IR 05000348/1990013
| ML20044B090 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/1990 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Maxwell G, Miller W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044B089 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-90-13, 50-364-90-13, NUDOCS 9007170291 | |
| Download: ML20044B090 (12) | |
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Sa na?u UNITED STATES
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Report Nos.: 50-348/90-13 and 50-364/90-13 Licensee:
Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street (
Birmingham, AL 36291
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Docket Nos.:
50-348 snd 50-364 License Nos.:
NPF-2 and NPF-E Facility name:
Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: May 11 - June 10, 1990
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Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama inspectors:
4 A MM 6 - 74 @
G. F. Maxwell, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed f& A hJi 4-29 40 W. H. Miller Jr., Resident Inspector Date Signed y
Approved by:
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F.5.Cantrell~SectionChief,Divisionof Date Signed
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Reactor Projects V
SUMMARY Scope:
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This routine on-site inspection involved a review of operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, semi-annual health physics emergency exercise, risked based inspection of AFW system, plant incident reports and licensee event reports.
Certain tours were conducted on deep backshift or weekends, these tours were conducted May 24 (deep backshift inspections occur between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m.).
Results:
Unit 1 operated at approximately 100 percent reactor power throughout the reporting period except power was reduced to approximately 15 percent on May 18 for steam generator cleaning and flushing operations and for main generator gownor valve testing.
The unit was returned to full power on May 21 at about 1:00 p.m.
Unit 2 started this reporting period in a ma'intenance outage.
On May 12 the unit tripped while returning to power.
Refer to paragraph 2.b.(2) for 007170 N1 UOO N PDR Mt D 7'ON ' W Q
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' details.. Th'e unit was again returned to power during the afternoon of May 12
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and was connected to the grid at 10:16 p.m. on May 12. Unit 2 has operated at approximately 100 percent since that date.
Unit 2 ' refuel date has been
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rescheduled from September 1 to October 12, 1990.
The refueling outage is-scheduled for 52 days.
During this. reporting period, Unit 1 experienced high vibration readings on
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containment fan cooler 1C which may be indicative of the problem recently
experienced with Unit 2 cooler, paragraph 3.
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-Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Licensee' Employees Contacted R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager R. M. Coleman, Modification Manager
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L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manag S. Fulmer, Supervisor Safety Audit and t.ngineering Review R. D. Hill, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations D.lN. Morey, General Manager - Far'ey Nuclear Plant C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager J. K. Osterholtz, Operations. Manager L. M. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support-
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J. J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager j
L. S. Williams, Training Manager
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Other~ licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations personnel,- maintenance and 1&C personnel, security force members, and '
office personnel..
. Acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this report are listed in the
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-las.t paragraph.
2.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
a.
Plant Tours The-inspectors conducted routine plant tours during this inspection period
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to-verify that the license requirements and comitments were. being implemented, These tours. were performed to verify that: systems, valves,
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and -breakers required for safe plant operations were in their correct position; fire _ protection equipment, spare equipment' and-materials;were being maintained and stored properly; plant operators were aware of the current plant status; plant operations: personnel were documenting the status of.out-of-service equipment; there were no undocumented cases of unusual flui.d leaks, piping ' vibration, abnormal hanger or ' seismic restraint movements;- all reviewed equipment requiring calibration was current; and in general, hot.sekeeping was satisfactory.
- Tours of the t', ant included review of site documentation and interviews with' plant personnel'
The inspectors reviewed the control room operators'
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logs, tag out logs, chemistry and health physics logs, and control boards r
and-panels. ~ During these tours the inspectors noted that the operators
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. appeared to be alert, aware of changing. plant conditions and manipulated c
e plant controls properly.
The inspectors evaluated operations shift
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turnovers and attended shif t briefings. They observed that the briefings and turnover provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew and
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verified that the staffing met the TS requirements.
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Site security was evaluated by observing personnel in the protected and vital areas to ensure that these persons had the proper authorization to.
be'in the respective areas. The inspectors also verified that vital area portals were kept locked and alarmed. The security personnel appeared to be alert and attentive to their duties, and those of" ~ -
performing personnel and vehicular searches were thorough and syt e.. Responses to security-alarm conditions appeared to be prompt and o.
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Selected activities - of the licensee's radiological protection program were' reviewed by the inspectors to verify conformance with plant procedures and NRC regulatory require::ents.
