IR 05000348/1980002

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IE Insp Repts 50-348/80-02 & 50-364/80-02 on 791231-800201. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Follow Procedures in Completing Equipment Tagging Forms for Maint
ML19323D720
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse, Farley  Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 03/07/1980
From: Bradford W, Martin R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19323D684 List:
References
50-348-80-02, 50-348-80-2, 50-364-80-02, 50-364-80-2, NUDOCS 8005220213
Download: ML19323D720 (9)


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UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

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<E REGION 11

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o 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

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Report Nos. 50-348/80-02 and 50-364/80-02

Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, Alabama 35202

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Facility Name: Farley Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos. NPF-2 and CPPR-86

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Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama Inspector:

8c/- ;R E / 980 W./li.'Br ford /

Date Signed 8/ N

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,< w Approved by:

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R. M.' Martin, Section Chief, RONS Branch

/D/te Signed SUMMARY Inspection on December 31, 1979 thru February 1, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine inspection involved 110 inspector-hours on site in the areas of plant operations, previously identified items of noncompliance, unresolved, and open items, IE Circular and IE Bulletins; Licensee Event Reports; Unit 1 and

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Unit 2 plant tours, Unit no. 2 preoperational start up test program, and physical security.

Results

Of the nine areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identi-fled in eight areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was found in one area (Deficiency involving failure to follow procedures in completing equipment tagging forms for maintenance - Paragraph 6).

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i DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • W. G. Hairston, Plant Manager
  • J. D. Woodard, Assistant Plant Manager
  • W. D. Shipman, Maintenance Superintendent

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  • John Garlington, Operations Superintendent
  • J. E. Odom, Assistant Operations Supervisor
  • K. W. McCraken, Technical Superintendent
  • D. E. Mansfield, Startup Superintendent - Unit No. 2
  • R. D. Hill, Plant QA Engineer

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  • J. W. Kale, QA Engineer
  • H. M. Clelland, Plant Engineer
  • B. R. Yance, Plant Engineer
  • C. D. Nesbitt, C&HP Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included five shift supervisors, five shift foremen, four technicians, twelve operators and six mechanics.
  • Attended exit interview 2.

Management Interviews The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management inter-views on January 4,11,18 and February 1,1980, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (78-27-01) Make procedures and program consistent in the audit area. This unresolved item concerns off-site vendors notifica-tion of corrective action taken or planned with a scheduled date of completion.

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The inspector verified that APCO-Operations Quality Assurance Administrative Procedure No. 9 (0QA-AP-09)~had been revised to state that off site vendors will be required to provide notification of corrective action taken and/or planned with a scheduled date for its completion. The vendor's response should be made within 30 days of receipt of the audit report. A tickler file system will be maintained to track vendor audit findings for timely response.

(Closed) Infraction (78-27-02) Failure to take and/or report timely correc-tive action to audit findings.

The inspector verified that all audit findings are entered into the computer which shows the corrective action,

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i the time limit for the corrective action, and the supervisor who is respon-sible for the corrective action.

This printout is updated on a weekly basis and any overdue correction action it identified. A memo is then generated to plant management.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (78-27-03) Place consumable items related to safety under QA control.

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(Closed) Unresolved Item (78-27-04) Place limited shelf life itgms related to safety under QA control.

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The inspector verified that the items listed above are controlled in a computer program which indicates the date the item was received, the expiration date, and the shelf life of the item. The above items are reviewed on a quarterly basis.

(Closed) Deficiency (78-27-08) Drawing revisions on outstanding Plant Change Notice (PCN's) not annotMed in control rocm drawings.

The inspector verified that all PCN's and drawing changes are transmitted to the shift supervisor and require acknowledgement back to document control.

The shift supervisor is responsible to make the required changes to the drawings.

(Closed) Unresolved Iteme (78-27-11) Revise Administrative Procedure No. 4 (AP 4) to specify method for changing vendor manuals and drawings.

The inspector verified that section 8.6.2 of AP-4 had been revised to require vendor manuals and drawings be controlled and that revision packages shall include proper manual identification and approval signatures. Manual revision resulting from Production Change Requests (PCR's) and Production Change Notices (PCN's) shall be accompanied by a vendor drawing and/or a manual review form.

