ML20246B026

Insp Repts 50-348/89-11 & 50-364/89-11 on 890411-0510. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Surveillance Observation,Monthly Maint Observation,Lers & Unit 2 Startup from Refueling

ML20246B026
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	05/25/1989
From:	Cantrell F, Maxwell G, Miller W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246B007	List: ML20246B005 ML20246B012 ML20246B026
References
50-348-89-11, 50-364-89-11, IEIN-87-050, IEIN-87-50, IEIN-89-033, IEIN-89-044, IEIN-89-33, IEIN-89-44, NUDOCS 8907070175
Download: ML20246B026 (15)

See also: IR 05000348/1989011

Text

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'#' . UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY' COMMISSION

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REGION ll

.101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.

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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

LReport Nos.: 50-348/89-11 and 50-364/89-11

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Licensee: Alab'ama Power Company

600 North 18th Street:

Birmingham, AL 36291

Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8

Facility Name: Farley 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted:' April 11'through May 10.-1989

Inspec rs: . . Om 1

h G.~F. Ma Seni o Resident Inspector- Date Signed

ell,

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W. 'H. ,M;11et, Jr. , Resident Inspector Date Signed

Approved by: ~ [!2J/b

F.'S.Cantrell,6p)fonChief Cate Sfgned

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine onsite inspection . involved a review of operational safety

verification, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance

observation, licensee. event reports, Unit 2 startup from refueling, response to

NRC information notices, followup of written reports (Part 21) and previous

inspection findings.

Results:

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Within .the areas inspected, the following violations were identified: Failure

to maintain containment integrity, paragraph 3.b.(1), and Failure to follow

procedure while preparing the solid state protective system for a surveillance

-test, paragraph 3.b.(2). The licensee was requested to review his practice of

leaving high-low interface valves energized.. paragraph 8.c.

Certain tours were conducted on deep backshift or weekends, these tours were

conducted on April 21, 30 and May 7 (deep backshift inspections occur between

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10 p.m. and 5 a.m.).

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8907070175 890525 [

PDR ADOCK 05000348 L

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REPORT. DETAILS

1. Licensee Employees Contacted

L" R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager

C. L. Buck, Plant Modification Manager .

L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Managet

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R. D. Hill, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations

' D. N.- Morey, General Manager - Farley. Nuclear Plant

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C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager-

J. K. Osterholtz, Operations Manager

L. M. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support

J. J.' Thomas, Maintenance Manager

L. S. Williams, Training Manager

Other licensee. employees contacted included, technicians, operations

personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security -force members, and-

-o ffice personnel.

The NRC Project Section Chief, F. S. Cantrell, visited the Farley. site

May 9-11, 1989, to tour .the site and meet with licensee management and

the resident inspectors.

' Acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this report are . listed in the

'last paragraph.

2. Plant Status

Unit 1

Unit 1 operated at approximately 100% reactor power throughout the

reporting period.

Unit 2

Unit 2 was shutdown throughout the reporting period for a normal scheduled

refueling outage.

3. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

a. Plant Tours

The inspectors conducted routine plant tours during this inspection

period to verify that the license requirements and commitments were

being implemented. Inspections were conducted at various times

including week-days, nights, weekends and holidays. These tours were

performed to verify that: systems, valves, and breakers required for

safe plant operations were in their correct position; fire protection

equipment, spare equipment and materials were being maintained and

stored properly; plant operators were aware of the current plant

status; plant operations personnel were documenting the status of

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out-of-service equipment; there were no undocumented cases of unusual

fluid leaks, piping vibration, abnormal hanger or seismic restraint

movements; all reviewed equipment requiring calibration was current;

and, general housekeeping was satisfactory.

Tours of the plant included review of site documentation and

interviews with plant personnel. The inspectors reviewed the control

room operators' logs, tag out logs, chemistry and health physics

logs, and control boards and panels. During these tours the

inspectors noted that the operators appeared to be alert, aware of

changing plant conditions and manipulated plant controls properly.

The inspectors evaluated operations shift turnovers and attended. 4

shift briefings. They observed that the briefings and turnovers

provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew and verified that

the staffing met the TS requirements.