The areas reviewed included: operation and :nanagement of the plant's health physics staff, "ALARA" implementation, radiation work permits for compliance to. plant procedures, personnel exposure records, observation of work and personnel in radiation areas to-
- verify compliance to radiation protection procedures, and control of radioactive materials.
b.
Plant Events and Observations (1) AFW Flow Restrictions On~ May 11, while conducting the STP 22.13 performance test for
,the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, inadequate AFW flow to "A" and "C" steam generators was observed. The'STP acceptance criteria required a flow greater than 200 gpm tc 3ach steam generator.
However, "A" and "C" steam generator AFW flow was recorded as 118.3 gpm and 126' 5 gpm'respectively.
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gation by-the licensee revcaled that the AFW flow limiting:
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-orifices for the "A" and-"C" steam generators were obstructed by.
metal' fragments
, Upon further evaluation it1was determined that these metal fragments were the result of.the damage which the turbine driven au'xiliary feedwater pump received' on May 12, 1989.
The resident inspectors observed the pieces of metal which were removed from the orifices.
The pieces when placed end to end projected a shape and size similar to one of the missing metal fragments noted in the May 12, 1989 incident report.
The combined dimensions.were approximately 2.1/4 X 23/32 X 1/4 inch.
The licensee evaluated the conditions and equipment associated with the metal fragments and documented the results in incident-report number 2-90-128 dated May 11, 1990.
Following the removal of the metal fragments and the evaluation, the AFW system was satisfactorily tested and returned to service.
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-(2) Unit 2 Reactor Trip of May 12, 1990 On May 12 at 6:15 a.m., the Unit 2 Reactor tripped from 8 percent power.
At the. time of the trip the reactor operators were performing surveillance test procedures FNP-2-STP-151.4, Main
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Turbine Protective Device Test.
The operator initiated a
~ turbine trip as required by the procedure and the " Turbine Overspeed Trip" alarm-was received in lieu of the required
" Turbine Auto Stop 011 Trip."
The procedure step was repeated to determine why the wrong annunciator alarm was received. The same results occurred.
Plant supervisors decided to continue to-the next procedure step to latch the main turbine. The procedure cautions-the operator that latching the main turbine can cause significant drops in the "EH" hydraulic fluid-pressure.
Therefore, EH fluid pressure is to be monitored closely and the:
second EH fluid pump. is to be started or the main turbine is to
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be tripped if necessary to prevent a decrease in speed of the operating main feed pump.
The EH system is used to control the speed of the' main feedwater pumps, a^
Prior to latching the main turbine, the operator verified that the EH pressures were normal at about 1700 psi and that one EH pump was running. The main turbine was latched and the-operators
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proceeded to follow the steps in -the test procedure.
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. governor, interceptor, and reheat stop valves closed as required,-
but the EH pressure also began to decrease and rapidly reach ?.00 psi..This caused.the speed of the main feed pump to begin ;o decrease.
_The control : room operators started the second EH pressure pump, started both the motor. driven and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and began-co insert the control _ rods V
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These. actions failed to-prevent -the reactor from tripping.
The cause of the trip:was from a low-low level in= steam generator "A" due to low feedwater
. flow as.a result of the decrease in speed from the operating main feedwater pump. This speed decreased due to the closure of the turbine stop valves during routine surveillance testing o'i the turbine trip protection system.
This testing resulted in-reduced pressure in the EH fluid system.
The NRC was notified of this trip and an appropriate written report is to be generated. The licensee's investigation of this
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event indicated that both of the EH pressure pumps should be
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i operated during operation of the 12-turbine steam stop valves to assure adequate pressure is maintained to the main feedpump speed control system.
Therefore, the affected procedures on both units are to be revised to require both pumps to be runpire or one pump to be running and one pump to be set for automatt-
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restart during operations that involve a loss of pressure due to f
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high EH system pressure demand.-
Also, the licensee is to correct the false response of annunci:. tor G83-turbine overspeed trip..
The inspectors reviewed the trip report data and the licensee's
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evaluation and had no further questions.
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(3) River Water Pump' Fire ( Incident Report 1-90-127)
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At approxtnately 0:57 a.m. on May 11 a fire alarm was received in the control room from the river water structure. The outside i
system operator was notified by radio and responded from the Unit.2 cooling towers to the river water structure by truck.
