IR 05000348/1989014

Insp Repts 50-348/89-14 & 50-364/89-14 on 890611-0710.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Surveillance Observation,Operator Training,Work Schedule & LERs

ML20245F211
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	07/26/1989
From:	Cantrell F, Maxwell G, Miller W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245F200	List: IR 05000348/1989014 ML20245F197
References
50-348-89-14, 50-364-89-14, NUDOCS 8908140205
Download: ML20245F211 (13)

Text

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g t UNITED STATES

!s* -E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1

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. REGION 11

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101 MARIETTA ST., ,,,,,

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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.: 50-348/89-14 and 50-364/89-14 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street

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Birmingham, AL 36291 Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8- -

~ Facility Name: Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: June 11 - July 10, 1989 Inspectors:

G. F. Maxwell, Senio I

den 1;%nspector

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D&te Signed f

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W. W Killer, Jr. , Resi'de6ps ctor 0 A YMk D6te Signed'

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Approved by: 8/ 6 #

F.'3. Tantrell, Section CWjdf Date Signed'

Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine onsite inspection involved a review of operational safety verifica-tion, monthly surveillance . observation, monthly maintenance observation, operator training and work schedule, and licensee event report Results

Within the areas inspected, the following unresolved items were identified involving inadequate design calculations on the service water system -

paragraph 3.b.(1) and apparent excessive work hours for licensed operators -

paragraph Certain tours were conducted on deep backshift or weekends, these tours were conducted on June 19 and July 7 (deep backshift inspections occur between 10 p.m. and 5 a.m.).

Calculations are not available to substantiate that the site service water i systems will deliver adequate water to emergency safeguard equipment in the event of certain design base accidents. The licensee promptly revised plant ]

j procedures to specify appropriate manual actions in the event of these deficient conditions. However, the licensee did not incorporate these changes in all control room documents in a timely manner.

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REPORT DETAILS 1. Licensee Employees Contacted R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager C. L. Buck, Plant Modification Manager L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager R. D. Hill, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations D. N. Morey, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager J. K. Osterholtz, Operations Manager L. M. Stinson, As:istant General Manager - Plant Support J. J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager L. S. Williams, Training Manager Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security force members, and office personne Acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this report are listed in the last paragrap . Plant Status Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at approximately 100 percent reactor power throughout the reporting perio Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at approximately 100 percent re.ctor power throughout the reporting perio Other Inspections Report No. 89-10, Maintenance Team Inspection, exit conducted on June 2 Report No. OL 89-01, Operator Licensee Requalification Training Inspection, June 17 - 2 On June 15, the Region II Deputy Director Reactor Project and NRR Deputy Director's Assistant visited the sit During the week of June 16, the site was visited by the Region 11 Regional Administrator, the NRR Farley Project Director, the NRR Farley License Project Manager, the Region II Director of Division of Reactor Safety, the

, RII Engineering Branch Chief, and the Region II Reactor Projects Section Chief for Farle _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ -

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3. Operational Safety Verification (71707, 92700) Plant Tours The inspectors ccnducted routine plant tours during this inspection period to verify that the licensee's requirements and commitments were being implemented. Inspections were conducted at various times including week-days, nights, weekends and holidays. These tours were performed to verify that: systems, valves, and breakers required for safe plant operations were in their correct position; fire protection equipment, spare equipment and materials were being maintained and stored properly; plant operators were aware of the current plant status; plant operations personnel were documenting the ~ status of out-of-service equipment; there were no undocumented cases of unusual fluid leaks, piping v'. oration, abnormal hanger or seismic restraint movements; all reviewed equipment requiring calibration was current; and, general housekeeping was satisfactor Tours of the plant included review of site documentation and interviews with plant personnel. The inspectors reviewed the control room operators' logs, tag out logs, chemistry and health physics logs, and control boards and panels. During these tours the inspectors noted that the operators appeared to be alert, aware of changing plant conditions and manipulated plant controls properly. The inspectors evaluated operations shift turnovers and attended shift briefing They observed that the briefings and turnover provided sufficient detail for the next shift cre Site security was evaluated by observing personnel in the protected and vital areas to ensure that these persons had the proper authorization to be in the respective areas. The inspectors also verified that vital area portals were kept locked and alarmed. The security personnel appeared to be alert and attentive to their duties and those officers performing personnel and vehicular searches were thorough and systematic. Responses to security alarm conditions appeared to be prompt and adequat !

