below, the inspectors determined that, generally, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that CAQ were corrected. The team determined that the licensee was generally effective in developing corrective actions that were appropriately focused. No significant conditions adverse to quality (SCAQ) were identified by the licensee over the 2-year assessment period; therefore, the team focused their review on ensuring that issues entered in the CAP were being properly screened and did not satisfy the criteria for being a SCAQ.
The inspectors reviewed CR 820528, initiated in 2014, associated with an NRC non-cited violation due to a nonconforming condition for the lack of independence between non-safety-related circuits and safety-related inverters associated with the vital 120-volt alternating-current (Vac) distribution system channels 2 and 4 on both units. Corrective actions to restore compliance were not being tracked under the CAP as of 2016 and compliance had not been restored as of the date of the inspection. The issue was determined to be a minor violation and is documented in this report in the inspection results section.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensees CAP complied with regulatory requirements and self-imposed standards. The licensees implementation of the CAP adequately supported nuclear safety.
2) Operating Experience The team determined that the licensees processes for the use of industry and NRC operating experience information were effective and complied with regulatory requirements and licensee standards. The implementation of these programs adequately supported nuclear safety. The team concluded that operating experience was adequately evaluated for applicability and that appropriate actions were implemented in accordance with applicable procedures.
3) Self-Assessments and Audits The inspectors reviewed a sample of completed self-assessments and audits conducted by both plant and nuclear oversight personnel. The inspectors determined that the licensee was effective at performing self-assessments and audits to identify issues at a low level, properly evaluated those issues, and resolved them commensurate with their safety significance. The self-assessments and audits were adequately self-critical and performance-related issues were being appropriately identified. The inspectors verified that CRs were created to document areas for improvement and findings, and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations.
4) Safety-Conscious Work Environment The inspectors interviewed a sample of plant employees from various departments and with varying roles/responsibilities within the organization. The inspectors determined that employees
- (1) were willing to raise nuclear safety concerns to their supervisor/manager or though the CAP,
- (2) were aware of alternative avenues for raising concerns such as the Employee Concern Program (ECP), and
- (3) had not experienced retaliation for raising safety concerns. Specifically, all individuals interviewed indicated that they would feel comfortable in raising safety concerns. All individuals felt that their management was receptive to receiving safety concerns and generally addressed them promptly and commensurate with the significance of the concern. Most interviewees were aware of the licensee's ECP and stated they would use the program, if necessary. When asked whether there have been any instances where individuals experienced retaliation or other negative reaction for raising safety concerns, all individuals interviewed stated that they had neither experienced nor heard of an instance of retaliation at the site. To supplement these discussions, the team reviewed the ECP case log and interviewed the ECP Coordinator to assess their perception of the site employees' willingness to raise nuclear safety concerns. Also, the team reviewed a sample of the most recent Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel meeting reports as well as the results from the most recent biennial safety culture survey and self-assessment from February 2021. The team determined that the processes in place to mitigate potential safety culture issues were adequately implemented.
Inadequate Service Water Battery Maintenance Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000348,05000364/2023011-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71152B A Green self-revealed non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures was identified for the failure to maintain preventive maintenance procedure, FNP-0-STP-906.0 Service Water Building Battery Inspection (QSR42B0523A, B, C, D),version 20.0, that was appropriate to ensure adequate separation between safety-related battery cell jars and associated battery rack restraining rails during periodic rack torque checks. As a result, on January 6, 2021, the service water battery bank number (no.) 4 was rendered inoperable when the jars of four cells were found cracked with approximately 50-percent electrolyte level.
