IR 05000348/1997015
| ML20203K459 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203K444 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-97-15, 50-364-97-15, NUDOCS 9803050089 | |
| Download: ML20203K459 (19) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
REGION 11 Docket Nos: 50 348 and 50 364 License Nos: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Report No: 50-348/97-15 and 50 364/97-15 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC)
Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP), Units 1 and 2 Location: 7388 North State Highway 95 Columbi.. AL 36319 Dates: November 30, 1997 thro 3 January 10, 1998 Inspectors: T. Ross, Senior Resident inspcctor J. Bartley, Resident inspector (RI)
R. Caldwell, R1 W. Kleinsorge, Reactor Inspector (Sections M through M8.3)
Approved by: P. Skinner. Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure 9803050089 900209 PDR ADOCK 05000340 0 PDR .
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EXECUTIVE SUMWaY
) Farley Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-348/97-15. 50-364/97-15 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering. maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of onsite resident inspector and region-based specialist inspection Doerations e Control Room professionalism and conduct remained acceptabl )erating crew team work ar.d connun1 cations were effective. Unit Siift Supervisor command and control and operations management oversight were evident (Section 01.1),
e Operator attentiveness to Main Control Board annunciator alarms and response to changing plant conditions were prompt especially during loss of an offsite power line due to severe weather conditions (Section 01.1).
- Fuel handling activities in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool were adequately controlled and consistent with procedural requirements including the use of approved fuel Assembly Transfer Forms (Section 1.2).
- Safety system walkdowns and tours verified that accessible portions of selected systems were adequately maintained and operational (Sectinn 02.2).
- Safety tagging activities were properly implemented and met procedural requirements (Section 02.3).
- A Non-Cited Violation was identified for an inoperable ceacter coolant system leak detection system (Section 08.1).
l Maintenance o Maintenance and surveillance testing activities were conducteo in a thorough and competent manner by qualified individuals in accordance with plant procedures and work instructions (Section M1.1).
- A Non-Cited Violation was identified during the conduct of maintenance activities in the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool-Controlled Refueling Area Boundary. Maintenance personnel failed to comply with the personnel accountability requirements and were not challenged by the HP technician covering the work (Section M1.3),
e The 2C Diesel Generator maintenance outage was performed by qualified and knowledgeable personnel. Post maintenance testing was satisfactorily completed (%ction M1.4).
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r Plant Seopp.ri e Security personnel activities observed were performed adequately. Site security systems were adequate to ensure physical protection of the plant (Section S1.1).
e On December 11. 1997, the on shift fire brigade responded to an unannounced fire drill at the Annex Building. The fire brigade responded promptly and demonstrated effective fire fighting techniques (Section F4.1).
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Report Details i
Summary of Plant Status l
Unit 1 operated continuously at 100% power for the entire inspection period, ,
exceat for a weekend reduction to 15% power on December 12 to blowdown and
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, flus 1 steam generators (SGs).
Unit 2 operated continuously at 100% power for the entire inspection period, except for a one day reduction to 60% power on December 27 to repair the 2A SG
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feedwater pump.
4 I. Doerations 01 Conduct of Operations
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01.1 Routine Obser vations of Control Room Operations
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a. Insoection Scone (Insoection Procedure (IP) 71707}
1he inspectors conducted frequent ins)ections of ongoing plant operations in the Main Control Room (iCR) to verify proper staffing, operator attehtiveness, adherence to approved operating procedures, communications, and command and control of operator activities, inspectors reviewed operator logs and Technical S)ecifications (TS)
Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCO) tracking sleets, walked down the l Main Control Boards (MCBs), and interviewed members of the operating shift crews to verify operational safety and compliance with TS. The inspectors frequently attended morning plant status meetings and shift
- turnover meetings to maintain awareness of overall facility operations.
