IR 05000348/1999002
| ML20206R220 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206R206 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-99-02, 50-348-99-2, 50-364-99-02, 50-364-99-2, NUDOCS 9905200041 | |
| Download: ML20206R220 (15) | |
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region ll Docket No and 50-364 License No NPF-2 and NPF-8 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, In Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: 7388 N. State Highway 95 Columbia, AL 36319 j
Dates: February 21 - April 3,1999 Inspectors: T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident inspector J. H. Bartley, Resident inspector R. K. Caldwell, Resident inspector !
R. P. Schin, Engineering inspector, (Sections E1, E3, E7, and E8) I N. Merriweather, Engineering Inspector, (Sections E1, E3. E7, and E8)
R. L. Moore, Engineering inspector, (Sections E1, E3, E7, and E8) I D. B. Forbes, Radiation Protection Inspector, (Sections R l and R1.2)
' Approved by: Pierce H. Skinner, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects l
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Enclosure 9905200041 990429 PDR ADOCK 05000349 G PDR ,
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j EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (
FARLEY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 and 2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Report 50-348,364/99-02 l This integrated inspection to assure public health and safety included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a six week period i of inspection by Resident inspectors from February 21 to April 3,1999, an engineering team I inspection of site and corporate activities, and a radiation protection inspection by a regional i specialis l Operations e Operator performance during routine observations, during power changes for both units, and during surveillance testing demonstrated effective oversight, good communications, and procedure compliance (Sections 01.1 and M1.1).
- Safety system walkdowns noted good material condition and appropriate system alignments. Minor deficiencies observed were addressed by licensee management (Section O2.1).
e Operator questioning attitude relative to an assessment of degraded conditions with one train of the control room emergency air conditioners and with an emergency diesel generator alarm condition was weak (Sections O2.2 end O2.3),
o Operator training on steam generator tube rupture and other scenarios was effective. Licensee evaluators conducted post training critiques that demonstrated effective self-assessments of operator training performance (Section O5.1).
Enaineerina e Temporary and permanent modifications were installed and controlled in accordance with station procedures and regulatory requirements. The 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and safety evaluations reviewed were clearly written, included a sufficient level of detail, technically accurate, and were appropriately filed as quality records. Appropriate controls were established and implemented to assure the design and licensing bases were adequately addressed for new and revised design calculations. The overall engineering support for procurement of replacement parts and material was appropriate (Sections E1.1, E 1.2, E1.3, and E3.1).
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e The licensee's corrective action program was generally adequate in that licensee identified safety issues were adequately addressed. The corrective action program was fragmented and the scope and interface of the numerous individual l processes were not clearly established. The engineering performance related to root cause evaluations was generally good in 1998 (Sections E7.1 and E7.2).
Plant Support
- The controls were effectively maintained for radioactive material, radiological postings, and radiation area /high radiation areas (Section R1.1).
e The licensee maintained programs for controlling exposures As Low As i i
Reasonably Achievable and continued to be effective in controlling overall I collective dose. All personnel radiation exposures during 1998 and 1999 to date were below regulatory limits (Section R1.2).
- Routine checks of security programs noted appropriate performance (Section S1.1),
o Chemistry support for operations was positively demonstrated during implementation of Unit 1 secondary chemistry flushes and Unit 1 increased coolant fission product activity monitoring (Sections 01.1 and R1.3).
- An observed emergency drill provided effective training and demonstrated adequate emergency plan implementation (Section P5.1).