Closed) Deficiency (78-27-13) One copy of Component Cooling Pump vendor's manual was not signed out and one copy was unserialized.

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The inspector verified that all vendor manuals had been recalled to document control, that all manuals had been accounted for, and have been serialized.

The inspector also reviewed the licensee corrective action report no. 320.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (78-35-02) Error in procedures STP-530 and STP-533 which re. quires securing the waste gas monitor (R-18).

The inspector verified that the two procedures in question had been revised and corrected on January 5,1979.

Closed Unresolved Item (78-35-01) Calibration data stickers missing from test guage blocks.

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The inspector reviewed the test gauge blocks and verified that the test gauge blocks have been calibrated and that the test gauge blocks have calibration stickers attached.

4.

Open Items (Closed) Open Item (79-22-02) Conduct Corporate Audit on training presented in response to IEB-79-06A.

r, The inspector reviewed QA Audit No. 79-11 of 6/13-7/3/79 to ve'rify that the audit had been completed and was satisfactory.

(Closed) Open Item (79-22-01) This open item concerned training records which indicated in some cases that there had been no participation in security training. The licensee had already initiated correction action.

The inspector reviewed training records to verify that security training had been administered to all licensee employees.

(Closed) Open Item (79-23-03) Identification of valvas in the auxiliary feedwater lines with metal identification tags.

The inspector observed certain valves in the auxiliary feedwater system to verify that the valves in the system had been identified with metal tags.

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Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

6.

Plant Operations The inspector reviewed plant operation to ascertain conformance with regu-latory requirements, technical specification and A(ninistrative Procedure No. 16, " conduct of operation - Operations Group". Station logs, such as the shif t supervisor, shif t foreman, control room operators, plant operators, shift turn over, the out of service equipment log, night order log book, and the limited condition of operation log book were reviewed.

Certain surveillance tests were observed and the results of other surveillance tests were reviewed. The inspector conducted tours of selected areas of the plant which included portions of the auxiliary building, turbine building, diesel generator building, fuel storage building and river water pump house. Observations were made of plant operation, monitoring instrumentation, j

radiation controls, fluid leaks, piping vi~ oration, pipe hangers, certain valve positionr., housekeeping, fire hazards and equipment tagged out of service for maintenance.

The inspector reviewed work Rquest No. 21908, dated January 27, 1980 which had been issued for shaft seal replacement on 1-A boric acid transfer pump.

The inspector noted that the work request had not been properly completed as delineated in FNP-1-AP-52

" Equipment Status Control and Maintenance

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s Authorization" in that:

(1) block No. 21 is to be checked as to whether the equipment is operable or inoperable while undergoing maintenance. The block was checked operable when in fact the pump was required to be removed and disassembled to perform the maintenance; and (2) item No. 28 - Test and Restoration was not adequate in that the retest requirements and a check list be performed on the aff. eted system and on portions of other systems located in the area. These requirements are t'o be specified on the work request, or appended to the work request. The retest requirement only stated, " ensure no seal leakage".

.3 The inspector verified that acceptable retest and independent ver'ification of valve, electrical and/or instrumentation alignments had been performed prior to returning the pump to service even though the requirement was not listed on the work requests.

  • During the management interview of February 1, 1980, the inspector stated that failure to follow procedures in properly completing the work request appeared to be an item of noncompliance (80-02-01).

7.

Review of Nonroutine Events Reports by the Licensee The following licensee event reports were reviewed for potential generic problems, to determine trends, to determine whether the information included

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in the report meets NRC reporting requirements, and to consider whether the

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corrective action discussed in the report appears appropriate. Licensee action with respect to selected reports was reviewed to verify that the events were reviewed and evaluated by the licensee as required by the Tech-nical Specification, that corrective action was taken by the licensee, and that safety limits, limiting safety settings and limiting conditions of operation were not exceeded. The inspector examined selected Plant Opera-tion Review Committee (PORC) minutes, incident reports, log and records, and interviewed selected personnel.

