IR 05000348/1993027
| ML20058J473 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 11/24/1993 |
| From: | Fillion P, Shymlock M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058J450 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-93-27, 50-364-93-27, NUDOCS 9312140124 | |
| Download: ML20058J473 (13) | |
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i UNITEo STATES
'f#p wo%, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y* 73g REGION li
$ ( 101 M '.RIETT. STREET, N.W , SUITE 29CO
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 0199 !
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Report No.: 50-348/93-27 and 50-364/93-27 i
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, In North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35291-0400 i
Docket No.: 50-348 and 50-364 License No.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 :
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Facility Name: Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: October 25-29, 1993 ,
Inspector: M, ~ , // /2.4[97 :
Date Signed P.J.Fillig '
Approved by: Nk !?FIE hStd3 M.ShymlockyChief Date Signed ;
Plant Systems Section :'
Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety l t
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SUMMARY i
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Scope: 1
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This special, announced inspection was conducted to assess the adequacy of the .
licensee's corrective actions for safety-significant findings identified !
during the Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection (EDSFI) o documented in NRC Report 348, 364/92-1 l Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. The licensee's effort to address the EDSFI findings was good. The violations and deviation were closed. Four of the thirteen unresolved / followup items remain open because the issues involved are under review by the NRC. One followup i item involving the battery service test remains open because additional l comments on the procedure were made by the inspecto )
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1 9312140124 931124 PDR ADOCK 05000348 G PDR I
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REPORT DETAILS l
- . Persons Contacted l
Licensee Employees ;
- Hayes, Senior Engineer
- Hill, General Manager j
- May, Senior Engineer !
- Nesbitt, Operations Manager {
- J. Osterholtz, Assistant General Manager, Support !
- J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager !
- R. Yance, Manager, Systems Performance
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Licensee Contractors l
D. Butani, Electrical Engineer, Bechtel Corporation !
- D. Gambrell, Electrical Supervisor, Southcrn Company Services i f
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included !
engineers and administrative personne Other NRC Employees T. Ross, Senior Resident Inspector I M. Morgan, Resident Inspector '
- Attended exit meeting i Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection Followup i (2515/111)
The inspection assessed the adequacy of the licensee's corrective i actions for findings identified during the EDSFI conducted June 8 ;
through July 10, 1992 (NRC Report 348,364/92-17). These findings and l the licensee's corrective actions are addressed in the following j paragraph .1 (Closed) Violation 92-17-01, Inadequate Determination of Causes and of Corrective Actions for Relays Which Failed to Meet Technical Specification Surveillance Test Acceptance Limit This violation was issued because the EDSFI team found there were inadequacies in the determination of causes and corrective actions for relay settings which failed to meet Technical Specification surveillance test limit Examples were identified involving diesel generator load sequencer timing relay and 4.16 kV undervoltage relays. In the case of the sequencer relays, a lack of timeliness and completeness in the determinations resulted in the sequencer for one train potentially-having settings outside Technical Specification limits for an operating period of over a year. For the undervoltage relays, cause determination was not timely in that it had not been initiated for three failures that occurred in March / April, 1992, and the determination had not been
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completed for a fourth that occurred in the same period. This violation was issued against 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actio The inspector confirmed that the licensee's corrective actions were in accordance with their response to the violation. The inspector agreed that the program now being implemented is effective in maintaining the sequencer timing relay set points within acceptable limit The calibration and surveillance procedures were revised to correct previous deficiencies. They have established a surveillance test interval of one month based on results of trending data. The inspector reviewed the time response trending plots for each of the sequencer timing relays and all the raw data for the Blf sequence ,
Since the original calibration procedure was used for all safety-related timing relays, the licensee reviewed the application of all safety- i related timing relays to determine whether precise timing was critica .
For purposes of this evaluation, the timing relays were assumed to have a tolerance of 20 percent rather than the guaranteed 10 percent to j encompass errors that may have been introduced with use of the original calibration procedure. As a result of this review, Plant Change Notices were issued to change timing relay set points associated with the post !
