IR 05000348/1989021
| ML19325E040 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1989 |
| From: | Coley J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19325E038 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-89-21, 50-364-89-21, GL-83-28, GL-88-14, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, IEB-88-009, IEB-88-9, NUDOCS 8911010055 | |
| Download: ML19325E040 (7) | |
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mmeep UNITC STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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MEGlON 11.
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-348/89-21,50-364/89-21
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Licensee: Alabama Power Company
600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35291-0400
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' Docket Nos.:
50-348, 50-364 License Nos.:
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Facility Name:
Farley Inspection Conducted:
August' 28 - Septer.ber 1,1989 f
Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama
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Inspector:
A. M.
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Date 51 ed
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Approved by:
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lake, Chief Dete Signed
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M ials and Processes Section
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g neering Branch i
Division of Reactor Safety
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SumARY f
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Scope:
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t-This routine, unannounced inspectiori was conducted in the areas of follow-up on
' I open items '(92701) and review of the Unit 2 final inservice inspection report i
for the first interval, third period, first outage (73755).
Results
The licensee assisted the inspector in closure of open items.
In the areas i
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inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
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REPORT DETAILS s
1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- C. L. Buck, Plant Modification Manager
- S. Casey, System Performance Supervisor
- L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Supervisor
- S. Fulmer Safety, Audit and Engineering Review, Supervisor
- H. R. Garland, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
- R. D. Hill, Assistant General Manager, Operations
- C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager
- J. K. Osterholtz, Operations Manager
- J. J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager D. Pugh, Metallurgical Engineer, Nuclear Maintenance Support, Corporate B. Moore, Corporate Licensing D. Hartline, Perfomance Engineering, Supervisor R. Marlow, Site Licensing Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- G. F. Maxwell, Senior Resident Inspector W. H. Miller, Jr., Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (92702)
(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item 50-348/88-14-02, Valve QV-198 is
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Incorrectly Identified on CYCS Drawing D-175039, Revision 22, Sheet 2"
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Valve QV-198 had been listed in Farley's first and second inservice inspection (ISI) interval plans as a test boundary valve.
However, the valve was identified on Drawing D-175039 as OV-193.
The inspector's review of revised Drawings D-175039, Revision 26 Sheet 2 revealed that the licensee has taken proper corrective action to correctly identify this valve in both ISI interval plans.
(0 pen) Inspector Follow-up Item 50-348/88-14-03, Second Interval
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Hydrostatic Test Scheduling" i
This inspector had previously identified that tests in the second interval plan were not scheduled in accordance with Table IWC-2500-1, Note 5, of
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the 1983 Edition of the Code.
The licensee had addressed this item in a
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request for relief from American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Code requirements which had been sent to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations (NRR).
The inspector, however, reviewed correspondence from
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NRR dated August 3,1989, which stated that the licensee had not provided
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an adequate technical basis for deviating from the code recuirements.
This item will remain open until the licensee provides acditional
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information to NRR to justify approval of their proposed scheduling plan
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or comply with Code re.1uirements.
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(0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-348, 364/88-17-01, " Technical Justification for
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Requested Relief from Hydrostatic Testing of Class 3 Piping Systems During Second Interval ISI" During an inspection of first interval testing, an inspector had noted that the licensee had submitted a relief request from hydrostatic testing for the majority of the ASME Class 3 piping.
The technical basis for the
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relief request was that hydrostatic testing was impractical since
these systems operate continuously during all modes of plant operation, i
The inspector informed the cognizant licensee personnel that this was i
considered an inadequate technical basis in that most of the systems i
involved were not required by the technical specification to be operable
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in all modes, were designed with more than one train, and had portions
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which could be " valved out" to accommodate the hydrostatic testing
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involved.
The inspector further noted that similar relief was also requested for the second interval testing without any amplification of the
initial basis.
The inspector had informed the licensee that NRR would be
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contacted regarding the need for further clarification and acceptability of the request for relief.
During the inspector's review of this open i
item, NRR correspondence dated August 3, 1989, was reviewed which required
the licensee to provide additional technical basis for their requested
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relief. This iter will remain open until the licensee's justification for i
relief is approved or the ASME Code requirements are followed.
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(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item 50-348, 364/89-09-03, "ASPE ISI Code of
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Record"
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This item reported to the licensee that procedures GW-001 and PMP-305 referenced the 74S75 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code in lieu of the required 83S83 ASME Code.
In addition, there was a reference conflict in GW-001 Paragraph 15.3.7 and Paragraph 5.3.
