IR 05000348/2016001
| ML16120A122 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/2016 |
| From: | Shane Sandal NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2 |
| To: | Gayheart C Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR 2016001 | |
| Download: ML16120A122 (22) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ril 29, 2016
SUBJECT:
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2016001 AND 05000364/2016001
Dear Ms. Gayheart:
On March 31, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. On April 18, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection. However, inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at Farley.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS)
component of NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Shane Sandal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-348, 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2, NPF-8
Enclosure:
IR 05000348/2016001; 05000364/2016001 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-348, 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2, NPF-8 Report Nos.: 05000348/2016001 and 05000364/2016001 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Location: Columbia, Alabama Dates: January 1, 2016 through March 31, 2016 Inspectors: P. Niebaum, Senior Resident Inspector K. Miller, Resident Inspector Approved by: Shane Sandal, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000348/2016001; and 05000364/2016001; January 1, 2016, through March 31, 2016;
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Quarterly Integrated Inspection Report The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by the resident inspectors. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated January 28, 2013, and revised February 4, 2015. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operations of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5. Documents reviewed which are not specifically identified in the Report Details are listed in the List of Documents Reviewed section of the Attachment.
A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the NRC. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. The violation and corrective action tracking number are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 started the report period at approximately 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). On March 31, a Unit 1 load reduction occurred because the main turbine governor valve #1 closed unexpectedly. Following the event, Unit 1 stabilized at approximately 91 percent RTP. Unit 1 remained at approximately 91 percent through the end of the report period.
Unit 2 operated at approximately 100 percent RTP throughout the report period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions: The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparations to protect risk-significant systems from near freezing ambient temperatures.
The inspectors verified that weather-related equipment deficiencies identified during the previous year had been placed into the work control process and/or corrected before the onset of seasonal extremes. The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of cold weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures before the onset of and during seasonal extreme weather conditions. The inspectors evaluated the following risk-significant systems:
- Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater System/Condensate Storage Tank
- Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System/Condensate Storage Tank
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial Walkdown: The inspectors verified that critical portions of the following two systems or trains were correctly aligned by performing partial walkdowns. The inspectors selected systems for assessment because they were a redundant or backup system or train, were important for mitigating risk for the current plant conditions, had been recently realigned, or were a single-train system. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures and drawings.
- Units 1 & 2, Common Main Control Room AC and Emergency Filtration System - A Train
- Unit 2, 2B diesel generator (DG) while the 1-2A DG was out of service for maintenance Complete Walkdown: The inspectors verified the alignment of the Unit 1 125 Volt D.C.
Auxiliary Building Distribution System. The inspectors selected this system for assessment because it is a risk-significant mitigating system. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures, drawings, the updated final safety analysis report, and other documents. The inspectors reviewed records related to the system outstanding design issues, maintenance work requests, and deficiencies. The inspectors verified that the selected system was correctly aligned by performing a complete walkdown of accessible components.
The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents, including condition reports and outstanding work orders to verify the licensee was identifying and resolving equipment alignment discrepancies. The inspectors also reviewed periodic reports containing information on the status of risk-significant systems, including maintenance rule reports and system health reports.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Quarterly Inspection: The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of selected fire plans by comparing the fire plans to the defined hazards and defense-in-depth features specified in the fire protection program. In evaluating the fire plans, the inspectors assessed the following attributes:
- control of transient combustibles and ignition sources
- fire detection systems
- water-based fire suppression systems
- gaseous fire suppression systems
- manual firefighting equipment and capability
- passive fire protection features
- compensatory measures and fire watches
- issues related to fire protection contained in the licensees corrective action program The inspectors toured the following six fire areas to assess material condition and operational status of fire protection equipment.
- Unit 1, Room 318 - Cable Spreading Room, Fire Area 1-040, Fire Zone 0318
- Unit 1, Room 346 - Switchgear and M-G Set Room, Fire Area 1-041, Fire Zone 0346
- Unit 2, Room 2318 - Cable Spreading Room, Fire Area 2-040, Fire Zone 2318
- Unit 2, Room 2335 - Load Center Room, Train A, Fire Area 2-041, Fire Zone 2335
- Unit 2, Room 2343 - Load Center Room, Train A, Fire Area 2-041, Fire Zone 2343
- Unit 2, Room 2346 - Switchgear and M-G Set Room, Fire Area 2-041, Fire Zone 2346 Annual Inspection: The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire brigade performance during a drill on February 23, 2016, and assessed the brigades capability to meet fire protection licensing basis requirements. The inspectors observed the following aspects of fire brigade performance:
- capability of fire brigade members
- leadership ability of the brigade leader
- use of turnout gear and fire-fighting equipment
- team effectiveness
- compliance with site procedures The inspectors also assessed the ability of control room operators to combat potential fires, including identifying the location of the fire, dispatching the fire brigade, and sounding alarms. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to declare the appropriate emergency action level and make required notifications in accordance with NUREG 0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (FEMA-REP-1),and Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
Internal Flooding: The inspectors reviewed related flood analysis documents and walked down the area(s) listed below containing risk-significant structures, systems, and components susceptible to flooding. The inspectors verified that plant design features and plant procedures for flood mitigation were consistent with design requirements and internal flooding analysis assumptions. The inspectors also assessed the condition of flood protection barriers and drain systems. In addition, the inspectors verified the licensee was identifying and properly addressing issues using the corrective action program.
