ML20138J666
| ML20138J666 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138J621 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-97-03, 50-348-97-3, 50-364-97-03, 50-364-97-3, NUDOCS 9705080289 | |
| Download: ML20138J666 (20) | |
See also: IR 05000348/1997003
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-348 and 50-364
License Nos: NPF-2 and NPF-8 l
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Report No: 50-348/97-03 and 50-364/97-03
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company. Inc.
Facility: Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP). Units 1 and 2
Location: 7388 North State Highway 95
Columbia. AL 36319
Dates: February 16 through March 29. 1997
Inspectors: T. Ross. Senior Resident Inspector
J. Bartley, Resident Inspector
R. Caldwell. Resident Inspector (In training)
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l Approved by: P. Skinner. Chief. Projects Branch 2
l Division of Reactor Projects
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Enclosure 2
9705080289 970429
PDR ADOCK 05000348
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Farley Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-348/97-03, 50-364/97-03
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations,
engineering. maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 6-week
period of resident inspections.
Doerations
e Operations personnel performed well while maintaining plant coriditions >
during Unit 1 and 2 at steady state full power operation. The Unit 1
shutdown. cooldown, and draindown was generally well controlled
(Sections 01.1 and 01.3).
- Unit 1 defueling activities were generally well controlled (Section
01.2).
e A violation was identified for multiple instances of failing to follow
procedure (Sections 01.3 and 01.4).
e A non-cited violation was identified for Nuclear Instrumentation System
(NIS) power range channels exceeding the Technical Specifications (TS)
limiting safety system setpoint (Section 01.5).
e Housekeeping and physical conditions were generally adequate, although
certain areas were poor. Licensee efforts to improve targeted areas was
evident. However, overall efforts to improve plant appearances
proceeded very slowly. (Section 02.1).
e Operator overtime was adequately controlled and the records were
thorough (Sectiori 06.1).
e Licensee efforts to identify. resolve, and prevent problems remained
effective (Section 07.1).
e The Nuclear Operations Review Board (NORB) meeting fulfilled the minimum
requirements of TS 6.5.2. However, no declining or adverse trends were
identified and no recommendations were made for improving plant safety
or the effectiveness of Safety Audit and Engineering Review (SAER) group
audits (Section 07.2).
Maintenance
o Maintenance and surveillance testing activities were generally conducted
in a thorough and competent manner by qualified individuals in
accordance with plant procedures and work instructions (Sections M1.1.
M1.2, M1.3. M1.4. and M1.5).
e The SAER Maintenance Rule audit was indepth and comprehensive (Section
M7.1).
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e Licensee's corrective actions for procedural compliance failures have
not been fully effective (Sections M8.1 and 01.4).
Engineerina
e Engineers and operators conducting the Unit 1 spent fuel inventory were
knowledgeable and followed their procedures (Section E1.1).
e An Engineering Sup] ort meeting focused awareness on recent procedure
implementation pro]lems (Section E4).
Plant Suncort
e Health Physics control over the radiologically controlled area, and the
work activities conducted within it. was good. Some contaminated areas
we,' cramped and physically restricted removal of anit-contamination
clothing (Section R2.1).
e Security activities continued to be performed in a conscientious and l
capable manner, assuring the physical protection of protected and vital
areas (Section 51.1). j
Enclosure 2
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l Report Details
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Summary of Plant Status (
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Unit 1 operated at 100% power until March 15. 1997, when the unit was shutdown
! for its 14th refueling outage (U1RF14) after 313 days of continuous operation.
j U1RF14 is scheduled to be completed in 55 days. ;
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Unit 2 operated continuously at 100% power for the entire inspection period.
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j I. Operations
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! 01 Conduct of Operations :
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01.1 Routine Observations of Control Room Doerations
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j a. Insoection Scoce (Insoection Procedure (IP) 71707)
{ Inspectors conducted frequent inspections of ongoing plant operations in
- the Main Control Room (MCR) to verify proper staffing, operator
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attentiveness, adherence to approved operating procedures,
communications, and command and control of operator activities.
Inspectors reviewed operator logs and Technical Specifications (TS)
4 Limiting Condition of 03eration (LCO) tracking sheets, walked down the
- Main Control Boards (MC3), and interviewed members of the operating
shift crew to verify operational safety and compliance with TSs. The
inspectors attended the morning plant status meetings to maintain I
i awareness of overall facility operations, maintenance activities, and '
] recent incidents. Morning reports and Occurrence Reports (ors) were !
! reviewed on a routine basis to assure that the licensee properly
reported and resolved potential safety concerns,
j b. Observations. Findinas and Conclusions
j Overall control and awareness of plant conditions during the inspection
- period remained adequate. Inspectors observed that the Unit 1 MCBs.