The licensee had issued lemporary Change Notice (TNC) 6D to correct procedure GW-001 and TCN 1A to correct procedure PMP-305.
During the inspection, both procedures were permanently revised and approved by the Plant Safety l
Committee.
(0 pen) Inspector Follow-up Item 50-348, 364/89-10-04, " Lack of Operability Requirements for Emergency Air Compressors" The emergency air compressors provide backup air to steam generator atmospheric relief valves and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump steam admission valves.
The purpose of these air compressors is to
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provide an assured backup air supply for use during a main steam line
break and, therefore, it is desirable that they be maintainea operable, j
Operability is detemined by the performance of a quarterly surveillance
test. During the NRC maintenance team inspection, the reliability of these
air compressors was identified as a concern. As a result of this concern, i
the licensee performed a review of the maintenance work history and j
surveillance testing.
The review indicated that the amount of corrective
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maintenance required for these air compressors is decreasing ano that i
reliability is improving. During 1989, no surveillance test has failed to
date.
Although, the licensee's review is encouraging, the inspector felt
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that insufficient testing has been perfortned on these air compressor to i
determine an improved reliability trend. Therefore, this item will remain
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open pending further review.
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(0 pen) Inspector Follow-up Item 50-348, 364/89-10-05, "ASME Section X1 i
Procedure Interface"
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This item was issued by the NRC maintenance team and actually addresses I
three separate procedure interface issues.
The present status of each
issue is discussed below:
a.
Procedure FNP-0-GMP-0.2. Appendix A. Section 4.0, listed examples of routine maintenance that did not require Section XI compliance.
i However, the maintenance team noted items incorrectly included in
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this list which affel.ted Section XI post-maintenance testing.
Cognizant licensee personnel stated that the procedure had been
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poorly worded. The intention of the requirement was that a Section XI, NIS-2 Form would not be required for these type of maintenance
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activities.
The licensee has revised FNP-0-GMP-0.2 to clarify this
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requirement.
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Cognizant licensee personnel had also informed the team that
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procedure AP-52 addressed test and restoration from work involving I
ASME Classes 1, 2, or 3 system or components and their supports. The
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team noted that post-maintenance requirements listed in Appendix III a
were limited to verification of alignment, but valve stroke testing
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and pump performance testing were not addressed.
The inspector i
discussed this item with ccgnizant plant management, and as a result of this meeting and review of Appendix III (which had not been
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revised), the inspector concluded that this item would remain open.
During the exit meeting, the Assistant General Manager Operations, took exception to this item, on the basis that sections in Appendix III i
appeared specifically to address post-maintenance testing.
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inspector restated his position that proper plant management had been l
notified about this item and discussions / review with these
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individuals had not changed or corrected the status of this item.
l However, the inspector infomed the Assistant General Manager that
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his exception would be addressed in the report so that subsequent review of this item will consider his position on this concern, c.
The team also identified the need for cross reference between Procedure FNP-0-AP-53 which establishes the scope and
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responsibilities for the Farley Nuclear Plant preventive maintenance j
program and Procedure FNP-0-GMP-1 which established the administrative control for the maintenance departnent preventive maintenance program.
Neither procedure included guidance for the case when the PM vibration analysis conducted also applied,to a Section XI pump.
In that case, if PM vibration trend results exceed Section XI alert levels then Section XI, Subsection IWP, Table IWP-3100-2, must take precedence and proper action must be taken to satisfy Section XI requirements. This concern had not been addressed by the licensee to date and will be reviewed further during a
subsequent inspection.
(0 pen) Violation 50-348, 364/89-10-01, " Failure to Follow Maintenance Procedures" The licensee's reply to this item has not been sent to Region II as of the date of this inspection. The inspector informed the licensee that until the inspector who issued this item and his managemant had concurred with the corrective action taken the implementation of the corrective action would not be verified.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-348, 364/09-10-02
" Vendor Drawing / Manual Control Progr6m" The licensee's review of the technical manual finding addressed in this item revealed that the change in question had never been issued as a permanent change by the vendor.
The licensee also stated, that their i
program for controlling changes to technical manuals was initiated in 1975 j
one year after receiving the proposed change and that somehow it had been
overlooked.
In addition, the licensee is presently in the process of i
establishing an interface program with three of their major vendors (Westinghouse Colt and General Electric) to updated their t.tchnical l
manuals.
However, the inspector noted the following:
(1) the technical
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manuals of the three major vendors only(2) presented 571 manuals of a total population of 3696 technical manuals; The licensee final rasponse to
NRC Generic Letter 83-28 which ad.iresses equipment classification and a j
vendor interface program for technical manuals had not been accepted by l
NRC and in fact is a very active issue; (3) The licensee has not
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manual problem)pport their position (that they do not have a technicalwiti attempted to su sample audit.