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REPORT DETAILS Summary of Plant Status At the beginning of this reporting period, Unit 1 was operating at full power and had been on line since December 29,1998. The unit operated at or near full power during the inspection period, except that power was reduced to 15 percent during the period j March 5-8 to perform steam generator secondary side chemical flushe j i
At the beginning of this reporting period, Unit 2 was operating near full power and had been on line since May 17,1998. The unit operated at power during the inspection
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i period. A load reduction to 50 percent power occurred beginning on March 19 to '
minimize core burn up during the spring time perio . Operations l 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Routine Observations of Control Room Operations (71707) (40500)
The inspectors noted operator attentiveness to annunciator alarms and equipment status was prompt. The operating crew consistently demonstrated a high level of awareness of existing piant conditions and ongoing plant activities. During the period, Unit 1 power was reduced to 15 percent or. March 5 in order to perform secondary side chemical flushes on all steam generators (SGs). Chemistry and operations personnel demonstrated good teamwork, communications, coordination, and procedure usage during the activity. The inspectors observed supervisory involvement during the power changes and chemistry sampling and analysis. The inspectors also reviewed Unit 2 l
operation at 50 percent power and noted operators were attentive to equipment and unit l status during the reduced power level. The unit operated satisfactorily at this reduced power level. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO)
tracking sheets reviewed by the inspectors were consistent with plant conditions and TS requirement Operational Status of :acilitics and Equipment 0 General Tours and insoections of Safety Systems (71707)
l General tours of safety-related areas were performed by the inspectors to observe the i physical condition of plant equipment and structures, and to verify that safety systems j were properly maintained and aligned. The inspectors monitored the status and operability of selected risk significant safety systems and equipment and conducted system walk downs for the reactor protection system, the auxiliary feedwater systems, and high head safety injection systems for both units. Minor deficiencies observed during the walkdown and review were discussed with licensee management. The -
inspectors concluded that the systems were properly aligned and operable for their required safety function _ _ _ _ _
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O2.2 Review of Control Room Air Conditionino System (CRACS) Ooerability (71707)
On March 2, the inspectors noted that the Unit 1 and 2 morning reports indicated that both redundant B train CRACS units (28 and 38) were degraded. The inspectors {
discussed the operability of the B train CRACS with operations management.
' Operations management stated that they considered the B train CRACS operable but a formal operability determination had not been performed. The inspectors noted that the
- licensee had performed procedure FNP-0-STP-26.7,"B Train Control Room Air l Conditioning System Operability Test," Revision (Rev.) 3, on February 23. The
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procedure required the CRACS to be operated for two hours and that the control room r l temperature was required to be equal to or less than 120 degrees F and stable after two hours of CRACS operatio The inspectors reviewed the data taken during the test and noted that the control room temperature was about 85 degrees F and increasing after the system had been in '
operation for two hours. The inspectors concluded that the test did not demonstrate that train 2B air conditioning unit wcs operable in that it did not demonstrate that the control room temperature was stable. The test did satisfactorily demonstrate that the 3B air conditioning unit was able to maintain the required control room temperature. The
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CRACS met the TS operability requirements after the 3B air conditioning unit functioned properly.
l The inspectors discussed the surveillance test and operations failure to identify that the l 28 CRACS was not operable with licensee management. The licensee caution tagged l
the 28 CRACS unit for emergency use only and selected the 3B CRACS as the B train primary air conditioning unit. The 2B CRACS was the selected unit during these discussions. On March 10, the licensee initiated a tracking LCO to ensure that the TS action statement would be entered if the 3B CRACS was removed from service.
l The inspectors concluded that licensee personnel did not thoroughly evaluate the STP-26.7 results, and did not recognize that the test failed to demonstrate that the 2B CRACS was operable._ These issues were discussed with plant management who initiated an occurrence report (OR) to address the problem and track corrective action .3 2C Emeroency Diesel Generator (EDG) Alarms (71707)
During the period, the inspectors noted that the 2C EDG trouble alarm had i annunciated. The operators informed the inspectors that the alarm was due a high level in the fuel oil day tank which occurred following a test run on the EDG. The inspectors noted that the control room annunciator for the a high fuel oil day tank level was not in an alarm condition and that the operating crew had recognized the alarm problem and had initiated a work orde The inspectors reviewed the Alarm Response Procedure (ARP) for the 2C EDG trouble annunciator and observed that a high fuel oil day tank level was not a listed condition that would actuate the alarm. The operating crew had not recognized this proble The licensee initiated an OR to address this deficiency. Actions were taken to address the alarm circuit and ARP.
