IR 05000348/2023003

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Integrated Inspection Report 05000348/2023003 and 05000364/2023003
ML23286A009
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 10/24/2023
From: Alan Blamey
Division Reactor Projects II
To: Coleman J
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR 2023003
Download: ML23286A009 (1)


Text

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2023003 AND 05000364/2023003

Dear Jamie Coleman:

On September 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant. On October 17, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Delson Erb, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Alan J. Blamey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000348 and 05000364 License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000348 and 05000364

License Numbers:

NPF-2 and NPF-8

Report Numbers:

05000348/2023003 and 05000364/2023003

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2023-003-0015

Licensee:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility:

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

Location:

Columbia, AL

Inspection Dates:

June 01, 2023 to November 15, 2023

Inspectors:

P. Braaten, Senior Reactor Inspector

P. Meier, Senior Resident Inspector

S. Sandal, Senior Reactor Analyst

S. Temple, Resident Inspector

Approved By:

Alan J. Blamey, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees

performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, in

accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs

program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to

https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the report period at approximately 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) and

remained at or near 100 percent RTP through the end of the report period.

Unit 2 began the report period at approximately 100 percent RTP. On September 26, 2023,

unit 2 began coasting down in preparation for a refueling outage and was at approximately 94

percent RTP at the end of the report period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in

effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with

their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared

complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met

consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection

Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515,

Appendix DProperty "Inspection Manual Chapter" (as page type) with input value "NRC Inspection Manual 2515,</br></br>Appendix D" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process., Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of

IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and

interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules

and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following

systems/trains:

(1)

Unit 1 'A' train low head safety injection system while 'B' train was unavailable due to

testing on July 5, 2023 (drawings D175038, D175041)

(2)

Unit 2 'A' train service water system while 'C' service water pump was unavailable

due to maintenance on August 28, 2023 (D200013)

(3)

Unit 1 'B' train component cooling water system while the 'A' train was unavailable

due to an 'A' train spent fuel pool system maintenance outage on

September 18, 2023 (D175039)

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the

unit 2 service water system on the week of July 17, 2023 (drawings D200013 and

D205003, procedure FNP-2-SOP-24.0).

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a

walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality,

material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas (FAs):

(1)

Unit 1 'A' train (1F) 4 kilovolt (kV) switchgear room (FA 1-041) on September 28, 2023

(2)

Unit 1 control rod drive mechanism control system cabinet room (FA 1-023) on

September 28, 2023

(3)

Unit 1 cable spreading room (FA 1-040) on September 28, 2023

(4)

Unit 2 control rod drive mechanism control system cabinet room (FA 2-041) on

September 28, 2023

(5)

Unit 2 'B' train vital direct-current (DC) switchgear room (FA 2-019) on

September 28, 2023

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors evaluated external flooding and mitigation protections for intense

precipitation during the week of July 31, 2023 (procedure FNP-0-AOP-21.0).

71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1)

Unit 2 'A', 'B', and 'C', component cooling water heat exchangers during the month of

July, 2023 (procedure NMP-ES-012; and work orders (WOs) SNC1221526,

SNC1227143, SNC1215934)

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control

room during the following activities:

Unit 2 operator testing of the 'C' charging pump on July 25, 2023 (procedure

FNP-2-STP-4.3)

Unit 2 operator compensatory actions and monitoring during annunciator

power supply replacement on August 9, 2023 (WO SNC1057454)

Unit 2 operator testing of the 'B' train residual heat removal pump on

August 30, 2023 (FNP-2-STP-11.2)

Unit 2 reactor coolant system dilution via the boron thermal regeneration

system on August 31, 2023

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator continuing training on plant

upgrades and new Ovation software installations planned during the upcoming unit 2

outage (2R29) on September 14, 2023.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following

structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1)

Review of the unit 1 and unit 2 Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)

50.65(a)(3) maintenance rule periodic evaluation for the period of May 27, 2021, to