Description:
The service water intake structure (SWIS) contains a 125-volt direct-current (Vdc) system that provides power for controls, power loads, annunciation, and alarms for the safety-related service water system. The system consists of four full capacity battery banks and associated battery charger subsystems that are divided into trains A and B and are shared between the two reactor units. Subsystems 1 and 2 are associated with train A and subsystems 3 and 4 are associated with train B. One subsystem per train is required to be operable for each train in Modes 1-4. As specified in the seismic qualification report for the SWIS battery/rack assembly (U417453, Seismic Qualification Report of Service Water Intake Structure - 125-Volt Batteries and Racks, dated November 16, 1986), the battery and battery rack must be installed and operated in accordance with the applicable sections and requirements of the vendor technical manual (VTM) and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 484-1981. Furthermore, IEEE 484-1981 Section 5.2.2, Mounting states that cells shall be mounted with manufacturers recommended separation distance and spacers; and Section 6.2.1, Rack Assembly states that the assembly of the rack be in accordance with the manufacturers recommended procedure. On January 6, 2021, while performing the quarterly battery inspection of the no. 4 battery bank subsystem (train B),technicians discovered four battery cells with low electrolyte level, approximately 50-percent, due to cracks along mid-height of the cell jars. The no. 4 battery bank had been in standby (i.e., B-train was aligned to battery no. 3) since, at least, January 1, 2021, when a monthly battery inspection was conducted, which inspected for battery cracks and electrolyte levels and did not identify any cracks nor low levels or leaks of electrolyte. Initial inspection noted that the affected cells were located on both sides of two tie rod locations on the rack. The tie rods are installed on the restraining rails, fastened to the front and back rails, in-between batteries. The tie rods are a design feature that restrict cell movement along the horizontal restraining rails during a seismic event. The no. 4 subsystem was declared inoperable, and the condition was captured in the corrective action program under condition report (CR)10764826.
The licensee conducted a causal evaluation for the identified battery cell cracks and documented it in corrective action report (CAR) 278814. The cracks were determined to be caused by pressure applied onto the battery cell jars by the restraining rails (i.e., squeezing)due to overly tightened/torqued tie rods. Over torquing of the tie rods resulted from the improper revision, in December 2016, of the 18-month maintenance/surveillance battery inspection procedure (FNP-0-STP-906.0). This procedure is conducted to satisfy TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.4.3, which requires, in part, verification that battery cells and racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration. The procedure was changed (per CR 10293999), in part, to add steps to verify tie rods are tightened to 12 ft-lb. The licensee determined that it inappropriately used an older version of the battery VTM (U429006, Service Water Battery Installation and Operations instructions for Type 3DCU-7, dated June 28, 1985) that included torque values for the tie rods. The VTM at the time of the procedure change, as well as the latest version (U419467, Standby Battery Vented Cell Installation and Operating Instructions, version 5.0), did not specify torque values for the tie rods and, instead, specified that tie rods should be tightened to allow a business card to fit between the cell jar and the restraining rail. The inspectors reviewed both the 1985 and latest version of the VTMs and confirmed the older version did specify torque values whereas the latest version did not; however, the inspectors noted that both manuals had consistent verbiage cautioning that tightening of the tie rods must not apply pressure of the restraining rails onto cells and guidance for assuring a proper gap between cells and rails during tightening of the tie rods. FNP-0-STP-906.0 was last performed on September 2, 2020, per work order SNC1021538, approximately four months before the battery jar cracks were identified.
Corrective Actions: The licensee corrected the damaged cells and restored the battery bank to service. The licensee revised (effective March 20, 2021) the maintenance inspection procedure, FNP-0-STP-906.0, with instructions to ensure technicians verify proper separation between battery cell jars and restraining rails during inspection of the tie rods. An extent of condition inspected and adjusted the tie rods, ensuring proper gap, for all SWIS DC battery banks and other safety-related station batteries. The extent of condition also included review and revision, as needed, of maintenance procedures for other safety-related batteries.
Corrective Action References: CR 10764826 and CAR 278814
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to a maintain procedure FNP-0-STP-906.0 that was appropriate to ensure adequate separation between safety-related battery jars and associated battery rack restraining rails during periodic rack torque checks was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the inadequate maintenance instructions led to cracks on the jars of four battery cells, which drained the batterys electrolyte, and rendered the battery bank no. 4 inoperable.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors screened the significance of the finding using Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 4 of IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that a detailed risk evaluation was required because the condition involved the potential degradation of the ability to mitigate the impact of a seismic event on the B-train SWIS battery due to the additional forces being applied to the jars by the battery rack rails as a result of the over-torqued condition. A detailed risk evaluation was performed by a regional Senior Reactor Analyst using SAPHIRE Version 8.2.8 and NRC Farley SPAR model Version 8.81. Conditional analyses were performed for Unit 1 and for Unit 2 to evaluate the risk increase due to the failure to ensure adequate separation between battery jars and their associated battery rack restraining rails. A condition exposure time of up to one year was assessed for seismic initiators to account for potential failure due to the combination of seismic and battery rack forces acting on the cell jars. For internal event sequences a condition exposure time (including repair time) of approximately 17 days was used to account for loss of function of the no. 4 SWIS battery due to jar cracking and loss of electrolyte. No credit was provided in the analysis for post-failure recovery of equipment impacted by the performance deficiency. The dominant sequences involved seismic, or Loss of Offsite Power initiators accompanied by an Extended Loss of AC Power with common mode failure of all A-train and B-train SWIS batteries, non-recovery of offsite or emergency AC power sources, and the failure to maintain long-term operation of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump to remove reactor decay heat. The analysis determined that the estimated increase in Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) was less than 1E-06/year for delta-CDF and less than 1E-07/year for delta-LERF, representing a finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) for Unit 1 and for Unit 2.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specifications 5.4.1.a requires, in part, written procedures shall be maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Section 9.a of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly performed in accordance with written procedures or documented instructions appropriate to the circumstances.