maintenance activities, and recent incident Morning reports and Occurrence Reports (OR) were routinely reviewed to assure that the licensee properly tracked, reported and resolved potential operational safety concern , Observations and findinas Overall control and awareness of plant conditions during the inspection period remained a strength. Operations Management oversight was evident as efforts to maintain MCB deficiencies at very low levels continued to be effective. Ins)ectors observed that the Unit 1 MCBs. Balance of Plant (BOP), and tie emergency power board (EPB) alarm panels were frequently " blackboard." The Unit 2 MCBs were also " blackboard" when a persistent digital rod position indication non urgent alarm cleared for several days. The Unit 2 BOP 3anels continued to have a few persistent alarms for known equipment 3ro)1 ems. The combined MCB deficiencies on Unit 1 and Unit 2 remained aelow 10. Most of the deficiencies involved non safety related instrumentation or equipment and none in alved a TS LC )erator attentiveness to MCB annunciator alarms and response to clanging plant conditions were prompt and effective. Interviews with members of the operating crew verified that they were consistently aware
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of plant conditions and ongoing activitie Shift staffing was verified
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} to be in compliance with procedural and TS requirements. Pre shift :
briefings of the operating crews by the shift supervisors (SS) provided ;
operators with shift direction and priorities. Shift turnovers were accomplished in an orderly manner following a board walktwn by the off- ;
going and on coming operators and S ;
On December 24. 1997, the inspectors observed the operators' response to l severe weather conditions and the subsequent loss of an offsite power i
line. Operator response to the associated alarms was prompt and '
- thorough. The SS exhibited good command and control and communications with personnel both inside and outside the MCR during the event.
The inspectors observed that routine reactivity manipulations performed by the operators were satisfactorily completed. The
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operators notified the applicable SS prior to each manipulation as required by procedure.
4 Conclusions
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Control Room professionalism and conduct remained acceptable, ,
Operating crew teamwork and communications were effective. Unit l SS command and control and operations management oversight were eviden l l 0)erator attentiveness to MCB annunciator alarms and response to clanging plant conditions were prompt especially during loss of an
- offsite power line due to severe weather conditions. Management's
, efforts to reduce the number of MCB deficiencies remained effectiv The operating crews consistently demonstrated a high level of awareness of existing plant conditions and ongoing plant activitie .2 Shuffle of Soent Fuel in Unit 2 Soent Fuel Pool
, Inspection Scone (IP 60705)
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i The inspector observed plant operators relocate spent fuel assemblies in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool (SFP) in preparation for the Unit 2 refueling
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. Observations and Findinos On January 6. 1998, the inspectors observed the relocation of several spent fuel assemblies in the SFP by licensed operators in accordance with FNP-2 FHP-5.4 Revision (Rev.) 5. S)ent Fuel Assembly Handling Tool. -All fuel movements were accomplis 1ed under the direct supervision
- of a shift foreman (SFM) who was a licensed senior reactor operator (SRO). About 76 spent fuel assemblies were scheduled to be relocate .. -- - - - _ . - - - _ - . .- -
c. Conclusions fuel handling activities witnessed by the inspector were adecuately controlled and consistent with procedural requirements inclucing the use of approved fuel Assembly Transfer Forms.
02 Operational Status of nilities and Equipment 02.1 General Tours of Specific Safety-Related Areas (IP 71707)
General tours of safety-related areas were performed by the inspectors to examine the physical condition of plant equipment and structures and to verify that safety systems were properly maintained and aligne These general walkdowns included the accessible portions of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSC).
Overall material conditions for Unit 1 and Unit 2 SSC were acceptabl Minor equipment and housekeeping problems obser ved by the ins)ectors were reported to the responsible manager for resolutio Alt 1ough certain licensee efforts to improve the material conditions of the plant (e.g.. painting) had been discontinued due to budgetary considerations, other offorts for ensuring adequate levels of housekceping were productive (e.g.. management / supervisor tours).
02.2 Biweekly insoections of Safety Systems (IP 717071 Inspectors verified the operability of the following selected safety systems and/or equipment:
. Unit 1 Vital DC Power Supply - Trains A and B e Unit 2 Vital DC Power Supply - Trains A and B e Service Water Intake Structure - Vital DC Power Supply for Trains A and B Accessible portioris of the systems listed above were verified to be properly aligned. The inspectors also observed that they were adequately maintained and in acceptable operating condition. Minor deficiencies, which did not affect system operability, were noted and discussed with the appropriate SS.