Site security was evaluated by observing personnel in the protected

and vital areas to ensure that these persons had the proper

authorization to be in the respective areas. The inspectors also

verified that vital area portals were kept locked and alarmed. The

security personnel appeared to be alert and attentive to their duties

and those officers performing personnel and vehicular searches were

thorough and systematic. Responses to security alarm conditions

appeared to be prompt and adequate.

Selected activities of the licensee's Radiological Protection Program

were reviewed by the inspectors to verify 'conformance with plant

procedures and NRC regulatory requirement. The areas reviewed

included: operation and management of the plant's health physics

staff, "ALARA" implementation, Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) for

compliance to plant procedures, personnel exposure records,  :

observation of work and personnel in radiation areas to verify

compliance to radiation protection procedures, and control of

radioactive materials,

b. Plant Events and Observations

(1) Loss of Unit 2 Containment Integrity

On April 19, at approximately 12:15 p.m., Unit 2 containment

integrity was breached during fuel movement when the bonnet to

valve Q2P25V001A in the 1/2 inch chemical injection line to

steam generator line 2A was removed with the manways and

handhole covers for steam generator 2A also removed. This

created an air to air path from the containment to the main ,

steam valve room, which is located outside of the containment

structure, through the open valve in the chemical injection

piping system. The licensee estimated that the valve bonnet was

removed and containment integrity was breached for approximately

30 minutes.

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' Work order MWR 182030, was issued and released by the operations

group to repack valve .Q2P25V001A. The maintenance workers

assigned to the repacking job found the valve-bonnet bolts to be

only finger tight. To eliminate the valve leak the workers

removed the valve bonnet, replaced the gasket and reinstalled

the bonnet. However, no approval was obtained to deviate from

the original work scope. On April 20, during a review of

completed work raquests, the licensee identified that this

maintenance work had resulted in a breach of containment

integrity. Initial investigation indicated that this breach had

existed for appro/ir.ately 30 minutes (between 12:15 and

12:45 p.m.). Furt kr investigation by the Licensee

(LER364/89-04) ind!cated that the packing for the valve

was removed at ap,)roximately 9:00 a.m. on April 19. All work

was completed on the valve by 4:00 p.m. that day. Containment

integrity was breached several times during this period;

however, the opening which resulted from removal of the packing

only is considered inconsequential with the bonnet removed, the

opening is more significant.

TS Section 3.9.4 states that during refueling operations each

containment building penetration providing direct access from

the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere will be

closed by an isolation valve, blind flange or manual va? a. l

This open penetration is identified as Violation 364/89-11-01,

Breach of Containment Integrity During Refueling.

The severity of this violation is reduced due to: the small size

of the open penetration (1/2 inch); short time of open

penetration; and, the temperature and pressure within the

containment being approximately the same as that which existed

outside of containment at the time of the event. Even considering

a fuel handling accident, the safety significance is minimal.

(2) Unit 2 Inadvertent Safety Injection

On April 29, while licensee personnel were conducting the

preliminary steps for a surveillance test the plant experienced

a false start signal for the "A" train safety injection

equipment. When the event occurred the plant was in Mode 5 (cold

shutdown). The " A" train safety injection equipment which

started, included emergency diesel generator 1/2 A, HSSI, RHR,

CCW and SW pumps.

The inspectors reviewed plant logs and documentation and

interviewed operators, supervisors and plant management

personnel concerning the event. It was determined that the

i following sequence of events occurred prior to, during or after

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Operations personnel were in the process of establishing- .

M the initial. conditions to allow surveillance test procedure

FNP-2-STP 16.6, Spray and Phase B Actuation Test, Revision 9

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to be conducted.

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The. STP would eventually require re-positioning the solid

L state protection system SSPS mode selector switches.

To allow the manipulation of the mnde selector switches the

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operators were required to first obtain a " partial release"

for the removal of clearance tags which were previously

.placed on the switches by maintenance instrumentation and

controls personnel.