4 prior to U1RF14, were in a " blackboard" condition on several occasions.
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Whereas, the Emergency Power Board and Unit 2 MCBs consistently had two
, or more persistent annunciators in alarm. Efforts to maintain MCB
deficiencies at low levels were not as effective as in the past. The
4 combined number of MCB deficiencies increased to 25, which is higher
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than normally observed. Operator response to changing plant conditions
remained very good. Interviews with the operating crew indicated that
- they were aware of plant conditions and activities. Pre-shift briefs of
1 the operating crews by the shift supervisors (SS) were generally concise
- and informative.
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On March 14. 1997, the inspector observed the Unit 1 crew's response to
low charging flows through the charging flow control valve FCV-122. The
1 crew's actions were logical, well thought out, and accomplished in
i accordance with (IAW) plant procedures.
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01.2 Unit 1 Defuelina (IP 60710)
On March 23, 1997, the inspectors observed defueling activities. The
inspectors observed fuel handling evolutions in the MCR containment,
and Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). Fuel handling was typically well controlled
and conducted IAW Unit Operating Procedure (UOP) FNP-1-UOP-4.1.
" Controlling Procedure For Refueling." FP-ALA-R14. "J.M. FARLEY XIV - XV
Refueling." Revision 0, and Engineering Test Procedure (ETP) FNP-0-ETP-
3636. " Fuel Assembly Visual Inspection During Core Unload." Revision 8.
Personnel performing activities were knowledgeable. Records were
complete and communications between stations was effective.
01.3 Unit 1 Shutdown. Cooldown and Draindown for UlRF14
On March 15 and 17. 1997, inspectors observed portions of Unit 1
cooldown to Mode 5 IAW FNP-1-U0P-2.2. " Shutdown of Unit from Hot Standby
to Cold Shutdown." Revision 45, and subsequent draindown IAW Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP) FNP-1-SOP-1.6. " Draining of Reactor Coolant
System to Reactor Vessel Flange." Revision 24. An inspector also
reviewed the official completed copy of FNP-1-UDP-2.1 " Shutdown of Unit
from Minimum Load to Hot Standby." Revision 31 to verify all applicable
procedural steps had been signed off. Both the cooldown and draindown
evolutions were performed in a methodical, step-by step manner IAW
procedural instructions, except for one instance. Unit 1 operators
entered Mode 4 without ensuring the breakers for certain motor-operated
valves (MOV) were opened as required by UDP-2.2 (see section 01.4
below).
01.4 Failure To Follow Procedures
During the report period, the licensee and inspectors identified several
examples of plant personnel failure to follow procedure. The examples
are as follows:
e On February 27. 1997, an inspector observed that an i
Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) technician only performed the :
calibration check once for each of the two IB Emergency Diesel '
Generator (EDG) fuel oil day tank room float switches. The
preventative maintenance (PM) data sheets WOO 470336/7
specifically required the level check to be repeated three times
per switch. The inspector asked the I&C technician, during
conduct of this PM activity, whether it was appropriate to deviate
from the explicit instructions on the PM data sheets. The I&C
technician continued to perform calibration checks contrary to the
PM data sheets. This change to the PM was not approved as
required by FNP-0-GMP-1, " Preventative Maintenance Procedure".
Revision 17. Both float switches were verified to be within
required tolerance at least for the one time they were checked.
Maintenance management was notified of the observation.
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e On February 27, 1997, the licensee discovered that numerous
checklists for verifying emergency equi) ment and supplies were not
being performed at the frequencies esta)lished by Emergency Plan
Implementing Procedure (EIP) FNP-0-EIP-16.0 " Emergency Equipment
and Supplies." Revision 31. Following a quality assurance audit
by the. Safety Audit and Engineering Review (SAER) group. an
Emergency Planning (EP) technician stated that he had falsified
many of the EP-16.0 checklists. He stated that this had been
going on for several years. The EP technician stated that he.had
performed the checklists on occasion, but not on the prescribed
frequency. See report section P3.1 for discussion of licensee
corrective actions,
e On March 15. 1997, during initial cooldown for U1RF14 IAW UDP-2.2,
a Unit 1 operator recognized that the power supply breakers for
MOVs 8706A and 8706B (RHR pump discharge to charging pump
suctions) were not opened prior to entering Mode 4 (i.e. RCS
temperature below 350 degrees F). TS 4.5.3.2 requires MOVs 8706A
and B to be closed with their breakers locked open when in Mode 4
for overpressure protection. This TS requirement is reflected in
the " Caution" statement before step 5.21 of UOP-2.2. Operators
failed to recognize this TS and procedural recuirement until after
Unit 1 RCS temperature was reduced below 350 cegrees. The
applicable breakers were opened and locked about six minutes after
entering Mode 4. Both MOVs were closed and remained closed during_.
the Mode 3 to Mode 4 transition. The licensee initiated OR #1-97-
065. i
e On March 16, 1997, during the performance of step 9 4.2 of .
Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) FNP-1-STP-158. " Reactor Coolant i
System Pressure Isolation Valve Leak Test." Revision 15. a Unit 1 l
operator noticed a sharp reduction in residual heat removal (RHR) !
system flow when MOV 8888B. RHR to Reactor Coolant-System (RCS) i
cold leg isolation valve, was shut. As RCS temperature began to
increase, the operator reopened MOV 8888B restoring RHR flow and <
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adequate reactor core decay heat removal. RCS temperature had
remained at approximately 180 degrees F during the incident, i
Operators terminated the test. The licensee initiated an i
investigation (OR #1-97-69). The licensee determined that the
test engineer. failed to restore the initial system valve lineup as I
required by ste) 8.12 of FNP-1-STP-158 after he completed the
check valve bacc leakage of step 9.3. By not restoring the system l
lineup, manual valve 89728 remained closed before commencing the >
next check valve back leakage test in step 9.4. Consequently. RHR ,
flow in one of the three cold leg injection paths was left
isolated. When step 9.4 2 was performed and a second cold leg t
injection path was isolated. RHR flow was aligned to only one cold j
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leg path. This flow was inadequate for decay heat removal.
[ Note. the STP requires isolating one of the three cold leg
injection paths in order to perform the check valve back leakage
test].
The aforementioned examples constitute a violation (VIO) of TS 6.8.1.
which is identified as VIO 50-348. 364/97-03-01. Multiple Examples of i
Failure To Follow Procedure. 4
Although the circumstances and causes were different, other violations
and non-cited violations (NCV) involving personnel failure to follow
procedure were identified during U1RF13. the last Unit 1 refueling
outage (i.e.. VIO 50-348. 364/95-18-05: Multiple Examples Of Inadequate
Procedural Compliance) and during the last 10 months as listed below:
NCV 50-364/96 1.5-01: Operator failed to establish an RCS vent path )
during critical midloop level changes.
VIO 50-348. 364/96-09-01: Multiple valve misalignments by System
o)erators resulted in two letdown transients and rendered the IB
E E inoperable.
VIO 50-3/ '96-07-01: I&C technician adjusted Unit 1 nuclear
instrumentation system (NIS) intermediate range compensating
voltage during inappropriate conditions.
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NCV 50-348, 364/96-04-06; Operations shift foreman made numerous !
EDG test data log entry errors '
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In each of the above violations, plant personnel failed to follow I
applicable procedural steps and/or guidance due to inadequate attention
to the details of the job being conducted. None of the previous
violations and NCVs have specifically recurred. However, based on the
significant number of problems with failure to follow procedures it is
evident that prior corrective actions have not been completely effective
in preventing reoccurrence of similar problems.
01.5 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-364/97-001: Nuclear
Instrumentation System Inaccuracies Below 50% Power
Based on a review of Westinghouse Technical Bulletin ESBU-TB-92-14-R1.
the licensee identified that between January 31 and February 1.1996.
Unit 2 operated in condition prohibited by TS. Technical Specification 3.3.1 required that a minimum of three Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) !
)ower range (PR) channels be operable. However. between January 31 and l
rebruary 1. two of four PR channels were inoperable while Unit 2 was at l
power due to mis-adjustments made at low power levels. Channels NI-41
and NI-44 were under-adjusted following a low power calorimetric such
that they would not have tripped the reactor on overpower until about
118.5%. The TS limiting safety system setting is less than 110%.
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The licensee modified the UDPs to specify reducing the PR high flux high
trip setpoint to 5 85% if PR NIs are adjusted during calorimetrics
performed at less than 50% rated thermal power. The inspectors verified
that the UOPs were revised. The revisions appeared to be adequate to
3revent recurrence. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is
3eing treated as a NCV consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy. This is identified as NCV 50-364/97-03-02.
Misadjusted NIS Power Range Channels Exceed TS Limiting Safety System
Setpoint.