02.3 Verification of Safety Taaoina a. Insnection Scone (IP 71707)
The inspectors reviewed and walked down portions of 17 selected tagouts to verify they were implemented in accordance with procedural requirement _ . - - . - - _ - _ - _ _ - - _ - . - _ - _ .-- . .- - - .
b. Observatiou and Findinaq
- The inspectors verified that devices identified on the tag orders were properly tagged. The device identifications were correct, tags were conspicuously placed on the devices, and the tags did not obscure control room panel indications. The administrative aspects of filling out the tagging order forms were complete and correct. The tags placed were adequate for personnel safety and equipment protection, fonclusion The inspectors concluded that the reviewed safety tagging activities were correct and met the procedural requirements. The administrative aspects of the tagging orders were complete and accurat .4 TS LC0 Trackina (IP 40500 and 71707)
The inspectors routinely reviewed the TS LCO tracking sheets filled out by the SFM. All tracking sheets for Units 1 and 2 reviewed by the ir,spectors were consistent with plant conditions and TS requirement Miscellaneous Operations Issues (IP 40500 and 92901)
0 .( Closed) Licensee Event ReDort (LER) 50-348/97-14: Reactor Coolant Leak Detection Gvstem inolerable Due To Defective Procedure Results in
- Doeratina Jondition >rohibited BY TS The licensee reported that the containment cooler drain valves had been mispositioned rendering the containment air cooler condensate level monitucing (CCLM) system ino)erable. The licensee determined that the a)plicable System Operating procedures (SODS) failed to incorporate the tirottled positions for these valve The inspectors verified that the latest revisions of FNP-1-SOP-50.2 Liquid Waste Processing System. Rev. 2. and FNP-2-SOP-50.2A, Liquid Waste Processing System. Rev. 3. incorporated the correct throttle positions for the containment cooler drain valves. The inspectors noted
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that the Unit 1 procedure lacked a footnote contained in the Unit 2 procedure which referenced the licensing basis documents for the throttled position. This minor discrepancy was mentioned to the Operations support staf The inspectors also reviewed the TS LCO Status Sheets for the previous two years. Based on this review, the inspectors determined that there were eight instances where both the containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitoring system (R-11) and the containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system (R-12) were inoserable for longer than six hours while the CCLM system was inoperaale. Technical Specification 3.4.7.1 required that R-11 and either the CCLM system or R-12 be operable for RCS leak detection. These eight instances constituted a violation of TS 3.4. .__ _ ._ _ _ _
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The licensee properly identified. described and reported the condition as documented in LER 50 348/97-14. Corrective actions were appropriate and effective. Therefore, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement (NCV) 50-348/97-lPolicb this violation 01 Inoperable RC3 LeakisDetection identified asResults System Non-Cited in Violati Operating in A Londition Prohibited By T II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Haintenance M1.1 Maintenance and Surveillance Testina Activities Inspection Scone (IP 61726 and 62707)
Inspectors observed and reviewed portions of 19 selected licensee corrective and preventive maintenance activities and routine surveillance testing activities. The purpose of these observations was to determine conformance with plant procedures, work instructions.
industry codes and st6ndards. TSs. and regulatory requirements, Observations and Findinas All observed maintenance work and surveillance testing activities were performed in accordance with work instructions, procedures, and applicable clearance controls. Safety-related maintenance and surveillance testing evolutions were well planned and execute Responsible personnel demonstrated familiarity with administrative and radiological controls. Surveillance tests of safety-related equipment were consistently performed in a deliberate step-by-step manner by personnel in close communication with the MCR, Overall, operators, technicians, and craftsman were observed to be knowledgeabl experienced, and adequately trained for the tasks performe Conclusions Maintenance and surveillance testing activities were conducted in a thorough and competent manner by qualified individuals in accordance with plant procedures and work instruction !