Maintenance procedure FNP-0-STP-906.0, was used to satisfy TS SR 3.8.4.3 to verify, in part, that battery cells and racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration by checking, in part, the tightness of bolted connections.
Contrary to the above, between December 20, 2016, and March 20, 2021, the licensee failed to maintain a preventive maintenance procedure that can affect the performance of safety-related batteries, that was appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, the licensee implemented a change to the SWIS batteries maintenance procedure FNP-0-STP-906.0, that failed to ensure that restraining rails did not apply pressure to the battery cell jars, by maintaining proper separation, when checking the torque on the battery racks tie rods. This resulted in the inoperability of the SWIS no. 4 battery bank on January 6, 2021, due to cracks and low electrolyte level on four cells.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Associated with a Containment Spray Suction Valve Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000364/2023011-02 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71152B A Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions was identified for the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality (CAQ) associated with the hand switch for the unit 2 A train (2A) containment spray (CS) suction valve from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). Specifically, the deficient hand switch resulted in inoperability of the 2A CS system in February 2022.
Description:
Corrective action program (CAP) procedure NMP-GM-002-001, Corrective Action Program Instructions, revision 43.0, identifies a CAQ as a condition that has inhibited safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) from satisfactory performance of a safety-related function, such as a component failure (e.g., a valve fails open). The procedure requires that condition reports (CRs) documenting CAQs be classified, or characterized, as a Priority or Severity Level 2 (SL2). Severity Level 2 CRs require corrective actions to rectify the CAQ. Additionally, equipment failures that result in unplanned entry into technical specifications required action statements of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> require completion of an equipment reliability checklist (ERC), which is a causal evaluation used to determine the reason for the equipment failure and actions necessary to restore reliability of plant components.
On February 12, 2021, during performance of FNP-2-STP-16.7, CS System Valve In-service Test, the 2A CS suction valve, MOV-8817A, would not reopen (following the close stroke test) when the control room hand switch was taken to open. This condition affected operability (i.e., the safety-related function) of the pump, which has a TS RAS of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Work order (WO) SNC1142580 was used to troubleshoot the valve and identified high resistance across the hand switch open contacts. As the hand switch was cycled, during troubleshooting, contact resistance was reduced enough to open the valve. The inspectors noted that although this condition was captured in the CAP as CR 10773899, the CR was not characterized as a CAQ (i.e., SL2) in accordance with the CAP procedure. Instead, the CR was screened as an SL4, which is a non-CAP condition. Non-CAP CRs are addressed at a lower priority using other processes outside the CAP (i.e., non-CAP CRs may be closed to trending and/or no additional actions). In this case, a WO was scheduled to replace the hand switch, however, because the CR was not identified as a CAQ, the WO was not identified as a corrective action WO and was given a lower priority.
In February 2022, MOV-8817A failed again while being restored from surveillance testing, per FNP-2-STP-16.7, where the valve would not reopen when the hand switch was taken to open. This condition was documented in CR10857083 and, in this instance, properly screened as a SL2 issue. Work order SNC1223297 was used to troubleshoot the malfunction, and the issue was, again, attributed to high contact resistance across the hand switch contacts. Following cleaning of the hand switch contacts, as a bridging action, the hand switch was replaced under WO SNC1143014 in June 2022. Additionally, as required by the CAP procedure, a causal evaluation ERC was conducted (CAR 295668). The causal evaluation identified a recent failure rate increase of hand switches supporting safety-related components due to age and resulting high contact resistance due to oxidation and/or dirt buildup on the contacts. The inspectors determined that contact sweeping, via cycling, did not correct the deficient condition of the hand switch. Furthermore, in the ERC, the licensee concluded that the CAP was not utilized to replace the hand switch at the next available opportunity.