LOCA hydrogen dilution fans and the overcurrent protection scheme for certain 600 V buses. The inspector reviewed these evaluations and concluded that the licensee had addressed the issue of potential errors ,
in timing relay set points. The reviews are contained in Southern Nuclear Operating Company Intracompany Correspondence NDS-92-1787, dated September 8, 1992, and its attachment Cause of failure of the undervoltage relays has been determined. Two of '
the relays failed due to the presence of a metal particle on the induction disk which was caused by a failure to clean the relay after calibration. One of the relays failed because it was left (after calibration) at a setting that was near the acceptance band limit thus allowing the relay to drift out of the acceptable band during the calibration interval. The applicable procedures were revised to
- increase emphasis on cleanliness control before inserting into the case I and sealing the cover. The inspector also reviewed the calibration results for the last four calibrations for each of the undervoltage -
relays. These results indicate that the relays have been reliabl <
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With regard to corrective steps to avoid further similar violations, the ,
l inspector confirmed that the licensee has taken the following steps:
The Maintenance Manager has issued a memorandum to the discipline superintendents on the subject of Incident Reports. He gave :
instructions that all Incident Reports that may be generated in the j future be answered within a period of thirty days. Procedure AP-30, Preparation and Processing of Incident Reports etc., was revised to call for the issuance of an Incident Report for any test failure which-results in a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) or would result in an LCO if the plant were in a different Mode. The violation is close ;
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3 (Closed) Violation 92-17-02, Failure to Calibrate Timer Used for Diesel '
Generator Start Time Test j
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, The EDSFI team found that the automatic timer used for Technical l Specification emergency diesel generator start test had never been ,
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calibrated. This violation was issued against 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, i Criterion XII, Control of Measuring and Test Equipmen !
The inspector reviewed Maintenance Work Request No. 247676, completed .
July 8,1992, which calibrated the diesel generator automatic timer used ,
for start tests. The inspector reviewed procedure EMP-1909.02, I Calibration Check of Diesel Start Interval Timer, which was created to !
l control future calibrations of the timer. The inspector reviewed I procedure STP-80 (used for diesel start test), and confirmed that it was revised to call for recording the start timer calibration due dat Various departments which perform surveillance tests were requested to review their procedures to ensure they require installed plant instrumentation used to satisfy acceptance criteria is calibrate During this review, it was noted that some procedures did not include i the recording of the calibration due date (CDD). In addition, it was identified that certain instruments were not being routinely calibrate The procedures were revised to record the CDD and the instruments have been included in the calibration prograi Violation 92-17-02 is closed.
, (Closed) Violation 92-17-03, Inadequate Support Installations.
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The diesel generator muffler sliding supports and the diesel fuel oil ;
vent dryer tank supports were inadequately installed. Additionally, procedural instructions to verify the muffler supports could accommodate thermal expansion from muffler heatup during diesel operation were not accomplishe Licensee analysis demonstrated the immediate adequacy of the supports. The vent dryer tanks were removed during the inspectio This violation was issued against 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, !
Instructions, Procedures, and Drawing !
l The licensee determined that the root cause of the inadequate vent dryer l tank supports was that the modification to install the dryer was ;
designed and implemented by the plant staff (as opposed to the engineer / architect) and prior to 1983 the plant staff did not have procedures for Category II over Category I concerns. Therefore, the licensee generated a printout of all Design Change Request issued prior to 1983. From the printout they identified those modifications that !
involved Category II over I concerns and were designed by the plant ,
staff. All the modifications in this group were aalked down to look for I possible violations of the Category II over I criteria, and no concerns were identifie The muffler support was modified to allow thermal expansion, and the inspector confirmed the change had been implemented by field inspection of the supports. The inspector reviewed Maintenance Procedure MP-12.2, '
Emergency Diesel Generator Air Intake and Exhaust Silencer Inspection, revision 6, issued June 7, 1993, and confirmed that it had been changed
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i on a previous revision to incorporate sufficient detail for inspecting i the muffler support Violation 92-17-03 is close ;
2.4 (Closed) Deviation 92-17-04, Failure to Ensure Cathodic Protection of Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Piping and Tank Contrary to an FSAR commitment to provide cathodic protection for the emergency diesel generator fuel oil piping and tanks, the licensee failed to ensure adequate cathodic protection for a period of year The licensee was aware of problems with the cathodic protection and had initiated actions to address the problems. However, the licensee failed to determine if the condition of the piping or tanks was significantly degraded from past deficient operation and failed to institute ground i potential measurements to verify satisfactory system operatio >