R0 No.79-041 -

River Water B Train Inoperable RO No.79-042 -

Containment Personnel Access Air Lock Inoperable RO No.79-043 Fire Protection Water Tanks A and B Low Out of Specifi-

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cation R0 No.79-044 Permissive P-4 Failure Not Identifiable Via Surveillance

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Control Room HVAC Chlorine Detector Inoperable RO No.79-046 -

Condensate Storage Tank Level Low Out of Specification RO No.79-047 Containment Air Lock Inoperable

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R0 No.79-048 Containment Emergency Access Hatch Door Inoperable

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RO No.79-049 Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve Not Tested

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RO No.79-050 -

Pressurizer Pressure Bistables Not Properly Set RO No.79-051 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Tripped

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RO No.79-052 -

Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Low RO No.79-053 -

Control Rod K14 Inoperable RO No.79-054 Negative Rate Trip May Not Occur For All Single Rod

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R0 No.79-055 Boric Acid Tank Liquid Level Below Technical Specification

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Minimum RO No.79-056 Fire Barriers Not Functional

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R0 No.79-057 Steam Generator B Level Channel Inoperable

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RO No.79-058 Boron Injection Tank Boron Concentration Below Specifi-

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cation RO No.79-059 -

Valve Shut In Boron Injection Flow Path R0 No.79-060 -

Containment Pressure Channel Failed During Startup RO No.79-061 -

Steam Generator Relief Valve Stuck Open g

RO No.79-062 -

Axial Flux Difference Outside Target Bond

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RO No.79-063 Boric Tank Inoperable Due To Valve Lineup

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R0 No.79-064 -

Steam Line Differential Pressure Bistable Inoperable RO N 79-065 Main Steam Isolation Valve Manually Inoperable

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R0 No.79-066 -

Containment Pressure Channel Inoperable Because o,f Faulty Connection 8.

IE Circulars - Unit 1 The following IECs were reviewed and discussed to verify that they had been received by station management; a review for applicability had been performed; and, if applicable, that any further required action had been taken or planned.

79-CI-08 -

Attempted extortion of low enriched fuel 79-CI-10 Pipe fittings manufactured from unacceptable material

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79-CI-12 -

Potential Diesel Generator Turbo Charger problems 79-CI-13 Replacement of diesel fire pump starting contactors

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79-CI-17 Contact problem in SB-12 switches in GE metal clad switchgear

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79-CI-18 -

Proper installation of Target Rock safety / relief valves 79-CI-19 -

Loose locking devices on Ingersol Rand pump impellers 9.

Plant Security The inspector verified that physical barriers were intact and that gates into the protected areas are closed ard locked if not attended, that doors into vital areas were closed and locked or attended, and that isolation zones were free of visual obstructions.

The inspector verified that access into protected areas was controlled, that persons and packages were identified and authorized prior to entry into protected areas, and that all persons, package and vehicles were searched prior to entry in accordance with regulatory requirements and

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security procedures.

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Within the areas inspected, no deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

10.

Plant Tour - Unit No. 2 Periodic tours were conducted on Unit No. 2.

During the tours, the following items were observed:

That welding, burning and cutting in areas turned over to; operation

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had adequate fire protection and that protective measures 'for equipment had been initiated.

That fire protection equipment had not been damaged and that periodic

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inspection had been performed.

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House keeping practices had been intiated and were observed.

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A method had been initiated for equipment preservation and that an equipment tagging procedure was being carried out on equipment not undergoing testing.

That installed instrumentation was protected and had not been abused.

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That cable pulling activities appeared to be correct and that there

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was not cable damage during the pulling activities.

That openings into systems were protected and that cleanliness control

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was observed.

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That deficiencies identified during testing are entered on a control

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punch list.

During the tour the inspector found tso abrasive pads in the Unit No. 2 Containment building. On investigating the use of these pads the inspector j

found that these pads were used to clean the exterior of stainless steel l

piping prior to covering with insulation. The inspector gave one pad to APC0 Quality Assurance and the other pad was given to the APCO chemistry and Health Physics Supervisor on unit no. 1.

The C&HP Supervisor conducted a test on the pad to determine the amount of chlorides present. The test revealed that the pad contained 404 ppm chloride.

I APCO construction QA conducted similar tests on the old pad given them and also on a new pad. The results of the test on the new pad was 200 ppm chlorides. APCO QA stated that this is covered in a certain construction QA procedure which covers the exterior cleaning of stainless piping prior to applying insulation. The piping is first cleaned with the pad, washed with demineralized water and then sampled for chlorides on the pipe. This procedure also reference a Westinghouse Specification on cleaning exterior

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piping. This is open item no. 80-02-02 pending a review of the procedures by the inspector.

