IR 05000348/2021011

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Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Programs) Inspection Report 05000348/2021011 and 05000364/2021011
ML21347A401
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 12/13/2021
From: James Baptist
NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1
To: Gayheart C
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR 2021011
Download: ML21347A401 (12)


Text

December 13, 2021

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (PROGRAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2021011 AND 05000364/2021011

Dear Ms. Gayheart:

On November 16, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

James B. Baptist, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000348 and 05000364 License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000348 and 05000364

License Numbers:

NPF-2 and NPF-8

Report Numbers:

05000348/2021011 and 05000364/2021011

Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-011-0024

Licensee:

Southern Company Nuclear

Facility:

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

Location:

Columbia, AL

Inspection Dates:

October 18, 2021 to November 05, 2021

Inspectors:

C. Baron, Contractor

P. Carman, Senior Reactor Inspector

R. Patterson, Senior Reactor Inspector

Approved By:

James B. Baptist, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Properly Categorize MOVs 8809A & B or Check Valve Q1(2)E11V0028 in the IST Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000348,05000364/2021011-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21N.

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.55a(f), Inservice Testing Requirements, subsection (4) for the licensees failure to categorize any Unit 1 & 2 RHR pump suction isolation valves (MOVs 8809A & B or check valve Q1(2)E11V0028) as inservice test (IST) Class A for which seat leakage is limited to a specific maximum amount in the closed position. Specifically, the licensees inservice testing program did not test safety-related valves in accordance with, ASME OM code Subsection ISTC-1300, Valve Categories, to ensure they could meet seat leakage requirements.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.21N.02 - Design-Basis Capability of Power-Operated Valves Under 10 CFR 50.55a Requirements POV Review (IP Section 03)

The inspectors:

a. Determined whether the sampled POVs are being tested and maintained in accordance with NRC regulations along with the licensees commitments and/or licensing bases.

Specific Guidance b. Determined whether the sampled POVs are capable of performing their design-basis functions.

c. Determined whether testing of the sampled POVs is adequate to demonstrate the capability of the POVs to perform their safety functions under design-basis conditions.

d. Evaluate maintenance activities including a walkdown of the sampled POVs (if accessible).

(1) Q2E21MOV8108, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Charging Pump Discharge to Regenerative Heat Exchange (HX)
(2) Q2N11PV3371A, Main Steam Line Atmospheric Vent Valve
(3) Q2N23MOV3209A, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) Pump Service Water (SW) Inlet
(4) Q1N12HV3226, Main Steam to Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
(5) Q2E21MOV8108, CVCS Charging Pump Discharge to Regenerative HX
(6) Q2E11MOV8889, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) HX Discharge to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot Leg
(7) Q2E11MOV8887A, RHR to RCS Cross-Connect
(8) Q1E21MOV8803B, High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) to RCS Cold Leg Isolation Valve

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Properly Categorize MOVs 8809A & B or Check Valve Q1(2)E11V0028 in the IST Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Green None (NPP)71111.21N.0 Systems

NCV 05000348,05000364/2021011-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.55a(f), Inservice Testing Requirements, subsection

(4) for the licensees failure to categorize any Unit 1 & 2 RHR pump suction isolation valves (MOVs 8809A & B or check valve Q1(2)E11V0028) as inservice test (IST) Class A for which seat leakage is limited to a specific maximum amount in the closed position. Specifically, the licensees inservice testing program did not test safety-related valves in accordance with, ASME OM code Subsection ISTC-1300, Valve Categories, to ensure they could meet seat leakage requirements.
Description:

The inspectors noted that a refueling water storage tank (RWST) leakage inflow rate of 3.5 gallons per minute (gpm) was assumed in final safety analysis report (FSAR)

Table 15.4-14, Parameter Used in the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis and that the other potential leakage paths from the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) to the vented RWST included valves that were subject to leak testing. The inspectors also noted that calculation BM-98-1711-001, Reverse Flow Evaluation of RWST Check Valves, revision 2 (approved on October 24, 2001) determined that the post-accident containment pressure could be approximately 8 psid greater than the RWST static head at the time of ECCS recirculation transfer. However, this potential leakage path from the ECCS to the RWST did not include any isolation valves that were subject to leak testing to ensure that the 3.5 gpm leakage parameter assumed in the site boundary and control room radiation dose analyses would not be exceeded.

The NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 91-56, Potential Radioactive Leakage to Tank Vented to Atmosphere, alerting licensees to potential problems resulting from the leakage of isolation valves in ECCS recirculation lines to the RWST, which is vented to the atmosphere.

The NRC informed licensees of corrective actions that could address the leak path vulnerabilities, by incorporating the valves identified in the leak path into the inservice testing program and categorizing them as Category A valves. The NRC noted 10 CFR 50.55a, which references the ASME OM Code, and subsection ISTC-1300 Valve Categories stipulates that Category A valves are valves for which seat leakage is limited to a specific maximum amount in the closed position for fulfillment of their required functions. The inspectors determined the licensee did not leak test MOVs 8809A & B or check valve Q1(2)E11V0028, to assure that following a design basis accident, during ECCS recirculation, the leakage of containment sump water to the RWST is maintained within the values assumed in the calculation of site boundary and control room doses. The licensee entered the issue into their CAP as CR 10840257 on November 9, 2021.

Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the issue into their CAP as CR 10840257 on November 9, 2021. The licensee provided additional information supporting the operability and functionality of MOVs 8809A & B or check valve Q1(2)E11V0028 to prevent excessive backflow from the containment sump to the RWST. Specifically, MOVs 8809A & B are required to be closed prior to opening the associated containment sump isolation valves and check valve Q1(2)E11V0028 has been periodically tested to verify its reverse flow closure.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure of the licensee to properly categorize MOVs 8809A & B or check valve Q1(2)E11V0028 in their inservice testing program to ensure they could perform their safety function was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Specifically, the finding was a deficiency affecting the design of a mitigating SSC, and the SSC did maintain its operability and functionality.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.55a(f), Inservice testing requirements, subsection

(4) requires in part, that pumps and valves which are classified as ASME Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 must meet the inservice test requirements set forth in the ASME OM Code and addenda that become effective subsequent to editions and addenda specified in paragraphs (f)(2) of this section and that are incorporated by reference in paragraph (a)(1)(iv) of this section.

Furthermore, subsection (f)(4)(ii) requires, inservice tests to verify operational readiness of pumps and valves, whose function is required for safety, conducted during successive 120-month intervals must comply with the requirements of the latest edition and addenda of the ASME OM Code incorporated by reference in paragraph (a)(1)(iv) of this section 18 months before the start of the 120-month interval. The ASME Code of record for Farley for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM) is the 2004 Edition with Addenda through OMb-2006. Subsection ISTC-1300, Valve Categories, requires in part, that valves within this subsection shall be placed in one or more of the following categories. Category A is for valves for which the seat leakage is limited to a specific maximum amount in the closed position for fulfillment of their required function(s), as specified in ISTA-1100.

Contrary to the above, since 2001, the licensee did not categorize MOVs 8809A & B or check valve Q1(2)E11V0028 as Category A valves to ensure the ASME OM test requirements were met by leak testing the valves to ensure the dose remains within control room and site boundary limits during a design basis accident. This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The violation was entered into the licensees CAP as CR 10840257. (NCV 05000348, 364/2021011-01 Failure to Properly Categorize MOVs 8809A & B or Check Valve Q1(2)E11V0028 in the IST Program)

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On November 16, 2021, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection results to Cheryl Gayheart and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.21N.02 Calculations

BM-98-1711-001

Reverse Flow Evaluation of RWST Check Valves

Rev. 2

71111.21N.02 Calculations

F-RIE-IEIF-

MOVR-RNK

Farley Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Risk Ranking for

Motor-Operated and Air-Operated Valves (Following Rev. 9

Version 3 Model update)