Selected activities of the licensee's Radiological Protection Program were reviewed by the inspectors to verify conformance with plant procedures and NRC requiremen The areas reviewed included:

operation and management of the plant's health physics staff, "ALARA" q

i'olementation, Radiation Work Permits (RWPs) for compliance to plant pi )cedures, personnel exposure records, observation of work and personnel in radiation areas to verify compliance to s adiation I protection procedures, and control of radioactive material ' Plant Events and Observations (1) Service Water System The licensee is performing a self-initiated safety system assessment of the service water syste During this assessment i a concern was identified in that for the following scenarios l

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.. l l 4 adequate service water may not be provided to emergency safeguard equipment: Loss of site power, without safety injection, with only one train of service water availabl (Under these conditions inadequate service water flow may result since an automatic isolation of non-safety service water loads will not occur, and the loss of instrument air caused by the loss of off-site power would cause - several service water air-operated valves to fail in their full open position.)-

Seismic event with a break of service water in the turbine

, building below the automatic isolation setpoint. (The seismic event is assumed to cause non-seismic instrument air lines and service water lines to break, and service water pump miniflow valves and other air operated valves to fail in the open positio This would result in reduced flow to the emergency safeguards equipment.)

The licensee was unable to locate calculations to indicate that sufficient service water flow would be available to emergency safeguards. equipment under these postulated condition Therefore, on the afternoon of June 16, the licensee initiated compensatory measures to assure adequate flow will be provided until the original design calculations are located or new calculations are performed. Temporary changes were. made to Procedures 1/2 - ESP-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, 1/2 - A0P-5.0, Loss of Electrical Train A and/or B, and 1/2 - A0P-10. Loss of Train A or B Service Water. These changes' indicated the actions required to manually isolate service water to non-safety loads to ensure adequate flow will be available to the emergency diesel generators and other safety related components. These procedure changes were written and approved on the evening of June 16. A training instruction procedure discussing the above problems and compensatory measures were provided in the control room on June 16, for all licensee operators, shift supervisors and other operations personnel. The changes to the procedures were completed by document control and sent to the control room on June 17. However, on the morning of June 19, the resident inspectors noted that procedures A0P-5 and A0P-10 had not been placed in the control room control 1_ed document files. Procedure ESP-0.1 had been placed in only four of the six documents inspected. The revised procedures v.ere promptly placed in the

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documents when this discrepancy was identifie The licensee's identification of this problem and ir.itiation of compensatory actions were very good, however, the failure to incorporated the revised implementing procedures within the control documents in the control room in a timely manner is considered a weakness in management's attention to detail. This concern was discussed with the licensee's site management.

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'The' potential service' water system discrepancies are identified as-Unresolved Item 348,364/89-14-02, Licensee's Reevaluation of Service Water System for Adequacy of Design. This item will be reevaluated during a subsequent NRC inspectio (2) Accumulator 2B Nitrogen Pressure Dropped Below Low Limits (IR No. 2-89-83)

The inspectors reviewed the circumstances associated with the drop in nitrogen pressure in Unit 2 accumulator "B". The licensee's review of this event was completed on June 1 On March 21, 1989, while attempting to add nitrogen to the accumulators, the pressure in accumulator 2B dropped below the TS low limit of 601 psig. The operators initially attempted to raise the pressure to all three accumulators at the same time to correct a low pressure alar This resulted in a ' slight pressure gain to accumulator 2A, pressure in accumulator. 2C remained constant and the pressure in accumulator 2B decrease Operations personnel iarnediately began an investigation to determine why the pressure in accumulator 2B could not be .