The inspectors determined that CR10773899 was incorrectly screened in February 2021 as an SL4 non-CAP issue instead of an SL2 issue for conditions affecting nuclear safety and quality (i.e., CAQ), as defined by NMP-GM-002-001. This led to the failure to promptly identify and correct a CAQ. The degraded hand switch and its resulting failure to align the associated CS RWST suction valve to the safety-related position, following routine surveillance testing, represented a CAQ that rendered the affected CS train inoperable. Despite attributing, via troubleshooting, valve failure to high resistance/oxidation on the hand switch contacts, the condition was captured in the CAP as a non-CAP condition (CR10773899), and no actual repairs or corrective actions, other than troubleshooting, were performed. The actions taken in 2021 served to troubleshoot and temporarily mitigate the degradation but did not correct the issue as demonstrated by the failure in 2022.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the issue into the CAP under CR10948857.
Corrective Action References: CRs 10773899, 10857083, 10948857, and WO SNC114301
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to promptly identify (or characterize) as a CAQ and, as a result, correct a deficient hand switch for the 2A CS RWST suction valve, MOV-8817A, in accordance with procedure NMP-GM-002-001, Corrective Action Program Instructions, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the deficient hand switch resulted in inoperability of the 2A CS system in February 2022.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, dated November 30, 2020. Because the finding represented a failure of containment pressure control and/or heat removal equipment, as directed by Exhibit 3, the inspectors further assessed the significance of the finding per IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, dated April 30, 2020. The finding screened out as Green using the guidance in IMC 0609 Appendix H (Section 07.01 - Table 7.1) because it was not associated with an SSC important to large early release frequency.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. In this case, improper screening of the 2021 CR in accordance with the screening procedure NMP-GM-002-001 led to a failure to properly characterize and correct the issue in a timely manner. The licensee incorrectly screened the CR as an SL4 non-CAP issue instead of an SL2, as a CAQ.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, states in part that Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.
The licensees Quality Assurance Topical Report describes the quality assurance program and administrative control requirements that meet 10 CFR 50, Appendix B requirements.
Section 16, Corrective Action, of the QATR states, in part, that the licensee has established the necessary measures and governing procedures to promptly identify, classify, and correct CAQs. Corporate procedure NMP-GM-002-001, which is a corrective action governing procedure, required that conditions that inhibit safety-related SSCs from performing their safety function be classified as SL2.
Contrary to the above, between February 2021 and February 2022, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a CAQ. Specifically, the deficient condition of the hand switch for the 2A CS RWST suction valve, MOV-8817A, was not promptly identified as a CAQ (i.e.,
SL2) in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-GM-002-001 and was, therefore, not promptly corrected. This resulted in the inoperability of the unit 2 A train of CS in February 2022.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Minor Violation 71152B Minor Violation: A minor violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B Criterion XVI Corrective Action was identified for the licensees failure to implement CAP measures, to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In 2014 the NRC identified, during a component design bases inspection (Inspection Report number 2014007, ADAMS Accession Number ML14209A904), a nonconforming condition relating to IEEE 308-1971, "Criteria for Class 1E Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," independence requirements, or lack thereof, between non-safety-related circuits and the safety-related inverters associated with the vital 120-volt alternating-current (Vac) distribution system channels 2 and 4 (for both units). The licensee entered this issue in their CAP as condition report (CR) 820528 in 2014. Per NMP-GM-002-001, Corrective Action Program Instructions, version 32.0, the licensee generated CAP Technical Evaluation (TE) 930607 to track, implement, and address corrective action design changes needed to restore compliance. In 2016, the licensee closed TE 930607 to long-term assessment management (LTAMs) F-14-0166 (for unit 1) and F-15-0371 (for unit 2) to track implementation of the design changes. The LTAM process was a non-CAP process (i.e., not subject to the tracking and timeliness requirements of the CAP). As a result, the inspectors determined that the licensee failed to process corrective actions for a nonconforming condition under the tracking and timeliness requirements of the CAP, per NMP-GM-002-001, which resulted and/or contributed to the nonconformance not being corrected almost 9 years later. Furthermore, the current version of NMP-GM-002-001 states CAP TEs cannot be closed to non-CAP processes such as LTAM tracking items. This issue was documented in the CAP under CR10948506 and 10953523.