The clearance tags had been , installed as a part of.-

procedure. IMP-0.7, Modes 5 and 6 Surveillance Test

Performance. This procedure was implemented earlier during

the outage-to disable solid state protection system output

relays during the outage, to prevent spurious activations.

FNP-2-STP-16.6, Section 3.9 states "If IMP-0.7 is in effect

in the SSPS, then perform the.following before running this

STP...in .the A Train SSPS logic cabinet place the input

error inhibit switch to the inhibit position... then ... in

' the A Train SSPS output cabinet place the mode selector

switch to the operate position."

Contrary to the above requirements of 2-STP-16.6 Section 3.9,

the operators, placed the SSPS mode selector switches

in the operate position while removing the clearance tags,.

without first placing the input error inhibit switches in

the inhibit position. As a result a SI signal was' generated.

The operators who were stationed at the main control boards

immediately recognized that a false start signal had been

generated. They then took all of the required procedural

steps to return the plant to its' normal mode 5

configuration.

The shift supervisor then reported the event to the NRC

duty officer.

The above discrepancy is identified as Violation 364/89-11-02,

Failure to follow procedure while preparing the SSPS for a

surveillance test.

(3) Filling and Venting Unit 2 RCS

The inspectors observed portions of the filling and venting

operations after the Unit 2 reactor vessel head was reinstalled.

The plant operators followed procedure 2. 50P-1.2, RCS Filling

and Venting, to satisfactorily accomplish these evolutions.

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L (4).RadiationIncidentReportNo.89-006'

During a routine plant tour on May 7, the inspectors noted a

system operator enter RHR pump room 2B which was posted as a

"High Radiation" area. The operator entered this area without

either an alarming digital dosimeter or a HP technician with a

dose rate survey instrument. Radiation Work Permit 0-89-0003

posted at the door to this pump room required an alarming

digital dosimeter or a HP technician with a dose rate survey

instrument. The system operator apparently violated the RWP.

For additional' information on this item refer to NRC Report

348,364/89-13.

Except as noted, no violations or deviations were identified. The results

of the inspections in this area indicate that the program was effective

with respect to meeting the safety objectives.

4. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors witnessed the licensee conducting maintenance surveillance

test activities on safety-related systems and components to verify that

the licensee performed the activities in accordance with TS and licensee

requirements. These observations included witnessing selected portions of

each surveillance, review of the surveillance procedures to ensure that

administrative controls and tagging procedures were in force, determining

that approval was obtained prior to conducting the surveillance test and

that individuals conducting the test were qualified in accordance with

plant-approved procedures. Other observations included ascertaining that

test instrumentation 'used was calibrated, data collected was within the

specified requirements of TS, any identified discrepancies were properly

noted, and the systems were correctly returned to service. The following

specific activities were observed:

1-STP-9.0 Reactor Cooiant System Leak Rate Test

1-STP-15.0 Containment Air Lock Door Seal Operability Test

2-STP-18.3 Containment Purge and Exhaust Valve IST

2-STP-18.5 Containment Mini-Purge and Exhaust Valve IST

2-STP-34 Containment Inspection

2-STP-40.0 Safety Injection With Loss of Off-Site Power

2-STP-40.5 Charging /HHSI Pump 2A, 2B & 2C Low Discharge Head Flow Test

0-STP-80.1 Diesel Generator 1-2A Operability Test

0-STP-80.2 Diesel Generator IC Operability Test

2-STP-108 Incore Thermocouple

2-STP-131.07 Smoke Detector Function Test (Containment)

2-STP-160.23 Train "B" RHR Suction Line Hydrostatic Test

1-STP-754 Verify R-23A/23B in service once per 24 Hours when R-60 is

inoperable

2-STP-905 Auxiliary Building Battery Inspection

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0-ETP-3616 Performing Monthly Flux Maps (Data Collection for STP-108,

110 and 121)

0-ETP-3640 Vessel TV Inspection Below Lower Core Plate (Unit 2)

0-ETP-3643 Verification of Rod Control System Operability (Unit 2)

a. Procedure 2-STP-40.0

Surveillance 2-STP-40.0 was conducted on April 21, but was not

satisfactory. Several valves and components did not function

properly and inverter 20 failed. This prevented resetting "B" train

following initiation of the safety injection signal. The items which

failed were retested under other procedures to verify operability.

b. Procedure 2-STP-905

During the evaluation of the electrical maintenance activities being

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conducted on battery 2B for surveillance 2-STP-905, the inspectors

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noted that the isolation breaker for the battery was not tagged open.