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The fire eigade was alerted and also dispatched to the fire.
t The operator arrived at the river water structure at about 1:10 a.m. and noted smoke being. discharged by the roof mounted " Train
coming from river water pump No. 3, discharged found smoke -
B" ventilation fans.
He. entered the structure..
a CO2 fire, extinguicher into the top vents of the motor and called the control room operators to provide information about the fire _
situat'on.
The' fire brigade responded to the building at about
'1:20 3.m.
The fire brigade members discharged two additional l
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C02, extinguishers and one dry chemical extinguisher into the
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motor housing to extinguish the. fire. The fire was out at about w
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During this time the river water pump tripped due to electrical
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. overload on the motor. - At 1:16 a.m. the ' river water cross
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~ connect valves for. Trains "A" and "B" were opened and the '"B"
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Train. river water pumps, No. 4 and 5, were secured.
After thei
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fire was out a surveillance test was conducted lon the Train "B" l
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, pumps which required the pumps to be started and stopped several
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times.
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The apparent cause was bearing failure as a result of a loose
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lower sleeve bearing oil level sightglass coupling which allowed
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the sightglass to rotate about 180 degrees.. The lubricating oil a
drained from the oil reservoir through a vent opening in.the top'
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o of the sightglass.
The licensee found oil on and around the'
pump pedestal.
A work order was written to replace the damage motor; however, a spare motor was not available on site.
A rebuilt motor was
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M scheduled to be shipped and received at the plant on June 8,
1990.
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The inspectors reviewed this event and the licensee investiga-
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tion report and have no further questions.
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No violations or deviations were identified. The results of-the ins)ections in this area indicate that the program was effective witi_ respect to meeting the safety objectives.
3.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The. inspectors witnessed maintenance surveillance test activities on safety-related systems and compwents to verify that these activities were performed in accordance with TS and licensee-requirements.
These observations included witnessing selected portions of each surveillance, review of the surveillance procedures to ensure that administrative
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controls and tagging procedures were in force, determining that approval was:obtained prior to conducting the surveillance test, and the individuals conducting the test were qualified in accordance with plant-approved procedures.
Other observations included ascertaining that test instru-mentation used was calibrated, data collected was within the specified requirements of TS, any identified discrepancies were properly noted, and the systems were correctly returned to service - The following specific activities were observed:
1-STP-8.0 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Controlled. Leakage Test 1-STP-17.0 Containment Cooling Train "B" Operability Test 1-STP-22.16 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Quarterly Inservice Test 1-STP-33 Solid State Protection System Train "B" Operability Test-1-STP-63.3 EQ Area Temperature Monitoring
~1-STP-80.1 Diesel Generator 1B Operability Test.
-1-STP-80.2 Diesel Generator 2C Operability Test.
2-STP-11.12 RHR Pump 2B Operability Test ~
2-STP-80.6 Diesel Generator 2B 24 Hour Load Test-
-2-STP-228.4 Nuclear Instrumentation System Intermediate Range N36 Test The containment cooling fans for Unit I were-tested on June 2 by surveillance test procedure 1-STP-17.0.
During this test fan IC developed high vibrations when ' started at the emergency. slow speed.
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reset the vibration alarm panel and ran thc Sn for approximately 30 minutes with no further high vibrations.
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surveillance test was considered satisfactory; however, the licen: u
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assure that'no serious problem exists.
Fan 1C was satisfactorily retested -
on June-6.
However, the inspectors are con
..ad that this fan vibration may be an indication of fan problems similar to the recent fan failures on the Unit 2 containment cooler ' fans bearings.
Refer to NRC Report 348,364/90-12 for details._ The inspectors will continue to monitor this problem during their routine inspection program.
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On June 3 -surveillance test-1-STP-63.3 indicated that the temperature'in the Unit 1 main steam valve -room was about 114 degree F which exceeded the acceptable level of 104 degrees F.
On June 6, Surveillance Test
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1-STP-63.3_was-Again unsatisfactory due to the temperature in the main steam valve roon, being greater than 104 degrees F. - The temperature was
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117 degrees F..
Y5e Unit 2 STP (2-STP-63.3) was also unsatisfactory on -
June 6 due to the temperature in the. main steam valve room being 114 degrees F-and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump room being 108 -
degrees F.
Portable fans that were placed in each roons were effective in reducing the temperature in these rooms to less than 105 degrees F.