Screening: The inspectors determined that licensee failed to process corrective actions for a nonconforming condition under CAP process per NMP-GM-002-001, was a minor performance deficiency. Specifically, the operability determination conducted by the licensee when the nonconformance was identified, which concluded the affected 120-Vac distribution system maintained its operability but was nonconforming, was still valid. Therefore, the performance deficiency did not adversely affect a cornerstone objective, would not lead to a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected, and could not reasonably be viewed as a precursor to a significant event.
Enforcement:
This failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI Corrective Action, constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On March 2, 2023, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Mr. Delson Erb, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Reports (CARs)
208475, 255115, 279602, 282258
ERC for 2B Battery Charger Room Cooler not running in
Auto or hand
03/17/2021
Unit 1 entered AOP-100 for RCS temp instrumentation
malfunction
Unit 2 transient due to drop 6 failure
ERC for Q2E13MOV8817A would not open when HS taken
to open position
03/21/2022
OPC for Q2E13MOV8817A would not open when HS taken
to open position
03/21/2022
Change in medical condition not reported within 30 days
08/27/2022
NRC Minor Violation: Operator Medical
Unit 1 TDAFW pump tripped while being secured
10/05/2022
Individuals not placed in FFD follow-up pool
2/07/2022
MOV3232B valve disc was discovered separated from disc
nut upon disassembly (CR 10912066)
11/08/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
(CRs)
00071779, 00820528, 10027796, 10154346, 10293999,
10308172, 10358701, 10367760, 10399030, 10424812,
10437530, 10453523, 10485613, 10501765, 10520082,
10606458, 10611092, 10657348, 10766109, 10660274,
10744091, 10746747, 10747939, 10764826, 10768678,
10772614, 10773899, 10778495, 10779129, 10781072,
10781645, 10783019, 10787431, 10788931, 10789463,
10789693, 10792481, 10793552, 10794097, 10801557,
10806313, 10814291, 10817407, 10817437, 10821354,
10823276, 10824316, 10826331, 10835014, 10835101,
10836017, 10836608, 10838056, 10838057, 10838437,
10839475, 10840095, 10840825, 10843358, 10843616,
10846675, 10846717, 10846726, 10847257, 10851386,
10852286, 10853774, 10855349, 10861359, 10863143,
10873896, 10874523, 10874699, 10874736, 10876153,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
10876795, 10879180, 10879557, 10883142, 10887730,
10888358, 10894451, 10895082, 10898654, 10904187,
10907923, 10908170, 10910657, 10910979, 10911116,
10911233, 10913655, 10914725, 10917141, 10917374,
10917403, 10918499, 10920813, 10921558, 10922511,
10924606, 10929132, 10932239, 10935916, 10936886,
10941467, 10941607, 10947808, 10948267, 10948793,
10950619
CR 10141952
1C service water pump excessive seal leak
11/02/2015
CR 10391171
2A SW pump seal leak
07/25/2017
CR 10490175
Approx. 50 drop/min service water leak at threaded nipple
05/06/2018
CR 10517532
Unit 1 A containment spray pump room cooler service water
return line relief valve is leaking
07/21/2018
CR 10613474
Maintenance Rule CME performance criteria exceeded
05/23/2019
CR 10644961
Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Performance Criteria
Exceeded
09/10/2019
CR 10646814
Service water piping through wall leak
09/17/2019
CR 10662496
Maintenance Rule performance criteria exceeded for unit 1
service water, P16-F02
11/07/2019
CR 10768917
Tracking CR for 1B service water pump seal leakage
01/25/2021
CR 10775744
Crack in the conduit going to the 2C service water pump
motor
2/17/2021
CR 10777584
1E SW pump oil addition
2/25/2021
CR 10777632
1A service water pump seal water Leak
2/23/2021
CR 10789693
Maintenance Rule unit 1 P16-F02 valve CME criteria
exceeded
04/12/2021
CR 10801193
Maintenance Rule performance criteria exceeded for unit 1
service water, P16-F02
05/27/2021
CR 10827058
2A service water pump, Q2P16P001A, seal is leaking
09/14/2021
CR 10916134
Oil containment curb modified
10/18/2022
Technical
Evaluations (TE)
20528, 1111784, 1110154, 1111793, 1111790, 1116037,
1116044, 1116034, 1110552, 1111659, 1102698,1102699
TE 1078054
21 Plant Farley Nuclear Safety Culture Biennial
Assessment
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
TE 1082582
Perform MRule Eval for CR10773899
TE 1085275
Perform MRule Eval for CR10785580 (Peer Check Review
Required)
TE 1085772
Perform MRule Eval for CRs 10787636 and 10787777 (Peer
Check Review Required)
TE 1086522
