IR 05000348/1997008
| ML20217R207 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217R180 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-97-08, 50-348-97-8, 50-364-97-08, 50-364-97-8, NUDOCS 9709040338 | |
| Download: ML20217R207 (26) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
REGION 11
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Docket Nos: 50-348 and 50 364 License Nos: NPF 2 and NPF 8 Report No: 50 348/97 08 and 50 364/97-08 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company. u . Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP), Units 1 and 2
, location: 7388 North State Highway 95 Columbia. AL 36319 Dates: June 22 through August 2, 1997 Inspectors: T. Ross. Senior Resident inspector (SRI)
J. Bartley. Resident inspector S. Cahill. SRI - Crystal River R. Caldwell. Resident inspector M. Ernstes. Project Engineer B. Holbrook. SRl Hatch T. Johnson, SRI - Turkey Point Approved by: P. Skinner. Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects ok Abo!! obO!$ 8
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Farley Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-348/97-08, 50-364/97-08 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection Ooerat1031 e Operator attentiveness to main control board (MCB) annunciator alarms and response to changing alant conditions were prompt. Management efforts to reduce the num)er of MCB deficiencies were effectiv Interviews with members of the operating crew indicated that they were consistently aware of plant conditions and ongoing activities (Section 01.1).
e Control Room professionalism was very good. Operator demeanor, conduct of business, and maintenance of noise level were excellent. Unnecessary per ,nnel and business were kept out of the " Controls Area." Unit Su0 and operations management oversight was evident. Command ano control functions were well provided (Section 01.1),
e The rapid actions taken by the on-shift crews after a Steam Generator feed Pump (SGFP) trip and another SGFP malfunction event a month later was the result of good teamwork, system knowledge, and supervisio Maintenance activities were appropriate. However, the root cause of the first lA SGFP trip was not determined and subsequently a second event occurred (Sections 01.2 and 01.3),
o A non-cited violation was identified for a Unit 2 Penetration Room Filtration valve l'inup which was determined to be in a non-proceduralized lineup (Section 01.4),
e Housekee)ing and physical conditions were adequat Extensive painting efforts lave improved the physical a)pearance of the plan Removal of rust from piping and components at tie Service Water Intake Structure prior to painting was not performed. Overall plant appearances and material conditions have improved. Examples of storing unsecured equipment around vital equipment were identified (Section 02.1),
o Safety system walkdowns and tours verified accessible portions of selected systems were adequately maintained and operational (Sections 02.1 and 02.2).
e Reviewed safety tagging activities were correct and met procedural requirements. The administrative aspects of the tagging orders were complete and accurate. The tags placed were adequate for personnel safety and equipment protection (Section 02.3).
Enclosure 2
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Maintenance e Maintenance and urveillance testing activities were generally conducted in a thorough and competent manner by qualified individuals in accordance with plant procedures and work instructions (Sections M1.1).
e Two major maintenance activities observed were performed wel However, a concern was identified during the testing of the #1 Diesel Driven Fire Pump outage (Section M1.2). Coinplications during the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator 18-month outage extended the out of service time to eleven days. which required a special report to the NPC. Problem resolution demonstrated conservative decision making. Corrective action efforts were thorough (Section M1.3).
e A non-cited violation was identified for 15 of 152 chemistry department preventive maintenance (PM) tasks exceeding the allowed grace period due to administrative deficiencies. Documentation of PM items assigned to other departments was satisfactory (Section M3.1).
e Failure to have procedures for the calibration of measuring and test equipment was identified as a violation (Section M8.2).
Enaineerina
! o Numerous small leaks identified on ECCS components in the penetration room boundary were not evaluated as part of the Technical Specification 6.8.3 Leak Reduction Program (Section E2.1).
Plant Suncort e Chemistry technicians were knowledgeabl Lab spaces were neat and clean. A non-cited violation was cited for a minor example of a failure to follow procedure concerning the positioning of the sample sink fume hood door during Reactor Coolant System sample purging (Section R1.2).
- In general, Health Physics control over the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA), and the work activities conducted within it, were appropriate and adequately supported the plant staff. Efforts to cleanup and reduce contaminated floor space of RCA have continued to be effective (Section R2.1),
o Security personnel observed during the inspection period were attentive to their responsibilities. Site security systems were adequate to ensure physical protection of the plant (Section S1.1).
e Shift clerks continued to do a good job managing the fire watches and tracking inoperable fire protection systems. The hourly and continuous fire watches were familiar with their responsibilities and were implementing them adequately (Section F1.1).
Enclosure 2 l
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I Reoort Det11h Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated continuously at 100% power for the entire inspection period, except for two rapid reductions in power to approximately 60% aower on June 23 and then again on July 29 due to speed control problems with tle 1A steam generator feed pump (SGFP). In both instances the unit was returned to full power a few days late Unit 2 operated continuously at 100% power for the entire inspection perio I. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations ;
01.1 Routine Observations of Control Room Doerations a. Jasoection Stone (Insoection Procedure (IP) 71707)
Inspectors conducted frequent inspections of ongoing plant operations in the Main Control Room (MCR) to verify proper staffing, operator attentiveness, adherence to approved operating procedures, communications, and command and coatrol of operator activities, inspectors reviewed operator logs and Technical Specifications (TS)
Limiting Condition of 0)eration (LCO) tracking sheets, walked down the Main Control Boards (MC3s), and interviewed members of the operating shift crews to verify operational safety and compliance with TSs. The inspectors attended morning plant status meetings and shift turnover meetings to maintain awareness of overall-facility operations.
l maintenance activities, and recent incident Morning reports and Occurrence Reports (OR) were reviewed on a routine basis to assure that the licensee properly reported and resolved potential safety concern b. Observations and Findinas Overall control and awareness of plant conditions during the inspection period remained adequate. Inspectors observed that the Unit 1 MCB annunciators and Balance of Plant (BOP) alarm Janels were occasionally
" blackboard." with the emergency power board (EPB) and Unit 2 MCBs
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nearly " blackboard" during the inspection period. Most of the time there were very few persistent annunciators in alarm, and these were for recognized long standing deficiencies. Aggressive management efforts to-l maintain MCB deficiencies at very low levels continued. The combined MCB deficiencies on Unit 1 and 2 have dropped below 15, with most being on Unit 2. Almost all of them involved nonsafety-related
, instrumentation or equipment, and none represented a TS LCO.
l 0)erator attentiveness to MCB annunciator alarms and response to clanging plant conditions and transients (see Sections 01.2 and 01.3)
were prompt and effective. Interviews with members of the operating crew identified that they were consistently aware of plant conditions Enclosure 2
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and ongoing activitie Operator knowledge was ver Operator logs generally were of sufficient detail and scop goo Shift staffing was i
verified to be in compliance with procedural and TS requirement Pre shift briefings of the operating crews by the shift supervisors (SS)
were generally concise and informative. The meetings accurately depicted plant and equipment status, and provided o)erators with shift direction and priorities. The inspector ooserved tlat re>resentatives
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chemistry, etc.) were not present to provide status and updates. This observation was discussed with licensee management.