The. temperature in the main steam valve rooms are being ) recorded everyis evaluatin four hours and the licensee's engineering group (Bechtel this problem.: The inspectors will continue to monitor this item during the routine. inspection program to review the licensee's resolution.
The FSAR indicates that the electrical components in this area are designed to operate:in an: ambient temperature of less than 105 degrees F.
No violations cr deviations were identified.
The results of the inspections in' this area indicate that the program was effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
' The ; inspectors reviewed maintenance-activities to verify the following:
maintenance personnel were obtaining the appropriate tag out and clearance approvals prior to commencing work activities; correct documentation was available for all requested parts and material prior to use; procedures were_ available for all requested parts and material prior. to use; procedures were available and' adequate for the work being conducted; maintenance personnel performing work-activities were: qualified to accomplish these tasks; activities reviewed were not violating any
' limiting conditions for operation during 'the specific -evolution; post-maintenance testing activities were completed; and that equipment was properly returned to service after the completion _ of work activities.
Activities reviewed included:
MWR-188887 Replace governor on diesel generator 2B with a refurbished governor.
MWR-209921 011 leaks on 2B emergency diesel generator.
~MWR-214685&-
Replace gaskets on diesel generator 2B to stop leaks.
MWR-214688 MWR--217196 Repair Unit 1 flow control valve FCV-122 on charging system MWR-217347 Emergency diesel generator 2B repairs to reduce-engine start time.
1MWR-217739 Repair speed indicator for Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
MWR-225932 Intermediate range monitor NI-36 reads lower than expected.
Trouble shoot to detennine cause.
10-ETP-4202 Tendon grease inspection - Unit 1.
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The inspectors observed various work activities associated with repairs on 2B emergency diesel generator.
The repairs were being conducted in
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accordance with MWR ~217347 and were required due to the diesel engine's
" slow start. "
During the observations the inspectors noted that there
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were approximately 10 drums-of " waste" oil which had been pumped out of
the diesel engine's oil sump.
The drums were located in the 2B diesel generator room and were not covered.
Upon notification, by_the resident.
inspectors, the licensee's. operations staff properly covered the drums with appropriate lids. _ The inspectors discussed this observation with the Plant Operations Manager.
The inspectors were informed that the operations staff would be given additional guidance concerning the proper i
- storage practices for diesel engine lubrication oil.
During the routine tendon grease inspection program of Unit 1 by -
procedure 0-ETP-4202, the licensee on June 4 found about 2 ounces of water in the lower tendon can for tendon No. V59.- The tendon is to be detentioned and the backside of the lower anchor head is to be inspected for water.- This problem is being evaluated by the licensee's engineering
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group (Southern Co.) to determine if this water caused any damage to the tendon.
This is inspector followup item 50-348/90-13-01, Water in lower tendon can.
No violations or deviations were identified.
The results of the inspec-tions in this area indicate that the program was effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives.
5.
Emergency Exercise - 1990 Semi-Annual: Health Physics Drill (82301)
On June 5, the 1990 semi-annual health physics drill was conducted.
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' drill began at 1:10 p.m. and simulated a-reactor coolant sample spill. in a
the Unit 1 139 foot elevation hallway to Unit 2.. The spill created simulated elevated radiation and airborne contamination levels.
The drill objectives were to evaluate the plant emergency organization 'and the health physics _ response-to the emergency; exercise' and test the plant's emergency notification and communication procedures; and evaluate tN content and effectiveness of the applicable Emergency Plant-l Inplementing. Procedures.-
Following the drill, a critique was conducted to evaluate the results of the drill.
The ' drill streegths and areas in need of improvement were discussed.
The inspectors cbserved the drill and attended the dr.ill critique.
The drill objectives were met; however.
-the i reas needing improvement will be incorporated into the plant's emergency training program.
This should help assure appropriate action
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during future drills and in the event of an actual emergency event-
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Risk'-Based Inspection Guidance for the Auxiliary Feedwater System at -
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' Farley (71707)
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The-inspectors. reviewed the Auxiliary Feedwater System Inspection Guidance for. the Farley Nuclear Plant submitted by NRR Division of Radiation Protection and _ Emergency Preparedness (Pacific Northwest Laboratory.)
Several changes to this document were recommended to NRR. The components on Table 3.1, Risk Important Walkdown Table fori AFW System Components, were reviewed.
