IR 05000348/1989020
| ML19325D821 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1989 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Maxwell G, Miller W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19325D819 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-89-20, 50-364-89-20, NUDOCS 8910260260 | |
| Download: ML19325D821 (17) | |
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/gpa heepq'g C'UCLEA3 CEGULATORY COMMCION
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Report Nos.: 50-348/89-20 and 50-364/89-20 Licensee: Alabama Power f.ompany
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600 North 16th $trvet e-
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Bii.ningh a, AI. 36T91 l;pc
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Docket Hos.: 50 348 and 50-364
'LicentiNos.
NPf 2 an.1 NPF-8
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O Facility name:
Farley 1 and 2,
f Inspection Conducted: August 1
< September 10, IE89 9.'
Inspection at Farley site near Dothan,' Alao6ina Inspectors: dba A
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G.' F. Maxwell, 5ffger Retident Inspector Date Signed YfAm1l7f$4 '
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W. H'.~ Miller, Jr., Repenf Inspector Date 51gned Approved by: Id+M
/M7 /N F, 5. Cantrell, SectiefVChief Date 5igned Assisting Inspectors:
B. Breslau, N. Economos B. L. Holbrook, M. J. Morgan, W. W. Stansberry e
SUIEARY
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Scope:
This routine onsite inspection involved a review of operational safety verifica-L-
tion, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, and
licensee plans for coping with strikes.
Resul ts:
Within the areas inspected, the following unresnived item was identified:
Requirements for detecting radioactive contamination in condensate pump discharge flow path - paragraph 3.b.3.
Certain tours were conducted on deep backshif t, holidays or weekends, these tours were conducted on August 7, 15, 16, 28 and September 4 (deep backshift inspections occur between 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m.).
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8910260260 891003 l
PDR ADOCK 05000340 G
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Other inspections conducted during this period: July 31 - August 4. Report
No. 89-14. Security Inspection; August 21-15. Report No. 89-19. Training
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Inspection; August 28 - Septem5tr 1. Report No. 89 21. Followup on ISI and
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Maintenance Open Items.
Report NO. 348 ?S4/F9-14 identified potential problems which the licensce
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noted during the Self Initiated Safety Assessment (SSSA) Team evaluation conducted on the service water system.
During this reporting period the
inspectors documented a CCW system concern which the SSSA identified.
The potential problem with the CCW system involves the pressure control valve which is associated with the RHR pump seal coolers and instrument air. The findings
identified by SSSA are sr.heduled to be discussed with NRC Region !! management i
in a meeting to be held between Alabama Power Company as the Regional Office on
o, i-September it. 1929.
Additional concerns were identified involving the
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increased loading on the diesel generator as a result of the corr'ective
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action for the CCW syt. tem and the training provided for fire watch duty.
A strength was identified in the operations area which was attributed to the
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prompt and decisive actions taken by Unit I riant operators when isolating a
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service water leak in one of the containment coolers.
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REPORT DETAILS
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Licensee Employees Contacted 9. G. Berryhill. Systems Performance end P16r.ning Menager C. L. Bucl. ??, ant Moditication Manager L. W. Enfingerz. Administrative Manager R. D. Hill, Assistant Geneial Manager - Piar,t Operat19ns
D. N. Morey, General Marager. Farley Nttlear Plant C. D. Nesbitt. Tachnical Manager
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J. K. Osterhaltr. Operatior.s "snager L. M. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support J. J. Thomas. Maintenance Manager
L. S. Williams, T-aining M4natjer r
Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operstions personnel, maintenance and 1&C personnel, security force members, and office personnel.
Acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this report are listed in the
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last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status
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Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at approximately 100 percent reactor power throughout the reporting period.
Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at approximately 100 percent reactor power throughout the
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reporting period.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
Plant Tours The inspectors conducted routine plant tours during this inspection period to verify that the licensee's requirements and commitments were being implemented.
inspections were conducted at various times including week-days, nights, weekends and holidays. These tours were performed to verify that: systems, valves, and breakers required for safe plant operations were in their correct position; fire protection equipment spare equipment and materials were being maintained and
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stored properly; plant operators were eware of the current plant status; plant operations personnel were documenting the status of l
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out-of-service equipments there were no undocumented cases of unusual fluid leaks piping vibration, abnormal hanger or seismic restrtint movements; all reviewed equipment requiring calibration was current;
and general housekeeping was satisfactory.