M1.2 ?f_ Penetration Room Filtration (PRF) Heater Testina (IP 62707)
On December 17. 1997, the inspectors observed the Engineering Support (ES) staff perform FNP-2-STP-124.3. Penetration Room Filtration Heater Performance Test. Rev 0. This was the final testing required to complete the ANSI N510-1989 testing requirements (refer to IR 50-348, 364/97 04 and VIO 50-348. 364/97 130-02014). The inspectors observed that the test was conducted per the procedure and the test instrumentation was within calibration. Res onsible engineers determined that system flow was approximatel 5800 standard cubic feet per minute (scfm) which was 303 scfm above t e TS limit. The engineers promptly notify the MCR staff who entered the appropriate LC0 and
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generated OR 2-97-044 and Deficiency Re> ort (DR) 9700885. PRF system flow adjustments were made to correct 11e problem and the LCO was exited well before the action time expired. Efforts to identify what caused the increased system flow were still ongoing by the end of the inspection perio The ins)ectors concluded that ES personnel responded appropriately to the hig1 flow rate condition and Operations personnel entered and exited the TS LCO correctl M1.3 Unit 2 Soent Fuel Pool Underwater Liaht Replacement Inspection Scone (IP 62707)
The inspectors observed maintenance personnel. supported by a health physics (HP) technician, conducting work in the controlled refueling area boundary (CRAB) around the Unit 2 SF Observations and Findinos Un December 30. 1997 ins)ectors observed two electricians conducting work inside the Unit 2 SF?-CRAB. Two other electricians and an HP technician, also dressed out in anti-contamination clothing, were providing assistance from outside the CRAB. U)on completion of their work, all four electricians pro)erly removed t1eir anti-contamination clothing and exited the area. lowever. after reviewing the Personnel and Material Accountability Log, the inspectors concluded that at least two of the electricians failed tu sign-in as required by FNP-0-ACP-7.0, Rev. 4. Foreign Material Control In Fuel H 1dling Areas And S)ent Fuel Pool Material Storage. None of the electi n ans recognized t1e necessity to sign-in on the Personnel and Material Accountability Lo ror were they challenged by the HP technician. The inspectors discussed this event with maintenance management. who promptly investigated the matter. The responsible electricians were coached and all maintenance personrci were briefed on ACP-7.0 requirements, Conclusions During the conduct of maintenance activities in the Unit 2 SFP-CRA maintenance personnel failed to comaly with the personnel accountability requirements of ACP-7.0. nor were t1ey challenged by the HP technician covering the work. Failure to comply with the personnel accountability logging requirements of ACP-7.0 had been observed during a previous Unit 2 refueling outage. However. because this instance was of minor significance and corrective actions were prompt and comprehensiv consistent with SectL IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation is identified as NCV 364/97-15-02. Failure To Follow Personnel Entry Requirements Of The L .c 2 SFP-CRA M1.4 2C Diesel Generator 18-Month Outane (62707)
The inspectors reviewed the work packages and observed portions of the 2C emergency diesel generator (EDG) 18-m; nth outage which occurred between December 8 - 12. 1997. Work was well planned and coordinate Maintenance supervision was constantly on-station, overseeing the activities and reviewing the work status. Workers were diligent in maintaining foreign material exclusion covers over open components. The
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licensee continued its practice of having a vencior representative on-site during major EDG outages to aid in resolving technical issue Overall. this maintenance evolution was accomplished without incident or significant problems. Maintenance work was performed by qualified and knowledgeable personnel. The portions of the post maintenance testing i
observed by the inspectors was satisfactorily complete M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (IP 92902)
M (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50 348/97-05 05: Failure To Control The Special Process Oi Weldina lnspection ScuDe This violation involved multiple examples of a lack of control of the welding process in the areas of " cold spring" during fit up prior to welding: under sized welder aerformance test specimens; and abandoned welding filler material Ile licensee's response to this violation, dated July 9. 1997, attributed the examples to inadequate procedures and aersonnel errors and initiated Corrective Action Report (CAR) No. 228 _icensee corrective actions included: (1) evaluation of the effect of
" cold spring" on piping systems: (2) evaluation of the under-sized test specimens: (3) removal of abandoned welding filler material: (4)