This item will remain open until such time that the l
licensee can provide technical basis to support its closure.
(0 pen)InspectorFollow-upItem 50-348, 364/89-10-03, "Adequac) of Action to Protected End-Use Devices from Poor Quality Instrument Air" J
i The licensee is presently writing an amended response to Generic Letter i
88-14 which addresses this concern.
Actions to be taken by the licensee in response to this issue will be verified during a future NRC Inspection.
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i (Closed) NRC Bulletin No. 88-09, " Thimble Tube Thinning in Westinghouse Reactors" l
NRC Bulletin Nn. 88-09 requests that each addressee establish and im)lement an inspection program to monitor thimble tube performance and i
ta ce appropriate corrective actions should the thimble tube fail to neet the established acceptance criterion.
This program should include the establishment and technical justification of an appropriate thimble tube o
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acceptance criterion and inspection frequency and the establishinint of an
inspection methodology. Holders of operating licenses that already had an
established inspection program to monitor thinible tube integrity
consistent with that requested by this bulletin and, based upon the l
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results of the last inspection, took appropriate corrective actions for
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the thimble tubes that failed to satisfy the established acceptance l
L criterion, are requested to implement the inspection pr0 gram in accordance with their established inspection frequency.
Alabama Power Company began to utilize the services of an eddy current vendor to perform incore flux measuring system thimble tube eddy current
testing (ECT) at Farley Nuclear Plant in 1986.
In order to be able to
identify a wide range of defects, the ECT vendor developed a calibration standard to include ASME B&PV Code standard defects, typical wear patterns, and service defects.
The current program includes performing l
ECT at each refueling outage until adequate confidence is established in wear rate projections.
Thimble tubes that do not meet the current t
acceptance criteria are either slightly withdrawn, in order to
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align the wear scar to a new location and provide an undamaged thimble
wear surface at locations where the degradation had been previously
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identified, or capped, depending upon the percentage of wall loss.
During the Unit I seventh and eight refueling outages and the Unit 2 fifth i
refueling outage, all thimble tubes (except those blocked or capped) were
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inspected full length and appropriate corrective actions were talen.
In the future, thimble tubes that cannot be eddy current inspected due to
blockage will be preventitively capped.
l The inspector reviewed the licensee's final eddy current reports for the above outages.
These reports included procedures, personnel qualifi-
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l cations, examination reports, and evaluations.
As a result of this
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technical review, the inspector concluded that the licensee has a very
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responsible program ik place to detect thimble tube thinning and,
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therefore, this issue is considered closed.
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I Within the dreas examined, violations or deviations were not identified.
3.
Review of NRC Temporary Instruction 2500/27 l
This temporary instruction was issued by NRC to verify the adequacy of the l
licensee efforts to identify all possible locations where nonconforming l
fasteners which were identified as a result of random sampling required by l
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NRC Bulletin 87 02, may have been used.
The licensee was to determine whether the fastener's application was acceptable to "use as-is" or i
whether replacement would be necessary.
The nonconforming sample
identified for the Farley Facility was a bolt identified as sample 50-23 L
and described as ASTM-A193 GRB8 5/8"-11x2 3/4". This bolt was identified as having exceeded the maximum hardness limit.
The inspector held discussions with cognizant licensee personnel both on site and in the corporate office and discovered that the licensee was taking no action on the lot of bolts identified by the sample in the l
temporary instruction.
The licensee position was based on the fact that NRC retesting )of this bolt had determined that it met the specification (ASTM-A193-81a requirements.
fhe inspector reviewed the information available and concurs with the licensee s actions based on the retesting results of the sample identified in this temporary instruction.
Within the area examined, violations or deviations were not identified.
4.
Review of Farley Unit 2 Inservice Inspection Final Report (73755)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's 90-day final inservice inspection report for the Unit 2, first interval, third period, first outage.
The report described and summarized the inservice inspection activities performed.during the Unit 2 sixth refueling outage which completed on May 17, 1989.
Infonnation included in this report consisted of examination plans and schedules, examination reports and results, examination methods and procedures, evaluation of results anc corrective actions and repairs.
Within the areas examined, violations or deviations were not identified.
5.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on September 1,1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas insnected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed above.
Proprietary inforn,ation is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee, except for the conenents of the Assistant General Manager Operations concerning the status of Inspector Follow-up Item No. 50-348,364/89-10-05(Seeparagroph2).
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