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increased. The investigation failed to identify the problem and at 12:10 a.m. on March 22, the pressure dropped below the TS ,

limit of 601 psig. The pressure centinued to drop and eventually reach a low point of 530 psig. The pressure of the nitrogen supply was -increased to maintain the pressure in all three of the accumulators. A containment entry for investigation was made and air operated accumulator common vent valve Q2E21HCV936 (V0092) was found to be approximately 50 percent ope ~

Instrument air was removed from the valve operator and the valve closed. When the valve closed the common relief valve for the nitrogen supply header to the accumulators opened due to high system pressur By tapping on the relief valve the relief valve seated. Upon closing these open valves pressure was restored to the accumulator at approximately 2:20 a.m. on March 22. This removed the plant from the action statement of the T Maintenance's investigation found that the failure of valve Q2E21HCV936 was caused by the positioner feedback arm becoming

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detached from the valve actuator. Procedure IMP-0.11, Instrument L Airline and Pressure Regulator Preventive Maintenance, requires routine preventive maintenance to be performed on this valve each 18 months during refueling. This Unit 2 procedure and the Unit 1 procedure are to be revised prior to the next refueling outage for each unit to require an inspection o~ the positioner mounting and feedback ar Maintenance's investigation also l found that the set point of the relief valve was in error. On

) January 25, 1988, the licensee discovered that the test gauge l used to set the relief valve was out of tolerance even though it

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was still within its calibration interval, and suspected that i this relief valve was set at 660 psig instead of 700 psig. The (. relief valve was removed and tested on April 3, and was found to i be set at 660 psig. . The relief valve was properly reset and reinstalled on April The TS requires all three accumulators to be inservice L

continuousl If one accumulator becomes inoperable, the accumulator must be restored to operable status within one hour or the plant must be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Accumulator 2B was inoperable (pressure less than 601 psig) for approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 20 minutes, but was restored to service before the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> hot shutdown requiremen The other 'wo accumulators remained operable during this time period. Therefore, the licensee determined that this event was not required to be reported to the NRC. The inspectors have no further questions concerning this inciden (3) Security Access Violation The licensee identified a security access violation on June 2 An unprotected access path was found from outside the protected area into the service water intake structure. The licensee promptly ini_tiated the compensatory measures specified by the

~arley Security Plan and promptly notified the NR The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions and had no further questions. The NRC Region II Physical Security Section was informed and will provide appropriate followup action during a subsequent inspectio (4) Contaminated Control Room Carpet On June 21, the inspectors noted that six 18"X18" carpet squares had been removed from the shift foremen's office in the control roo An investigation revealed that during a routine health physics survey of the control room complex on June 21, these six carpet square were found to have contamination level from 2,000 dpm/ scan to 7,000 dpm/ sca This contamination was outside the radiation control area of the plant and was below the NRC limits. However, due to the licensee's procedural requirements and general practice of maintaining areas outside of the radiation control area (RCA) at a nondetectable contamination level, the contaminated carpet was promptly removed and properly dispose The licensee stated that there had been no recent contaminated shoe / foot instances identified of personnel exiting the RC However, this event is to be further evaluated by the licensee in an attempt to initiate appropriate action to prevent recurrenc _-_--

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'i (5): Component Cooling Water System-During this inspection period the inspectors reviewed the preventive maintenance program, system flow balance methods, and

. general arrangement of the CCW systems for Unit 1 and 2. A

.walkdown inspection was made of the system to verify that the

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valve alignments conformed to the systems operating procedures, and to check major components for leakage and any general'

condition that would degrade performanc The inspectors noted a number of valves in the system which were throttled to maintain proper component cooling water flow. For Unit'l procedure 1-SOP-23.0, CCW System, indicates the valves to'

be throttled, the throttled position (i.e., amount' or percent {

Opened /c1csed) and requires the valves to be " seal wired" in that position. For Unit 2 procedure 2-SOP-23.0, indicates the valves to be throttled but does not indicate the actual amount