The controlling work authorization (WR-83535) and 2-STP-905 were

reviewed and found not to contain any specific requirements to tag

the isolation breaker (LB18-Q2R42E002B-B) open. The STP did contain

requirements that the breaker be placed in the open position and that

the battery cables, once disconnected, be taped with electrical

insulation tape on their exposed ends. The inspectors discussed the

above as found condition with the electrical maintenance personnel

who were conducting the work and also with the electrical maintenance

supervisor. As a result of the inspectors concern about the safety

of those personnel who conduct this STP, the electrical isolation

breaker LB18 was promptly tagged open. The licensee is currently

evaluating the site practices concerning tagging requirements for

work involving low voltage power sources such as the plant batteries.

c. Procedure 1-STP-'754

The radiation monitor for the main steam relief and atmospheric steam

dump discharge from loop 1A monitor RE-60A, was declared inoperable  ;

on November 30, 1988. The licensee reported this to the NRC by LER ,

88-23 and initiated the preplanned alternate method of monitoring i

the main steam relief and atmospheric steam dump discharge. This

method included verification that radiation monitors RE-23A and 23B 1

on the steam generator blowdown system were in service once per 24

hours or conducting an appropriate grab sample if monitors RE-23A

and 23B were not in service. These alternate methods are

accomplished and documented by procedure FNP-1-STP-754, RE-60A, B, &

C Contingency Sampling. On April 14 and 17, the inspectors reviewed

recently' completed surveillance of 1-STP-754 to verify that

appropriate measures were being implemented while radiation monitor

RE-60A was out of service. During this review it was noted that the

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steam generator blowdown ' system for Unit I was out of service from l

April 5 at 11:03 a.m. until April 7 at 5:15 p.m. On these dates 1

radiation monitors RE-23A and 23B were not operable since there was

no flow through the steam generator blowdown system. Grab samples

were not taken from 'the steam generator outlets as required when

RE-23A and 23B are not in service.

This problem was discussed with the plant chemistry group and it was

determined that the cause of the problem was a procedure inadequacy.

The licensee noted that the use of radiation monitor RE-15A on the

steam jet air ejector would provide an improved method of monitoring

parameters when RE-60A, B or C are out of service. Grab samples

would be required if RE-15A was not in service. Procedure

FNP-1-STP-754 was promptly revised to incorporate this change. The

failure to implement the previously approved preplanned compensatory

measures while RE-60A and RE-23A and 23B were out of service on April

6 and 7 is a procedure violation. This violation has minimal safety

significance since monitor RE-15A was available to detect any

radiation within the secondary system, and is not cited because the

criteria specified in Section V. A of- the enforcement policy were

satisfied, NCV 348/89-11-02.

Excepted as noted, no violations or deviations were identified. the

results of the inspections in this area indicate that the prooram was

effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives.  ;

5. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's mainten.ince activities to verify

the following: maintenance personnel were obt.ining the appropriate tag

out and clearance approvals prior to commencing work activities, correct

documentation was available for all requested parts and material prior to

use, procedures were available for all requested parts and material prior

to use, procedures were available and adequate for the work being

conducted, maintenance personnel performing work activities were qualified

to accomplish these tasks, no maintenance activities reviewed were

violatirig any limiting conditions for operation during the specific

evolution, the required QA/QC reviews and QC hold points were implemented,

post-maintenance testing activities were completed, and equipment was

properly returned to service after the completion of work activities.

Activities reviewed included:

MWR-164766 Cut and cap Unit 2 BIT bypass line.

MWR-182604 Overload test of Unit 1 MOV347BA, outside air to control

room filter motor starter.

MWR-183040 Disassemble / reassemble Unit 2 MSIV Q2N11V001B for

preventive maintenance using Procedure 0-MP-39-0.