revision of portions of the Special Processes Manual; and (5) had the welding contractor emphasize the importance of procedure adherence and filler material control in the in-process training program, Observations and findinos To evaluate the licensee's corrective actions and the results achieved, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's letter and completed CAR. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed Design Ct.2nge Request (DCR) 93-1-8550: L % tion No. CN97-104. dated April 17, 1997:
DCR 94-1-8751 study calcula dated April 18. 1997, which addressed the " cold spring" issue and OR c .-150. Weld Bend Specimens, dated A)ril 18. 1997, which addressed the under-sized test specimen issu e ins)ectors reviewed applicable changes made to Special Processes Manual NP-0 M-23 and 3rocedures FNP-0-SPP-GW-002. General Welding Standard for Pressure 30undary Applications. Rev.19. FNP-0-SPP-WP-03 Specification for Welder Qualification for Pressure Boundary Applications. Rev. 19. and FNP-0-SPP-WP-031. Specification for Welder Qualification for Structural Applications. Rev.19. that. collectively, require differences in piping alignment to be evaluated by engineering
personnel prior to welding and provide tolerances for welder qualification test specimen thickness. The inspectors also reviewed WPC-GWT-001. Williams Power Corporation General Welding Guidelines / Training Policy, dated August 28. 1997, and other related quality record The inspectors concluded that the licensee had conducted an adequate survey to determine the extent of the problem. Three of the five corrective actions were also completed satisfactorily. However, as discussed below, questions remained related to the adequacy of welder performance qualification using under-sized bend test specimens and the licensee's evaluation of " cold spring" effects. Based on NRC followup of these two issues as unresolved items, this violation is considered close The insoectors noted the following irregularities with the licensee's evaluation of under-sized welder qualification test specimens. These problems called into question the licensee's attention to detail and acceptability of welds deposited b;1 welders whose performance qualification test coupons were evaeted with under sized test specimen Relative to OR 1-97-150 the following was noted:
. NRC Inspection Report 50 348.364/97 05, paragraph M1.11 b. stated in part "...several specimens . . were 1/32 to 1/16-inch under 3/8-inch in thickness." Occurrence Report 1-97-150, issued to address the undersize bend specimens evaluated only s)ecimens that were 1/32-inch undersize . The calculation in OR 1-97-150 used an incorrect value for the bend mandril diameter (4T vice 1.5-inch) to evaluate the effect of the under-sized weld bend specimen Subsequently, the licensee remeasured the bend specimens and found some that were 1/16-inch undersized. Preliminary remeasurements and recalculations appeared to call into question the qualification of several welders employ 2d during the spring IS37 Outage. The licensee issued OR 1-98-005 to address this issue. Pending the licensee's evaluation and subsequent NRC inspection, this matter is identified as Unresolved , tem (URI) 50-348/97-15-03: Adequacy of Welder Performance Qualification Using Under-sized Bend Test Specimen The inspectors also noted several irregularities with the licensee's evaluationoftheeffectofthe"coldspring"onthepipingsystem These problems revealed potential problems in the licensee s attention to detail: sufficiencies of calculation assumptions, design, inputs and references and; assumed but unstated " engineering judgement." The inspectors noted the following relative to DCR 94-1-8751 study calculation:
- DCR 94-1-8751 study calculatinn. Sheet B3 of 10. Problem No. 317 states "... Max. Allowable load -8000lbs..... 0ther pipe support components are judged to be acceptable." No mention is made of
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the basis for the 8000 lbs. maximum allowab load, or which pipe support component was not included in the %)er pipe support components....."
- With respect to the basis of the 8000 lbs. maximum allowable load, the inspector was informed that by ' engineering judgment' it was determined that item 1. #1 Fig. 211 Sway Strut Assembly. Mark N SW R368, Sketch No. 5367. was the weakest member of the suppor The Grinnell catalog ph 153. flg. 211, indicates a load of 8000 lbs. for size 1 sway strut assembly. This explanation was accompanied, subsecuent to the inspection, by copies of selected pages from sketch ho. 5367 and the Grinnell catalog ph 15 * DCR 94-1-8751 study calculation. Sheet B3 of 10, Problem No. 318 states " Support loads in Z-direction increase by 65%. Support calculation C005375. Rev 0 review shows that weld size at joint No. 1 is critical. The weld size have been evaluated with increased load and found to be with in allcwable limits (sic)."