November 30, 2022

(2)

Unit 1 'A' train service water pump motor replacement following motor failure during a

planned surveillance on July 17, 2023 (condition report (CR) 10988585)

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the

following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and

appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1)

Unit 1 'A' train service water pump motor unplanned replacement due to motor failure

resulting in yellow risk the week of July 17, 2023 (procedure NMP-DP-001)

(2)

Unit 2 planned maintenance for the following components on July 5, 2023 (NMP-OS-

010):

power range nuclear instrumentation calibrations resulting in half-trip conditions

turbine auxiliary pump

one of two instrument air driers

charging system flow control valve (FCV-122)

(3)

Unit 2 emergent issues regarding a unit 2 'B' steam generator level transmitter failure

(LT0486) and unit 2 'B' 125-volt DC bus ground on July 31, 2023 (CRs 10992157,

10992082)

(4)

Unit 1 and unit 2 containment high temperatures risk from August 22 to 27, 2023

(NMP-DP-001, license amendment request letter NL-23-0704 [ML23234A151])

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the

following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1)

Unit 2 charging system flow control valve (FCV-122) packing leak identified on

June 29, 2023 (CR 10984272)

(2)

Diesel-driven fire pump number 2 failed to start on low pressure set point identified on

July 10, 2023 (CR 10986611)

(3)

Unit 1 'A' train service water pump trip identified on July 17, 2023 (CR 10988585)

(4)

Unit 2 loss of audible alarms for main control board annunciator panels 'A', 'B', and 'C'

identified on July 2, 2023 (CR 10984684)

(5)

Unit 2 'A' pressurizer safety valve failed to lift during as-found testing identified on

August 1, 2023 (CR 10992890)

(6)

Unit 2 automatic rod control speed indication failure on September 10, 2023

(CR 11005131)

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1)

Temporary design modification and associated technical specification license

amendment associated with high containment temperatures (NL-23-0704)

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system

operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

(1)

Unit 2 'C' component cooling water heat exchanger return-to-service following

maintenance outage on July 21, 2023 (WO SNC1215934)

(2)

Unit 2 annunciator system repair completed on August 9, 2023 (WO SNC1507454)

(3)

Unit 1 'A' train motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump testing from the hot shutdown

panel following local/remote switch replacement on August 10, 2023 (WO

SNC1535112, procedure FNP-1-STP-73.1)

(4)

Unit 2 refueling water storage tank to the 'A' train containment spray pump suction

motor operated valve (MOV8817A) control circuit relay (49X) replacement performed

on August 15, 2023 (WO SNC996298)

(5)

Unit 2 'B' train penetration room filtration system following a system maintenance

outage on August 30, 2023 (FNP-2-STP-20.0)

(6)

Unit 2 steam generator 'B' level transmitter LT0486 calibration and testing following

transmitter replacement on September 13, 2023 (SNC1565105, FNP-2-STP-213.6)

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

(1)

Unit 1 'B' train auxiliary building battery quarterly verification on July 6, 2023

(procedure FNP-1-STP-905.4)

(2)

Unit 1 'A' component cooling water pump quarterly inservice test on July 31, 2023

(FNP-1-STP-23.1)

(3)

Unit 2 'A' train charging pump quarterly test on September 5, 2023 (FNP-2-STP-4.1)

(4)

Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and valve testing on

September 25, 2023 (FNP-1-STP-22.16, FNP-1-STP-21.3, FNP-1-STP-22.23)

Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1)

FLEX (i.e., diverse and flexible coping strategies) diesel generator testing and steam

generator FLEX pump testing during the week of July 31, 2023 (WOs SNC1385139;

SNC1191192; SNC1162916)

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04) (2 Samples)

(1)

Unit 1 (July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)

(2)

Unit 2 (July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)

BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)

(1)

Unit 1 (July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)

(2)

Unit 2 (July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)

(1)

Unit 1 (July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)

(2)

Unit 2 (July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023)

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program

related to the following issues:

(1)

Concerns identified with fire protection and the service water system in the service

water intake structure

(2)

Frequency oscillations during surveillance testing of the '1B' emergency diesel

generator (CRs 10304463, 11003395)

71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential

adverse trends in underground pipe leaks that might be indicative of a more

significant safety issue (CR 10939085).