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1 General Tours of Specific Safety-Related Areas (IP 71707)
General tours of safety-related areas were performed by the inspectors
to examine the physical condition of plant equipment and structures, and
to verify that safety systems were properly aligned. These general
walkdowns included the accessible portions of safety-related structures,
systems, and components in the following areas:
e Unit 1 containment
e Unit 1 main steam (MS) valve room
o Unit 1 and 2 Condensate Storage Tank (CSTs)
e Unit 1 and 2 SFP. SFP heat exchangers (HXs), and SFP cooling pump
rcoms
e Unit I and 2 new fuel storage areas
e Unit 1 and 2 aiping penetration rooms (PPR) on 100 foot elevation
e Unit 1 and 2 3 prs on 121 foot elevation
e Unit 1 and 2 electrical penetration rooms and vital motor control
centers (MCCs)
e Unit 1 and 2 penetration room filtration (PRF) systems
o Unit 1B RHR pump room
o Unit 1 and 2 control room emergency filtration system (CREFS) and
control room air conditioning system
o Unit 1 and 2 charging pump rooms and hallway
e lurbine building
o EDG building
e Unit 1 and 2 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump rooms
e Unit 1 and 2 motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump rooms
e Unit 1 and 2 containment spray pump rooms
e Unit 1 component cooling water pump and HX rooms
e Unit 1 and 2 vital 4160 volt alternating current (VAC) switchgear
and vital 600 VAC load center rooms, trains A and B
General material conditions nd housokeeping for Unit 2 were adequate.
Areas were generally clear ci cr. d debris. However, except for the
121 foot elevation PPR and 2A Charging pump skid, most painted surfaces
of floors and equipment were chip)ed, stained and worn. Unit I
refueling outage activities made lousekeeping a challenge, but efforts
Enclosure 2
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to control the effect of these activities were obvious. Limited efforts
to improve physical appearances plant areas and equipment were ongoing.
Overall efforts to improve plant appearances proceeded slowly. Minor
equipment and housekeeping problems identified by the inspectors during
their routine tours were reported to the responsible SS and/or
maintenance department for resolution. None of these problems
represented operability concerns.
02.2 Biweekly Insoections of Safety Systems (IP 71707)
Inspectors used IP 71707 to verify the operability of the Unit 1 and 2
CSTs. Accessible portions of the systems were verified to be properly
aligned and operable. The inspectors did not identify any significant
issues that adversely affected system operability.
Inspectors re-verified corrective actions for LER 50-348/94-005: Missile
Protection for Condensate Storage Tanks, due to the CST missile
arotection issue identified during a recent NRC Architect and
Engineering Inspection. Specific items verified were:
. The Vacuum degasification valves for each CST were closed and
appropriate hold tags applied.
. The emergency plugging equipment was stationed in the Diesel
Generator Building Carbon Dioxide room. The Maintenance
Department is responsible for installing the plugs, if required.
The inspectors observed that the plugging kit lacked patching
equipment and brought this finding to the attention of the
! licensee. The licensee added appropriate patching materials.
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. A procedure precaution addressing the issue was verified to be
- incorporated into Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) FNP-0-AOP-
21.0. " Severe Weather." Revision 11.
During the CST system walkdown the inspectors identified numerous loose
and abandoned items (e.g., four sections of 2" X 4" planks about three
feet long, several hand-sized metal ]lates, and a four foot section of
two inch carbon steel pipe) within t1e fenced CST enclosures. These
were identified to the SS. The Inspectors concluded that corrective
actions were implemented.
02.3 Unit 1 Containment Tour
i On March 15. 1997, inspectors toured the Unit 1 containment shortly
after shutdown to Mode 3. Overall, containment looked good. Numerous
small boron leaks were identified from aipe caps. valve packing and body
to bonnet. Several of these leaks had 3een previously identified and
marked by licensee personnel. however many others had not, indicating
that they had not been identified.
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02.4 Taq Orders (IP 71707)
During the course of routine inspections portior.s of the following tag
orders (TO) and associated equipment clearance tag were examined by the
inspectors:
e TO# 97-0729: A Train CREFS recirculation filter unit
e TO# 97-0860-1: A Train PRF System
All tags and TOs examined by the inspectors were properly executed and
implemented.
02.5 TS LCO Trackina (IP 71707)
The inspectors routinely reviewed the TS LCO tracking sheets filled out
by the shift foremen. All tracking sheets for Unit 1 and 2 reviewed by ,
the inspectors were consistent with plant conditions and TS l
requirements. However, the licensee identified several TS compliance '
problems associated with the way the TS are written. These are as ;
follows:
a) TS Table 3.3-1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation, functional unit 6.B
requires two channels of NIS source range (SR) to be operable
(indication only) prior to entering Mode 3. However NIS SRs are
deenergized at power and are not usually energized until many
minutes after entering Mode 3. Also the applicable surveillance
tests are performed after energizing.
b) TS 4.5.3.2 required certain emergency core cooling system valves
to be closed with their breakers locked open prior to entry into
Mode 4. However, these same valves are required to be operable
for Mode 3 per TS 3.5.2: TS provided no allowance far
transitioning from Mode 3 to 4 without entering a condition
prohibited by TS.
c) TS Table 4.3-1. Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance
Requirements, functional unit 2.B for NIS PR. neutron flux-low,
requires certain channel calibrations that are not only irrelevant
but can not be performed.