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Tours of the plant included review of site documentction and interviews with plant persont.e1.
The inspectors reviewed the control room
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operators' logs, tag out logs, cheinistry and heaith physics logs, and
control boards and panels.
During these tours the inspectors noted
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that the operators appeared to be alert, aware of cr.anging plant
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conditions and manipulated plant controls properly.
The inspettors l
evaluated operations shift turnovers and attended shif t briefings.
F They observed that the bnefi"js and turnover provided sufNcient
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detail for the next shift crew and verified that the staffhg met
the TS requirements.
3tte security was evaluatad by obserting personnel in the prctected and vital areas to ensure that these persons had the proper authari-ration to be in the respective areas.
The inspect 6rs also verified
that vital area portals were kept locked and alarmed.
The security personnel appeared to be alert and attentive to their duties and those officers performing personnel and vehicular searches were thorough and systematic.
Responses to security alarm conditions appeared to be prompt and adequate.
Selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program wero reviewed by the inspectors to verify conformance with plant procedures and NRC regulatory requirements.
The areas reviewed
included: operation and management of the plant's health physics staff. ALARA implementation. Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) for compliance to plant procedures, personnel exposure records, observa-i tion of work and personnel in radiation areas to verify compliance to radiation protection procedures, and control of radioactive materials.
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Plant Events and Observations r
1.
Inoperable Emergency Notification System - Incident Report
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1-89 '264, t
On August 2. at approximately 11:20 a.m., the Unit 2 shift
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supervisor received a call from the Houston County Emergency Management Agency stating that the telephone actuation of the tone alert radio emergency alarm system was inoperable.
The tone alert radio system is part of the public prompt notifica-
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tion system.
The shift supervisor promptly notified the site emergency coordinator. NRC resident inspector and NRC emergency operations cwder.
The call to the NRC was made via the emergency notification system (red phone) at 11:50 a.m.
The licensee stationed personnel at the micro-wave building at
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11:55 a.m. to manually activate the tone alert radio system in I
the event of an emergency while the system was inoperable. The
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licensee's telephone maintenance personnel investigated and
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found an open conductor in the telephone cable between Dothan
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and Headland.
Repairs were made and the system was returned to i
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service at 10:42 p.m. on August 2.
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event and found that the system war promptly repaired st.en found i
c inoperative and that the NRC was notified appropriately.
The inspectors had no further questions on this event.
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2s 9WST Boron St.mple
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At 8:00 a.m., ori August 21, the weekly wate. tempin was taken from the RWST. This sample was analyzed by che~.tistry at 11:30 r..ti, and the bcron concentration was found to be 2?72 ppm.
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Section 3.1.2.6 requires the boron concentration in the RWST to
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be maintained between 2300 and 2500 ppm.
Since the boron concentration appeared to deviate from the TS requirements, the i
licensee inmediately took another sample at 12:20 p.m.
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analysis of this sample at 1:00 p.m. found the boron concentra-tion to be 2278 ppm which was below the TS minimum limit.
At 1:20 p.m. circulation of the water solution in the RWST was initiated by using RHR pump 2A and the refueling water purifica-
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tion pump.
Another sample was taken from the RWST at 2:45 p.m.
and the analysis of this sample indicated that the boron concentration was 2386 ppm.
Two additional samples were taken at 30 minute intervals and indicated a boron concentration of
2397 ppm. This met the TS requirements.
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A review of recent samples taken from the RWST indicated a
downward trend in the boron concentration.
On August 14, the
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concentration was 2326 ppm which was only slightly greater than the TS minimum of 2300 ppm.
It appears that the boron within
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the RWST became stratified since the water within the tank had
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not been recirculated within the past month.
To assure that boron concentrations within the RWST are maintained within the TS limits, the licensee has revised procedure 0-CCP-202, Water Chemistry Specification, to require the boron concentration in the RWST to be maintained between 2350 and 2450 ppm.
Furthermore, the procedure requires the plant chemist to immediately advise the shift supervisor if the chemical analysis indicates that the boron concentration is out of these administrative control limits.