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The inspectors concluded that the high fuel oil day tank level did not affect EDG operability. However, the inspectors concluded based on the observations discussed in Section 2.2 above and this issue that the operating crew demonstrated a weak questioning attitude with respect to the 2B CRACS inoperability and the cause of the EDG trouble annunciato Operations Training and Qualification 0 Simulator Trainina (71707)
Due to a continuing Unit 1 Steam Generator (SG) primary to secondary system leakage, the inspectors observed simulator training for several crews during the performance of
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steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) events. The inspectors verified operator crews q performed satisfactorily to implement procedures and control plant conditions during the simulated events. The inspectors observed that the training was well conducted and crew performance for procedure compliance and communications were stron The inspectors also observed three licensed operator evaluated requalification program scenarios and noted that operator crew performance for normal and transient conditions was satisfactory. The scenarios adequately challenged operator teamwork, communications, and procedure usage. Licensee evaluators conducted post training critiques that demonstrated effective self-assessments of operator training performanc II. Maintenance l M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments (61726) (62707)
The inspectors witnessed or reviewed portions of selected maintenance and surveillance test activities in progress. The inspectors determined that the activities were effectively conducted and that the work was properly performed in accordance with approved maintenance work orders. A post maintenance test failure on the 2C EDG was appropriately addressed by the licensee. Repairs were effected and retesting was satisfactor M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) and Refuelina Transfer Canal Leak Chase Systems (62707)
During routine plant walk downs, the inspectors noted leakage associated with the Unit 1 refueling transfer canal and the SFP. The inspectors observed water dripping from a normally open transfer canal leak chase valve. The licensee sampled the water and determined it to be ground water. Some small leakage was also observed coming form a valve packing and a pipe cap associated with the SFP system. The licensee tightened the valve packing and valve cap which stopped the leak. The inspectors noted that neither of these leakage problems had been identified by the license .
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Additional ground water leakage in the same general area (between the containment and the auxiliary building wall at the 100 foot elevation) was being captured and pumped to the floor drain system. The licensee had previously addressed the ground water leakage and since the leakage had reoccurred, a longer term corrective action was currently being evaluated. The inspectors considered that the groundwater in-leakage had the potential to mask other system leakage in the are The inspectors were informed that, in the past, the SFP leak chase system was not monitored, however, the system was now being monitored to ensure any system leakage was detected. The inspectors confirmed that chemistry monitored each unit's SFP leak chase system every six months. However, the leakage results were not trended by chemistry, operations, or the system engineers. The licertsee informed the inspectors that this issue would be reviewed to determine if trending was necessar Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E Desion Chanoes and Plant Modifications (37550)
The inspectors reviewed 13 permanent design changes and ten minor departures from design (temporary modifications) that were completed in 1997 and 1998. Inspectors assessed overall quality and verified that the design changes and plant modifications were consistent with the plant design and licensing basis. Inspectors also verified that I activities related to the modification process such as updating the station design basis j and procedures, training, and post modification testing were adequately performe l l
The inspectors observed that each of the design change packages had been reviewed l and approved by both offsite and onsite review organizations. The level of detailin the l design change packages was adequate to ensure proper installation and testing of the l modification. Drawings, procedures, and the design bases were updated as applicable l for the . modifications reviewe Temporary modifications were installed and controlled in accordance with station procedures and regulatory requirements. There were 48 temporary modifications installed in the plant at the time of this inspection, and only one was for safety-related equipment. The inspectors concluded that station modification activities were consistent with regulatory requirements and station procedure E1.2 10 CFR 50.59 Safetv Evaluations (37550) (37001)
The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and safety evaluations related to modifications and temporary modifications that were reviewed. Inspectors also reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and safety evaluations for recent changes to emergency operating procedures and surveillance procedures and five recent Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) changes.
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l The inspectors noted that the 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and safety evaluations were clearly written, included a sufficient level of detail, were technically accurate, and were appropriately filed as quality record E1.3 Desian Calculations (37550) <
The inspectors reviewed design calculations which were originated or revised in the previous two years to determine if appropriate controls were implemented to assure the '
design and licensing bases were maintained. The inspectors verified that assumptions in the calculations reviewed were reasonable. Design inputs were appropriately identified and supported by references. In general, methodologies were conservative, adequate design margins were established, and there were no calculation errors. The inspectors identified minor discrepancies in which reference sources were listed incorrectly and a result statement that was inconsistent with the supporting informatio The discrepancies were resolved by the licensee. The required technical and independent reviews were documented. The calculations reviewed were well organized and clearly written. Interfaces between calculations were generally consistent with their application of design informatio The inspectors concluded that appropriate controls were established and implemented to assure the design and licensing bases were adequately addressed for new and revised design calculation E Reauests for Enaineerina Assistance (REAs) (37550) j The inspectors reviewed the REA process and approximately 15 REAs that were completed in 1997 and 1998. The inspectors found that, in general, engineering j technical evaluations in responses to REAs thoroughly and effectively addressed the i
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issues for which the station requested support. Design deficiencies discovered during the licensee's reviews and evaluations were properly entered into the corrective action program. The timeliness of REA responses was consistent with the depth and significance of the issues addresse The inspectors concluded that engineering technical responses to REAs were generally thorough and effectively addressed the issue .