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As corrective action, work control procedures were revised to require that a determination be made during work order processing as to whether an engineering review is needed to evaluate the reported condition and potential long term effects. The revised procedure was AP-52, Equipment '
Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, and the inspector confirmed that it calls for the above stated reviews on a quarterly l basis. The inspector reviewed Maintenance Work Request No. 267652 which *
controlled the work of performing ground potential testing.on December :
22, 1992. The system was found to be in working condition. The i inspector confirmed, by referring to the PM Task Planning System, that making ground potential test was scheduled on a yearly basis. Deviation >
92-17-04 is close r 2.5 (Closed) Unresolved item 92-17-06, Lack of Coordination Calculation for 208 V Subsystem ,
The EDSFI team found there was no calculation analyzing the coordination between the 600/208 VAC transformer primary protection and the ;
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protective devices for the 208 VAC motor control centers (MCCs). The team was particularly concerned that there could be miscoordination :
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between transformer protection and protection for non-Class IE load The transformer is connected delta on the high-voltage side and wye on the low-voltage side with a solidly grounded neutral, ,
The licensee presented a calculation which was a coordination study of the 208 V system. This calculation was identified as E-137, Protection '
Coordination of Breakers Associated with Solatron Regulators and ;
Breakers in 600/208 V MCC's and Panels. Two conclusions of this calculation were: ,
t (a) The transformer primary protection will coordinate with any downstream protective device for any fault at the terminals of any non-safety-related equipmen :
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(b) The transformer primary protection will coordinate with any downstream protective device for almost any single-line-to-ground (SLG) fault on cables feeding non-safety-related equipmen Coordination is lacking for maximum level SLG faults at certain location The inspector reviewed the methodology for calculation E-137 and agreed that the conclusions were valid. Furthermore, the inspector concluded
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that a sufficient degree of coordination exists in the 208 V system such that isolation between safety-related and non-safety-related circuits is c maintained. Consequently the design meets the requirements for isolation, and Unresolved Item 92-17-06 is close '
2.6 (0 pen) Unresolved Item 92-17-07, Auxiliary Building Battery Voltage is Marginal for Present Load Requirement .
This Unresolved Item involved three concerns:
(a) The licensee did not have analysis demonstrating whether the design basis stated in the FSAR relative to battery duty cycle :
capacity was me (b) The calculation methodology with regard to choice of conductor temperature and electrolyte temperature was questioned by the '
inspecto (c) Conclusions in the calculation appeared to be based on the t questionable use of site testing to establish ratings of devices 1 that were non-conservative relative to manufacturer's published l rating ,
With regard to item 2.6(a), the FSAR has been revised and it now reads ,
as follows. " ....the batteries are capable of supplying adequate voltage to all safety-related components for an extended period without battery charger support under the following scenario: After initiation of a LOSP or LOSP+LOCA, the batteries will have sufficient capacity to support automatic diesel generator starting and load sequencing, and to support operation of all required safety-related de loads for 2 h for Unit I and I h for Unit 2, assuming a battery charger failure occurs after initiation of the LOSP or LOSP+LOCA event. .... The service test for the batteries will be performed using this load profile [0 to 1 min, i 500 A and I to 120 min, 350 A) which envelopes both the normal and ;
design basis accident load profiles." The analytical basis for these statements are contained in Calculation No. E-144, Determination of Battery Capacity Margins for Adequacy of Voltage etc. This calculation was first approved in December, 199 FSAR Section 8.3.2.1.1, Safety-Related Batteries, has been extensively ;
revised as a result of the EDSFI team's finding. Since the NRC.is '
reviewing this FSAR change, Unresolved Item 92-17-07 remains ope +
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With regard to item 2.6(b), the inspector reviewed the choice of conductor temperature used in the voltage calculations. Most conductors are modeled with a resistance corresponding to 90 deg. Celsius conductor temperature. A certain limited number of conductors are modeled with a resistance corresponding to 50 deg. Celsius conductor temperature. The EDSFI team's concern was with the ones using 50 deg. Celsius. The inspector reviewed the routing of these cables and the level of current carried by the cables, and concluded that use of 50 deg. Celsius ,
resistance was justified for the particular cables in question. One of '
the design inputs to Calculation E-144 was that the battery electrolyte temperature is 60 deg Fahrenheit. This temperature was consistent with the room temperature analysis performed by the HVAC engineer Therefore the concern expressed during the EDSFI that an incorrect temperature derating factor was used has now been resolve The conclusion in Calculation No. E-144 that all components receive -
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adequate voltage for the specified time duration does not depend on the use of design input obtained from site testing. The conclusion is based on design inputs obtained from ratings originally published by the .