To prevent boron stratification the RWST water will be periodically recirculated.
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The licensee's staff took immediate action to resolve the inspectors concerns on this matter and had initiated appropriate
action to maintain RWST boron concentrations within the TS a
limits. The inspectors have no further questions at this time.
3.
Condensate and Feedwater System During a walkdown and review of the condensate and feedwater system, the inspectors observed that the hotwell flush or condensate pump discharge flow rath is frequently used to taaintain chemistry in the secondary system.
This system
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discharges into the river via the service water discharge piping
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system.
There are no radiation moritors in this flow, patn to detect radioacthe certamination in t'ne event, of a primary to
secondary leak.
Also there does not appear to be a plant
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pro:edure to menitor the flew thrcugh this systen to chect for
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pMsible radioacthe contan'ination.
FSAH set.tions 20.4.0 and 11.3 do not appear to adequately address thit future.
The inspectors discussed this concern with the licensee, and the licensee w'.11 conduct an evaluation to determine what actions are required.
This item is identified as unresolved item 348,364/89-20-01, Requirements for Detecting Radioactive i
Contamination in Condensate Pump Discharge Flow Path, pendinq
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the ccmpletion of this evaluation, j
4.
Turbine Building Fire j
The inspectors investigated the circumstances associated with a
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turbine building fire that occurred on August 22.
On the morning of August 22, contractor iron workers and welders were installing security grating on the east wall of Unit 2 turbine building.
Fire watch personnel were posted both inside
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and outside of the building as stipulated by the Hot Work Permit.
At approximately 10:25 a.m., the inside fire watch noticed smoke coming from the turbine building wall panels located approximately 28 feet nortn of column line T-12.5 along column line T-A about 10 feet above the floor. The inside fire watch attempted to call the control room by using the plant t
phone system but was unable to reach the control room since he
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did not know the number and the number was not posted on the phone. Another fire watch inside the turbine building attempted to extinguish the fire by using a portable fire extinguisher.
i The outside fire watch noticed the discharge from the ine.ide fire watch's extinguisher.
He obtained a fire watch relief and t
went inside the turbine building to determine the problem.
After learning of the fire, he returned to discharge his
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extinguisher in the affected area to help extinguish the fire.
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S The inside fire watch was unable to contact the control roomt therefore, he notified a licensee employee who promptly notified the control room.
The plant fire alarm was received and fire
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brigade was requested to respond to the fire at 10:30 a.m.
Eight fire brigade members and several other personnel responded to the fire.
A 1-1/2 inch fire hose from en interior turbine
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building hose station and a 2-1/2 inch fire hose from an
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exterior fire hydrant were advanced to the fire location. Water from both hose lines *60 used to extinguish the fire. The fire was considered extinguished at 10:49 a.m.
i subceytent insestigttien (9termined that the fire ras caused by heat from widing operations betng conducted on the exterior wall of tnc turbine building which ignited a tar coated
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fiberboard seal in the we.11 panel. To prevent recurrence, future
welding on this wali will ot111re wetted fire resistant cloth to protect adjacent tar and fiberboard.
A shop work order has been written to inspect all niant phones to ensute that they
have a sticker on tht.m listing the control room numbers for use in the event of an emergency.
Flour, the contractor, has been r
requested to discuss the proper use of plant phones and
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Gai-tronics phones in their bi-weekly safety meetings to report a fire or any other emergency situation to the control room.
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The response to this event was slightly delayed due to the contractor employee not having access to phone numbers for use in the event of an emergency.
However, once the control room was notified the fire brigade response, fire fighting operations and followup activities were satisfactory. Fire fighting
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operations prevented fire spread and limited damage to only a
very small portion of the fiberboard in the wall. The inspectors
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will monitor corrective actions taken to train fire watches on
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control room notifications.
Pending resolbtion, this item is identified as Inspector Followup Item 348,364/89-20-03, Instruction to fire watch for notifying control room were
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inadequate.
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5.
Plant Vent Stack Radiation Alarm - Unit 1
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The inspectors were observing control room evolutions on August 22,
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when radiation monitors R-14 and R-22 in the Unit 1 plant vent
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stack alarmed indicating high radiation in the stack.