For the basis of the last statement above, the inspectors were informed that by a proportional increase of the loads, the required weld size needed to resist those )roportionally increased loads had increased from 0.225-inch to 0.227-inc1, and as 0.227-inch was less than the 0.2E-inch specified weld size: therefore the increased load was acce) table. This explanation was accompanied, subsegnnt to the ins)ection. ]y copies of sheets 2 and 5 of Calculation C005357. Rev. O. wit 1 wide line corrections made to sheet 2 line 10 changing F,-4308#/-3335# to F - i 5273#, and sheet 5 lines 32 and 36 to show the effects of the increased load of F - 5273#. It should be noted that the SUPPORT INVENTORY-LOADS
IN LBS. table on page B2 indicates that the new load for Froblem 317 was 5273 lbs. whereas the new load for Problem 218 (t N problem under discussion here) was 6932 lbs. Furthermore. DCR 54-1-8751 study cah.ulation. Sheet B3 of 10, Problem No. 318 refers to Support Calculation C005375 and not tt Support Calculation C005357. The inspector questioned whether the 0.227-inch weld size was arrived at using 5273 lbs, or 6932 lbs. and exactly which calculation the reviewer of the DCR 94-1-8751 study calculation used. C005357 or C005375, for this review. In addition. in the third line of text under the approval block problem 315 is listed when problem 314 was intende The licensee attributed the errors in the calculation to ' typographical
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error In the case of the data provided subject to the inspectio the licensee indicated that material was provided as an aid for the benefit of the inspectors and not an official calculatio As both Problem Nos. 317 and 318 significantly exceeded their qualification loads, support qualification was necessary. In addition to the lack of attention to detail as evidenced by the ' typographical errors' and the assumed but unstated " engineering judgement." it appeared that the information provided to the inspectors during this inspection, for the re-qualification of Problem Nos 317 and 318 was not consister,t with the requirements of ANSI N-45.2.ll-1974. Quality
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lo Assurance Requirements for Design of Nuclear Power Plants, paragraph in that assumptions, design inputs and references did not appear to be sufficiently detailed such that a person technically qualified in the subject could review and understand the analysis and verify the results without recourse to the originator. In addition 1t was not clear whether DCR 94-1-8751 study calculation dated April 18. 1997, subsequently identified by the licensee as Calculation No. SS 94-1-8751-001, had been made a part of the calculation of record. Pending further review by the licensee and the NRC, this matter is identified as URI 50-348/97-16-04: Adequacy of Calculation No. SS-9418751-001, fl M8.2 Elosed) V10 50-348. 364/97-08-03: Lack Of Measurina And Test Eauinment Calibration Proredures This violation involved the lack of required formal calibration ,
procedures for approximately 50 items of measuring and test equipment (M&TE). The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence dated. September 25. 1997. The licensee attributed the violation to inadequate 3rocedures and personnel errors. The licensee initiated CAR No. 2300. For corrective action, the licensee performed several activities: (1) evaluated the on-site calibrations performed without '
formal calibration procedures: (2) withdrew from the calibration lab or placed in a hold status, all M&TE not calibrated by a qualified off-site facility or not calibrated on site using an a) proved procedure:
(3) removed from the calibration lab all caliaration data sheets not part of a formal approved calibration procedure: (4) trained personnel:
(5) revised procedure FNP-0-AP-11. Centrol and Calibration of Measuring and Test Equipment and Plant Instrumentation: (6) established new formal calibration procedures for M&TE that were to be calibrated on-site: and (7) conducted a broadness review to determine the extent of the condition. As a result of the licensee's program review to date, the licensee had revised seven existing calibration procedures: canceled seven existing calibration procedures; was processing revisions to three existing calibration procedures; planned to revise five existing calibration procedures (the remaining nine existing calibration procedures were not affected): issued two new calibration procedures and were actively processing five new calibeation procedures; and had identified the need for an additional 19 new calibration procedure To evaluate the licensee's corrective actions and the results achieved, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel, conducted a walkdown inspection of the calibration lab, and reviewed the licensee's letter and completed CA The inspectors reviewed procedures FNP-0-lMP-14 Diesel Generator Nozzle Test Cauge Calibration. Rev. 0; FNP-0-lMP 13 Heise Digital Gauges (Range of 50 Inches wc & Above) Calibration. Re , and FNP-0-AP-11 Rev, 1 To verify the effectiveness of the licensee's review the inspectors selected five M&TE where the responsibility for calibration was with an organization other than Maintenance, and verified that there was an appropriately approved formal procedure in place for calibration of each of those M&TE. In addition the inspectors examined other related auality record .