Perform MRule Eval for CR 10790273 (Peer Check Review
Required)
TE 1101084
Implement WCAP-17308, EDG Voltage and Frequency
TE 1121548
Perform MRule Eval for CR 10835014 (Peer Check Review
Required)
TE 1121558
Perform MRule Eval for CR10784390 (Peer Check Review
Required)
TE 975457
Technical Review of Service Water System Water-hammer
Calculations per RER SNC821995
2/14/2016
CR 10948506
NRC violation corrective actions not tracked in CAP
CR 10948628
Weak corrective actions related to CAR309048 (failure to
report licensed operator medical change)
CR 10948793
Gaps in evaluating the effect of EDG voltage and frequency
variations
CR 10948846
Missing documentation for Part 21 screening for CAR
21992
CR 10948857
CR 10773899 assigned CAP Pri 4 instead of Pri 2
CR 10948885
Service water intake structure no. 3 battery cells not labeled
CR 10952049
Crack in top of battery cell #53
CR 10952426
FSAR editorial change
CR 10952428
FNP-1/2-SOP-68.0 editorial change
CR 10952462
20V Vital AC Inst. Distribution PNL 1D Breaker 6 label
update needed
CR 10952485
2B auxiliary building battery gap
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 10952487
TDAFW battery rack spacing requirements
B-528303
Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 - Main Steam System - N11
Hanger Information (Sheets 1, 14, -17)
Ver. 2.0
Drawings
D-175038
P&ID - Safety Injection System (Unit 1) - Sheet 1 and 2
Ver. 44.0
and 25.0
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
D-177024
Single Line 120 VAC Vital & Regulated System Train A (Unit
1)
Ver. 37.0
D-177025
Single Line 120 VAC Vital & Regulated System Train B (Unit
1) - Sheets 1 and 2
Ver. 39.0
and 2.0
D-177082
Single Line DC Distribution System 1A (Unit 1)
Ver. 45.0
D-177083
Single Line DC Distribution System 1B (Unit 1)
Ver. 42
D-205038
P&ID - Unit 2 Safety Injection System (Unit 2) - Sheets1 and
Ver. 39.0,
25.0, and
34.0
D-207024
Single Line 120 VAC Vital & Regulated System Train A (Unit
2)
Ver. 28.0
D-207082
Single Line DC Distribution System 2A (Unit 2)
Ver. 30.0
D-207083
Single Line DC Distribution System 2B (Unit 2)
Ver. 34.0
D-207638
Elementary Diagram Containment Spray Pump Inlet 575V
Motor Operated Valve (Unit 2)
Ver. 8.0
D-277025
Single Line 120 VAC Vital & Regulated System Train B (Unit
2) - Sheets 1 and 2
Rev. 32.0
and 1.0
M06709
Racks, 2-Step EP3, 3DCU-9, PERP Plates
Rev. 10
U176261
Battery Rack 1A and 1B Layout of 60 Cells (Heavy Seismic
Resistant)
Ver. 3.0
U211521
25V Station Battery Auxiliary Building Rack 2a/2B Layout
Ver. 2.0
DECP
SNC772350
NCV -Failure to Comply with IEEE 308-1971 for Non-1E
Inverter Loads
Rev. 0
SNC1224101ED
Equivalency Evaluation for MOV 8817A Hand Switch
N2E1HS8817A Replacement
SNC1259625ED
Equivalency Evaluation for Containment Spray Hand Switch
Replacements
Engineering
Changes
SNC772350
DECP
Design Equivalent Change Package for NCV -Failure to
Comply with IEEE 308-1971 for Non-1E Inverter Loads
EVAL-F-D11-
04467
Gas Radiation Monitors, Unit 2 D11-F01 Gas Monitors
N2D11RE0010 N2D11RE0011 Q2D11RE0024A/B
Q2D11RE0025A/BN2D11RE0029B QSD11RE0035A/B
N2D11RE0070A/B/C
Engineering
Evaluations
EVAL-F-P16-
Unit 1/Service Water System, CR 10793414; CR 10801193
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
05310
NEED a(1) plan approved by mid-July with corrective actions
and goals
EVAL-F-P19-
05509
Unit 2/Instrument Air System, N2P19C001A/B/C - 5th CME
Exceeding Event Date 3/15/22. Therefore 60 days from
event date for MREP is 5/14/22 for a(1)/a(2) consideration
Desktop Guide - Review of DOFs: Checklist for Site
Supervisors
N/A
Seismic and Environmental Qualification Report of 125 Volt
DC 4LCY-07 Battery and 2-Step Battery Rack
Ver. 1.0
701
Employee Concern Program Policy
November
2019
A-181000
Functional System Description Component Cooling Water
Ver. 27
A-181001
Functional System Description Service Water System
Ver. 69
ASME NQA-1
Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility
Applications
1994 Edition
Control Room
Logs Entries
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Date Range: 01-01-2021 through 01-31-
23
Fire Protection Aging Management Program
Ver. 2
IEEE Recommended Practice for Installation Design and
Installation of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating
Stations and Substations
1981
IST Program
IST Basis for RHR Pump Suction from RWST Check Valve
(Q1E11V0028)
2/23/2023
License Bases
Document
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Fifth 10-Year Interval ln-
service Testing Program
Ver. 5.0
License Bases
Document
Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications
Unit 1
(Amend. No.