The reactor operators promptly acknowledged the alarms and implemented
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the plant emergency procedures. The counting room was contacted.
Procedure EIP-9, Radiation Exposure Estimation and Classification
of Emergencies, was used to calculate estimated off-site radiation l
exposure as a result of the radioactive material released and to j
determine the appropriate protective actions.
l The dose calculations at the site boundary were found to be
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l 4.14E-5 mrem /hr for iodine.
These limits were less than the TS l
radiological effluents specified to meet the Notification of an
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Unusual Event (NOVE) emergency classification of 5.7E 2 mrem /hr i
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Therefore, the release limits were below the levels that required any emergency actions or notifications.
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An investigation to determine the cause of the high radiation L
alarms found that the excess pressure safety relief diaphram on the recycle evaporator condenser unit ruptured due to high
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pressure in the evaporator.
The diaphragm disk is designed to rupture at a pressure of 15 psi and discharge to the plant vent stack through a 4 inch pipe. The excess pressure was created when
auxiliary steam leaked past steam admission valve PCV 316 to the
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recycle evaporatcr due to a leaking valve seat.
The resultant
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heat increased the pressure in the evaporator, absorption tower
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and evaporator condenser.
This heat continued to increase the presture in the system until the safety pressure relief disk br the: evaporator 7uptured. Valve K V 316 is throttled to maintain a
the nperating pressure on the recycle evaporator. This valve is
not designed for positive seating and the seat normally leaks
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after 1cng usage.
Closure of the manual vehe upstream of the
flow control valve would provide assurance of eliminating steam
flow to the evaporator when desired.
The inspectors reviewed
the licensee's action and had no further questions.
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Receipt inspection of New Fuel f
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The inspectors witnessed the receipt inspection of new fuel on August 2 for Unit I fuel cycle 10.
The Unit I refueling outage is scheduled to begin on September 23 and be completed i
November 7.
The fuel inspection was performed using procedures i
0-RCP-53 Receipt of New Fuel, and 0-FHP-3.0, Receipt and Storage of New Fuel.
No discrepancies were noted.
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Security Work Schedules
A concern was addressed to the inspectors about the use of l
overtime work hours by security employees.
Security employees
were previously permitted to work overtime hours without any formal restrictions.
Reportedly, a number of security officers l
worked 12 to 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> days for several weeks without any days
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off.
The inspectors discussed this concern with licensee management.
Effective August 28. the licensee implemented a
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program, as documented by item 89-253 in the security " Pass-on"
log, that normally no security individual will be permitted to
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work more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any seven day period.
The security
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chief advised the inspectors on August 30. that the security (
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group will follow the sane guidelines as those listed in procedure AP-64. Work Schedule for Personnel Perfoming Safety Related Functions.
An individual will not be permitted to work more than 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period, nor more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in any 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period, nor more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any seven day period.
The inspectors reviewed the revised work schedule for security I
and had no further questions.
8.
Operations 1989 Unit 1 Outagt Schedule Tne iupectors reviewed the approved work schedule for the
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Septenber - Novmber 1989 f, nit I refueling outage.
This five week schedule requirer 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shifts, except for eight hour shifts on training dayv..
Yhere are two work per',ods with seven consecutive 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> dan and one work period with six consecutive
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12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> dan scheduled. This results in two periods of 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br />
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in seven days every five weeks. TS 6.2.2.f.3 limits the maximum i
work hours to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a seven day period.
Routine use of
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overtime for operations personnel in excess of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any
seven days appears to violate TS 6.2.2.f.3.
This concern was
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previously discussed with the licensee in a management meeting
conducted in the NRC Region !! Office on July 31, 1989 and is currently identified as Unresolved Item 348.364/89-14-01.
Apparent Excessive Work Hours for Licensee Operators.
The
licensee's continued practice of routinely exceeding the TS
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limits on working hours remains open pending resolution by l
RII/NRR.
9.
Component Cooling Water (CCW) - Unit 1 On September 1. the inspectors were informed by the licensee
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that as a result of the Self Initiated Safety Assessment on the
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service water system a similar evaluation was conducted on the CCW system.
During the evaluation of the CCW system, a potential design discrepancy was identified.