- Unit 2, Auxiliary Building 100 elevation, lower equipment room Underground Cables: The inspectors reviewed related flood analysis documents and inspected the areas listed below containing cables whose failure could disable risk-significant equipment. The inspector directly observed the condition of cables and cable support structures and, as applicable, verified that dewatering devices and drainage systems were functioning properly. In addition, the inspectors verified the licensee was identifying and properly addressing issues using the corrective action program.
- Unit 1, Pull Box 1ZB1M43
- Unit 1, Pull Box 1ZB1M44
- Unit 2, Pull Box 1ZB2M43
- Unit 2, Pull Box 1ZB2M44
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
Annual Review: The inspectors verified the readiness and availability of the 2B diesel generator jacket water heat exchanger to perform its design function by reviewing eddy current testing and the licensees heat exchanger inspection reports. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee entered any significant heat exchanger performance problems into the corrective action program and that the licensees corrective actions were appropriate.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification: The inspectors observed a simulator scenario conducted for training of an operating crew for requalification on January 12, 2016. The inspectors assessed the following attributes:
- licensed operator performance
- the ability of the licensee to administer the scenario and evaluate the operators
- the quality of the post-scenario critique
- simulator performance Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance: The inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room during a high risk activity on March 31, 2016. The inspectors observed the control room staffs recovery actions from the Unit 1 main turbine governor valve failing closed while the plant was operating at 100% power. The inspectors assessed the following:
- use of plant procedures
- control board manipulations
- communications between crew members
- use and interpretation of instruments, indications, and alarms
- use of human error prevention techniques
- documentation of activities
- management and supervision
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensees treatment of the two issues listed below to verify the licensee appropriately addressed equipment problems within the scope of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants). The inspectors reviewed procedures and records to evaluate the licensees identification, assessment, and characterization of the problems as well as their corrective actions for returning the equipment to a satisfactory condition. The inspectors also interviewed system engineers and the maintenance rule coordinator to assess the accuracy of performance deficiencies and extent of condition.
- Unit 2, turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, overfill of turbine bearing reservoir
- Unit 2, 2C atmospheric relief valve (ARV) failure to stroke during surveillance test
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the five maintenance activities listed below to verify that the licensee assessed and managed plant risk as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and licensee procedures. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensees risk assessments and implementation of risk management actions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee was identifying and resolving problems with assessing and managing maintenance-related risk using the corrective action program. Additionally, for maintenance resulting from unforeseen situations, the inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees planning and control of emergent work activities.
- Unit 2, January 7, 2016, 2B RHR equipment outage, TDAFW pump discharge flow control valve surveillance
- Unit 1, February 2, 2016, 1B DG equipment outage, 1B RHR flow control valve (605B), RHR HX bypass valve maintenance
- Unit 1, February 22, 2016, 1B DG surveillance, main generator hydrogen temperature control valve bypass operation
- Units 1 and 2, March 16, 2016, High Voltage Switchyard Work including maintenance on PCB 830 and 836 and testing on the #1 auto bank transformer
- Unit 1, March 24, 2016, SR 3.0.3 risk evaluation for missed technical specification surveillance, SR 3.4.8.2 on the 1B 125 volt DC battery
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected the seven operability determinations or functionality evaluations listed below for review based on the risk-significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the determinations to ensure that technical specification operability was properly justified and the components or systems remained capable of performing their design functions. To verify whether components or systems were operable, the inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specification and updated final safety analysis report to the licensees evaluations. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations.
- Unit 1, Power Range NI-41 low output current indications, CR 10135727
- Unit 2, 2C charging pump circuit breaker spring charging motor LS2 switch loose, CR 10167409
- Unit 2, Flexible conduit between 120 vital AC panel and main control board disconnected, CR 10169414
- Units 1 & 2, 1-2A diesel generator jacket water heat exchanger anode plug leakage, CR 10171511
- Unit 2, 2A service water pump discharge vacuum breaker piping leak, CR 10175510
- Unit 1, 1B diesel generator degraded exhaust system, CR 10176773
- Units 1 & 2, Common main control room ventilation duct leakage, B train, CR 10089307
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for the six maintenance activities listed below to verify the work performed was completed correctly and the test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability.