244) Unit 2
(Amend. No.
241)
License Bases
Document
Joseph
- M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2, Technical
Specification Bases
Rev. 112
Miscellaneous
License Bases
Document
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report
Updated
Rev. 31
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
License Bases
Document
SNC-1, Quality Assurance Topical Report
Ver. 25.0
MIS-17-019
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - 5th Interval
In-service Testing Program
Ver. 6.0
MRC Agenda
Corrective Action Program Management Review Committee
(MRC) Agenda for
2/26/2023
MRC Agenda
Corrective Action Program Management Review Committee
(MRC) Agenda for
2/21/2023
NSCMP 2022-01
Nuclear Safety Culture Leadership Team Report 2022-01
(NMP-GM-024-F04)
03/07/2022
NSCMP 2022-02
Nuclear Safety Culture Leadership Team Report 2022-02
(NMP-GM-024-F04)
08/31/2022
NSCMP 2022-03
Nuclear Safety Culture Leadership Team Report 2022-03
(NMP-GM-024-F04)
2/13/2022
SNC Corporate
Guidelines 730-
2
Employee Concerns Guideline
November
2019
SS-1123-22
Specification for Service Water Intake Structure Batteries
Ver. 4.0
System Health
Report
System R41 - DC Distribution System (Units 1 and 2)
2/2022 -
1/2023
System Health
Report
System R42 - Battery System
2/2022 -
1/2023
System Health
Reports
System R21 - 120 Volt Vital Distribution System (Units 1 and
2)
2/2022 -
1/2023
U416525
Pond Service Water Intake Batteries - Battery Arrangement,
2-Step EP3 for (20) 3DCU-7 Units
Ver. 1.0
U417453
Pond Service Water Intake Batteries-Seismic Qualification
Report - 125 Volt Batteries and Racks
10/24/1987
U419467
Standby Battery Vented Cell Installation and Operating
Instructions
Ver. 5.0
U429006
Service Water Battery Installation and Operating Instructions
- Type 3DCU7
07/08/1985
Valve Basis
Report
Containment Spray Pump 2A From RWST Q2E13V0012A
(MOV8817A)
2/14/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Operability
Evaluations
NMP-AD-012-F01
MS-R127B was discovered with retaining pin partially
dislodged (CR10935916)
01/01/2023
FNP-0-SOP-
38.0-1 B
B Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries
Ver. 21.0
ATI-2455
Monitor Snubber MS-R127B once per shift for any movement
in the pin
N/A
FNP-0-EMP-
1340.01
MAINTENANCE OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS G.E. AK-2A
Ver. 24.0
FNP-0-FSP-301.0
Fire Pump Diesel Starting Battery Quarterly Inspection
Ver. 10.0
FNP-0-FSP-302.0
Fire Pump Diesel Starting Battery Inspection
Ver. 3.0
FNP-0-M-82
Service Water Plan
Ver. 17.1
FNP-0-SOP-38.0-
C
C Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries
Ver. 22.0
FNP-0-SOP-38.0-
1-2A
1-2A Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries
Ver. 24.0
FNP-0-SOP-38.0-
2C
2C Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries
Ver. 22.0
FNP-0-STP-905.0
Auxiliary Building Battery Inspection (Q1R42E002A,
Q1R42E002B, Q2R42E002A, and Q2R42E002B)
Ver. 3.0
FNP-0-STP-905.6
Auxiliary Building Outage Battery Inspection (Q1R42E002A,
Q1R42E002B, Q2R42E002A, and Q2R42E002B)
Ver. 1.0
FNP-0-STP-906.0
Service Water Building Battery Inspection (QSR42B0523A,