- that the valves are to be throttle Plant Operators through experience have established the throttle position, but procedures do not indicate the required position of the valve This problem has also beer. identified by the licensee and procedure l 2-SOP-23.0 is being reevaluated to determine the appropriate corrective action. On July 11, the licensee performed flow checks of the Unit 2 CCW system to verify that the flows for normal operations conformed to the flow requirements of the FSAR and . pre-operational test No major discrepancies were identified. This item is identified as Inspector Followup Item 364/89-14-03, Procedure 2-50P-23.0 To Be Revised To Include Position of Throttled Valves in CCW System. This procedure is proposed to be revised by the end of the next Unit 2 refueling outage since several of the valves are not accessible during normal plant operatio During the system wulkdown leaks were noted on the Unit 1, Train A spent fuel pool heat exchanger. Boron seepage was coming from the east end of the heat exchanger and from the flanges to inlet valve to the heat exchanger, These leaks had previously been identified by the licensee, reported and maintenance work request 168396A issued to correct the problem. The inspectors suggested that the licensee reevaluate these leaks to determine if the maintenance request should be assigned a high priority

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for correction of the leak No violations or deviations were identified. The results of the inspections in this area indicate that the program was effective with respect to meeting the safety objective . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors witnessed the licensee conducting maintenance surveillance test activities on safety-related systems and components to verify that the licensee performed the activities in accordance with TS and licensee

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requirements. These observations included witnessing selected portions of each surveillance, review of the surveillance procedures to ensure that administrative controls and tagging procedures were in force, determining that approval was obtained prior to conducting the surveillance test and the individuals conducting the test were qualified in accordance with plant-approved procedures. Other observations included ascertaining that test instrumentation used-was calibrated, date collected was within the specified requirements of TS, any identified discrepancies were properly noted, and the systems were correctly returned to service. The following specific activities were observed:

2-STP-1 Operations Daily and Shift Surveillance Requirements 1-STP- Full Length Control Rod Operability Test 1-STP- RCS Leakage' Test 2-STP- RCS Leakage Test 2-STP-11.12 RHR Pump 28 Operability Test 1-STP-2 On Site AC Distribution Inspection 2-STP-2 On Site AC Distribution Inspection 1-STP-2 On Site DC Distribution Inspection 2-STP-2 On Site DC Distribution Inspection 2-STP-33:0 B Solid State Protection Train "B" Operability Test 2-STP-33.1 B Safeguards Test Cabinet Train "B" Functional Test 2-STP-71 Main Control Room Remote Valve Verification 2-STP-72 Safety Parameter Display System Functional Check 0-STP-8 Diesel Generator 1-2A Operability Test 0-STP-8 Diesel Generator 1C Operability Test 2-STP-109 Power Range Neutron Flux channel Calibration 1-STP-913 Reactor Coolant Pump 1A and 1C Under Frequency Test NC violations or deviations were identified. The results of the inspections in this area indicate that the program was effective with respect to meeting the safety objective . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance activities to verify the following: maintenance personnel were obtaining the appropriate tag out and clearance approvals prior to commencing work activities, correct documentation was available for all requested parts and material prior to use, procedures were available for all requested parts and material prior to use, procedures were available and adequate for the work being conducted, maintenance personnel performing work activities were qualified to accomplish these tasks, no maintenance activities reviewed were violating any limiting conditions for operation during the specific evolution, the required QA/QC reviews and QC hold points were implemented, post-maintenance testing activities were completed, and equipment was properly returned to service after the completion of work activities. Activities reviewed included:

MWR 189253 Recalibrates Unit 1 RCS temperature transmitter TE-432B-1 MWR 189274& Investigate and correct problem causing slow start on diesel 198333 generator 2B from air header Nos. I and 2

