IR 05000348/1980042
| ML20003H653 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1981 |
| From: | Bradford W, Julian C, Mulkey J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003H642 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-80-42, 50-364-80-53, NUDOCS 8105060577 | |
| Download: ML20003H653 (6) | |
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[ p urol'o UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
E REGION 11
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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rxV Report Nos. 50-348/80-42 and 50-364/80-53 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35202 Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 Facility'Name: Farley License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8 Inspection at Farley ite near Dothan, Alabama Inspector:
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2 /v ;/ K i apW. [ Bradford Date Signed Dsh z/s/c,
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pJ. P. Mul key Date Signed Approved by:
b-2 /23/9/
C. Julianf/ Acting Section Chief, RONS Branch Da~te Signe'd SUMMARY Inspectica on December 1-31, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 190 resident inspector-hours onsitt 'n the areas of plant tours, Unit I refueling, Unit 1 plant operation, Service vater pumps lube and cooling, Unit 2 plant testing status, Unit 1 low presswe turbine inspection and Unit P.
phase III and low power ascension test program administration.
Results Of the 7 areas inspected no violations or deviations were found in 4~ areas; 3 violations were found in 3 areas (Failure to follow procedures - Paragraph 5; Inoperable service water system paragraph 7.a; and Inadequate test procedures -
paragraph 7.b.)
81050 6057h
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l DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees i
W. G. Hairston, Plant Manager J. D. Woodard, Assistant Plant Manager D. Morey, Operations Superintendent
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R. S. Hill, Operations Supervisor W. D. Shipman, Maintenance Superintendent R. W. McCraken, Technical Superir.tendent D. E. Mansfield, Unit No.2 Startup Superintendent i
C. Nesbitt, C&HP Supervisor i
L. Williams, Training Superintendent J. Mooney, Alabama Power Company Construction Manager
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W. Hollands, Alabama Power Company QA Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included shift supervisors, shift formen, plant operators, security force members and office personnel.
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2.
Exit Interview I
The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews with the Plant Manager and selected members of ~ his staff. The violations were discussed.
Licensee representatives acknowledged their l
understanding of the findings.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings l
(Closed) 50-364/80-46-01 - This unresolved item concerned repair work on No.
2A charging pump. During the repair, the maintenance personnel found a one inch long ty J.026 inch deep longitudal groove in the pump shaft. A Field Deficienc./ Report was prepared and the entire rotating assembly was returned to the pmp vendor.
The inspector was concerned that the defective shaft had been reinstalled without the defect being found and evaluated during the inspection following the original rework.
The inspector has reviewed the licensee's documentation and has verified that the licensee had performed the evaluation.
This is documented on Construction Work Request Nos. 2-40.92, dated 10/12/79
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and 2-43-1012, dated 1/31/80 and Startup Work Request No. 2-40-1061, dated
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8/20/80.
The inspector had no further question.
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4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Plant Tours Tours of selected plant areas were conducted throughout the reporting period. The following items, as available, were observed, a.
Fire Equipment Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppression equipment.
b.
Housekeeping Minimal accumulations of debris and maintenance of required cleanliness levels in systems and areas during the Unit 1 refueling outage and preoperational testing of Unit No. 2.
c.
Equipment Preservation Aaintenance of special preservative measures for installed equfgment as applicable.
d.
Component Tagging l
l Implementation and observance of equipment tagging for safety or equipment protection.
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Communication Effectiveness of public address systems in all areas toured.
f.
Equipment Controls Effectiveness of jurisdictional controls in precluding unauthorized work on systems tagged out for maintenance and for preoperational testing.
g.
Security
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Implementation of security provisions for both units.
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On December 15, 1980, the inspectors toured the diesel generator building to observe maintenance activities and to verify that security was maintained.
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The diesel generator rooms were posted with "N0 SM0 KING" signs on each door.
The inspectors observed evidence of smoking in all five of the diesel
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generator rooms in that there were cigarette butts in the' floor drain sumps i
and in pipe trenches at the end of the diesel generators. This is an l
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apparent violation of posted fire protection requirements and section 4.1 of Administrative Procedure FNP-0-AP-38, "Use of Open Flame" which states in part that " Smoking is prohibited in the Auxiliary Building, Diesel Generator building, and service water structure except those areas posted as smoking areas".
This item is identified as a failure to follow procedures as required by section 6.8 of the Technical Specifications (50-348/80-42-01, 50-364/80-53-01).
Unit No.1 Refueling The inspectors observed portions of the Unit I refueling activities to verify the following:
a.
That refueling activities were conducted by an approved procedure.
b.
That the fuel handling activities were under the direction of an operator holding a senior reactor operator's license who was present on the refueling floor at all times when fuel movements were made.
c.
A liceased operator was present in the control room and was in direct communication with the refueling floor.
d.