manufacturer. Therefore the concern of item 2.6(c) above has now been resolve .7 (Closed) Unresolved Item 92-17-08, Some Safety-Related Equipment Rooms Could Experience Temperatures Above Those Stated in the FSA Calculations performed about the time of the EDSFI indicated certain ;
auxiliary building rooms containing safety-related equipment could experience accident temperatures in excess of those originally identified in the FSAR. The FSAR at that time stated that accident condition temperatures could be maintained below 40 deg. Celsius. The ;
response to the EDSFI findings, dated November 5, 1992, states that the ,
highest temperature in any room in a post-LOCA environment would be 55 deg. Celsius. Increasing from normal to the maximum temperature would be a slow essentially linear process taking about 30 days. The licensee i has evaluated the capability of each piece of equipment to perform its safety-related function in the postulated higher temperature environment. The results of this evaluation indicate that, with the exception of overload relays, documentation exists to show that ambient temperatures during the 30 day period following an accident have no l significant impact on the safety-related electrical equipment located in auxiliary building rooms cooled by service water. The evaluation is contained in File A-88 (ES 90-1711) which is a Bechtel Power Corporation :
documen Plant Change Request PPCR-BPE-1348 and 2270 will adjust '
overload relay settings and replace overload heaters so that they will not impact any safety-related system should the maximum temperature be !
reached. The inspector reviewed ES 90-1711 and the backup
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documentation, and concluded the results were valid. The licensee also presented an FSAR revision clarifying the HVAC design basis. Unresolved Item 92-17-08 is close i l
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2.8 (Closed) Unresolved Item 92-17-09, Updating of Controlled Vendor Manual A section of the licensee's controlled copy of the vendor manual for the 600 V load center switchgear was not the latest revision (Rev. B versus Rev. G). The EDSF1 team was concerned that the vendor had not provided the updated manual to the licensee and questioned whether there was a breakdown in the system for updating vendor informatio The licensee sent correspondence to the vendor requesting a response to this concern. The vendor replied that Revision B of the manual together with bulletins which had been transmitted over the years provided complete current information. A list of bulletins was provided. The licensee then checked their files, and confirmed that the bulletins had been received. Therefore, there was no evidence that a breakdown in the vendor manual program had occurred. Unresolved Item 92-17-09 is close .9 (0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 92-17-10, Battery Test Procedures Did Not Verify Design Adequac A battery service test is a capacity test performed to demonstrate that the battery can meet its accident analysis duty cycle. This test is performed at eighteen-month intervals pursuant to the Technical Specification. The pass / fail criteria for the service test is that the battery terminal voltage remain above values which the design basis calculation indicates are necessary to provide adequate voltage throughout the system. In general, each time segment of the duty cycle would have a critical voltage associated with it. Since voltage decays linearly throughout a segment, it is normally adequate to record the voltage only at the end of a segment. An additional consideration is-the momentary (ie.1 or 2 s) voltage dip that occurs immediately after a large' sudden increase in current. This dip is known as the Coup de Fouet effect. The current levels of the first minute segment of the service test would be high enough to cause a noticeable Coup de Fouet effect. Continuous monitoring of the voltage during the first minute is needed to demonstrate that the voltage does not fall below the design criteria valu The inspector compared the licensee's service test procedure (STP-905.1)
against the above stated criteria. The procedure specified and delineated a service test that met the requirements, except for the following comments. First, monitoring in the first segment (500 A for one minute) was not continuous, and would not detect the Coup de Fouet effect. Second, the voltage criteria at the end of the test did not match the calculated minimum voltage. The test criteria was that individual cell voltages not go below 1.75 V, which equates to a battery terminal voltage of 105 V. Calculations showed that voltages of 107 to 111 V were required, depending on the battery being analyze The licensee had made some changes to STP-905.1 since the EDSFI which addressed the specific comments made by the team at that time. The
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comments above represent a refinement or enhancement beyond the original EDSFI finding. The licensee agreed to study these new comments before performing the next service test. Inspector Followup Item 92-17-10 remains ope i
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2.10 (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 92-17-11, Invalid Diesel Generator Start Test Failures Not Identified or Reporte The EDSFI team had noted that the licensee did not include, in their diesel generator reliability data, start test failures if those failures :
occurred at times when one air header was deliberately shut off and the failure mode was exceeding the 12 second start time. This situation occurred on twelve occasion !