At Farley the CCW system is a closed system which operates during all phases of plant operations and shutdown.
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emergency safe shutdown heat loads which are cooled by the CCW system include; charging pumps, spent fuel pool heat exchangers.
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RHR heat exchangers and the RHR pump seal coolers.
Some of those loads which are supplied by the CCW system that are not l
classified as emergency loads include; excess letdown heat
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exchanger, seal water heat exchanger, waste gas compressors, and
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at least eight other system components.
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The RHR pump seal coolers for Unit 1 are cooled by CCW and are designed for a maximum pressure of 100 psig. During a LOCA the
inlet pressure to these coolers is maintained by pressure control valves PC-3404A and PC 3404B.
These valves are i
controlled at 60 psig by instrument air (nan-safety related) and if air is lost, the valves fail fully opan.
With these valves i
fully open it could result in lifting the 100 psig relief valves
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which are installed just downstream of the pressure control valves. This could cause a loss of inventory to the CCW system.
leading to a low CCW surge tank level and ultimately loss of r
suction to the CCW pumps.
Under normal conditions the flow
rate of the CCW system is about 7000 gpm with an inlet pressure l
of less than 100 psig.
However, during a LOCA the secordary (non-emergency) heat loads for the CCW r,ysten wtald be iholated i
thus decreasing the CCW system flow-rate and increasing system pressure (to as much as 110 to 110 psig).
If the instrument i
air was lost under these conditions then the RhR pump seal
cooler relief valves could lift, inventory loss would occur.
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and loss of CCW flow would follow unless prompt operator action was takens The potential overpressure condition appears to or.ly effect Unit 1.
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Until final action can be taken to resolve this potential design discrepancy, the licensee has implemented interim changes to the i
Unit 1 plant operating procedures affected by this condition.
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The changes require. that upon indication of a $1 signal and loss
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of instrument air that CCW flow will be established to both RHR heat exchangers by opening valves 3185A and 31858.
By opening these CCW inlet valves to the RHR heat exchangers. CCW flow rate
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will increase causing a marked decrease in CCW system pressure.
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If the 100 psig RHR pump seal cooler relief valves have lifted
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then this action would allow them to close.
The inspectors
question whether the additional flow will cause the diesel
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generators to see additional loading.
Pending resolution, this
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item is identified as Inspection Follow Item. 348.364/89-20-04 Additional diesel generator load due to CCU flow increase durin,g a 51 and loss of Instrument Air.
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i Licensee management is scheduled to neet with NRC Region 11 management in the Regional office on September 12. At that time
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the above concern about the CCW system and other items identified by the Self Initiated Safety Assessment Team will be discussed.
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10.
Service Water Leak - Unit 1 Containment Cooler l
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On September 7. the inspectors observed the performance of Unit 1 operators while they were locating and isolating a service water leak in the containment building.
The leak was discovered at t
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about 9:25 a.m. and the operators took prompt action in locating
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and isolating the leak. The operators scanned the indicators for i
the primary and secondary" system and quickly determined that the
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leak was coming from the B" containment cooler.
The SW to the
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cooler was isolated and the Shift Supervisor directed that a WR be generated to inspect the containment for any damages which
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could have occurred as a result of the leak and then inspect to locate the cause of the leak.
There was no equipment impaired
by the leak and it resulted from freeze plug failure on the SW
line to the "B" containment cooler. A WR was issued to promptly
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repair the freeze plug opening.
The repairs were completed and
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the cooler was satisfactorily tested and returned to service.
i No violations or devihtions were identified. The results of the inspections in this area inc'icate that the program was effectise witn respect to
meeting the safety objectivas, the prompt and decisive action taken by
the operators while isolating the Unit I containment cooler SW 1eak was
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considered as a strength in the operations area.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors witnessed the licensee conducting maintenance surveillance
test activities on safety related systems and components to verify that
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the licensee performed the activities in accordance with TS and licensee requirements. These observations included witnessing selected portions of i
each surveillance, review of the surveillance procedures to ensure that i
administrative controls and tagging procedures were in force, detemining
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that approval was obtained prior to conducting the surycillence test and the individuals conducting the test were qualified in accordance with plant-approved procedures.