Core monitoring during refueling activites was in accordance with tr.e Technical Spec 1#ications.
e.
That core maps, status boards and check sheets were maintained in accordance with approved procedures.
f.
That the refueling crew had been trained and was experienced in
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refueling operations.
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That baron concentration determinations had been made and was
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maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications.
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That containment integrity was maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications.
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That housekeeping was maintained in the refueling area.
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That staffing during the refueling was maintained in accordance with Technical Specifications.
Within the areas inspected, there were no violations or deviations identified.
7.
Unit No.1 Plant Operation
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The inspectors reviewed plant operations to ascertain conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications and Administrative
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Procedure No. 16, " Conduct of Operation Operations Group". Station logs, such as the shift supervisor, shift forman, control room operator shift turnover, the Out of Service equipment log, night order log books and the limited condition of operation log were reviewed.
Observations were made of plant operation, monitoring instrumentation, radiation controls, fluid leaks, piping vibration, pipe hangers, certain valve positions and control room alarm status indications.
Discussions were conducted with plant operators throughout the plant concerning certain alarm functions and plant operations. Within the areas inspected, there were no violations or deviations identified.
a.
On November 12, 1980, during the present Unit I refueling outage, the licensee was preparing to modify the service water lube and cooling
water piping. This modification consisted of changing out the existing carbon steel piping to stainless steel piping.
In preparation for this l
modification, the licensee found that the lube and cooling water piping for "A" train and "B" train service water pumps had been cross i
connected.
This condition existed for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
This was reported by the licensee to Region II by prompt report and by LERs 348-80-069/0IT-0 and 368-80-01/0IT-0. This ittm was previously discussed in IE Inspection Report Nos. 348/80-40 and 364/80-50.
The inspectors have reviewed this item and have determined that the piping error was attributable to a design error due to the ambiguity of Southern Company Servires Incorporated (SCSI) pipi,nq design drawing's No. D. 170422 and D. 200114. The installation drawings were made cy Daniels Construction Company from the SCSI design drawings. The Daniels piping installation drawings are identified as drawing No's.
(Q-1-P16-HCB-228 and HBD-399-E4120) and (Q-i-P16-HCB-2284 and HBD-399-E4124).
-The inspectors have determined that the service water system was not operable in accordance with section 3.7.4 of the Technical i
Specifications which requires at least two independent service water trains to be operable.
In the event that one service water train was inoperable during the loss of offsite power, the other service water train would become inoperable due to the cross connection of the lube i
and cooling piping.
This would render the service water system in::apable of performing its specified functions.
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This is an apparent violation of the Technical Specification Section 3.7.4. (50-348/80-42-02).
b.
The inspectors have reviewed the licensee's Unit 2 preoperational test procedures TP-0-11-3-001, " Service Water Intake Structure Lube and Cooling Water Functional Test", completed on February 8,1980, and TP-011-5-002, " Service Water Preoperational Test", completed on September 30, 1980. The test procedure's acceptance criteria were not adequate in that they did not identify the cross connection of the "A" and "B" train service water lube and cooling supply headers. 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, requires in part that procedures include J
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appropriate acceptance criteria for determining that activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.
This apparent. violation is identified as 50-348/80-42-03 and 50-364/80-53-02.
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Unit No. 2 Plant Testing Status The status of the licensee's Phase II preoperational testing program was reviewed and is summarized as follows:
Testing not started 4%
Testing in progress 13%
Testing completed 81%
Test Data Approved 80%.
9.
Unit No.1 Low Pressure Turbines During this refueling outage, an inspection was conducted by the licensee of the Unit i low pressure turbines for keyway and disc bore cracking. Cracks were discovered in low pressure turbines 1 and 2.
The licensee has installed new low pressure turbines and has returned the damaged turbines to Westinghouse Corporation for analysis and repair.
The inspector had no further questions.
10.
Phase Three and Power Ascension Test Program Administration The administrative aspects of the Phase III and Power Ascension Test Program were reviewed to ensure te. sting will be prepared. performed and evaluated in accordance with regulatory requirements.
The review was conducted using ANSI 18.7 and Regulatory Guide 1.68 as guidance. The licensee test program is described in Section 14 of. the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and implementation is delineated in Administrative Procedure 48.
A test organization has been established and responsibilities assigned for conducting the program. The Phase III and Power Ascension Test Program is under the direction of the Alabama Power Company Technical Superintendent.
Administrative measures have been reviewed and found satf sfactory for the following items:
a.
Methods to govern the conduct of testing.
b.
Methods to control the scheduling of test activities and special test.
equipment.
c.
Methods to evaluate test results.
d.
Methods to document the test procedure review, approval and issuance.
The inspector concluded that the Phase III and Power Ascension Test Program as defined in Administrative Procedure 48 and the FSAR is in agreement with the NRC Requirements.
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The inspectors had no further questions.
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