INSPECTION RESULTS

Observation: Service water intake structure fire protection issues

71152A

Several issues of concern were identified associated with fire protection and the service water

system in the service water intake structure (SWIS). Below are the issues:

1.

The unit 2 service water pump area oil containment berm was lowered in one section

to allow a drainpipe run behind two of the pumps. The concern is that during an oil fire

scenario, the oil may drain and spread the fire to the credited shutdown pumps due to

the lower curbing. This issue was documented in the corrective action program as

condition report (CR) 10916134

2.

A potential issue was identified regarding the PRA modeling of the extent of fire

damage to adjacent service water pumps in the SWIS. Specifically, a 2003 SWIS fire

model evaluation concluded that a service water pump lubricant fire would result in

damage to adjacent service water pumps while the PRA appeared to only model

damage to the immediately affected pump. This issue was documented in the

corrective action program as CR 10929601.

3.

A potential issue was identified regarding the licensees fire brigade response time at

the SWIS and the associated basis of the fire PRA assumptions for suppression

probabilities. This issue was documented in the corrective action program as CR

10929606.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluations in accordance with their corrective action

program associated with each of the issues. A synapsis for each issue is listed below:

1.

The inspectors independently measured the unit 2 service water pump oil berm area

and height of the lowered section to verify the licensees calculation to establish the

available volume to contain potential oil spills. The inspectors determined that the

volume was sufficient with margin to prevent oil from spilling over to the adjacent

pumps. The inspectors did not identify a performance deficiency.

2.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to a request for additional

information (RAI) from the NRC, dated December 28, 2004 (Agency Documents

Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML050060177),

which described a risk analysis for service water pump and motor lubricant fires that

included damage to adjacent pumps. The RAI response was regarding an earlier,

August 28, 2003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML032450036), request for exemption from

fire protection requirements due to concerns about Kaowool fire barrier material. The

inspectors reviewed a recently completed fire modeling evaluation of the SWIS that

documented the impact of an oil spill fire from a service water pump (Farley SWIS Oil

Fire Calculation, dated August 24, 2023). The inspectors noted that the 2023

evaluation concluded that service water lubricant fires would, in fact, result in damage

to adjacent pumps. The inspector observed that the conclusions from the 2023 fire

modeling evaluation were consistent with the licensees RAI response in 2004. The

inspectors interviewed the licensee to determine the reason for the most recent SWIS

pump fire modeling evaluation and learned that the evaluation was completed to

address 2022 focused scope fire PRA peer review comments regarding the

documentation of fire modeling that had already been incorporated into the model of

record. The licensee had noted the evaluation in the PRA model maintenance log to

be added as an attachment to the fire PRA at the next revision. The inspector

reviewed PRA model targets for the applicable fire scenarios and observed the results

were consistent with the conclusions documented in the fire modeling evaluation (i.e.,

the PRA modeled fire damage to adjacent service water pumps). The inspectors

observed that fire modeling of service water pump lubricant fires was consistent with

treatment in the fire PRA model and, as a result, no performance deficiency was

identified.

3.

The inspectors reviewed multiple brigade drill packages for drills conducted at the

SWIS and other areas of the plant. The team also interviewed plant personnel to

better understand how the brigade response utilized security operators to facilitate

prompt brigade response to a fire at the SWIS. After reviewing the licensee's

evaluation, brigade drill results, and discussions with plant staff, the inspectors did not

identify a performance deficiency regarding fire brigade response time and the

associated fire PRA assumptions.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On October 17, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to

Mr. Delson Erb, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.