The inspectors concluded that the licensee conducted an adequate survey to determine the extent of the problem: had taken appropriate actions to correct the problem and prevent a recurrence of similar circumstances:
and had achieved full compliance. This violation is close M8.3 (Closed) V10 50-348. 364/97-09-01: Failure To Demonstrate Performance Of Maintenance Rule Scoped Systems This violation involved the licensee's failure to monitor the performance of 15 high safety significant SSCS: and failure to implement a subsequently established program for monitoring those and seven other SSCs. The licensee attributed the violation to an inadequate )rocedure and personnel errors. The licensee initiated CAR No. 2315. T 1e licensee added the 22 SSCs to the scope of the Maintenance Rule:
conducted a three year historical review: conducted an (a)(1) vs. (a)(2)
determination for the newly added SSCs: revised procedure FNP-0-ACP-52.1. Guidelines for Scheduh ng of On-line Maintenance, and FNP-0-M 8 Maintenance Rule Site Implementation Manual; and conducted trainin The 22 SSCs identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-348364/97 09 were identified by the licensee as 30 functions. As a result of the licensee's review. 28 functions. in addition to the 30 functions indicated above, were identified and added to their program for tracking. In addition, the licensee's (a)(1) vs. (a)(2) determination identified eleven additional functions that failed their performance criteria (ten for availability and one for reliability) w1ich were subsequently classified as (a)(1). The licensee planned to have established goals for the eleven functio;.5 prior to the issuance of the February 1998 Maintenance Rule monthly repor To evaluate the licensee's corrective actions and the results achieved, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's letter and completed CAR. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed FNP 0-ACP-5 Rev. 5. FNP-0-M-89. Rev. 3. and other related quality record .
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The inspectors ccncluded that the licensee conducted an adequate survey -
to determine the extent of the problem; had taken appropriate actions to correct the prcolem and prevent a recurrence of similar circumstances; and had achieved Tull compliance. ;nis violation is close III. Encineerina F
El Conduct of Engineering El.1 Safety-Related Pumo Seal Desian weakness (IP 37551)
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On October 24.1997, tne 1A CCW pump experienced a ser!ous seal failure following a maintenance outage for seal and bearing replacomen Because the subsequent repair resulted in exceeding the est clished unavailability goal, the licensee properly designated the pump as a Category (a)(1) omponent per the Maintenance Rule. Occurru ce Report
} 1-97-388. lA Cr. Pump Inboard Seal Overheated, was initiated to investigate tne circumstances surrounding the failure including any generic implications. The inspectors reviewed OR 1-97-388 and associated root cause evaluation. The root cause evaluation m -d i that certain seal design flaws existed for the CCW Jumps ;11y
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the charging. containment spray (CS) and Residual ieat nm s)
pumps. After discussions with the licensee, the CS pu- ..i ned L to not have the seals in question and the design flaws characterized as possible design weaknesses. Specificai,y. the root cause evaluation identified two possible design weakness:
(1) Insufficient clearance between * *ft seal and auxiliary packing retaining rin (2) Potentially incorrect seal design for fluid application, corsidering additives and contaminant m q Due to the potential safety implications for major safety-related pump _
an Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-348. 364/97-15-05. Pump Seal Design Weaknesses for Major Safety-F. elated Pumps, is being opened to review and
, verify the licensee's evaluation and proposed corrective action IV. Plant Sucoort 92 Status of Radinlogical Protection and Chemistry Controls Facilities and Equipment R2.1 Radioloaically Controlled Area. Units 1 and 2 (IP 71/50)
Overall cleanliness of the radiologically controlled area (RCA) remained
- acceptable, Plant personnci observed working in the RCA demonstrated appro)riate knowledge and application of radiclogical control practice Healt1 physics technicians conti' nd to positively control and support work activities in the RC . - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities S1.1 Routine Observations of Plant Security Measures (IP 71750)
During routine inspection activities, inspectors verified that portions of site security program plans were being properly implemented. This oas evidenced by proper display of picture badges and use of the ,