The licensee, in their response to the inspection findings, stated their position on this matter. The NRC agrees with the position stated in the respons '
Establishing a reliability number for the diesel generator is important to plant operations. Reliability data should be gathered from tests where a start signal is given to a diesel generator which has been placed in its normal standby configuration by using the plant alignment procedure. Since the intentional "one-header" start is not a normal ,
standby configuration, failures during such a test may or may not t represent valid test If the failure mode is failure to meet the start time, the test is an invalid test because the failure may be attributed to the intentionally degraded air start system. Failure to start, load ,
and run due to any other failure mode represents a valid failur Successful "one-header" tests are valid tests. Therefore, the licensee's procedure is correct and gathers the correct dat ,
The purpose of the "one-header" start is to demonstrate that the diesel generator meets the design basis of redundancy in the air start syste i Any information, such as obtained from a diesel start test, that indicates this criteria is not met indicates the need for corrective action. The EDSFI inspection report, in Section 3.8, states: "
...a Diesel Generator Task Force was formed by the licensee to address diesel problems including those which stem from deficiencies in the air start .
system". At the time of this followup inspection, "one-header" starts had been successful in recent attempt Unresolved Item 92-17-11 is close .11 (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 92-17-12, Weaknesses in DC Ground Fault Detectio The identified weaknesses were in the area of alarm sensitivity and ;
system procedural guidanc In the November 5, 1992, response the licensee described three steps they would take, or had taken, to strengthen the ground detection system. First, they had lowered the alarm set point to provide the required sensitivity. Second, they would create a routine maintenance task to take voltage readings from the
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positive and negative buses which provides a means of detecting higher resistance grounds than the alarm. Third, they would modify the ground i detection system at the service water pump house. If the modified :
system was seen es an improvement after a trial period, the same system would be installed on all safety-related systems. The NRC, in a !
December 4,1992, letter to the licensee, accepted these proposed steps !
as adequately addressing the weaknesse :
The inspector confirmed that the second and third steps had been i implemented. The modified system at the service water house was inspecte . It nad an installed voltmeter and switches to allow various *
voltage readings to be made by an operator. The operating procedure -
gave guidance on how to interpret the voltage readings in terms of ground faults. The inspector concluded that the licensee was taking actions to strengthen the ground detection system according to their i submittal. Inspector Followup Item 92-17-12 is close l 2.12 (0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 92-17-13 Inadequate Motor Overload l Protectio The concern of this item involved the protection for the reactor coolant pump motors and protection for 600 V motors in general. The issues ,
involved are under review by the NRC and this item remains open for that '
reason. Some clarification of the issues was obtained during this inspectio The overcurrent protection scheme for the reactor coolant pump motors utilizes three relays, two inverse time relays and a high dropout uni In addition, stator resistance temperature detectors are wired to an ;
alarm unit which is set to alarm at 130 deg. Celsius. Because there is little margin between the locked rotor current and the locked rotor thermal withstand, a single overcurrent relay of the type being utilized could not provide complete protection. Therefore, two overcurrent !
relays taken together are needed to create a time-current characteristic i which will protect the motor. And the licensee has accomplished thi l The high dropout unit is wired and set to disable automatic tripping '
when the current seen by the relay is below 2000 A, which is about 200 percent of full load current. The underlying philosophy of the high dropout unit is to make the decision to trip the reactor coolant pump a deliberate operator action when the overload is at a level which allows some time to make the decision. The operator would be informed of a potential problem through the temperature alar The EDSFI report, 92-17, states in section 2.3.2: "From curve SK-E-193, it was evident that both relays used in the motor protection (IAC66K and ,
C011) were set above the thermal limits of the motor for acceleration and running conditions." This statement could not be confirmed during !