- ~ Operators responded appropriately to alarm conditions and used the )
alarm response procedures (ARPs). Procedure use for system manipulations, power changes, testing and other evolutions was evident. Those activitias requiring step by-step completion were effectively performed with the procedure referred to frequentl : The inspector did note that neither the overhead alarm window nor l the ARP addressed alarm (reflash) capability. Licensee i representatives stated that they would address this issu Reactor Operator (RO) reactivity manipulations were observed by the inspectors. These included borations and dilutions using the Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS) and control rod ;
movements. These mani)ulations were performed per procedure .
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requirements. Senior leactor Operator (SRO) involvement was observed to be consistent with the re Administrative Procedure FNP-0 AP-16.quirement " Conduct of of Section Operations - of ,
Operations Group," Revision (Rev.) 26. and management expectations.
, Conclusions Control Room professionalism was very good. Operator demeanor, conduct of business, and maintenance of noise level were excellent. Unnecessary personnel and business were kept out of the " Controls Area." Unit SR0 and operations management oversight
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was evident. Command and control functions were well provided.
, Operator attentiveness to main control board (MCB) annunciator alarms and response to cSanging )lant conditions were prompt. Management efforts to reduce the num)er of MCB deficiencies were effectiv Interviews with members of the operating crew indicated that they were
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consistently aware of plant conditions and ongoing activities.
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l 01.2 1A Steam Generator Feedwater Pumo (SGFP) Trio a. Insoection Stone (IP 93702)
The ins)ector reviewed licensee response to a SGFP trip, which forced Jnit 1 to reduce power to approximately 62% from 100%
powe b, Observations and Findinas
} At 6:17 a.m. on June 23, 1997, the 1A SGFP tri) ped and control room operators entered procedures FNP 1-A0P-13.0, ".oss of Main feedwater,"
Rev. 10, and FNP-1-A0P-17.0, " Rapid Load Reduction," Rev. 9. The -
operators commenced driving rods in, started emergency boration, and '
started the rapid ramp down of the main turbine. A Unit 2 operator came over and assisted by controlling the Auxiliary Feed Pumps and stabilized steam generator water levels. The unit was stabilized at approximately
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62% power.
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The inspectors observed the Shift foreman for 0)erations (SF0) conduct a walkdown of the 1A SGFP in order to ascertain t1e cause of the trip.
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The walkdown was thorough: however, the cause for the SGFP tri) was not determined. The operating crew took 3rompt action to ensure tlat no ;
work was being conducted on the IB SG P to ensure that it would not be d .
inadvertently tripped,
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The inspectors observed the control room activities near the conclusion of the event and saw that operators were communicating well and d
reviewing the actions required by the procedures. The inspectors observed operators place the main turbine in auto after the trip, per
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FNP-1-SOP-28.1, " Turbine Generator Operation." Rev. 58. The shift
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supervisor and the system engineer were at the MCB to observe if the equipment operated as expected after the even Unit I was maintained at a) proximately 64% power during the 1A SGFP troubleshooting. The troualeshooting did not mnclusively identify the cause of the trip. Evidence reviewed by the ncensee indicated a component having an intermittent type failure. Therefore. 7300 cards NCD and NCB for the 1A SGFP boiler control loop were replaced and the speed pick up that feeds the electrical signal conversion unit (" Tach Pak") in the boiler control cabinet was changed to the spare speed pick-
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up. The Tach Pak was not changed out at this time. Additionally, the C1 & C2 card in the boiler control cabinet was replaced and the 1A SGFP was instrumented to detect any future abnormal occurrence OR 1-97-233 was written to document the event. The inspectors reviewed the completed OR and determined it accurately characterized the event and described the corrective action Enclosure 2 l
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c, Conclusions The rapid actions taken by the on-shift crew during the event and recovery demonstrated good teamwork, system knowledge, and supervisio However, as demonstrated by the event of July 29, 1997 (Section 01.3),
the root cause of the 1A SGFP trip was not determined or correcte .3 Unit 1 Unclanned Load Reduction a, insoection Scone (IP 71707 and 93702)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee response to the abnormal performance of the 1A SGFP on July 29, 1997, with the unit at 100%
power, Observations and Findinas At 10:50 a.m. on July 29 Unit 1 Control Room operators noted abnormal conditions of the 1A SGFP. A decrease in pump suction pressure, increase in lA SGFP turbine speed, and minor perturbations-in steam generator (SG) level control occurre Operators confirmed that some malfunction of the 1A SGFP control system had resulted in both the high and low pressure steam supply valves opening. This resulted in the SGFP turbine speed increasing to about 5500 rpm. This was less than the overspeed trip of about 5750 rp The R0s implemented procedure FNP-1 A0P-17.0, to preclude the 1A SGFP from tripping due to the lack of SGFP control. Power was '
reduced to 62%, which was within the capacity of the IB SGFP, Boration and control rod movements were appropriately performed, Once power had stabilized, the manual steam supply valves were closed and troubleshooting was initiated. The licensee also initiated OR l-97-28 Licensee maintenance and engineering personnel determined that the Tach Pak had failed. A similar malfunc'ecn had caused the 1A SGFP to overspeed and trip on June 23, 1997 (Section 01,2). The Tach L Pak unit was replaced: however, the device could not be calibrated. A second unit was obtained and was successfully calibrated. The speed sensor. electronic cards, and other system control functions were checked and found to be satisfactory. The 1A SGFP was restarted, tested, and placed in service. Instrument and Control (I&C) maintenance personnel subsequently identified a loose electronic card, which was replaced. The unit returned to l 100% power on July 3 Enclosure 2 l
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! The inspectors.were in the Unit 1 Control Room at the time of the
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- malfunctio ropriate and timely, and l Operator actions demonstrated conservative decisions.were apkhe shift supervisor and operations response and oversight were very good. Command and control was effectively demonstrate The inspectors witnessed portions of the troubleshooting and I&C activitie Personnel appeared knowledgeable and a)propriate precautions for the operating 1B ! iP were taken. Engineering supoort, procedure and technical wanual use, and oversight of maintenance work were observed to be goo v Conclusions j
