IR 05000348/1980012

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IE Insp Repts 50-348/80-12 & 50-364/80-14 on 800528-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Unit 1 Containment Tendon Surveillance Quality Records & Unit 2 Containment Structural Integrity Test Qa/Qc Controls
ML19330C045
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 06/24/1980
From: Conlon T, Lenahan J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19330C044 List:
References
50-348-80-12, 50-364-80-14, NUDOCS 8008070459
Download: ML19330C045 (3)


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UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

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101 MARIETTA sT N.W., SUITE 3100 o

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

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Report Nos. 50-348/80-12 and 50-364/80-14 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35202 Facility Name: Farley Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos. NPF-2 and CPPR-86 Inspection at Farley site near Ashford, Alabama s //

X hL f S/ YO Inspecto c

J. J. Lenahan

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/Date' Signed Approved 6%' */ G

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E'. Conlon, Section Chief, RCES Branch

/Dat( Signed SUMMARY Inspection on May 28-30, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 21 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Unit I containment tendon surveillance quality records and Unit 2 containment structural integrity test QA/QC controls, work performance and quality records.

Results Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • W. G. Hairston, III, Plant Manager G. Waymire, Jr., Engineer D. Mansfield, Start-up Superintendent Other Organizations C. G. Sciortini, QC Inspector, VSL Corporation R. Rowley, SIT Test Supervisor, Bechtel N. J. Tohoski, SIT Technical Director, Bechtel D. Palmer, SIT Technical Director, Bechtel H. Wilkerson, Civil Engineer, Bechtel K. Gondhi, Structural Engineer, Bechtel NRC Resident Inspector W. H. Bradford
  • Attended exit interview

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2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 30, 1980 by NRC resident inspector W. H. Bradford with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Independent Inspector Effort The inspector examined procedure number FNP-1-STP-609, Revision 4, "Contain-ment Tendon Surveillance Test" to determine if the test procedure complied with the requirements of Farley Technical Specification 4.6.1.6.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.35, Revision 2, and commitments of FSAR Section 3.8.1.7.3 for the inservice inspection of the Unit I containment building tendons.

This procedure specifies the requirements for inspection, testing, analysis and data reporting of the containment building post-tensioning syste (

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-2-The inspector reviewed quality records relating to the second tendon sur-veillance inspection and discussed the results with the VSL QC inspector.

The second tendon surveillance, which is required to be made 3 years after the structural integrity test is performed, was completed as of the date of this NRC inspection except for regreasing of the tendon voids. The following quality records were examined:

Calibration records of hydraulic ram stressing jack number 1000-12-1 a.

b.

Inspection records for the field end and shop end of the anchorage assembly for tendon number V16, D309, H39 cB, H12 BA H26 BA, H6HA, H30 CA and H25 CA.

Records of prestressing force and retrasioning and tendon test wire c.

inspection records for tendon numbers listed in paragraph 5.b.

Review of the above records identified the problem described below:

The second tendon surveillance disclosed that 8 out of 170 wires were broken in tendon number H 12BA. In addition, I wire has not been button-headed and 2 other buttonheads have unacceptable cracks. Therefore tendon H 12BA has 11 ineffective wires.

The licensee's evaluation of tendon number H 12BA will be reviewed by NRC in a subsequent inspection. This was identified to the licensee as Inspector Follow-up Item 348/80-12-01, " Eval-uation of Tendon Surveillance Test Results". Nine of the tendons in the containment structure are redundant and are not required to obtain the design prestress level.

No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

6.

Containment Structural Integrity Test (SIT) - Unit 2 a.

Review of program and Test Procedures.

The inspector examined test procedure number 059-5-004, " Structural Integrity Test and Tendon Anchorage Concrete Surveillance Program", to determine if work activities and quality control and quality assurance functions were provided for as specified in FSAR Sections 3.8.1.7.1 and 3.8.1.7.4 and NRC requirements. The test procedure specified type location and accuracy of instrumentation and the method and sequence for application of test loads. The test pressure was specified to be 1.15 times _ the containment design pressure. The procedure required visual inspection of concrete surfaces and measurement and mapping of cracks at several location on the containment structure and at some tendon end anchorage at the maximum test pressure and at atmospheric pressure before and after the test. The procedure was approved by authorized licensee personnel prior to the test.

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Enclosure:

Inspection Report Nos. 50-348/80-12 and 50-364/80-14 cc w/ encl:

A. R. Barton, Executive Vice President F. L. Clayton, Jr., Senior Vice President

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H. O. Thrash, Manager-Nuclear Generation O. D. Kingsley, Jr., Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Technical Services J. W. McGowan, Manager-Operations Quality Assurance W. G. Hairston, III, Plant Manager W. C. Petty, Menager-Quality Assurance (Design and Construction)

R. E. Hollands, Jr., QA Supervisor 1:

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-3-b.

Witnessing of Containment Structural Integrity Test.

The crack pattern may areas and several other locations on the exterior of the containment structure were examined by the inspector during the test. Interviews were conducted with several members of the SIT crew.

The crew was knowledgeable of the test program and procedures and the care and operation of the test instrumentation.

Initial strains and deflections were recorded. Data output from the instrumentation was recorded and processed on a computer which printed the results in a numerical form.

The inspector witnessed approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of the SIT from test pressures of 20 psig to the maximum test pressure, 62.1 psig, and start of depressurization. Crack patterns were checked as required.

The inspector observed mapping of crack patterns at maximum pressure.

The inspector verified dimensions of several. cracks and the accuracy of recording the crack locations.

Radial and vertical deflections were recorded at required intervals. Test pressures were held at the specified increments for the required time periods. Test data was reviewed by responsible engineers during the test to verify that defelections were within predicted FSAR values. No adverse environ-mental conditions occurred during the test.

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Review of Test Records

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The inspector examined the following records relating to the structural integrity test:

(a) Calibration records of extensometers and pressure gauger.

(b) Concrete crack pattern mapping at pressures of 0 psig, 27 psig, and 62.1 psig.

(c) Deflection data collected at pressures of 0 psig, 5 psig,10 psig, 14 psig, 15 psig, 20 psig, 25 psig, 27 psig, 30 psig, 35 psig, 35 40 psig, 45, psig, 50 psig and 62.1 psig.

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Review of the above records and discussions with responsible engineers identified the problem described below:

i The data collected for deflection of the dome indicated that a point 42' from the center of the dome had deflected more than a point at the apex of the dome. Bechtel engineers felt that this was due to a mis-labeling of the instrumentation line and that the actual deflection of the dome at the apex was larger than the point at the 42' from center. Following the completion of depressurization, the engineers indicated that the instrument locations would be verified. The results of the verification of the dome deflection instrumentation (extensometer)

locations will be reviewed by NRC in a subsequent inspection. This was identifir.d to the licensee as Inspector Follow up Item 364/80-14-01, l

" Verification of SIT Dome Extensometer Locations".

No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

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