I E3 Engineering Plant Support l E Procurement Enaineerino (37550)
The inspectors reviewed engineering involvement in the procurement of replacement f parts and material. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed Procurement Engineering's !
resolution of receipt inspection deficiencie Approximately 15 commercial grade dedications were reviewed for replacement parts either installed or approved for installation in 1998 and 1999. Technical and quality l requirements were appropriately established and verified. Minor receipt inspection l documentation discrepancies that were identified by the inspectors were adequately j l
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addressed by the licensee. A sample review of five acceptable substitute evaluations i for obsolete parts demonstrated that technical evaluations were thorough and well documented. A sample review of ten receipt inspection deficiencies demonstrated that !
material receiving discrepancies were effectively resolve The inspectors concluded that overall engineering support for procurement of replacement parts and material was appropriat E3.2 Encineerina Sucoort System Specialist Inspection Scope (37552) l l
l The inspectors reviewed the engineering support system specialist program to l determine if the implementation was consictent with the licensee's established program described in station procedure Observations and Findinas ;
i The program description, which included a listing of systems to be assigned to system specialists and their functions, was provided in Administrative Control Procedure FNP-0- l ACP-57, System Specialist Guideline, Rev.1. At the time of this inspection, the system specialist positions were not fully staffed. The licensee had three qualified system specialists in the group and several newly hired or reassigned employees that had been i assigned to systems and were undergoing system specialist qualification training. Also, .
some systems temporarily had no assigned system specialis ]
One function of the system specialists was the generation of periodic system health !
reports which provided an overview of the status and performance of the selected plant j systems. The inspectors reviewed the system health report for the fourth quarter of '
1998, which addressed the condition of 18 systems. The inspectors noted that the system health report included appropriate system performance information for those i systems included in the report. However, the report was not consistent with the ,
licensee's program description, in that some systems described in the program scope ;
were not addressed (e.g., electrical switchgear and Electro-hydraulic control systems). '
In addition, some of those systems required to be included in the program for performance trending and tracking had not been assigned to a system specialist. The licensee stated that they were rewriting the system specialist procedure to include some additional systems and were in the process of addressing the lack of assigned system specialists for some system Conclusions The inspectors noted that the implementation of the licensee's system specialist program was not consistent with the program described in station procedures. Not all of the systems described in the program scope were assigned a specialist and the majority of the system specialists had been newly hired or assigned and had limited experienc The licensee had recognized these issues and was addressing them as demonstrated by the recent staff increases and on-going system specialist training.
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E7 Quality Assurance in Engineering Activities t
E Corrective Actions and Work Backloas Inspection Scoce (37550)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program, including implementing procedures and examples of problems addressed by the various corrective action program mechanisms. Inspectors also reviewed the licensee's management of backlogs of engineering work, including corrective action item Observations and Findinas The inspectors noted that the licensee's corrective action program was fragmented, ,
including numerous problem tracking processes. The inspectors reviewed thirteen '
separate processes to identify and track resolution of station problems. The problem identification and tracking processes were controlled by different organizations and various levels of program guidance was provided. Several of the lower tier processes had no procedural guidance and were not audited by the station quality organizatio Additionally, management of the processes was challenged by the lack of clearly defined interfaces and definitions of what level of problem was encompassed by each process. Interviews with station staff indicated confusion in determining which process was appropriate for addressing a proble The inspectors noted that safety related issues identified in the higher level processes such as the Corrective Action Reports (CARS) and Occurrence Reports (ors) were appropriately addressed. The inspectors did not identify specific problems which were not adequately addressed in the sample reviewed during this inspection. However, the fragmentation, lack of clear scope and interface description, and lack of oversight of the
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lower process mechanisms provided a potential for deficient implementation of the
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corrective action program at the statio The licensee had recognized many of these issues and was planning to revise the procedures to include examples of items that should be included. Also, the licensee planned to install a comprehensive computerized system for tracking plant problems identified in the various corrective action processes by July 200 The inspectors noted that the backlogs of engineering work were adequately controlle This included computerized databases, periodic review, trending, anc me.r.agement reports. There had been a large increase in backlog in recent years due primarily to the Functional System Description / Safety System Self Assessment Program and the UFSAR Review Program, and that backlog had been appropriately addressed by a new Configuration Management group.