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f MWR 192912 Investigate and correct problem causing Unit 2 rod control system urgent failure alarmd MWR 192914 Recalibrates speed indicator for diesel generator 2B MWR 197731& Repair 011 leak on RHR pump 2B 197732 MWR 200095 Recalibrates discharge gage to RHR pump 2A MWR 200765 Repair / replace uait selector switch for diesel generator IC WA 00300889 Containment purge exhaust fan breaker preventive maintenance using procedure OEM - 1322.01 WA 00302706 Containment purge supply fan breaker preventive maintenance using procedure OEM - 1322.0 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action on MWR 197732 l

involving an oil leak to the motor of RHR pump 28. During the refueling outage this pump motor lost lubrication oil during long run times. The licensee's investigation indicated that a possible cause was due to overfilling the oil reservoir. This resulted in the oil for shaft bearing developing a siphoning action that pulled oil from the oil reservoir and discharged the oil down the motor shaft. The oil reservoir and bearing were recleaned and motor relubricated and satisfactorily run for 18 hour2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> The outage pump's functional performance during long term cooling runs should be verified during the next long term shutdown, such as the refueling outage scheduled for the Fall of 1990. This is identified as Inspector Followup Item 364/89-14-04, Verification of - RHR pump 2A operability following long run times, and will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspectio No violation or deviations were identified. The results of the inspections in this arca indicate that the program was effective with respect to meeting the safety objective . Licensee Event Reports (92700, 90714)

The following Licensee Event Report (LER) was reviewed for potential generic problems to determine trends, to determine whether information included in the report meets the NRC reporting requirements and to consider whether the corrective action discussed in the report appears appropriate. The licensee action was reviewed to verify that the event has been reviewed and evaluated by the licensee as required by the Technical Specifications; that corrective action was taken by the licensee; and that safety limits, limiting safety setting and LCOs were not exceede The inspector examined the incident report. logs and records, and interviewed selected personnel. The following report is considered closed:

Unit 1 LER/89-01 Special Report: Fire doors inoperable for more than seven days I

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Unit _2 LER/89-07 Reactor trip caused by a loose electrical connector on the 2A steam generator feed pump thrust bearing wear cable LER/89-08 Reactor trip caused by inadequate procedure for verifying proper insulation after reassembly of bearing oil piping No violations or deviations were identifie . Operation Training and Work Schedule (71707 and 41701) Operator Training During the week of June 26. the inspectors were informed by the Region II Operators Licensing Section that some of the plant's licensed operators had failed their operator requalification examination The inspectors veriffed that the licensee employes a method of formal notification to a',1 licensed operators who failed requalification examination The operators are first informed orally that they failed the exam and they are not allowed to perform any licensed duties until they successfully pass the requalification examinations. This oral notification is then followed by a formal written notification which requires a confirmation signature. The operators are then required to attend special requalification training and upon completion they will be eligible to take another requalifi-cation examinatio Upon successfully passing the ra-exam they will be formally notified, in writing, that they can return to conduct licensed dutie Operator Work Schedule The inspectors evaluated the licensed operator's time sheets for April, May and June 1989. The evaluation was done to determine if the operators' work hours during the outage may have impacted their ability to successfully pass the requalification exams which were recently administered. The evaluation included reviewing selected individuals time sheets, evaluating the shift work schedule (for March - May, 1989), interviewing licensed operators and discussions with plant supervision and management. The time sheets and the shift work schedule which authorized the work hours were compared to those administrative controls outlined by TS Section 6.2.2. The inspectors did not determine a correlation between the work schedule during the outage and the requalifiction exam results. .However, as a result of the evaluation the inspectors noted the following:

The approved work schedule (for March - May,1989) included the recent Unit 2 outage. The schedule indicated that the operation's staff for both units was required to rotate through two, seven day, 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per day periods. That would schedule two periods of 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> in seven days every five weeks. This schedule placed the staff into (

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a rotation which routinely required the operators to apparently deviate from the maximum time allowed to work by TS 6.2.2. (72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any seven day period). The inspectors discussed this concern with the licensee site management and was informed that this type schedule provides benefits to the operators of both unit Specifically, when additional outage overtime is required the operation's staff would continue to be allowed normal days off, resulting in ten days off during a five week period. The time sheets for the operators selected during the March - May period showed that operators worked one seven day period,12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per day and were allowed two days off; and then they would shift to another perio This cycle through the schedule resulted in ten days allowed off during a five week period. The inspectors noted that 'when the operators were placed in training their work weeks consisted of four days of eight hours each for training and one 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> work day whereby operators were assigned to one of the units for normal work dutie The operator time sheets revealed that there were numerous examples where operators worked in excess of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> during a seven day period. Two of the operators and one Senior Reactor Operator (SR0)