The licensee intends to address these TS problems in their upcoming
submittal incorporating the improved standard TS. In addition, the
licensee conducted a comprehensive review of all TS requirements
uniquely associated with decreasing Mode changes. The licensee will
issue applicable LERs which the inspectors will review.
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06 Operations Organization and Administration
06.1 Administrative Control of Goerator Overtime (IP 71707)
The requirements for control of operator overtime are contained in TS 6.2.2. The inspector interviewed two shift clerks and reviewed several
randomly selected operator overtime records for the period December 1
through 31. 1996. The inspector did not identify any discreaancies with
the control of operator overtime. The inspector concluded t1at the
o)erator overtime was adequately controlled and the records were
tlorough.
07 Quality Assurance in Operations
07.1 Effectiveness of Licensee Control in Identifyina. Resolvina. and
Preventina Problems (IP 71707 and 40500)
The inspectors briefly reviewed all newly initiated ors and completed
ors approved during the inspection period to ensure that plant incidents
which affect or could potentially affect safety were properly documented
and processed IAW Administrative Procedure (AP) FNP-0-AP-30.
" Preparation and Processing of Incident Reports." Revision 22 Selected
ors were reviewed in detail.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's program for identifying and
resolving problems remained effective and was being accomplished IAW
FNP-0-AP-30. Plant personnel and management exhibited an appropriate
threshold for identifying problems. initiating ors. and assigning formal
root cause determinations. Each new OR received prompt attention and
was discussed in the morning status / plan of the day meeting. The
l Operations manager continued to pursue the OR backlog with other
j managers and reduce the number.
Inspectors reviewed the following ors for accuracy completeness and
reportability, and adequacy of corrective actions:
. OR #1-97-035: Inadequate Emergency Response Procedures associated
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l . OR #1-97-039: Auxiliary Feedwater FCV solenoid missing mounting
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screws
These ors were processed properly with one exception. The corrective
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that two operations personnel (a reactor operator and SS) assumed their
onsnift duties prior to reviewing Event Specific Procedure ESP-1.3.
" Transfer To Cold Leg Recirculation." procedure changes. Inspectors
identified this discrepancy to Operations management. The inspector
considered this a minor isolated occurrence.
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07.2 Nuclear Operations Review f.oard
a. Ecpag i
On March 20. 1997, inspectors monitored the quarterly meeting of the
Nuclear Operations Review Boarsi (NORB) via telephone. TS 6.5.2
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establishes the requirements ol' the NORB. TS 6.5.2.7 lists nine topics
which are required to be reviewed by the NORB.
b. Observations and Findings ,
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The NORB reviewed the topics prescribed by TS 6 5.2.7 in 30 minutes.
Overall, the NORB appeared to meet the minimum requirements of TS 6.5.2
mgarding attendance, quorum, and areas covered However, only a couple
of the NORB members actively participated. Mcinbers asked few questions.
Participation of several members was limited to signifying assent to the
. standard "NORB Recommendation Guide" stateents drafted by the NORB
secretary. No independent comments, conclusions, or recommendations
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were heard by the inspectors from the vanous NORB members. No
declining or adverse trends were identitied: no recommendations for
improving plant safety or effectiveness of SAER audits were made; all i
areas reviewed were adequate with no areas of weakness or proposed i
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In general, the meeting was quite perfunctory. Subsecuent to the
meeting, the NORB Vice Chairman did not reveal any adcitional insights
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except that NORB members are encouraged to review the meeting material
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and ask questions before the meeting. The Vice Chairman acknowledged
that this particular meeting was probably shorter and less dynamic than
most. However, the inspector considered this NORB meeting very similar
to one observed on February 21, 1996.
II. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 General Comments
a. Inspection Stone (IP 61726 and 62707)
Inspectors observed and reviewed portions of various licensee corrective
and preventive maintenance activities, and witnessed routine
surveillance testing to determine conformance with plant procedures,
work instructions, industry codes and standards TSs. and regulatory
requirements. The inspectors observed all or portions of the following
maintenance and surveillance activities, as identified by their
associated work order (WO), work authorization (WA) or STP:
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e WO# 467103: IB MDAFW pump vibration measurements
e WA# 120178: A train CREFS recirculation filter unit and
pressurization unit visual inspections
e WO# S97002116: 1A PRF System Environmental Qualification (E0)
Ins
e WO#pection
S97002126: 2B PRF System EQ Inspection
e WA# WOO 466705: MCC 1V 600 VAC Breaker Inspections and Cleaning
e Installation of jumpers per FNP-1-SOP-16.1 and Electrical
Maintenance Procedure EMP-1906.01 to override low dilution flow
Steam Generator blowdown isolation
e FNP-1-STP-26.0B: Control Room B Train Ventilation Operability Test .
e FNP-0-ETP-4426 PRF Dirty Filter Data Collection (2A PRF) l
e FNP-0-ETP-3616; Monthly Surveillance Flux Map [ Unit 2] l
e FNP-1-STP-206.2: Post-Accident Containment Water Level 01E11LT l
3594B Loop Calibration i
e FNP-0-ETP-3636: Fuel Assembly Visual Inspection During Core Unload l
[ Unit 1]
b. Observations. Findinas and Conclusions l
All of the maintenance work and surveillance testing observed by the
inspectors was performed IAW work instructions, procedures, and
applicable clearance controls. No adverse findings were identified.
Safety-related maintenance and surveillance testing evolutions were well
planned and executed. Personnel demonstrated familiarity with
administrative and radiological controls. Surveillance tests of safety-
related equi) ment were consistently performed in a deliberate step-by-
step manner Jy personnel in close communication with the MCR. Overall,
operators and technicians appeared knowledgeable, experienced, and well
trained for the tasks they performed.
M1.2 Main Steam Safety Valve lift Testina
On March 11, 12. and 13, 1997, inspectors observed MS safety valve lift
testing and adjustments IAW FNP-1-STP-608.1 " Main Steam Line Safety
Valve Test." Revision 8. and the applicable Furmanite Trevitest
procedure. All lift testing was accomplished by contractors in a well
controlled manner, under the direct constant supervision of plant
maintenance personnel. Activities were well coordinated with the MCR.
M1.3 1C Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Package Inspection and Cleanina
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The inspector observed maintenance activities involving the disassembly,
ins)ection, and cleaning of the 1C Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal
paccage and the reinstallation of the lower seal, including centering
and torquing. This work was performed under WA WOO 467103 using ALA-PMS-
0-120. " Seal Inspection and Replacement." Revision 11. The ins)ector
verified the installation of high temperature 0-rings (Generic _etter
88-20 commitment). Westinghouse personnel were skilled and
knowledgeable.
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M1.4 PRF System Heater Performance Test
On March 5, 1997, the Inspectors observed the performance of FNP-1-STP-
917 " Penetration Room Ventilation System Heater Test." Revision 2. for
the Unit 1A PRF system. This was conducted under WA W00475671. The
required LCO was written and the work was properly authorized. Initial
system conditions were established and the system appeared to operate
adequately. The procedure now requires starting the recirculation fan
first and then the exhaust fan. This prevented HV 3357A from slamming
o)en and shut, which was a recently identified problem in both plants.
T1e plant electricians tested the heaters after Engineering Support (ES)
personnel verified the system was at a full flow of 4887 standard cubic
feet per minute. The electricians identified that phase 'B' power to
the heater was open and an OR was written. The inspector concluded the
procedure was effective in identifying conditions adverse to quality.
M1.5 PRF System Monthly Ooerability Testina
On March 5 and 6, 1997 the inspector observed conduct of FNP-1-STP-20.0,
" Penetration Room Filtration System Train A Quarterly Operability and
Valve In-Service Test," Revision 23. Air Operated Valve 1HV3357A stroke
time exceeded the Stroke Time for Corrective Action but was within the
Maximum Allowable Time. The operator initially timed from when he heard
the air release from the valve to when it repositioned. The SS informed
the operator that the stroke time was to be measured from when valve
movement was first apparent until the valve stopped. The test was
conducted again, but still exceeded the Stroke Time for Corrective
Action. An OR was written by the SS.
On March 6, 1997, the inspector observed STP FNP-2-STP-20.2.
" Penetration Room Filtration System Train A Monthly Operability Test."
Revision 5. The system operated satisfactorily in automatic. However,
when the procedure forced the system into the full recirculation mode,
it did not maintain penetration room vacuum.
Work authorizations and procedures appeared to be properly filled out
and personnel conducting the test were knowledgeable of the test and
plant conditions. The inspector concluded that the tests were conducted
IAW procedures and effectively identified conditions adverse to quality.
!