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8 Conclusions The licensee's corrective action program was generally adequate in that licensee identified safety issues were adequately addressed. The inspectors noted that the licensee's corrective action program was fragmented and the scope and interface of the numerous individual processes were not clearly establishe E Root Cause Evaluations (37550)
The inspectors reviewed engineering performance related to root cause evaluations as demonstrated by root cause evaluations documented in 1997 and 1998 Occurrence Reports. Appropriate procedural guidance was provided for the conduct and documentation of root cause analysis. Related procedures included FNP O AP-30, Preparation and Processing of incident Reports, Plant Event Reports, and Licensee Event Reports, Rev. 24; FNP-O-ACP 9.0, Root Cause Program, Rev. 3; and FNP-O-ACP-9.1, Root Cause investigation, Rev. The inspectors noted that the OR root cause analyses for 1998 were generally thorough and corrective actions were consistent with identified root and contributing causes. The inspectors noted that the 1998 OR root cause analyses were an improvement over the 1997 OR root cause analyses. The inspectors noted an isolated example of deficient performance in root cause analysis and applied corrective actions for a 1997 issue relating to seismic positioning of electrical breakers. However, this was not characteristic of later performance in this area. The inspectors concluded that engineering performance related to root cause evaluations was generally good in 199 E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
E (Closed) IFl 50-348.364/98-04-03. RWST Uncertaintv Calculation !
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The inspectors reviewed calculations SJ-98-1693 001, Establish Set Point Uncertainty for the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level Loops, Rev.1; and SJ-98-1693-003, Establish the Set Point Uncertainty for the RWST Level Switches, Rev. O. The inspectors verified that the RWST level set points were adequate for pump Net Positive Suction Head requirements and vortex limitations with the calculated loop uncertainty and the analyticallimits used in the related emergency core cooling system pumps'
design calculation E8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-348.364/97-11-07. Auxiliarv Buildino Batterv Surveillance Test Criteria inconsistent with Technical Specifications (TS)
The licensee's response to the violation, dated December 18,1997, stated that the TS would be revised to list the correct acceptance criteria and the subject of the violation would be provided to applicable engineering personnel. The inspectors verified that the TS 4.8.2.3.2.C.5 change had been completed by amendment 139 for Unit 1 and amendment 131 for Unit 2. The issue had been communicated to engineering personnel and documented in CAR 2319, Rev. I
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E (Closed) Violation 50-348.364/97-11-05. DCMS Didn't Ensure That Calculations Were Verified and Controlled The inspectors reviewed the licensee's calculation review project (see section E1.3), !
which was addressing this item. Inspectors verified that the licensee was tracking this ;
item as CAR No. 2323 and was on schedule to complete the corrective actions by the !
end of 199 l E (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-348/1999-001-00: 4160 Volt Breaker in a Non-Seismically Racked Out Condition (92700) (90712)
i The inspectors verified the completion of selected licensee actions, and reviewed a '
previous LER (50-348/1997-002-00). The inspectors concluded that the corrective actions taken for the previous LER were adequate. The recent LER appeared to be an ;
isolated case of personnel error caused by poor communications and failure to follow procedure. This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement action IV. Plant Support I
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R1.1 Tour of Radioloalcal Protected Areas (83750)
During tours of the Turbine Building, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings, Auxiliary Building, and storage and handling facilities, the inspectors reviewed survey data and '
observed activities in progress. Locked High Radiation Areas were locked and controlled as required by licensee procedures. Radiological surveys reviewed were well documented and areas observed were posted consistent with the survey documentation. The inspectors performed independent contamination and radiation I surveys of selected areas to verify survey results. Calibrations for "in use" direct l radiation and air sampler instrumentation were current for those instruments observe l Overall radiological housekeeping was observed to be acceptabl '
For selected Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) reviewed. the inspectors noted that appropriate protective clothing and dosimetry were required. During plant tours adherence to the RWP requirements was verifie l The inspectors reviewed and discussed with the licensee representatives the program for testing and qualifying breathing air as Grade D. The licensee was calibrating breathing air compressor equipment and sampling in-use breathing air systems for certification in accordance with procedural requirements. Breathing air met Grade D or better quality requirements. The inspectors examined selected breathing air manifolds for physicalintegrity and current calibration of gauges and verified all respiratory protection equipment observed during facility tours was being maintained in a satisfactory conditio .