were selected by the inspectors as examples to understand how the schedule worke The first operator was a Reactor Operator who coincidentally failed the most recent operator requalification examination. He was assigned to crew five en the operating unit (Unit 1). During the outage he worked two 84 hour9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> periods within two separate seven day time frame He worked eight consecutive days without taking a day off even though the work schedule pennitted .him to take two days off between werk periods. This occurred between April 8 and 14, 198 The second operator was a Reactor Operator assigned to crew one on the operating uni During the outage period he worked three-84 hour periods during three scheduled seven day time frames. Between l

Aprii 6 and April 21 he worked 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per day for eight days. He had one day off and returned for seven additional 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> days. On May 11 - 25, he worked each day for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> except for May ?4 and 2 On those days he worked eight hours per day. The work schedule permitted this operator to take at least two days off between each of those seven day periods which were included during the above date The SR0 was assigned duties as shift supervisor and other supervisory tasks for the operations shif He was assigned to crew three for Unit 2. From April 20 through May 5, he worked sixteen days without taking any days off. The first seven days he worked 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per da He then worked two days for eight hours per day followed by seven additional 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> day _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - - _

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The above items appear to be in violation of TS Section 6.2. requirements concerning operating personnel on Unit I working in excess of 40 hour4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> nominal work week and operating personnel' on Unit 2 routinely working more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> during any seven day perio The inspectors discussed these concerns with site licensee management-personnel and a meeting has been scheduled between licensee management and Region 11 management on July 31, 198 At that time this item will be discussed furthe This is an Unresolved Item 50-348,364/89-14-01 Apparent Excessive Work Hours for Licensed Operator No other violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period and on July 11, with the plant manager and selected members of his staf The inspection findings were discussed in detail. A licensee representative stated that he did not agree with inspector's interpretation of overtime limits and requested a management meeting with the NRC to discuss this matte The licensee acknowledged the other inspection findings and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.-

Licensee was informed that the items discussed in paragraph 6 were close ITEM NUMBER DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE 348,364/89-14-01 (0 pen) Unresolved Item: Excessive work hours for Licensed Operator - paragraph , 364/89-14-02 (0 pen) Unresolved Item: Licensee's reevaluation of service water system for adequacy of design - paragraph 3.b.(1).

364/89-14-03 (0 pen) Inspector Followup Item: Procedure 2-50P-23.0 to be revised to include position of throttled valves in CCW system -

paragraph 3.b.(5).

364/89-14-04 (0 pen) Inspector Followup Item: Verification of RHR pump 2A operability following long run times - paragraph . Acronyms and Abbreviations AFW -

Auxiliary Feedwater A0P -

Abnormal Operating Procedure AP -

Administrative Procedure APC0 - Alabama Power Company

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CFR - Code of. Federal Regulations CCW - Component Cooling Water DC - Design Change DR - Deviation Report ECP - Emergency Contingency Procedure

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EIP. - Emergency Plant Implementing Procedure EQ -

Environmental Qualifications ESF - Engineered Safety Features EWR - Engineering Work Request F - Fahrenheit GPM - Gallons Per Minute ISI - Inservice Inspection IST - Inservice Test LC0 - Limiting Condition for Operation M0V - . Motor-Operated Valve M0 VATS - Motor-Operated Valve Actuation Testing MK2 - Maintenance Work Request NCR - Honconformance Report NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR - NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation PMD - Plant Modifications Department QA - Quality Assurance QC - Quality Control RCP - Radiation Control and Protection Procedure RCS - Reactor Coolant System RHR - Residual Heat Removal SI -

Safety Injection SAER - Safety Audit and Engineering Review S/G - Steam Generator SSPS - Solid Stata Protection System 50V - Scleroid Operated Valve STP -

Surveillance Test Procedure Service Water

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TS - Technical Sp(cification TSC - Technical Support Center WA - Work Authorization

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