MWR-183120 Replace spring for safety relief valve on service water to

RHR 2B room cooler and set relief at 154 psi.

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MWR-193022 Inspection of fuses in Unit 1 panel cabinet J

(Q1HINGB325047) for B0P control panel.

MWR-195302 Replace "PCB" in transformer 2F with new dielectric

solution (Procedure EMP-3573.02).

MWR-197064 Inspect and rebuild Unit 2 snubber 2 SI-R997A for safety

injection line.

MWR-198441 Repairs to Unit 2 electrical penetration Q2T52B040.

WA-WOO 302462 Statior service transformer 2F supply breaker inspection,  !

test and maintenance using Procedure EMP-1313.03.

2-PMP-1078 Hydrostatic test of Train A service water header (0TC

890427-1).

0-MP-89.0 Limitorque motor operated valve testing using "M0 VATS"

testing system (valve No. Q2N21M0V3232C).

On April 28, the inspectors witnessed a hydrostatic test of Unit 2 service

water train B header which was unsatisfactory. The hydrostatic test pumps ,

were unable to maintain the required test pressure for 10 minutes.

Subsequently, the test procedure was revised to permit the system to be

pressurized by the train B system through cross train interconnecting

piping. This portion of the test was not observed by the inspectors.

No violations or deviations were identified. The results of the

inspections in this area indicate that the program was effective with

respect to meetina the safety objectives.

6. Licensee Event Reports (92700, 90714)

The following Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed for potential

generic problems to determine trends, to determine whether information

included in the report meets the NRC reporting requirements and to

consider whether the corrective action discussed in the report appears

appropriate. Licensee actions were reviewed to verify that the event

has been reviewed and evaluated by the licensee as required by the

Technical Specifications; that corrective action was taken by the

licensee; and that safety limits, limiting safety settings and LCOs were

not exceeded. The inspector examined the incident reports, logs and  ;

records, and interviewed selectcu a vrsonnel. The following reports are

considered closed:

Unit 1

LER/88-18 Failure to adequately eddress effects of fire in an area.

Unit 2

LER/88-02 TS 3.0.3 entered when a fire damper in the penetration room

filtration system common suction line was closed.

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LER/88-06 Special Report: Fire detection system inoperable for more

than fourteen days.

LER/89-03 Steam generator tube plugging.

No violations or deviations were identified. The results of the

inspections in this area ' indicate that the program was effective with

respect to meeting the safety objectives.

7. Unit 2 Plant Startup from Refueling (71711)

The licensee implemented administrative procedures to assure that systems

disturbed or tested during the refueling outage were returned to operable

status before plant startup. Procedure FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of

Operation - Operations Group, Appendix C, Return to Service and System

Lineup, requires a return to service check list to be prepared to insure

that all necessary work and actions tre completed prior to returning the

plant to service. Procedures FNP-2~dOP-1.1B, Startup of Unit from Cold

Shutdown to Hot Standby, and FNP-2-dOP-1.2, Startup from Hot Standby to

Minimum Load, require additional verification of the completion of system

lineups and completion of surveillance test procedures before entrance

into the next appropriate operational mode. The inspectors reviewed the

check lists required by these procedures and verified that the licensee's

program was effective. Completed system lineup check list procedures were

reviewed, to verify that the restoration program was being implemented. j

No discrepancies were noted. 1

On the evening shift of May 7, the inspectors performed a post refueling

outage inspection of the Unit 2 containment to verify that the general

cleanliness was acceptable for plant entry into Mode 4. Practically all

of the tools, equipment and materials which had been moved into containment

to support the refueling outage had been removed. The inspectors reviewed

the deficiency check list o/ procedure 2-STP-34, Containment Inspection,

and noted that NRC identified discrepancies were also on the licensee's

checklist. These items included: tool boxes, drain hoses, HP supplies and

several miscellaneous areas which needed additional cleaning. The

licensee stated that all of these discrepancies were corrected prior to

entry into Mode 4.