Operator response to a SGFP malfunction on Unit I was very goo Maintenance activities were appropriat .4 Abnormal Penetration Room Filtration (PRF) System Lineun (IP 71707)
On July 7.1997, during a routine tour of the MCR. the inspector noted that the Unit 2 4 train PRF was lined up in an operating mode not directed by procedure. Unit 2 Fuel Handling Area (FHA) ventilation system was scheduled for a multiple day outage. While securing the FHA ventilation system 10 accordance with tag order (TO) 97-1744, the shift started Unit 2 A tre.n PRF per system operating procedure (S0P) FNP-2-SOP-58.0 " Auxiliary Building HVAC System." Rev. 26. and aligned it to the Saent Fuel Pool-(SFO). However, the inspectors noted that 02E15iOV336?A. 2A PRF Supply from the Penetration Room, was also ope This was no;. a proceduralized lineup. Procedure SOP-58.0, Step 4. provided direction for securing the FHA ventilation system which lined up the PRF system to take a suction on-the SFP area. The inspectors were not able to identify any procedural guidance for lining up the PRF system to both the SFP and Penetration Room Boundary (PRB)
simultaneously, any administrative controls, or an evaluation of the lineup. This issue was discussed with the Unit 2 SS who directed that PRF be place in a 3rocedurally directed lineup. On July 8. the inspectors noted tlat an OR had not been generated for this instance of failing to follow procedure. This was discussed with operations management and OR 2-97-254 was subsequently-generate ,
The inspectors reviewed the non-proceduralized lineup and determined that the system would have performed itt safety function, and therefor this lineup did not have any safety ccnsequence. This failure to fol'u procedure constitutes a viotnion of minor significance and is being '
treated as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Polic This is identified as NCV 50-364/97-08;01:
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Failure to Follow trocedure for the Penetration Room Filtration Syste a Enclosure 2 d
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02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 General Tours of Specific Safety-Related Areas (IP 71707)
General tours of safety-related areas were performed by the inspectors to examine the physical condition of plant equipment and structures, and "
to verify that safety systems were properly aligned. These general walkdowns included the accessible portions of safety-related structures, systems, and component General material conditions and housekeeping for Units 1 and 2 were adequate. Areas were generally clear of trash and debris. The extensive paintin;l efforts have improved the appearances of rooms, structures and equipment in some specific areas. No efforts to remove rust from piping and components at the SWIS prior to painting were observed. Minor equipment and housekeeping problems identified by the inspectors during their routine tours were reported to the responsible SS and/or maintenance departrient for resolutio The inspectors observed the storage of unsecured equipment, some in close proximity to vital equipment. The following are examples of unsecured equipment in the plant that were identified to the SSs and I management:
e Rolling chairs and stepladders around the vital switchgear at the SWIS e Upright ladder discovered leaning against vital 600 VAC Load Center 10, and next to local control panel e Unsecured ladder next to Unit 2 isophase bus cooling unit e Improperly secured gas bottle on Auxiliary Building roof, and loose power cables >
e Plastic patio chair in the Unit 2 cable spreading room o WetVac stored in Unit 1 cable spreading room Plant management was re-evaluating the strength of current administrative control .2 Biweekly Insoections of Safety S"'tems (IP 71707)
Inspectors verified the aperability of the following selected safety systems and/or equipment:
e 1-2A EDG e Unit 1 containment penetration integrity e Unit 1 and 2 CS systems
- Unit 1 and 2 Emergency Air Compressors and Pressurizer Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORV) backup nitrogen supply
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Accessible portions of the systems listed above were verified to be properly aligned and observed to be well maintained and in good operating condition. The inspectors did not identify any significant i Aaes that adversely affected system operabilit The inspectors verified Unit 1 containment integrity using FNP-1-STP-14.0. Appendix 1. " Containment Penetration Integrity Verification." Re . The inspectors verified that accessible valves, breakers, hatches, and capped pipes were properly aligned. No discrepancies were note The Emergency Air Compressors provide a backup air supply for the Main Steam (MS) atmospheric relief valves and Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Sum) steam supply valves. Nitrogen bottles provide motive force for tie 3ressurizer's PORVs during a loss of instrument air. Overall, the systems were adequately maintained. However, seven manually operated valves had paint and a significant accumulation of dirt on the valve stem threads. These valves are normally closed and must be opened to supply air to the MS atmospheric relief vr.lves and TDAFW pump steam su) ply valves. The inspectors reviewoi surveillance test procedures (ST)) performed on the Emergency Air Cwressors and found that the tests did not cycle any of these valves. These discrepancies were turned over to the Unit 1 and 2 SS. The SS initiated deficiency reports (DR) to have the valve stems cleaned and the valves cycled. The inspectors concluded that the condition did not rei. der the valves incapable of being operate The observations by the inspectors indicated that both trains of CS systems for both units were properly aligned and in good condition, except for certain drain valve and flange leaks (see i.2.1). The minor leaks have been observed during past inspector walkdowns. Some had DRs attached but nthers did no The inspectors discussed t;1ese observations with the Operations manage .3 Verification of Safety Taaaina Insoection ScoDe (IP 71707)
The inspectors reviewed procedure FNP-0-AP-14. " Safety Tagging." Re . and verified that selected tagging activities were conducted in
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accordance with procedural recuirements. The inspectors reviewed and walked down devices tagged uncer the following tag orders (TO):
e TO# 97-1744 FHA Ventilation System o TO# 97-1771-2 2A Charging Pump e TO# 97-1825 2C EDG e TO# 97-1916-1 1B CS System
. TO# 97-1782-2 2B Emergency Air Compressor System e TO# 97-1373-2 U2 Component Cooling Water System o TO# 97-1647-2 U2 Incore Detectors Enclosure 2 i
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b. Observations and Findinas The inspectors verified that devices identified on the tag orders were properly tagged. The devices numbers were correct. tags were conspicuously placed on the devices and the tags did not obscure control room panel indications. The administrative aspects of filling out the tagging order forms were complete and correct. The tags placed were adequate for personnel safety ard equipment protection, c. Conclusion The inspectors concluded that the safety tagging activities reviewed were correct and met the procedural requirements. The administrative astects of the tagging orders were complete and accurate. The tags placed were adequate for personnel safety and equipment protectio .4 TS LCO Trackina (IP 71707)-