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11.

Overall Review of Unit No. 2 Preoperational Test Program a.

Licensee documents containing guidelines and administrative controls for conduct of the preoperational (pre-fuel loading) test program were reviewed and compared to the applicable provisions of Section 14 and 17 of the FSAR for Units 1 and 2 and to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.68,

"Preoperational and Initial Startup Test. Programs for Water-cooled Power Reactors" 1973. Licensee documents reviewed include the following.

(1) APCO startup standard 3, " Organization", May 24, 1978'.

(2) APC0 startup standard 4,

" Construction Quality Assurrance -

startup Operating Quality Assurance Relationship", June 26, 1978.

(3) APC0 startup standa rd 5, " Test Specifications" April 6,1979.

(4) APCO startup standard 6, " Test Procedure Development, Conduct, and Results Approval", May 10, 1979.

(5) APCO startup standard 7, " Construction /startup interface", May 8, 1978.

(6) APCO startup standard 8, " Safety and Test Tagging", May 14, 1978.

(7) APCO startup standard 10, " System Release Procedure", September 20, 1979.

(8) APC0 startup standard 12, " Document Control", January 30, 1979.

(9) APC0 startup standard 16, " Calibration and Control of Test Equip-ment", January 30, 1979.

(10) APCO startup standard 17, " Temporary Alteration Control", May 16, 1978.

(11) APC0 startup standard 18, " Resolution of Problem areas and Audit Noncompliances", May 10, 1979.

(12) APCO startup standard 21, " Scoping System" May 15, 1978.

(13) APC0 startup standard 22, " Joint Test Group", June 26, 1978.

(14) APC0 startup standard 23, " Housekeeping and system cleaning",

June 26, 1978.

(15) APC0 startup standard 24, " Personnel Indoctrination and Certifi-cation ", March 20, 1979.

(16) APC0'startup standard 25, "As Built Drawings", May 10, 1976.

b.

Documents in paragraph a were reviewed to verify that controls existed for various functions within the test program and are as follows:

(1) Test Program A description of the testing program, including initial testing and formal preop testing exists. Responsibilities for the various type of tests have been defined.

Individual tests have been defined, along with an expected sequence. The format of test procedures has also been defined.

(2) Test Organization Responsibilites of the various groups to be involved in testing their interfaces, and qualifications have been defined.

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(3) Test Program Administation (a) A method for control of system status before testing and turnover of systems have been defined. A method for return of systems to construction is defined.

(b) Controls are defined for conduct of tests, including scheduling, testing coordination and document ation of results.

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(c) Requirements for documenting deficiencies foundJin testing and resolution of them have been defined.

(d) Controls have been established for formal evaluation of test results and resolution of deficiencies.

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(4) Document Control Administrative Controls have been established which control test procedure processes for review, approval and issuance, and for revision of approved procedures.

(5) Equipment Protection and Cleanliness Controls for Housekeeping activities were verified to include:

(a) Implementation of clean zones.

(b) Control of facilities and equipment including cleanliness, environment and fire protection.

(c) A program for maintaining the appropriate degree of cleanliness of nuclear plant components and piping during preoperational testing.

(d) Water chemistry controls during preoperational testing.

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i (6) Test and Measuring Equipment Controls of test and measuring equipment include:

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(a) A listing of controlled test equipment, calibration requirements, and the calibration history.

(b) Controls for storage and issuance to preclude use of equipment which had not been calibrated within the specified interval.

(c) A requirement for recording test equipment identity and calibration date.

Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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IEB 79-15 " Deep Draf t Pump Deficiencies" The subject bulletin required the licensee to determine if deep draft pumps were installed in safety related systems, and, if so, to identify any deficiencies related to the pumps. The inspection verified verbally with the licensee end by review of the licensee's file records that the licensee's response to the bulletin, dated December 18, 1979, was accurate and covered all information requested.

The licensee has initiated corrective action on the river wa'tdr pumps by installing stainless steel piping and a electronic select'ron filter to control the silt and other foreign material in the river water which is used for shaft sealing and motor cooling. Since the installation of the above, it appears that pump problems reported in response to the bul.letin have been decreased significantly. The licensee is considering making the same modification to the service water pumps.

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