M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities i
M7.1 Maintenance Rule Quality Assurance Audit
I
On February 18, 1997, the SAER Maintenance Rule Audit Exit for plant
management was observed. The audit team was experienced and included
expertise from: Maintenance Support - Hatch Project: Project Engineer -
Vogtle Project: Vogtle Senior Engineer; and a Farley Senior Engineer.
The individual from the Hatch Project had recently experienced a NRC
Maintenance Rule Inspection. The team identified several significant
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findings, these included: eight system functions were found classified i
category (a)(1) without performance goals established; some non-safety !
related systems were not scoped into the program (Heater Drain.
Extraction Steam. and some structures like the Turbine Building): Some
maintenance rule functions were not monitored as required; and, the
method used to assess out of service equipment did not account for the ,
overall effect on performance of safety functions. The team identified l
several other less significant issues. The results were, in general. !
accepted by the maintenance rule program owners. The inspector 1
concluded that the audit was indepth and comprehensive with regards to I
the Maintenance Rule implementation.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (IP 92902)
M8.1 (Closed) VIO 50-348.364/95-18-05: Failure To Follow Procedures. Multiple
Examples
Corrective action report No. 348/364-95-18-05 was issued to document the
scope of the violation and implementation of corrective actions. By
letter dated December 19, 1995, the licensee responded to the NRC
providing a description of the reasons Gr the violation and proposed
corrective actions. An inspector review a Lhese documents and
determined that in addition to correcting tne immediate consecuences of j
each of the violation examples, the licensee conducted a broacness '
review of other previous procedural compliance problems. This
licensee's review identified the following procedure performance
weaknesses: 1) not performing a procedural step. 2) not signing off each l
l
step as performed. 3) not performing steps in the designated sequence,
and 4) performing actions not in direct compliance with the procedure.
1 To address these generic concerns in order to prevent recurrence, the
licensee requested site supervision and managers to conduct specific
l training on procedural adherence with all groups emphasizing the
aforementioned procedural performance weaknesses and reinforcing i
management expectations. The inspector verified conduct of this
training by reviewing applicable training attendance sheets and
documentation. This vioiation is considered closed. However, it is
evident that the licensee's corrective actions have not been effective
in preventing recurrence of procedural performance weaknesses (see
report section 01.4).
III. Enaineerina
El Conduct of Engineering (IP 37551)
El.1 Unit 1 SFP Fuel Inventorv
On March 18. 1997, inspectors observed ES engineers and an operator
conducting an inventory of fuel in the Unit 1 SFP prior to core unload
IAW FNP-1-ETP-3634. " Fuel Inventory Verification," Revision 9. The
engineers and operator were knowledgeable and followed their procedure.
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The MCR operating crew was aware of their activities. Except for
certain equipment problems with the underwater lighting. and minor
difficulties in orienting the video camera, the evolution went smoothly.
Subsequent discussions with the res)onsible ES supervisor confirmed that
all fuel assemblies to be verified )y ETP-3634 were accounted for.
E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge And Performance
On March 21, 1997, an inspector attended a meeting of all ES department
personnel to discuss recent procedural compliance problems (i.e.. VIO
97-01-01 and the first example in report Section 01.4 above). Each of
the two responsible test engineers discussed their particular incidents
involving a failure to follow procedures, and subsequent lessons
learned. The associated ES supervisors explained their roles in failing
to prevent the specific incidents. At the end of the meeting the ES
manager reiterated the need for procedural compliance, implementing !
self-verification, and requesting su) port as necessary. The meeting was .
effective in focusing awareness of t1e pitfalls associated with the l
recent problems to the engineering staff.
]
IV. Plant Sucoort '
R2 Status of Radiological Protection Facilities and Equipment
R2.1 Tours of the Unit 1 and 2 Radioloaically Controlled Areas (RCAs)
(IP 71750)
During the course of the inspection aeriod, the inspectors conducted
tours of the Unit 1 and 2 auxiliary auilding RCAs. In general, health
physics (HP) control over the RCA. and the work activities conducted
within it, were good. However, in Unit 1. some contaminated areas were
cramped and physically restricted. Some of these areas lacked step off
pads. Some were so confined that workers had to remove their anti-
contamination clothing outside the roped off contaminated area (e.g. 1B
charging pump). In another instance, clothing had to be removed while
standing on the step off pad (e.g.. RHR pump rooms). These problems did
not result in any contamination events and were discussed with HP
management.