The inspectors routinely reviewed the TS LC0 tracking sheets filled out by the shift foremen. All tracking sheets for Units 1 and 2 reviewed by the inspectors were consistent with plant conditions and TS requirements, i
l 02.5 Preoarations For Hurricane Danny (IP 71707)
On July 19. the inspectors toured the site and observed and verified licentee preparations for Hurricane Danny. The licensee secured or stowed loose items and added additional fuel oil to the emergency diesel generators. Hurricane preparations were commensurate with the potential ris Miscellaneous Operations Issues (IP 92901)
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0 (Closed) VIO 50-348.364/96-09-01: Multiple Valve Misalignments By System Operators (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-348/96-05: Valve Misalignment Due to Personnel Error Results .n Missed Surveillance The-licensee responded to the violation in correspondence dated December 4, 1996, and associated Corrective Action Report (CAR) N . The inspectors reviewed the licensee's letter and completed CA including attached training sheets, and corrective actions identified in the LE Licensee corrective actions were effective, this violation and LER are close ,
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l II. Maintenan M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments a. Insoection S.one (IP 61726 and 62707)
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Inspectors observed and reviewed portions of various licensee corrective and preventive maintenance activities, and witnessed routine surveillance testing to determine conformance with plant procedures, work instructions, industry codes and standards. Technical S)ecifications (TSs), and regulatory requirements. The inspectors o) served all or portions of the following maintenance and surveillance activities, as identified by their associated work order (WO), work authorization (WA), or surveillance test procedure (STP):
e WO#479670 FNP-0-MP-5.7, " Ins)ection and Repair of Charging Pump Speed Increaser Luae Oil Pum) Cou) lings " Rev. 3 e WO#M97002585 Replace exhaust boot on 2A S P Ex1aust Fan e FNP-1,2-STP-408 " Dissolved Oxygen Determination for the Reactor Coolant System " Revs. 12 and 13 e FNP-1,2-STP-409 " Chloride Determination for the Reactor Coolant System," Revs. 14 and 19 e FNP-1,2-STP-410 " Fluoride Determination for the Reactor Coolant System " Revs. 15 and 17 e WO#477676 2C EDG 18-month ins)ections e FNP-0-STP-26.0B " Control Room Train 3 Ventilation Operability Test,"
Rev. 12 e WO#M97001957 Replace bonnet of emergency air supply valve to TDAFW steam supply valve HV-3235A e FNP-1-STP-213,6- " Steam Generator 1B Level Transmitter 486 Functional Test," Rev. 26 b. Observations. Findinas and Conclusions All of the maintenance work and surveillance testing observed by the inspectors was performed in accordance with work instructions, procedures, and applicable clearance controls. No adverse findings were identified. Safety-related maintenance and surveillance testing evolutions were well-planned and executed. Personnel demonstrated familiarity with administrative and radiological controls. Surveillance tests of safety-related equipment were consistently performed in a deliberate step-by-step manner by personnel in close communication with the MCR. Overall, operators and technicians were observed to be knowledgeable, experienced and well trained for the tasks performe Enclosure 2 l
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M1.2 #1 Diesel Driven Fire Pumo (DDFP) Outaae (IP 62707)
The inspectors observed the majority of the outage condu ted on #1 DDFP 3er WO#480465 and FNP-0-FSP-400. " Diesel Driven Fire Pump Ins)ection."
Rev. 3. including valve adjustment, turbocharger inspection. Jelt replacement, and return to service testing. This was the first time that Farley personnel performed this procedure without a technical representative being present. Their inexperience caused delays while refining FSP-400 guidance for.. valve adjustments and making a special tool for adjusting the valve Delays also resumed on the first day when o)erations tagged out the DDFP for pre-release without realizing that t1e first part of the outage required running the DDFP to obtain
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the as-found data. Although delays occurred, the quality of the work was goo Maintenance workers were knowledgeable and did a good job maintaining cleanliriess of the work area. However, on July 18. 1997, while observing the post-maintenance testing, the inspectors observed an activity being performed that was not addressed in FNP-0-FSP-203.5. "#1
1 Diesel-Driven Fire Pump Functional Test." Rev. 4 The procedure-directed performing the overspeed test and adjustment of the overspeed setpoint. The inspectors noted that the test personnel set up ;
approximately 1000 gpm recirculation flow back to the storage tank. The i procedure did not provide direction to set up recirculation flow back to the tar.k. The inspectors discussed this observation with the maintenance personnel. They stated that they did this based on previous experience with the overspeed test lifting the pump's relief valv The inspectors determined that this observation did not invalidate the test and was probably a good maintenance practic M1.3 2C EDG 18-Month Outaae (IP 62707) Scope The inspector reviewed the work packages and observed selected portions of the 2C EDG 18 month outage including: service water (SW)._ jacket water (JW) and lube oil (LO) draining: injector testing: heat exchanger (HX) tube bundle replacements: generator inspection: camshaft bearing inspection; and the search for missing check valve components. The inspector also followed up on the replacement of the #12 cylinder liner and reviewed the evaluation for the missing check valve component Observations and Findings Work.was typically well-coordinated. Workers were diligent in maintaining foreign material exclusion covers over open components. The licensee's practice of having COLTECH representatives onsite during major EDG work proved to be advantageous for addressing technical issues. Delays in returning the 2C EDG to service were caused by the Enclosure 2
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proble11s discussed in the following paragraphs. The 2C EDG outage, scheduled to be five days, lasted 11 days, exceeding the allowed outage time by one day and which require submission of a special report to the NR During the inspection of the JW system, the licensee identified that the internals of 02R43V0559 Jacket Coolant Pump Discharge Check Valve, were missing. The inspectors observed the licensee's corrective actions for locating the missing internals. These corrective actions required extensive disassembly of the jacket water system. Licensee efforts to locate the missing components were thorough and generally successfu However, the licensee was unable to locate the following check valve components:
e Torsion Spring tang - 16 gauge wire 1-7/16 inch long e Two Torsion Spring coils - 16 gauge wire. approximately 5/8 inch diameter s Four hard leather inserts, each approximately 2/4 inch Outsidc
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Diameter (00). 1/2 inch ID. and 1/8 inch thick l
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The inspectors discussed with the COLTECH representative and hcensee maintenance personnel the potential impac' of the missing components on i EDG performance. The inspectors also physically walked down the cooling system and viewed the internal cooling water passages while the EDG was disassemble In addition. the ins)ectors reviewed the licensee's safety evaluation which concluded tlat the missing components would not adversely affect the performance of the 2C EDG. The inspectors review determined that the actions of the licensee were adequate for the missing valve part Another delay occurred when a JW leak was identified on a cylinder liner during the hydrostatic test of the JW system. The leak was very smali, and would not have be m vis' a or identifiable except for the extensive disassembly of the EDG due tu the search for the check valve component The licensee conservatively decided to replace the liner. This required further disassembly and removal of the upper crankshaft. The ins)ector examined the old liner and discussed the location of the leak wit 1 licensee staff and concluded that it was unlikely the missing check valve components caused the lea A delay also occurred during the reassembly of the upper crankshaf The COLTECH representative found that two bearing alignment pins were missing while inspecting the bearing halves prior to installatio These pins are approximately 1/4 inch diameter and 3/4 inch long. The licensee commenced a search for the pins which included inspecting all the upper galleries, vacuuming all residual LO from the sump. and dragging a magnet through the sump. One pm was located in the upper gallery. The second pin was not recovered. Based on the extensive search, the licensee determined that the Jin most likely fell outside of the EDG. However, if this were the not t1e case, to ensure that the pin Enclosure 2
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would not adversely affect the EDG, the licensee identified all flocations where the pin may have dropped into the EDG and determined that the pin would be swept to the sump and captured by the L0 strainers. The inspectors conluded that this assessment was adequat The inspectors observed the return to service maintenance run performed
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on August 1.1997. -No deficiencies were identii c. . Conclusions-Maintenance work was performed by well qualified :nd knowledgeable t
' individuals. -Problem resolution demonstrated conservative decision-makin Corrective action efforts were thorough.
o M3- Maintenance Procedures-and Documentation M3.1 Review of Preventive-Maintenance (PM) Documentation
! .Msoection Scooe (62707)-
n l The inspectors reviewed procedure FNP-0-GMP-1 " Preventative Maintenance
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Procedure," Rev. 17,.and-reviewed licensee ~ actions to implement the l= requirements of the procedure. Items inspected included the process to-schedule, track, trend and_ document preventive maintenance item :b; Observations and'Findinas The inspectors observed from plant tours that some locally posted-calibration labels: indicated thatlthe. devices had-not been calibrated within the scheduled due'date. N e insp t ors observed-that-step 3.6 of:
- procedure FNP-0-GMP-1 allowed 25% grace period for calibration, based '
upon the normal frequency time schedule, es an allowed extension. The=
procedure did not recuire that the local calibration-labels be updated to reflect the extenced time. .The. inspectors observed that the computer generated reports accurately reflected the extended time PM items are scheduled to be worked within' a specified time period-with-an assigned due date. 1The inspectors reviewed a. list of active PMs and observed there was a total of 1653 of which approximately 15% were beyond the due date and into the 25% grace period for ccmpletion' for a-variety of reasons. The ir.spectors observed that the chemistry department was an outlier with about 48% of the active 152'PMs in th extended grace period, About 15 PMs assigned to the chemistry
' department had exceeded thefallowed 25% grace-perio The inspectors-observed from the documents reviewed.that some procedure forms for PM Extension Requests were not always completed. This-documentation was for PMs that would be completed after the allowed 25%-
additional time grace period. Documentation for some PMs that management decided should be voided was:not updated. Additionall Enclosure 2:
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Mumentation was not updated to indicate that some PMs could not be performed due to component unavailability. Failure to address chemistry related PMs that had exceeded their allowed grace period constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a NCV consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This is identified as NCV 50-348, 364/97-08-02, Multiple Chemistry PMs Exceeded Allowed Grace Perio The inspectors observed that most administrative deficiencies were PM tasks assigned to the Chemistry department. The inspectors discussed this observation with chemistry management. Chemistry personnel immediately conducted a review of p6st te PMs assigned to the
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department and discovered that administative deficiencies existed for
' about 15 items. The inspectors were informed that some past due PMs i
were immediately performed and that actions to correct other administrative deficiencies had been initiated. The inspectors were informed that an unclear understanding of who was receiving and taking actions on the PM management report contributed to the administrative I
. deficiencies. The inspectors did not identify any past due PM that presented a component or instrument operability concer Conclusions The inspectors identified a weakness in the administrative aspects of obtaining approval for past due PM items assigned to the Chemistry departmen Documentation of PM items assigned to other departments was satisfactor M3.2 EDG Test Data Loa (IP 61726)
On July 9. the inspectors reviewed the EDG Test Data Lo The log was legible, up to date and complete. All necessary data was included in the log, with good explanations of invalid starts and tests, and valid failure M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (IP 92902)
M (Closed) VIO 50-348/96-07-01: Misadjustment of Unit 1 NIS Intermediate Range Compensating Voltage The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence date October 25, 1996 and initiated CAR No. 2218. An inspector reviewed the licensee's letter and completed CAR. The ins)ector also reviewed applicable changes made to FNP-0-IMP-228.4. "4uclear Instrumentation System Intermediate Range Compensation Voltage Adjustment." Rev. 4, that incorporated new guidelines for determining minimum source range level Licensee corrective actions were effectiv Based on this review, this violation is close Enclosure 2 u ._ . . . . . .