Plant procedures 1/2-SOP-22.0, Auxiliary Feedwater System, and Surveillance Test Procedures 1/2-STP-22.5 were examined to verify that the components in Table 3.1 were included in the licensee's procedures. -
-Table'3.1 conta ned several errors which should be corrected to conform to i
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the plant's "As-Built" configuration. A walkdown inspection was also made of the accessible AFW components to verify that: the system components were properly aligned;. components were provided with proper identification tags; hangers and supports were in service; and the general housekeeping in the vicinity of the components was satisfactory.
No problems were Mentified.
-The-inspection guidance provided by this document should assist the inspectors in future review and inspection of the AFW system components.
7.
LicenseeEventReports(90714)
The following Licensee Event Report (LER) was reviewed for potential generic problems to determine trends, to determine whether information.
-i_ncluded in the report meets the NRC reporting-requirements; and.to -
consider whether the corrective action discussed in;the report appears appropriate.
Licensee action-was reviewed to verify that the event has been reviewed and evaluated by the licensee as required by-the Technical Specifications; that corrective action was taken by the licensee; and that safety limits, limiting safety setting and LCOs were not exceeded.
The.
inspector examined the incident report, logs and records, and interviewed
- selected personnel. - The following report is considered closed:
LER-88-20 Personnel error results in TS action statement requirements'
not being met when fire protection systems were inoperable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Plant Incident Reports (71707)
During the reporting period the inspectors evaluated the conditions associated with the most recently documented plant incident reports.
Those reports which were more significant included:
(a) Report 2-90--129, Unit 2 reactor trip setpoint was determined to be-greater than TS ali c :>ed limit for intermediate range nuclear instrumentation N1-36.
The NI detector was replaced and the instrumentation was re-calibrated.
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-(b). Report 1-90-138, Unit I waste monitoring tank number 2 overflowed.
onto the 83' elevation floor.
Note, the 8P elevation was not contaminated by the overflow.
This event was possibly caused by inaccurate level indication for the monitoring tank.
(c). Report 2-90-142. Unit 2 incorrect valve lineup for CCW system while shifting,CCW he it exchangers.
This caused a brief loss of flow to the on-service heat exchunger.
(d)~ Report 2-90-143, Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump lost local and remote indication for the trip throttle valve.
The loss of indication was attributed to a blown control ptwer fuse.
(e) Report 2-90-144, Unit 2 main turbine governor valve closed due to a faile'd DEH MVP card, Prompt operator action minimized the impact of the valve closure on the plant.
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.(f) Report 1-90-150, Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump declared inoperable due to loss of speed control.
The loss was caused by an electrical circuit being disconnected for the turbine speed control.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. ~ Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period, and on June 12, with the plant manager'and selected members of his staff.
The inspection findings were discussed in' detail.
The licensee acknowledged the. inspection findings the and did4 not identify as proprietary any material reviewed.by(IFI inspectors during-this inspection.
One IFI was identified 348/90-13-01, Water in Lower Tendon Can).
Licensee was informed that the LER 88-20 (discussed -in paragraph 7) was-closed.
11. Acronyms and Abbreviations AFW -
Auxiliary Feedwater A0P -
Abnormal. 0perating Procedure AP:
Administrative Procedure
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"APC0 -
Alabama Power Company CFR Code of Federal Regulations
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'CVCS -
Chemical and Volume Control System CCW '-
Component Cooling Water Design Change.
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ECP. -
Emergency' Contingency Procedure Electro-Hydraulic EH:
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Emergency Plant Implementing Procedure EIP
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Environmental' Qualifications EQ
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Engineered Safety Features ESF:
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Engineering Work Request Fahrenheit F
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Gallons Per Minute GPM
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Inservice Inspection IST -
Inservice Test
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Limiting Condition for Operation LC0
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Motor-0perated Valve MOV
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MOVATS - Motor-0perated Valve Actuation Testing
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MWR --
Maintenance Work Request
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Nonconformance Report NCR
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC
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NRR --
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation PMD Plant Modifications Department-
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Radiation Control and Protection Procedure RCP
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RCS Reactor C0olant System
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RHR -~
Residual Heat Removal SI Safety Injection
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SAER -
Safety Audit and Engineering Review SSPS -
Solid State Protection S:' stem SPDS -
Safety Parameter Display system
, Surveillance Test Procedure
STP.
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-Technical Specification TS-
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WA Work Authorization -
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