P3 Emergency Plan Procedures and Documentation
P3.1 Emeroency Eauioment and Sucolies Checklist Verification
On February 27.1997 'an EP technician admitted to falsifying many of 4
the EIP-16.0 " Emergency Equi) ment and Supplies," checklists required to i
be accomplished on a routine ) asis. The licensee initiated OR #97-046 to
track the deficiency. The EP coordinator and plant staff promptly
i
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conducted all EIP-16.0 checklists to confirm EP equipment and supplies
in a proper state of readiness. The licensee identified some
discrepancies. The inspectors determined that the discrepancies would
not have impacted the licensee's emergency response capabilities.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
S1.1 Routine Observations of Plant Security Measures (IP 71750) ,
!
During routine inspection activities, inspectors verified that portions I
of site security program plans were being pro)erly implemented. This l
was evidenced by: proper display of picture Jadges by plant personnel; l
appropriate key carding of vital area doors; adequate stationing / tours 1
of security personnel; proper searching of Jackages/ personnel at the )
primary access point and service water intate structure. Security
activities observed during the inspection period were performed well and
were adequate to ensure physical protection of the plant.
V. Manaaement Meetinos and Other Areas
X1 Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Commitments
A recent discovery of a licensee o)erating its facility in a manner
contrary to the UFSAR description lighlighted the need for a special
focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or
parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. While performing the inspections
discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable
portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. The
inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the
observed plant practices. procedures and/or parameters.
X2 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee
management on A)ril 2,1997, after the end of the inspection period.
The licensee actnowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during
the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary
information was identified.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee i
M. Ajluni. SNC (Corporate) Licensing Manager - Farley Project
B. Bell Maintenance Team Leader
R. Coleman Maintenance Manager
S. Fulmer. Technical Manager
D. Grissette. Operations Manager
R. Hili. General Manager - FNP
C. Hillman Security Chief
R. Martin. Superintendent Operations Support
M. Mitchell. Health Physics Superintendent
C. Nesbit. Assistant General Manager - Support
J. Powell Superintendent Unit 2 Operations i
R. Rogers. Engineering Support Supervisor - Engineering Support )
L. Stinson. Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations 1
J. Thomas. Engineering Support Manager l
G. Waymire. Administrative Manager
NRC
J. Zimmerman. Project Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant i
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying. Resolving, and
Preventing Problems
IP 60710: Refueling Activities
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
IP 71707: Plant Operations !
IP 71750: Plant Support Activities l
IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance j
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
Iypf Item Number Status Descriotion and Reference
VIO 50-348. 364/97-03-01 Open Multiple Examples of Failure To
Follow Procedures (Section 01.4).
NCV 50-364/9/-03-02 Open Misadjusted NIS Power Range Channels
Exceed TS Limiting Safety System
Setpoint (Section 01.5).
Closed
, Tvoe 11.em Number Status Descriotion and Referencg
VIO 50-348, 364/95-18-05 Closed Failure To Follow Procedures.
Multiple Examples (Section M8.1).
NCV 50-364/97-03-02 Closed Misadjusted NIS Power Range Channels
Exceed TS Limiting Safety System
l Setpoint (Section 01.5).
LER 50-364/97-001 Closed Nuclear Instrumentation System
- Inaccuracies Below 50% Power ,
(Section 01.5).
"
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
AP Administrative Procedure
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
.
'
CREFS Control Room Emergency Filtration System
CST Condensate Storage Tank
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
EIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure
EQ Environmental Qualification
ES Engineering Support
ETP Engineering Test Procedure
FNP Farley Nuclear Plant
HP Health Physics
HX Heat Exchanger
I&C Instrumentation and Control
IAW In Accordance With
IP Inspection Procedure
IR Inspection Report
LCO Limiting Condition of Operation
LER Licensee Event Report
MCB Main Control Board
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'
MCC Motor Control Center
- MCR Main Control Room
'
MDAFW Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
MOV Motor Operated Valve
MS Main Steam
NCV Non-Cited Violation
- NI Nuclear Instrumentation
'
NIS Nuclear Instrumentation System
NORB Nuclear Operations Review Board
NOV Notice Of Violation
!
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- OR Occurrence Report
- i PDR Public Document Room
PM Preventative Maintenance
PPR Piping Penetration Room
PR Power Range
PRF Penetration Room Filtration
<
RCA Radiologically Controlled Area
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
SAER Safety Audit and Engineering Review
SFP Spent Fuel Pool
SNC Southern Nuclear Company
S0P Standard Operating Procedure
SR Source Range
SS Shift Supervisor
STP Surveillance Test Procedure
TO Tag Order
TS Technical S]ecifications
U1RF13 Unit 1. 13t1 Refueling Outage
U1RF14 Unit 1. 14th Refueling Outage
U2RF11 Unit 2. 11th Refueling Outage
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
UOP Unit Operating Procedure
VAC Volt Alternating Current
VIO Violation
WA Work Authorization
WO Work Order
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