B, C, D)
Ver. 15.0,
16.0, 20.0,
and 21.0
FNP-1-SOP-104
Operations Control of Snubbers
Ver. 19.0
FNP-1-SOP-22.0
Auxiliary Feedwater System
Ver. 84.0
FNP-1-STP-11.17
RHR RWST Suction Check Valve Reverse Closure Test
Ver. 11.0
FNP-1-STP-80.1
Diesel Generator 1B Operability Test
Ver. 61.1
FNP-2-ESP-0.1
Reactor Trip Response
Rev. 40.0
FNP-2-SOP-22.0
Auxiliary Feedwater System
Ver. 85.0
FNP-2-STP-11.17
RHR RWST Suction Check Valve Reverse Closure Test
Ver. 8.0
Procedures
FNP-2-STP-16.7
Containment Spray System Valve In-service Test
Ver. 29.0
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
MS-7771
Procedure for Locking Disc to Piston (Cast Steel Valves)
Rev. 3
NMP-AD-012
Ver. 15.1
NMP-AD-027
NRC Inspection Preparation and Response
Ver. 12.0
NMP-AD-028
CFR 21 Evaluations and Reporting Requirements
Ver. 7.0
NMP-ES-021
Structural Monitoring Program for the Maintenance Rule
Ver. 2.0
NMP-ES-027
Ver. 10.4
NMP-ES-057-003
Snubber Program Implementation
Ver. 9.0
NMP-ES-072
Surveillance Frequency Control Program
Ver. 5.0
NMP-GM-002
Corrective Action Program
Ver. 16.0
NMP-GM-002-
001
Corrective Action Program Instructions
Ver. 43.0
NMP-GM-002-
004
CAP Training and Qualification Plan Instruction
Ver. 6.1
NMP-GM-002-
GL03
Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions Guideline
Ver. 32.0
NMP-GM-006
Work Management
Ver. 21.1
NMP-GM-006-
GL11
Work Prioritization Screening
Ver. 4.2
NMP-GM-016-
2
Non-Corrective Action Program (CAP) Business Item
Instructions
Ver. 7.0
NMP-GM-024
Nuclear Safety Culture Program
Ver. 9.1
NMP-GM-024-
001
Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring and Review Process
Ver. 12.0
NMP-MA-050
Work Package Preparation
Ver. 12.2
NMP-MA-053
SNC Maintenance Department Measuring and Test
Equipment Program (M&TE)
Ver. 6.0
NMP-OS-026
License Administration
Ver. 2.2
NMP-OS-026-F04
Notification to Supervisor and Medical Services of Change in
Medical Condition for a Licensed Operator
Ver. 1.0
NOS-101
Nuclear Oversight and Responsibilities
Ver. 10.0
NOS-104
Audit Planning and Scheduling
Ver. 25.0
21-RP-Audit
21 Radiation Protection Audit
07/7/2021
Self-Assessments
CNOS-21-099
21 Managing Fatigue and Medical Review Officer Audit
05/03/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Fleet-MF/MRO-
21
CNOS-21-146
Fleet-RGA-2021
21 Regulatory Affairs Audit
06/17/2021
CNOS-22-144
Fleet-SEC-2022
22 Fleet Security Audit
06/07/2022
CNOS-22-208
Fleet-OPS-2022
22 Operations Audit
08/19/2022
SNC908778, SNC886615, SNC821998, SNC796837,
SNC675804, SNC398807, SNC389677, SNC389676,
SNC1441733, SNC1427706, SNC1424305, SNC1421742,
SNC1417356, SNC1412736, SNC1406050, SNC1400518,
SNC1400277, SNC1394290, SNC1390277, SNC1326807,
SNC1294702, SNC1294286, SNC1285745, SNC1223297,
SNC1218093, SNC1218019, SNC1186746, SNC1173941,
SNC1157237, SNC1156670, SNC1147417, SNC1144896,
SNC1143049, SNC1143048, SNC1143014, SNC1142580,
SNC1122095, SNC1106231, SNC1075126, SNC1057207,
SNC1028304, SNC1021854, SNC1021538,
Work Orders
WO (planned)
SNC1075127, SNC1124622, SNC1217959, SNC1218068,
SNC1218133, SNC1424305, and SNC1428111