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M8,2 (Closed) Unresolved item (URI) 50 348. 364/97-06-01: Lack of Calibration Procedures During the week of June 16. the inspectors observed a technician calibrate a multimeter without a formal procedure. The technician did use a prepared data sheet for guidance and to document as-found/as-left data. Subsequent investigations by the licensee determined that 28 types /models of Measuring & Test Equipment (M&TE) controlled by the calibration lab did not have any written calibration procedure Examples of M&TE without written calibration procedures included -
pressure gauges, multimeters, transmitters, torque wrenche differential pressure (DP) gauges, ammeters, etc. About 24 ty)es/models of M&TE did have procedures, although several nodels of these i&TE were no longer in us The inspectors interviewed the I&C Calibration Lab Coordinator and team leader responsible for developing maintenance procedures. Based on this interview, the inspectors concluded that the lack of calibration procedures had existed for several year However, the issue had been assigned a low priority. The inspectors discussed this with the
, maintenance manager. The licensee terminated the onsite calibration of any M&TE that did not have an approved calibration procedur CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XII and Section 12.4.1 of the Operations Quality Assurance Policy Manual. GO-M-7. Rev. 32, requires-establishing and maintaining a system for control and calibration of measuring and test equipment to include provisions for preparing and implementing procedures for the control, calibrction, and adjustment of each category of measuring and test equipment requiring calibratio However, most of the M&TE used onsite did not have written and approved calibration procedures, this is identified as VIO 50-348, 364/97-08-0 Lack Of M&TE Calibration Procedures. The unresolved item is considered closed based upon issuance of the VI M8.3 (Closed) LER 50-364/95-09-01: Entry Into S)ecified Condition With Intermediate Neutror Flux Detector Inopera]le-The inspectors reviewed this LER revision and determined that the previous closecut of associated violations VIO 50-364/95-20-03 and NCV 95-21-01, and the original LER 50-364/95-09, were sufficient verification that the significant corrective actions had been accomplished. This LER is considered closed, s
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III. Enaineerina El Conduct of Engineering (IP 37551)
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E1.1 The inspectors observed portions of procedure FNP-1-ETP-4392. " Secondary Plant Performance Test Unit Operation Procedure," Revision (Rev.) 2, conducted under WO# 97005225. The information appeared complete, the engineer was very knowledgeable of the test, plant conditions, and how i the test impacted shift operations.
l-E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment (IP 37551)
E2.1 Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment On July 24 and 25 the inspectors observed that numerous drain valves were leaking on both trains of the containment spray (CS) system for both units. The pump casing and suction line drain valves were leaking by their seats into the room sump. Some of the leaks had deficiency reports (DRs) written for the leak, but several on the 1B and 2A CS systems did not. Boric acid accumulation was also observed around the 1B CS pump suction spool flange, causing significant bolt corrosion. No DR was written addressing this boric acid accumulation. The active drain valve leaks were on the order of several drops a minute, with the most significant being a drop or two per second, After being notified, the Unit 1 shift supervisor (SS) requested a system o)erator (S0) and Shift Foreman to investigate. DRs were written and OR 1-97-274 was initiate TS 6.8.3 requires a program to reduce leakage from those portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to as low as practical level The inspectors reviewed the most recent CS system leakage assessments performed on Units 1 and 2 in accordance with FNP-1-ETP-24 " Containment Spray Leakage Assessment." Rev. 10, and FNP-2-ETP-253,
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" Containment Spray Leakage Assessment," Rev. 7. These leakage assessments were accomplished during U1RF14 and U2RF11. as were the leakage assessments for CVCS, RHR. Waste Gas and samaling systems as part of the plant Leakage Reduction Programs for eac1 unit. All of i these assessments are routinely done during every refueling outag After reviewing ETP-240 and 253. the inspectors concluded that these assessm?nts were effective in identifying leaks within the scope of the Leak Reduction Progra However, the licensee had not been aggressive in reducing the leakage to "as low as practical levels." Furthermore, since these leak assessments were accomplished. the inspector observed that additional leaks had developed which were not assessed in the Leak Reduction Progra <
Enclosure 2
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In concert with the Leak Reduction Program, the licensee has procedures for identifying, evaluating, and repairing boric dcid leaks in order to limit corrosion. FNP-0-ACP-52.2 " Work Order Development and Approval,"
Rev. 3. step 1.3.38 requires that the repair and/or cleaning-of residue of any borated water leaks on safety-related systems be performed in accordance with FNP-0-ETP-4303. " Evaluation and Prevention of Damage From Borated Water Leakage." However, the ins)ectors observed active borated water leaks (e.g.. Units 1 and 2 High lead Safety injection (HHSI) flow orifices) and inactive leaks with considerable boric acid accumulation (e.g. ,1B CS pump suction flange) in the plant that had nnt been addressed according to ETP-430 On August 4. the inspectors met with Operations. Maintenance and Engineering Support (ES) management to discuss plant programs for controlling coolant leaks to limit corrosion of safety-related )iping systems and 3ressure boundaries, and to reduce any potentially lighly
, radioactive Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) fluid leaks outside containmen During this meeting the discussions identified that boric acid leaks were not consistently forwarded to the ES department for evaluation. Also, plant personnel (especially the S0s) were not consistently writing DRs for identified leaks to ensure that appropriate evaluations and/or repairs were made. During the meeting, licensee management was also unclear if leakage limits for the various systems scoped by the Leak Reduction Program were adequately defined and/or consistent with leak limits described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
The above issues are identified as URI 50-348, 364/97-08-04. Primary Coolant Leakage Outside Containment until the licensee completes its investigation regarding the scope and frequency of leak assessments, basis of acceptable leakage limits, and leak evaluation and repair as part of the Leak Reduction Program, and administrative controls for limiting corrosio E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903)
E (Closed) Deviation (DEV) 50-348. 364/96-07-02. " Failure to Fulfill Pressure Sensor RTT Commitments."