Other observations included ascertaining that
test instrumentation used was calibrated, data collected was within the specified requirements of TS, any identified dist.repancies were properly noted, and the systems were correctly returned to service. The following i
specific activities were observed:
i 0-STP-54.1 Fire Pump Operability Test - Pump 2
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0-STP-80.1 Diesel Generator 1-2A Operability Test
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0-STP-80.1 Diesel Generator 1B Operability Test 0-STP-80.2 Diesel Generator 10 Operability Test t
1-STP-62.0 Main Turbine Valve Operability Test 1-STP-913.0 Underfrequency Test of Reactor Coolant Pump 1B 2-STP-416 RWST Coron Sample 2-STP-627.2 Leak Test of Containment Purge System a.
Fire Pump The inspectors witnessed test 0-STP-54.1 of fire pump 2 conducted on August 2.
The fire pump failed the test due to pump RPM speed not being consistent, caused by the diesel governor being out of adjustment.
The pump governor was adjusted by the pump vendor and pump was satisfactorily retested.
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Diesel Generators
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On August 7. diesel generator 10 experienced a slow single header
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start during performance test of procedures 0-STP-80.2.
Diesel
generator 1-2A experienced a slow single header start during performance of procedure 0-STP 80.1 on August 21.
However, both
s diesels started satisfactorily when restarted using a dual header
start.
Recently, the inspectors have witnessed several tests where
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the diesel generators started slow on a single header start.
The
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licensee and the diesel vendor. Colt, are investigating the cause
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of these slow starts. The vendor hac made several recommendations to help prevent slow starting of the diesels.
These reccamende.tions l
includeG:
M more positive. priming method should be incorporated into operttions procedure to assure that the fuel supply to the
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diesels are kept primed. 2) the fuel sbpply foot valves in the day j
tanks should be cleaned quarterly. 3) a derign char.ge should be made
t9 provide a positive vent for the fuel accumulators.
The licent.ee
15 evaluating these recommendstions.
Pending resolution these items
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are identified as lntpector Followup Item 328.364/89-20-02 Modifica-
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r, ions to Reduce Slow Start of bnercency Diesei Generators.
No violatiens or deviations were identified.
The results of the
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inspections in this area indicate that the program was effective with respf.ct to meeting the safety objectives.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance activities to verify the following:
maintenance personnel were obtaining the appropriate tag i
out and clearance approvals prior to commencing work activities, correct i
documentation was available for all requested parts and material prior to
use, procedures were available for all requested parts and material prior
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to use, procedures were available and adequate for the work being
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conducted, maintenance personnel performing work activities were qualified
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to accomplish these tasks. no maintenance activities reviewed were
violating any limiting conditions for operation during the specific evolution, the required QC hold points were implemented, post-maintenance
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testing activities were completed, and equipment was properly returned to
service after the completion of work activities. Activities reviewed included:
MWR 164296 Perform accumulator vent line test while operating diesel generator 28.
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MWR 170821 Repair hydraulic leak on radwaste compactor.
MWR 188701 Repair leak on charging pump 1A discharge header drain
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valve.
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MWR 203123 Lube $and check for vibration on rod control drive motor
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generator set 1A.
WA WOO 311598 Inspect charging pump 2A using procedures GMP-9.0, 10.0,
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19.0, and 20.
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WA-WOO 312406 i.ube charging pump 2A, WA-WOO 313352 Maintenance of Emergency Light Units - Appendix R using procedure 1-EMP-1381.01.
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WA-WOO 313907 Routine 18 month maintenance inspection on diesel i
generator 1-2A 'Att 9 procedures 0-MN!4.1,14.0 an:1 14.11, WA WOO 314146 Routine iS c onth mair.tenato inspectio, en diesei
& a-300316N7 eenerator 2[ Usir.g procedure 0 MP-12.2,14.1,14.4 and 14.11.
j While cherving repair operatfors to the waste compactor which was being l
performed under MWR 170821, the inspectors noted that two n,aintenance i
employees working in the contaminated area adjacent to the compactor were i
not equipped with a high range dosimeter.
RW3 2-89.0299 required both lou and high range dosimeters to be worn while working on this job.