biometrics system by plant personnel: appropriate key carding of vital area doors: adequate stationing and tours in the protected area by security personnel: proper searching of packages and persor,nel at the primary access point and service water intake structure: and adequ6te performance of security systems (i.e.. video cameras). Disabled vital area doors were properly manned and controlled. Security personnel activities observed were Jerformed adequately. Site security systems were adequate to ensure p'iysical protection of the plan F4 Fire Protection Staff Knowledqe and Performance F4.1 Fire Briaade Drill (iP 71750)
On December 11, 1997, the inspectors observed the on-shift fire brigade respond to an unannounced fire drill. The fire brigade jonded promptly and demonstrated effective fire fighting technique Appropriate fire fighting equipment was deployed and brigade members were properly attired, with one exception. The turr.out coat and high boots did not provide adequate heat protection for ele of the brigade member This individual was sufficiently tall that the coat and boots were unable to overlap, thus creating an unprotected gap. The licensee indicated that they were aware of the aroblem and planned to augment the brigade's protective clothing with bun (er pant V. Manaaement Meetinas and Othei Areas X1 Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Commitments A recent discovery of a licensee o)erattro its facility in a manner contrary tc the UFSAR descriptici lighlignted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing the inspections discussed in this re) ort, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. The inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures and/or parameter X2 Exit Meeting Summary
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The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee Odnagement on January 14, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente l ll ... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee C. Buck. Operations Superintendent - Unit 2 t
R. Coleman. Maintenance Manager >-
C. Collins. Operations superintendent - Administration
. Crone. Engineering Support Performance Supervisor T. Esteve. Planning & Control Supervisor R. Fucich. ES Manager .
S. Gates. Administration Manager D. Grissette. Operations Manager R. Mill. General Manager x
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R. Johnsan. Operations Superintendent - Procedures R. Martin. Maintenance Team Leader M. Mitchell. HP Superintendent C. Nesbitt. Assistant General Manager. Plant Support J. Odom. Operations Superintendent - Unit 1 M. Stinson. Assistant General Manager. Operations G. Waymire. Tetinical Support Manager R. Yance. Plant Modifications and Maintenance Support Manager NRC J. Zimmerman. NRR Project Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES (IP) USED IP 37551: Onsite Engineering 3 IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls In Identifying. Resolving, and Preventing Problems IP 60705: Preparation For Refueling IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92901: Followup - Operations IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance IP 92903: Followup - Engineering
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened Iype Item NuicaC Slatuji Descriotion and Reference NCV 50-348/97-15-01 Open Inoperable RCS Leak Detection System Results In 0 erating In A Condition Prohibited B TS (Section 08.1)
NCV 50-364/97-15-02 Open Failure To Follow Personnel Entry Requirements Of The Unit 2 SFP-CRAB (Section M1.3)
URI 60-348/97-15-03 Open Adequacy of Welder Performance l Qualification Using l'nder-sized Bend Test Specimens (Section M8.1)
URI 50-348/97-15-04 Open Adequacy of Calculation No. SS-94-1-8751-001 (Section M8.1)
IFI 50-348, 364/97-15-05 Open Pump Seal Design Weaknesses for Major Safety-Related Pumps (Section El.1)
Closed T_ypa Item Number
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Status Descriotion and Reference NCV 50-348/97-15-01 Closed Inoperable RCS Leak Detection System Results In Operating In A Cc.f. tion Prohibited By TS (Section 08.1)
NO 50-364/97-15-02 Clcsed Failure To Follow Personnei Entry Requirements Of The Unit 2 SFP-CRAB (Section M1.3)
LER 50-348/97-14 Closed Reactor Coolant Leak Detection ,
System Inoperable Due To Defective Procedure Results In Operating Cond' tion Prohibited By TS (Section 08.1)
VIO 50-348/97-05-05 Closed Failure To Control Special Process Of Welding (Section M8.1)
VIO 50-348, 364/97 08-03 Closed Lack Of Measuring And Test Equipment Calibration Procedures (Section M8.2)
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i V10 50-348, 364/97-09 01 Closed Failure To Demonstrate Performance Of Maintenance Rule Scoped Systems
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(Section M8.3)
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