The licensee's Safety Audit and Engineering Revien (SAER) report 96-STPP/34 identified that some licensee commitments associated with TS amendments 116 for Unit 1. and 108 for Unit 2 were not fulfilled. The TS amendment was made in order to eliminate some sensor Response Time Testing. The licensee responded to the deviation by correspondence dated October 25, 199 The licensee identified the cause of this deviation to be personnel error, by operations management. and failure of maintenance personnel to adequately address the commitments prior to issuarce of the TS amendment The inspectors reviewed licensee corrective actions, which included a review of: 3revious TS amendments (for time periods of approximately two years for Jnit 1 and three years
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for Unit 2) to verify that other commitments were not missed: revision of applicable surveillance tests: maintenance and administrative control procedures; a work history to ensure that recently installed instruments were properly tested: and counseling cf individuals involved in the missed commitments. Based upon the inspectors' review of the licensee's actions, this item is close E8.2 (Closed) VIO 50-348. 364/96-03-05. "10 CFR 70.24(a) Criticality Monitor" This violation occurred when specific exemptions from Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 10 CFR 70.24 (a), (Criticality Monitor) were not continued from the licensee's construction permit to the 10 CFR Part 50 operating license. The licensee responded to this violation by
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correspondence dated June 13. 1996. The licensee's request for an :
exemption was granted by the NRC on July 31, 199 Based u)on the L l inspectors review of licensee actions and the issuance of t1e exempticn
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request, this violation is close E8.3 (Closed) Insoector Followuo Item (IFI) 50-348. 364/95-18-06: Electrical 1 Distribution System Functional Inspection (EDSFI)-Degraded Voltage Commitments This IFI documented two commitments made in Southern Nuclear Operating Company. Inc. (SNC) letter to the NRC dated June 6. 1995. that were also identified in a Safety Evaluation Report dated August 9.1995. The commitments were:
e Include LCOs and surveillance re grid alarm relays in the Imprc quirements
. TS (ITS) (SR) for the packag degraded and, if SNC decided net to implement the IIS, to submit a TS amendment within six months of the decision not to implement the IT * Document the offsite system operating voltage range and its purpose in the Updated FSAR (UFSAR) to be performed in the spring of 199 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's draft version of ITS Section 3.3.5. Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator Start Instrumentation, and verified that the LCOs and surveillance for the degraded grid alarm relays were incorporated. The second commitment was closed in Inspection Report (IR) 50-348, 364/97-01. Based on this review this item is close E8.4 (Closed) LER 50-348. 364/96-07-01: IEEE-279 Requirements Not Met For Protection Channel III Steam Generator Information In a revision to LER 50-348, 364/96-07, the licensee updated its proposed corrective actions to acknowledge those actions that were already completed and commit to additional long term action Enclosure 2 u l
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Specifically, the licensee committed to modify the steam generator water level control (SGWLL) system during refueling outages (RF) U1RF15 and U2RF12 to achieve full compliance with IEEE-279. By letter dated April 29. 1997, the licensee requested the NRC approve the interim SGWLC design as a proposed alternative to IEEE 279-1971 pursuant to ,
10CFR50.55a(a)(3). In a subsequent letter dated July 25. 1997, the licensee notified the NRC that they were withdrawing their commitment to modify the SGWLC systems because of plans to replace the SGs during U1RF16 and U2RF14. SNC requested NRC a> proval of their proposed alternative per 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3). Tuse letters and the licensee's requests are being reviewed by NR Based on this correspm dence this LER is considered close IV. Plant Sucoort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls P.1.1 Radioloaical Controls (IP 71750)
An inspector observed portions of procedure FNP-1-STP-714 " Waste Monitor Tank Surveillance " Rev.19. for liquid waste release permit (LWRP)# 970443.012.180.L 't a #2 Waste Monitoring Tank (WMT). The Radiochemist used the current procedure, the calculations were correct, and the ensuing paperwork complete and proper. The inspectors concluded that the surveillance was adequately accomplishe R1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Samole and Analysis a. Insoection Scoce (IP 7175Q1 The inspectors observed chemistry technicians obtain Unit 1 and 2 RCS samples, prepare check samples, and perform analyses for Baro Chlorides. Fluorides. Hydrogen, and radioisotope b. Observations and Findinas The samples were drawn and analyzed using the guidance of procedure FNP-1.2-CCP-651, " Sampling the Reactor Coolant System." Revs.14 and 1 The inspectors determined that the technicians followed the procedure Overall chemistry and cleanliness practices were good and the technicians were knowledgeable and conscientious. As an example, one technician was not satisfied with the timing of the Degassed Gross Activity (DGA) sample. Because it did not meet his expectation for timing, although it was within procedural requirements, the operator re-sampled for DGA to ensure that the timing was consistent from sample to sam 31 The lab spaces were clean and neat. All instruments were witlin calibration and all reagents were within their expiration dat Enclosure 2 m
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The inspectors reviewed the chemistry radiation work permit (RWP)# 097-0201 and FNP-0-CCP-675. " Fume Hoed Operations." Rev. The RWP required closing the fume hood door to less than or equal to four inches while purging and anytime not actively obtaining a sample or aerforming analysis inside the hood. Procedure FNP-0-CCP-675 directed slutting the fume hood door less than or equal to Sr inches while ) urging the RCS sample. Contrary to the RWP and the procedure the tec1nicians left the fume hood doors open approximately eight inches all of the time. The inspectors investigated further and determined that the fume hoods provided approximately 300 foot per minute (fpm) capture velocity while open approximately eight inche CCP-675 required 100-200 fpm capture velocity for the activities being performed in the sample sink. The inspectors concluded that this was a minor violation since there was adequate capture air flow at the eight inch open position although the procedures directed closing the fume hood doors to less than or equal to four inches. This failure to follow procedure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy, This is identified as NCV 50-348, 364/97-08-05: Failure to follow fume hood procedure.