Accessible key portions of the Unit 2 containment spray system and

component cooling water system were inspected by the inspectors to verify

that: valves and electrical breakers were in correct alignment; hangers

l and supports were properly made up; and major components were labeled,

lubricated, cooled and no visible leakage existed. Portions of these

systems had been disturbed during this outage, but based on this l

l inspection, these systems appears to have been returned to service in

accordance with the applicable procedures. However, several minor

discrepancies were identifieo, reported to the licensee, and were promptly

corrected.

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l The inspectors witnessed portions of the reactor thermocouple RTD cross

l calibration tests (2-STP-198) and rod drive control system operability

! tests (0-ETP-3643) which were conducted before the reactor coolant systems

were considered ready for operation.

No violations or deviations were identified. The results of the

inspections in this area indicate that the program was effective with

respect to meeting the safety objectives.

8. Review of Licensee's Response to NRC Information Notices (92701)

a. (lydrogen Storage - IN 89-44

As requested by NRC internal memorandum dated May 2,1989, the

inspectors reviewed the hydrogen storage facility at Farley to

determine: distance from the hydrogen storage facility to the nearest

safety related structure or air intake, and maximum volume of

gaseous or liquid hydrogen stored on site.

The bulk hydrogen storage facility is located approximately 1300 ft

from the nearest safety related structure which is the diesel

generator building. The maximum hydrogen stored at this location is

200,000 ft3 in the gaseous form and 1,500 gallons of liquid hydrogen.

The distance between this bulk storage location and safety related

structures should not present a fire or explosion hazard to safety

related plant structures.

A hydrogen cylinder having a maximum capacity of 280 cubic feet ic

stored adjacent to the main steam valve room of each unit. The

location and arrangement of these cylinders do not present hazards to

safety related components which warrants additional protection.

Additional hydrogen cylinders are installed in a number of plant

locations such as counting rooms, laboratories, etc. These were

considered in the plant's fire prntection evaluation and found to

pose minimal danger to the plant's safe shutdown capability. Spare

cylinders for these applications are stored in the warehouse complex

located approximately 700 feet from the nearest safety related

structure. The maximum quantity of hyarogen in this location is

approximately 2,000 cubic feet and does not appear to present a fire or

exposure hazard to safety related plant structures.

The licensee is evaluating this IN.

b. Potential Failure of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Mechanical l

Plugs - IN 89-33 l

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Upon receipt of this information notice, the licensee immediately

initiated an investigation to determine if any of the plugs installed

i in the Unit 2 steam generators were of the heat numbers identified by

i Westinghouse as being susceptible to cracks. The following number of

l susceptible plugs were found installed in Unit 2:

S/G S/G S/G

Heat No. A B C

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l 4523 13 35 61

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The above plugs were modified by installation of a Westinghouse -

designed " plug-in-plug" modification, except five heat No. 4523 plugs

in steam generator C which were replaced witn new plugs. These five

plugs were removed and returned to Westinghouse for further

evaluation. Also, one leaking plug in steam generator 2C of heat

No. 3962 was removed and replaced by a new plug.

The licensee's evaluation of IN 89-33 is in progress to determine the

number of plugs installed in Unit I which require the " plug-in-plug" ,

tradification during the September 1989 refueling outage. (

c. Potential LOCA at High and Low Pressure Interfaces from Fire Camage -

IN 87-50.

Valves 870iA, 87018, 8702A and 87028 in the surtion piping from the

RCS to RHR pumps are located in containment ar.- are maintained in the

closed position, except when the RHR system is in operation. These .

valves have interlocks to prevent inadvertent over pressurization of 3

the RHR system, depressurization of RCS or overflow and dilution of )

the RWST. The RHR inlet isolation valves are designed to automatically

close if RCS pressure exceeds 700 psig. The inspector's were I

concerned that the power supply for the above valves at Farley is not

removed when the units are above modes 4 to avoid the type concerns i

discussed in IN 87-50 involving the potential for " shorts" that could )

cause an unplanned operation of these interface valves in the event I

of a fire in certain locations. The licensee stated that power is I

maintained on these valves to facilitate initiation of the RHR system )

when required. The licensee's current evaluation found that this j

information notice was not applicable to Farley. The inspectors  ;

suggested that this item be re-evaluated. This concern is identified i

as Inspector Followup Item 348/89-11-01, 364/89-11-03, Licensee's

Reevaluation of Information Notice 87-50.