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i l The inspectors reviewed and discussed with licensee management radiological survey l results following underground leaks of the Unit 1 Steam Generator Blowdown Line and a l Unit 2 Waste Monitor Tank Discharge Line. The licensee initiated occurrence reports to
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address the problems. Based on a review of po.ct event surveys, observations, and l discussions with licensee personnel, the inspectors determined the licensee's immediate followup actions to control the areas were appropriate. The licensee was continuing with radiological surveys, assessment and repairs at the time of the inspectio R1.2 Occupational Radiation Exposure Control Prooram (83750)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of radiation protection principles to achieve occupational doses and doses to members of the public that are As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). I The inspectors reviewed ALARA procedures and discussed ALARA initiatives such as dose estimates and planning for work activities. Reviewed initiatives included shielding, reactor coolant system micron filtration, reactor crudburst shutdown activities, surveys, l teledosimetry, planning efforts to implement a hot spot posting program, and initial l preplanning for the upcoming steam generator replacements. Based on these l discussions and observations, the inspectors determined that the licensee was l maintaining programs for controlling exposures ALARA. All personnel radiation exposures during 1998 and 1999 to date were below regulatory limits.
l R1.3 Unit 1 increased Reactor Coolant Activity (71750)
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l The inspectors continued to monitor the Unit 1 reactor coolant activity increase as l
indicated by higher levels of dose equivalent iodine (DEI). The DEI value has increased since early February and the highest peak was 9.0E-02 micro-curies per gram. The peak value was less than the Technical Specification action level of greater than .15 micro-curie per gram. Chemistry and engineering personnel were proactive in sampling and determining that a probable fuel rod defect had occurre P5 Staff Training and Qualification in Emergency Preparedness (EP)
l P EP Drill On March 11, the licensee conducted a site emergency drill simulating a Year 2000 (Y2K) problem as the initiating event. The inspectors observed and participated in the drill. During the drill, the licensee identified and corrected an emergency event classification problem. The inspectors concluded that the emergency drill provided effective training and demonstrated adequate emergency plan implementation.
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S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities l
l S Routine Observations of Plant Security Measures (71750)
i The inspectors verified that portions of site security program plans were being properly implemented. Disabled vital area doors were properly manned and controlled. Security personnel activities observed during the inspection period were well performed. Site security systems were adequate to ensure physical protection of the i plan V. Manaaement Meetinas '
X1 Exit Meeting Summary l The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the l conclusion of the inspection on April 6,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings {
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( The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection i should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie Partial List of Persons Contacted
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Licensee 2 R. V. Badham, Safety Audit Engineering Review C. D. Collins, Operation Support Superintendent R. M. Coleman, Maintenance Manager K. C. Dyar, Security Manager R. S. Fucich, Engineering Support Manager S. Fulmer, Plant Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager J. S. Gates, Administration Manager D. E. Grissette, Assistant General Manager - Operations l J. G. Horn, Outage Planning Supervisor J. R. Johnson, Operations Manager D. H. Jones, SNC - Configuration Management Manager L. M. Stinson, Plant General Manager - FNP G. S. Waymire, Technical Manager B. R. Yance, Plant Modification and Maintenance Support Manager Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, l operators, mechanics, and electricians.
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l f 12 l Jtems Opened. Closed, and Discussed l l
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Closed Tvoe Item Number Status Descriotion and Reference
, IFl 50-348,364/98-04-03 Closed RWST Uncertainty Calculation (Section l E8.1)
j VIO 50-348,364/97-11-07 Closed Auxihary Building Battery Surveillance Test '
Criteria inconsistent with Technical Specifications (Section E8.2)
VIO 50-348,364/97-11-05 Closed DCMS Didn't Ensure that Calculations Were Verified and Controlled (Section E8.3)
LER 50-348/99-001-00 Closed 4160 Volt Breaker in a Non-Seismically Racked Out Condition (Section E8.4)
INSPECTION PROCEDURES (IP) USED iP 37001: 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Program f IP 37550: Engineering l lP 37551: Onsite Engineering
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IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in identifying, Resolving, and Prevent Problems l j
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations 4 IP 62707: Maintenance Observations I IP 71707: Plant Operation !
IP 71750: Plant Support Activities I IP 83750: Occupational Radiation Exposure IP 90712: In office Review of Written Reports
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l lP 92700: Onsite Follow up of Written Reports i IP 92903: Follow up - Engineenng l I
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