l c. Conclusions i
The chemistry technicians were knowledgeabl Lab spaces were neat and clean. A minor violation was identified concerning the positioning of the sample sink fume hood doo R2 Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment (IP 71750)
R2.1 Cleanuo and Decontamination of Radiolooically Controlled Area (RCA)
During the course of the inspection aeriod, the inspectors conducted tours of the Unit 1 and 2 auxiliary auilding RCA. In general. HP control over the RCA, and the work activities conducted within it, were appropriate and adequately supported the plant staff. Efforts to cleanup and reduce contaminated floor space of RCA have continue HP was-Jarticularly successful in recovering the contaminated floor space in t1e residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger (HX) rooms, by deconning the areas under the RHR HX end bells, and installing creatively-designed catch barriers. The licensee was currently looking at implementing similar improvements in the four RHR pump rooms which were generally contaminated and restrict personnel access to the equipment located withi S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (IP 71750)
S1.1 Routine Observations of Plant Security Measures During routine inspection acti'/ities, inspectors verified that portions of site security program plans were being properly implemented. This was generally evidenced by: proper display of picture badges by plant Enclosure 2 w x _ _
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personnel: appropriate key carding of vital areatdoors: adequate stationing / tours in the protected area by security pers .el: proper -i searching of packages / personnel at the primary access point and service-water intake structure: and adequate maintenance of security systems,
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Security personnel activities observed during the inspection period were- '
performed well. Site security systems were adequate to ensure physical protection of the plan F1 Control Of Fire Protection Activities (IP 71750)
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F1.1. Fire htches On July 17, the inspectors accompanied the auxiliary building RCA hourly fire watch on his rounds, interviewed the responsible shift clerk, and reviewed the administrative systems for tracking inoperable fire
' barriers, detectors and suppression systems. On July 18, the inspectors also interviewed and observed continuous fire watches' stationed in the
. Unit 2 121-foot elev6 tion piping penetration room.
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The hourly and: continuous fire watches were familiar with their responsibilities'and were im)lementing them appropriately, The inspector observed that the lourly fire watch did not remain very long-in any one room. He typically entered an area, did a quick scan, and promptly continued on his way.in order to finish all the assigned areas-within an hour. This' technique was unlikely detect incipient or-smoldering fires in larger or more congested rooms, such as the piping-penetration rooms. The continuous fire watches observed by the ins)ector were alert, but remained on or near a chair by the door. This=
.tec1nique also was unlikely to detect incipient or. smoldering fires beyond their--line-of-sight. These observations were discussed with licensee managemen The shift clerk responsible for tracking inoperable' fire protection systems, overseeing the fire watches and reviewing their logs was very knowledgeable and experienced. He maintained good control over the numerous fire protection-compensatory measures that were in plac V. Manaaement Meetinas and Other Areas
. XI: . Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report-(UFSAR)' Commitments A recent discovery of a licensee.0)erating its-facility-in a manner contrary to the UFSAR description lighlighted the need for a specia ifocused review that compares plant practices, proc'edures and/or
- parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing the inspections
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discussed-in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR-that related to the areas inspected. The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the'
observed plant practices, procedures and/or parameter Enclosure 2 i
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X2 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on August 11, 1997, after the end of the inspection perio The licensee acknowledged the findings presente The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspec' ion should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. Bullock, Operations R. Coleman. Maintenance Manager G. Crone. Training Supervisor R. Federico. Senior Engineer - Engineering Support S. Fulmer. Technical Manager D. Grissette. Operations Manager D. Hobson. Operations V. Holly. Operations F. Lero. Operations K. Lockhart. SAER I
W. 0'dfield. Operations J. Powell, Superintendent Unit 2 Operations L. Stinson. Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations J. Thomas. Engineering Support Manager G. Waymire. Plant Administration Manager T. Youngblood. Operations NRC T. Ross. Senior Resident Inspector J. Bartley. Resident Inspector INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 37551: Ontite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92901: Followup - Operations IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance IP 92903: Followup - Engineering IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors Enclosure 2 l
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ITEMS OPENED,-CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened lypg Item Number Status Descriotion and Referen.ca NCV 50-364/97-08-01 Open Failure to Follow Procedure for the Penetration Room Filtration System (Section 01.4)
NCV 50-348, 364/97-08-02 Open Multiple Chemistry PMs Exceeded Allowed Grace Period (Section M3.1)
VIO 50-348. 364/97-08-03 Open Lack Of M&TE Calibration Procedures (Section M8.2)
[ URI 50-348, 364/97-08-04 Open Primary Coolant Leakage Outside
Containment (Section E2.1)
NCV 50-348, 364/97-08-05 Open Failure to follow fume hood procedure (Section R1.2)
t Closed lypg Item Number Status Descriotion anc' Reference NCV 50-364/97-08-01 Closed Failure to Follow Procedure for the Penetration Room Filtration System (Section 01.4)
VIO 50-348.364/96-09-01 Closed Multiple Valve Misalignments By System Operators (Section 08.1)
LER 50-348/96-05 Closed Valve Misalignment Due to Personnel Error Results in Missed Surveillance (Section 08.1)
NCV 50-348, 364/97-08-02 Closed Multiple Chemistry PMs Exceeded Allowed Grace Period (Section M3.1)
VIO 50-348/96-07-01 Closed Misadjustment of Unit 1 NIS Intermediate Range Compensating Voltage (Section M8.1)
URI 50-348, 364/97-06-01 Closed Lack of Calibration Procedures (Section M8.2)
LER 50-364/95-09-01 Closed Entry Into Specified Condition With Intermediate Neutron Flux Detector Inoperable (Section M8.3)
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DEV 50-348, 364/96-07-02 Closed Failure to Fulfill Pressure Sensor RTT Commitments (Section E8.1)
VIO 50 348, 364/96-03-05 Closed 10 CFR 70.24(a) Criticality Monitor (S?ction E8.2)
IFI 50-348. 364/95-18-06 Closed EDSFI Degraded Voltage Commitments (Section E8.3)
LER 50-348, 364/96-07-01 Closed IEEE-279 Requirements Nct Met For Protection Channel III Steam Generator Information (Section E8.4)
NCV 50-348, 364/97-08-05 Closed Failure to Follow Fume Hood Procedure (Section R1.2)
Discussed lyng Item Number Status Descriotion and Reference l VIO 50-348, 364/97-03-01_ Open Multiple Examples of Failure to i
Follow Procedures (Sections 0 l M1.2, and R1.2)
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