Version 1

71111.21N.02 Calculations

F-RIE-

VALVERISK-U00

Farley Unit 1 and 2 Valve Risk Ranking Evaluation

Version 1

71111.21N.02 Calculations

FNP-

Q1E21MOV8803B

Thrust and Torque Calculation

Rev. 2

71111.21N.02 Calculations

FNP-

Q1N23MOV3209A

Thrust and Torque Calculation

Rev. 2

71111.21N.02 Calculations

FNP-

Q2E11MOV8887A

Thrust and Torque Calculation

Rev. 1

71111.21N.02 Calculations

FNP-

Q2E11MOV8889

Thrust and Torque Calculation

Rev. 1

71111.21N.02 Calculations

SE-91-1925-14-

PE

MOV 3232A,B,C: Terminal Voltage at End of Stroke

Rev. 1

71111.21N.02 Calculations

SE-94-0-0378-001

MOV Combination Starter Component Sizes and Settings

Rev. 5

71111.21N.02 Calculations

SE-94-0470-001

Unit 1 As-Built Load Study

Rev. 10

71111.21N.02 Calculations

SE-SNC529029-

001

Unit 1 Minimum Expected Voltage Study

Rev. 2

71111.21N.02 Calculations

SM-04-4801-002

AOV Design Basis Review - Setpoints for Q1N12HV3226

Version 2.0

71111.21N.02 Calculations

SM-90-1653-001

MOV Thrust Requirements for Gate & Globe Valves

Version 17

71111.21N.02 Calculations

SM-90-1653-002

Reduced Voltage Torque/Thrust Capability for Gate &

Globe Valves in the FNP MOV Program

Version 23

71111.21N.02 Calculations

SM-90-1653-002

Reduced Voltage Torque/Thrust Capability for Gate &

Globe Valves in the FNP MOV Program

Rev. 23

71111.21N.02 Calculations

SM-90-1653-003

Design Basis Differential Pressure for the MOV Program

Rev. 15

71111.21N.02 Calculations

SM-90-1653-003

Design Basis Differential Pressure for the MOV Program

Version 15

71111.21N.02 Calculations

SM-99-2189-007

AOV Design Basis Review - Setpoints for

Q2N11PV3371A/B/C

Version 2

71111.21N.02 Corrective Action

Documents

10835846

Discrepancy Between the Values for Required Voltage for

MOV8803B

10/20/2021

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Resulting from

Inspection

71111.21N.02 Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

10837853

Revision Requested for NMP-ES-017-008

10/29/2021

71111.21N.02 Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

10840257

Maximum Allowable Leakage from the Containment Sump

to RWST

11/09/2021

71111.21N.02 Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

10840275

Incorrect Test Methodology for Category A/C Check Valves 11/09/2021

71111.21N.02 Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR 10835850

10835850 - Discrepancy in the Electrical Inspection

Procedure

10/20/2021

71111.21N.02 Drawings

D-175033

Main Steam and Auxiliary Steam Systems

Version 12

71111.21N.02 Drawings

D-175038

Sht. 1, P&ID - Safety Injection System

Rev. 44

71111.21N.02 Drawings

D-205007

P&ID - Auxiliary Feedwater System, Sheet 1

Version 29.0

71111.21N.02 Drawings

D-205033

P&ID - Main Steam and Auxiliary Steam System, Sheet 1

Version 43.0

71111.21N.02 Drawings

D-205038

Sht. 1, P&ID - Safety Injection System

Rev. 39.0

71111.21N.02 Drawings

D-205038

Sht. 2, P&ID - Safety Injection System

Rev. 24.0

71111.21N.02 Drawings

D-205039

P&ID Chemical and Volume Control System, Sheet 6

Version 11.0

71111.21N.02 Drawings

U-176883

Outline & Dimensions for HV-3226

Version 2.0

71111.21N.02 Drawings

U-205093

150# OSY Gate Valve

11/25/1975

71111.21N.02 Drawings

U-277627

Atmosphere Relief Valve

Version 13.0

71111.21N.02 Drawings

U-611878

1500# Bolted Bonnet Gate Valve Q2E21MOV8106,

Q2E21MOV8107, & Q2E21MOV8108 (V265, V257, &

V258)

Version 1.0

71111.21N.02 Miscellaneous

ALA-10-147

Summary of Seismic and Weak Link Calculation Performed

for Valves at Locations 8106, 8107 and 8108

11/18/2020

71111.21N.02 Miscellaneous

ALA-11-89

Increase of Weak Link Closing Trust for Farley Units 1 and

10/27/2011

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Valve Locations 8106, 8107, and 8108

71111.21N.02 Miscellaneous

LDCR 20-044

Removal of Containment Penetrations 23, 24, 28, 42, 43,

44, 45, 46, 61a, 61b, 66 and 67 from the Requirements of

Technical Specification 5.5.17, Containment Leakage Test

Program

Version 1.0

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-1-EEP-1

Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant

Rev. 35.0

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-1-ESP-1.2

Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization

Rev. 26.0

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-1-ESP-1.3

Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation

Rev. 25.0

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-1-ESP-1.4

Transfer to Simultaneous Cold and Hot Leg Recirculation

Rev. 16.0

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-1-SOP-7.0

Residual Heat Removal System

Rev. 112.0

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-1-STP-11.17

RHR RWST Suction Check Valve Reverse Closure Test

10/09/19

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-1-STP-21.3

TDAFWP Steam Supply Valve IST

06/28/2021

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-1-STP-4.10

Reverse Flow Testing of RWST to Charging Pump Check

Valve & CVCS Emerg. Borate Filter to Chg. Pmp. Suction

Check Valve

Rev. 22.0

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-1-STP-40.0B

Safety Injection with Loss of Off-Site Power Test - B Train

Rev. 12.0

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-1-STP-45.4

ECCS Refueling Outage Valves Inservice Test

04/09/21

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-1-UOP-1.1

Startup of Unit from Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby

Rev. 110.2

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-1-UOP-1.2

Startup of Unit from Hot Standby to Minimum Load

Rev. 120.0

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-2-SOP-7.0

Residual Heat Removal System

Rev. 102.0

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-2-STP-11.17

RHR RWST Suction Check Valve Reverse Closure Test

10/23/20

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-2-STP-11.6

Residual Heat Removal Valves Inservice Test

11/02/20

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-2-STP-11.6

Residual Heat Removal Valves Inservice Test

07/26/21

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FNP-2-STP-158.0

Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve Leak

Test

11/10/20

71111.21N.02 Procedures

FPN-0-SOP-103.0

Return to Service Checklist and Return to Service Systems

Lineup

Rev. 49.0

71111.21N.02 Procedures

NMP-ES-017

Motor-Operated Valve Program

Version 10.1

71111.21N.02 Procedures

NMP-ES-017-001

Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Regulatory Scoping Process

Version 6.2

71111.21N.02 Procedures

NMP-ES-017-001-

F-V3

FNP GL89-10/96-05 MOV Program Scope

Version 1.0

71111.21N.02 Procedures

NMP-ES-017-002

Motor Operated Valve Design Basis Setpoint Deamination

Version 6.2

71111.21N.02 Procedures

NMP-ES-017-003

Motor Operated Valve Performance Trending and Margin

Version 5.2

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Management

71111.21N.02 Work Orders

SNC75202,

SNC390935,

SNC679107,

SNC681216,

SNC681217,

SNC831498,

SNC835825,

SNC835825,

SNC975098