The inspectors questioned the employees and were advised that the HP staff had eliminated the need for the high range dcsimeter. However, the HP foreman stated that the requirement to wear a high range dosimeter for this area
htd rot ocen eliminated. The HP foreman immediately stopped this work and
counseled the individuals about the need to follow the RWP procedures.
The work area around the compactor was found to be a low radiation level j
and relatively clean and free of any significant contamination.
A high i
range dosimeter was probably not required for this area; however, the RWP had not been revised and was still required to be followed.
This problem is similar to previous Violation 348,364/89-12-02, Violation of TS 6.11 requirements for failure of an operator to comply with RWP
requirements when entering an area posted as a high radiation area.
To
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prevent recurrence of this problem the licensen proposes to implement an
RWP change authorization log which will be maintained in the work area
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with the RWP.
This will clearly indicate the approved changes that have been made to the RWP.
The licensee estimates that this change will be completed by September 1,1989.
Based on the low radiation level, no
significant contamination, pending corrective action for a similar I
violation and prompt licensee actions following identification of this
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event, no violation is being issued.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
The results of the inspections in this area indicate that the program was effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives.
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l 6.
Licensee Plans For Coping With strikes (92709)
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i During the week of August 14. the resident inspectors were assisted by
regional inspectors in determining if the licensee had prepared an adequate
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contingency plan for coping with a potential strike condition.
The evaluation included a review of the licensee's approved Strike Contingency l
Plan dated August 9.1989; determining the quantity and type personnel
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affected by the strike; reviewing minimum requirements per shift for i
on-site staffing; review of the training and qualification program and
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training for those assigned to the various positions which could be t
affected by a strike; availabi!ity of support in the areas of security,
traW portation of goods and materials medical care, and fire protection;
verification that tiersonnel were sufficient in riumber and Qualifications
to im,'iment the s.ite emergency plan; anci verification that the licenset's
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safeguards contingency plan pertaining to strikes i.fis adequate, this
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included verificatien that the Energency Notification System would not be
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compromised.
The inspectors noted that if a strike occurred it would have an impact on plant management, operations ard maintenance.
In general the remaining i
groups are net in the union and would not be affected by the strike, these i
incinde; Ctemistry and Radiation Protection. Administrative Controls, and
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Security.
Based on this observation the inspectors placed more empusis i
on the areas of management, operations, maintenance, and some special i
consideration was made for security and emergency preparedness.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plans for coping with a strike.
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F This review evaluated the quantity and types of personnel who will be affected to ensure that the minimum requirements per shift for on-site staffing is capable of meeting the requirements for power operation. The Dinspectors further reviewed the training and qualification program to l
ensure that licensed personnel who will be engaged in licensed activities
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are cualified and proficient in these activities. Additionally, training i
and familiarization has been properly conducted for non-licensed personnel (
who may be performing functions other than their normally assigned duties.
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Results of this review are described in the following sections:
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Strike Organization
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The licensee has identified personnel to staff three shifts, two shifts would rotate on a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> basis with the third shift
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supplementing the day shif t.
The basic routine would require each shift to stand five days of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, then take two days off before r
rotating between day shift and night shift or ttand down from control
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room duties and supplementing the day shif t.
The maintence group would maintain its current organizational structure from the maintenance manager down through the staff supervisory level in the l&C. Electrical, and Mechanical Maintenance
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groups.
Ninety percent of the work force experience is composed of personnel who were formerly journeyman that have obtained foreman i
positions. This group also includes maintenance instructors from the
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training department.
The remaining ten percent are engineering and
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technical personnel who would function as helpers, planners, or i
assist as directed.
This organizational structure is considered to be adequate to support
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safe plant operations, i
b.
Control Room Licensed Operators
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The licensee identified 32 individuals who would staff three shifts
of shift supervisors, sHft foremn and plant oper.iturs to provide shif t coverage for contrni coem operations.
Two shiftt, would rotate
on a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> basis with the third shift supplementing the day shift, i
their basic routine is described above.
Three of tna proposed SS/SF personnel and three of the proposed. plant
operator persor.nel have reactivated their licenses by com71eting
40 hourt of parnilel watchstanding. Documentation has been forwarded I
to the facilit3's trainirg group for retentici.. Two of the proposed
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SS/SF personnel hat, failed the last NRC odministered requalification
exam (6/10/E9 through 6/26/f.9); hrwever, both individuals hav' been placed ir. an accelerated requalification program.