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9. Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events (92700)

a. (Closed) 348,364/P2189-01, Slow close lever rebound spring for Brown

Boveri; M'd power distribution K-Line electrically operated K-225

through K-7000 circuit breakers. The licensee conducted . an

evalut.cion and determine that ABB K-Line circuit breakers were not

installed at Farley. Therefore, this item is not applicable at

Farley and is closed.

10. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)

a. (Closed) Deviation 348,364/89-32-01, Receipt of high radiation signal

by radiation monitors in control room ventilation system does not

sound an alarm in the control room.

The licensee evaluated this discrepancy and determined that the alarm

commitment could be removed from the FSAR. However, further

management review determined that an audible alart would be a

desirable enhancement and this alarm has been installed. This item

is closed.

b. (0 pen) Unresolved Item 348,364/87-33-01, Correct fuse size

designation on as built drawings. NRC Report 348,364/89-05

requested a written response from the licensee indicating the status,

corrective action, and significance of this item. The licensee's

response of April 24, 1989 indicated that an evaluation of plant

fuses will be made to determine if correct fuse sizes and an

inspection will be made to verify that the correct fuses are

installed. A fuse manual is to be written to assure that the correct

fuses are installed during future maintenance. This fuse manual will

supersede existing design drawings and manuals as the controlling

document for fuses. The manual is scheduled to be completed and

fully implemented by September 29, 1989. The fuse inspection and

evaluation program results are scheduled to be completed by

December 31, 1989. This item will be re-evaluated upon completion

of the licensee's review. This item remains open.

11. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management

interviews throughout the report period and on May 10, with the plant

manager and selected members of his staff. The inspection findings were

discussed in detail. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings

and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the

inspectors during this inspection.

Licensee was informed that the items discussed in paragraph Nos. 6, 9 and

10 were closed.

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Item Number Description and Reference

364/89-11-01 (OPEN) Violation: Failure to maintain

containment integrity - paragraph 3.b.(1).

364/89-11-02 (OPEN) Violation: Failure to follow

procedures while preparing the solid state

protection system for a surveillance test -

paragraph 3.b.(2).

348/89-11-01 (OPEN) Inspector Followup Item: Licensee's

364/89-11-03 re-evaluation of IN 87-50, high-low pressure

interface - paragraph 8.c.

348/89-11-02 (CLOSED) Non Cited Violation: Failure to

take grab samples when - radiation monitors

were inoperable.

12. Acronyms and Abbreviations .i

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AFW - Auxiliary Feedwater

A0P - Abnormal Operating Procedure

AP - Administrative Procedure

APC0 - Alabama Power Company

CFR - Code of federal Regulations

CCW - Cor,ponent Cooling Water

DC -

Design Change

DR - Deviation Report

ECP - Emargency Contingency Procedure

EIP - Emergency Plant Implementing Procedure

EQ -

Environmental Qualifications

ESF - Engineered Safety Features

EWR - Engineering Work Request

F -

Fahrenheit

GPM -

Gallons Per Minute

IN -

Information Notice

ISI - Inservice Inspection

IST -

Inservice Test

LC0 - Limiting Condition for Operation

MOV - Motor-0perated Valve

MOVATS - Motor-0perated Valve Actuation Testing

MWR - Maintenance Work Request j

NCR - Nonconformance Report 1'

NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRR - NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

PMD - Plant Modifications Department

QA - Quality Assurance

QC - Quality Control

RCP - Radiation Control and Protection Procedure

RCS - Reactor Coolant System

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RHR - Residual Heat Removal

RTD - Resistance Temperature Detector ,

Safety Injection

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SAER - Safety Audit and Engineering Review j

S/G - Steam Generator j

SSPS - Solid State Protection System

S0V - Solenoid Operated Valve

STP -

Surveillance Test Procedure

SW. -- Service Water

TS - Technical Specification

TSC - Technical Support Center

WA -

Work Authorization

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