the followup inspection. Examination of SK-E-193 which is on Sheet A-33 :
of Calculation E 35.lA, Rev. O, indicated that the protection is provided as described above. The report states that the relay characteristics were shown on SK-E-193 and that the thermal limit curve
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was shown on E-35 page 241J. Apparently an error was made in ,
transferring information from one sheet to another during the EDSFI
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With regard to the protection of 600 V motors, the licensee's procedures for setting the overcurrent devices implements a philosophy of favoring i security over protection in those cases where a compromise must be made <
due to the fact that the trip devices have discrete (non-continuous)
settings and a tolerance ban The NRC is in the process of reviewing the overcurrent protection at Farley to make sure that all relevant considerations have been mad ;
Inspector Followup Item 92-17-13 is ope '
2.13 (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 92-17-15, No Preventive Maintenance for 011 Static 230 kV Cable System; and (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 92-17-16, Recommended Preventive Maintenance Not Being Performed on Oil- ;
Filled 4160/600 V Transformers and TDAFW Uninterruptible Power Supply Panel Both these items involved enhancements to the maintenance program which the licensee has implemented. The inspector confirmed implementation by reviewing the following maintenance program planning tasks:
(a) Information Management System (IMS) PM Planning Task for equipment j NSS520SS-1&2 for oil static pumping stations 1&2: This task calls for yearly general inspection of oil static pump motors IA, 18, l 2A and 2B to include checks of the wiring and general cleanliness l of the motors. The local control / alarm panel will also be {
inspected and cleaned as necessar i (b) IMS PM Planning Task NSS52, tasks 1&2, for oil and storage equipment associated with the 230 kV cable: This task calls for calibrating the instruments on the attached list per the referenced drawings on a five year interv& (c) IMS PM Planning Task NIR118-2 for station service transformer IB:
Thin task calls for calibrating temperature indicator per IMP-42 )
(d) IMS PM Planning Task NIRllB-2, task 2, for station service transformer IB: This task calls for replacing the pressure i indicator in accordance with EMP-2570.13 on a six year interva I (e) IMS PM Planning Task Q1N23L for the turbine driven auxiliary j feedwater pump uninterruptible power supply: This task calls for ;
performing cleaning and inspection in accordance with EMP-1352.06 '
on an eighteen month interva ;
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(f) IMS PM Planning Task Q1N23L, task 2, for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump ete: This task calls for semi-annually performing infrared survey of TDAFW UPS battery, charger and [
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Inspector Followup Items 92-17-15 and 16 are close .14 (Closed) Inspector followup Item 92-17-17, Circuit Breaker and Fuse Configuration Control Discrepancie (
Inspection of a selected sample of fuses and circuit breakers, by the ,
EDSFI team, identified a number of instances in which the fuses and the breaker instantaneous trip settings were not as specified by the respective fuse list and design drawings. None of the differences were found to be operability concern .
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With regard to the fuse control program, the licensee provided an explanation in their November 5, 1992, response. This was accepted by the NRC as resolving the issue as stated in the NRC letter of December 4, 199 The licensee presented an engineering study which addressed the issue of discrepancies between breaker settings and documents. This study was identified as Bechtel File A-88 (ES-92-2386). The study evaluated "as found" breaker settings which had been compiled through field inspections. In cases where the "as found" setting was higher than shown on documents, the document was revised to match the setting. In '
cases where the "as found" setting was lower than shown on drawings, the '
setting will be changed to match the drawing which was in accordance with the design guid ;
The inspector accepted this documentation as resolving the issu I Inspector Followup Item 92-17-17 is close !
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2.15 Items Under Review by the NR The following items remain open because the issues are under review by the NRC:
(a) 92-17-05, Degraded Grid Voltage Relay Settings Specified by ,
Technical Specifications are Inadequat (b) 92-17-14, No Periodic Testing to Verify Continued Capabilities of Most Safety-Related Holded-Case Circuit Breaker .0 Exit Meeting The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 29, 1993, ,
with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described -
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below. Dissenting comments were not received from the license i I
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Item'TYDe/ Number * Status /ReDort Section Violation 92-17-01 Closed / l
Violation 92-17-02 Closed / Violation 92-17-03 Closed / !
i Deviation 92-17-04 Closed / !
Unresolved Item 92-17-05 Open (NRC review)/2.15 ]!
Unresolved Item 92-17-06 Closed / l
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Unresolved Item 92-17-07 Open (NRC review)/ l Unresolved Item 92-17-08 Closed / l l
Unresolved Item 92-17-09 Closed / i i
Inspector Followup Item 92-17-10 Open/ ;
Inspector Followup Item 92-17-11 Closed /2.10 l
Inspector Followup Item 92-17-12 Closed /2.ll !
Inspector Followup Item 92-17-13 Open (NRC review)/2.12 j
Inspector Followup Item 92-17-14
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Open (NRC review, generic issue)/2.15 Inspector Followup Item 92-17-15 Closed /2.13 ;
Inspector Followup Item 92-17-16 Closed /2.14 Inspector Followup Item 92-17-17 Closed /2.14 .
- Each item number is preceded with 348,364/
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