They have been retested and have resurrid their nomal thift duties.
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The inspectors interviewed 10 proposed plant operators and detemined
that each felt confident with their proposed assignment. Additionally, i
the inspectors verified, through document review, that medical, fire l
brigade and respirator requirements were adequately met.
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System Operators The licensee has identified 27 individuals who would provide shift coverage for the auxiliary building, turbine building, diesel
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building, outside, and rover positions.
The inspectors determined by i
reviewing training documentation and interviewing personnel, that 18 of these individuals satisfactorily completed their retraining
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program which included performance JPMs in June 1989.
These 18
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individuals have inactive license, and held either SS, SF or plant operator positions.
Five others are in a hot license class which are
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scheduled to receive their final exam in October 1989.
Each of i
these individuals are required to perform QRs, which serve the same purpose as JPMs.
The remaining four system operators qualifications have been determined to be adequate to support shift cperations. The inspectors determined that the experience level appears to be adequate to support continued plant operations should a strike occur.
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Physical Security I
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Strike Contingency Plan.
Physical Security and Security Contingency Plan to ensure that the
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plant emergency preparedness and security were maintained at a level consistent with proper plant integrity and operation.
I It appears that the quality and quantity of personnel who would be operating the emergency response and security functions would be more than necessary to normally operate the plant and is capable of meeting regulatory requirements during h strike.
Provisions were made with local law enforcement agencies to deal with nondocile strikers and to respond in the event of a threat to plant safety or security.
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On Setemt.or '.,, the union voted to ratify a new contract with the
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licemee.
As a result it was not necessary for the licersee to imlesient the Strike Centingacy Plan.
No nolations ce deviations were identified. The results of the inspections W this area it.dicate that the program was effective with respect to
Leeting the safety objectives.
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D.it Interview The inspection scope and findings *ere suntaarited during management
interviews +hroughout the report period and on September 11, with the
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plant mantcer and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings
were discussed in detail.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection
findings summarized below and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
Item Number Description
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89-20-01(UNR)
Requirements for detecting radioactive containina-
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tion in condensate pump discharge flow path.
89-20-02(IFI)
Modifications to reduce slow starts of emergency diesel generator, j
89-02-03 (IFI)
Instruction to fire watch for notifying control room were inadequate, t
89-20-04 (IFI)
Additional diesel generator loading due to CCW flow increase during a SI and loss of instrument air.
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t l1 8.
Acronyms and Abbreviations
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Abnormal Operating Proced re A0P
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Administrative Procedure AP
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APC0 -
Alabama Power Company
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Code of Federal Regulations CFR
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Component Cooling Water CCW
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Design Change DC
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Deviation Report DR
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Emergency Contingency Procedure ECP
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Emergency Plant implementing Procedure
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EIP
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Environmental Qualifications EQ
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Engineered Safety Features ESF
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Engineerirts Work Request EWR
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F Fahrenheit
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Ch11cns Per Minute GPM
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Inservice inspection ISI
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Inservice Test IST
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Job Performance 112esure JFM
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Limiting Condition for Operation LC0
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Motor-Operated Valve M0V
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M0 VATS - Motor-Operated Valve Actuation Testing System Maintenance Work Pequ%t MWR
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Nonconfomance Report NCR
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FRC Nuclear Regal 6 tory Comission
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NPC Office of Nucicer Rear. tor Regulation NRR
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Pounds Per Square Inch PSI
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PSIG -
Pounds Per Square Inch Guage Plant Modifications Department PMD
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Quality Assurance QA
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Quality Control QC
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Qualification Record QR
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Radiation Control and Protection Procedure RCP
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Radiation Work Permit RWP
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RWST -
Refueling Water Storage Tank Safety injection SI
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SAER -
Safety Audit and Engineering Review Shift Foreman SF
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Steam Generator S/G
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Shift supervisor SS
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SSPS -
Solid State Protection System Solenoid Operated Valve S0V
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Surveillance Test Procedure STP
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Technical Specification TS
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WA Work Authori7ation
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Work Request WR
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Unresolved item UR
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