- WO SNC749633, Unit 2, 2C charging pump circuit breaker spring charging motor LS2 switch loose
- WO SNC701453, Perform 24-month inspection FNP-0-MP-14.1 and FNP-0-MP-12.2 on 2B diesel generator
- WO SNC69675, Replace 2B Service Water Pump
- WO SNC695155, Perform functional test per FNP-1-STP-213.12B on steam generator pressure instrument channels
- Various work orders, Unit 1 rod control urgent failure alarm The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following:
- Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness.
- Effects of testing on the plant were adequately addressed.
- Test instrumentation was appropriate.
- Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
- Equipment was returned to its operational status following testing.
- Test documentation was properly evaluated.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with post-maintenance testing.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. A licensee-identified violation is documented in Section 4OA7.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the six surveillance tests listed below and either observed the test or reviewed test results to verify testing adequately demonstrated equipment operability and met technical specification and licensee procedural requirements. The inspectors evaluated the test activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with surveillance testing.
Routine Surveillance Tests
- FNP-2-STP-73.1, Hot Shutdown Panel Operability Verification, Appendix P, Verification of TDAFWP Flow Control Valve Operation From the Hot Shutdown Panel, Ver. 22.0
- FNP-1-STP-22.16, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Quarterly Inservice Test, Ver. 63.0
- FNP-0-ETP-4493, Control Room Habitability Tracer Gas Testing, Ver. 6.0
- FNP-2-STP-22.2, 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Quarterly Inservice Test, Ver. 31
- FNP-0-STP-80.1, Diesel Generator 1-2A Operability Test, Ver. 68.1 In-Service Tests (IST)
- FNP-1-STP-23.1, 1A Component Cooling Water Pump Quarterly Inservice Test, Ver.
38.3
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the emergency preparedness drill conducted on January 27, 2016, and the emergency exercise conducted on March 9, 2016. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator and/or technical support center to evaluate implementation of the emergency plan, including event classification, notification, and protective action recommendations. The inspectors evaluated the licensees performance against criteria established in the licensees procedures. Additionally, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to assess the licensees effectiveness in identifying emergency preparedness weaknesses and verified the identified weaknesses were entered in the corrective action program.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of the performance indicator (PI) data, submitted by the licensee, for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PIs listed below. The inspectors reviewed plant records compiled between January 2015 and December 2015 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the data reported for the station. The inspectors verified that the PI data complied with guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, and licensee procedures. The inspectors verified the accuracy of reported data that were used to calculate the value of each PI.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with PI data.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- unplanned scrams per 7,000 critical hours
- unplanned power changes per 7,000 critical hours
- unplanned scrams with complications
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review
The inspectors screened items entered into the licensees corrective action program in order to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up. The inspectors reviewed condition reports, attended screening meetings, or accessed the licensees computerized corrective action database.
.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the following two condition reports which constitute one inspection sample:
- CR 10193448, 1-2A DG Unbalanced Engine Condition at Full Load
- CR 10196233, 1-2A DG Firing Pressure Imbalance The inspectors evaluated the following attributes of the licensees actions:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner
- evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues
- consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences
- classification and prioritization of the problem
- identification of root and contributing causes of the problem
- identification of any additional condition reports
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Report Review: The inspectors reviewed the most recent INPO evaluation report dated January 2016 to determine if those reports identified safety or training issues not previously identified by NRC evaluations. The report contained no safety issues that were not already known by the NRC.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On April 18, 2016, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Ms. Cheryl Gayheart and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection period.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and was a violation of NRC requirements which met the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation.
- Technical Specifications 5.4, Procedures, required, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering activities recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. Section 9.a of RG 1.33 recommended that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly pre-planned and performed in accordance with written procedures, instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to provide procedures that were appropriate to the circumstances for adding the proper amount of oil for the turbine connected to the Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feed water (TDAFW) pump. On February 4, 2016, the turbine oil system was overfilled because licensee procedure FNP-0-SOP-22.1, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Lubrication Procedures, (Ver. 7) and work order SNC 759097 did not contain guidance to identify the proper oil level. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because there was not an actual loss of function for greater than the TS allowed outage time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as CR 10178550.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- J. Andrews, Maintenance Director
- G. Bell, Licensing Supervisor
- E. Berry, Site Systems Manager
- J. Carroll, Shift Operations Manager
- B. Freeman, Engineering Supervisor
- C. Gayheart, Site Vice President
- S. Henry, Operations Director
- R. Hruby, Engineering Director
- J. Hutto, Plant Manager
- V. Locke, Performance Improvement Supervisor
- L. Shaffield, Assistant Maintenance Director
- B. Taylor, Regulatory Affairs Manager