IR 05000348/1989007
| ML20245H558 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 04/19/1989 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Maxwell G, Miller W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245H439 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-89-07, 50-348-89-7, 50-364-89-07, 50-364-89-7, GL-88-17, NUDOCS 8905030432 | |
| Download: ML20245H558 (11) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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,101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, G EORGI A 303 23 lI
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Report Nos.: 50-348/89-07-and 50-364/89-07'
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-Licensee:
. Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street E,
Birmingham, AL 36291 Docket N'os.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.:
NPF-2 and NPF-8 Facility name:
Farley 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: March 11 through April 10, 1989-Inspection at Farley site near Dothan, Alabama I
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f Inspecto s:
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l.F G
Maxwell,SenLrResidentInspectorSr/g i
Date Si~ned DAU n
W' H Mil r, Jr., Resident Inspector Date Signed i
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Approved by:
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Q F. S. Eantrell..Section Chief Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine onsite inspection involved a review of operational safety verification, monthly surveillance observation, monthly maintenance observation, design changes and modifications, inspection of quality verification function and decay heat removal (generic letter 88-17)~.
Results: Within the areas inspected, the following violation was identified:
i Failure to follow procedure for restoration of fire protection system
to service, paragraph 3.B.2.
This is a repeat violation concerning failure to follow procedure, but is not indicative of a management breakdown.
Neither does it indicate that operator performance has become unsatisfactory.
However, it does indicate that improvements still need to be made towards full procedural compliance.
Certain tours were conducted on deep backshift or weekends, these i
tours were conduct,1 on March 19 and 25 (deep backshift inspections occur between 10 pai. and 5 a.m.).
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Licensee. Employees Contacted R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager C. L. Buck, Plant Modification Manager L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager R. D. Hill, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations D. N. Morey, General Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager J. K. Osterholtz, Operations Manager L. M. Stinson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support J. J. Thomas, Maintenance Manager L. S. Williams, Training Manager Other licensee employees contacted included, technicians, operations personnel, maintenance and 18C personnel, security forces members, and
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office personnel.
Acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Plant Status Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at approximately 100% reactor power throughout the reporting period except between March 23 and March 26.
During that time,
power was. reduced to approximately 75% to allow repairs to be made on two
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leaking main condenser tubes.
Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at approximately 100% reactor power until March 25.
On March 25 the plant was shutdown to begin a normal scheduled refueling outage for cycle 7 of 38 days and 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br />.
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3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707, 92700)
i A.
Plant Tours
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The inspectors conducted routine plant tours during this inspection period to verify that the licensee's requirements and commitments i
were being implemented. Inspections were conducted at various times including week-days, nights, weekends and holidays.
These tours were performed to verify that: systems, valves, and breakers required for j
i safe plant operations were in their correct position; fire protection j
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equipment, spare equipment and materials were being maintained and stored properly; plant operators were aware of the current plant status;. plant operations personnel-were documenting. the: status of.
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out-of-service equipment; there were no undocumented cases of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibration, abnormal hanger or. seismic restraint
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movements; all reviewed equipment requiring calibration was current;.
and general housekeeping was satisfactory.
Tours of' the - plant included review of site ' documentation and interviews with plant personnel. The inspectors reviewed the control room operators'. logs, tag out logs, chemistry and health physics-logs, and control-boards and panels.
During these tours the inspectors noted that the operators appeared to be alert, aware of changing plant conditions and manipulated plant controls properly.
' The inspectors evaluated. operations shift turr /ers and attended shif.t briefings.
They observed that the ' briefings and turnovers provided sufficient detail for the next shift crew and verified that the staffing met the TS requirements.
Site. security was evaluated by observing personnel in the protected and vital areas to ensure that these persons had the proper authorization to be in the respective areas.
The inspectors also verified that vital area portals were kept locked and alarmed.
The security personnel appeared to be alert and attentive to their duties and those officers performing personnel and vehicular searches were thorough and systematic.
Responses to security alarm conditions appeared to be prompt and adequate.
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Selected activities of the licensee's Radiological Protection Program were reviewed by the inspectors to verify. conformance with plant procedures and NRC regulatory requirement.
The areas reviewed included: operation and management of the plant's health physics staff, "ALARA" implementation, radiation work permits (RWPs) for compliance to plant procedures, personnel exposure records, observation of work and personnel in radiation areas to verify compliance to radiation protection procedures, and control of radioactive materials.
B.
Plant Events and Observations (1) Containment Inspection Following Unit 2 shutdown for refueling for cycle 7 on March 25, the licensee conducted a comprehensive inspection of the containment to identify all leaking components and equipment in need of maintenance following the long operating run of 453 days. The inspection identified no major equipment problems and only 17 leaking valves. Most of the leaking valves consisted of
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small leaks such as packing leaks, leaks from valve stems, check
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valve gaskets leaks, etc.
The inspectors performed a walkdown inspection of containment on the morning of March 26 and verified that the general housekeeping and cleanliness inside containment were excellent.
No additionel leaks other than those identified by the licensee and no major equipment damage were noted.
I (2)
Inoperative Fire Protection System The inspectors reviewed the circumstances associated with licensee's incident report 2-89-58.
On February 25, at approximately 7:30 p.m., a system operator assigned to the rover watch position for the auxiliary building found fire protection panel zone FSP-2A-59 switch in the override position.
He contacted the shift foreman as directed by the log data sheet, and an immediate investigation was begun to determine why the switch was in the override position.
The automatic sprinkler
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system for. zone FSP-2A-59 is inoperable while the switch is in the override position.
Zone FSP-2A-59 covers the 139' elevation
- west corridor (rooms 2319 and 2345) which contains redundant safe shutdown cables.
TS 3.7.11.2 requires a continuous fire watch for this area when the sprinkler system is not operational.
l The licensee's investigation determineJ that on February 24, at 8:30 a.m., system FSP-2A-59 was placed in override to clean and calibrate the area smoke detectors. The appropriate fire watches were established.
At approximately 3:00 p.m. on February 24, the work on the system was functionally accepted by the shift foreman. The assigned fire watches were discontinued; however, system operability verification was not performed.
The system was inoperable without compensatory measures from about 3:00 p.m. on February 24 until 7:30 p.m. on February 25 or for approximately 281/2 hours.
The ' failure to ensure appropriate restoration requirements are met is a violation of procedure FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, Section 7.5.9 and Appendix III, Table III.
Further investigation by the NRC inspectors noted that the system operators assigned rover watch duties in the auxiliary building had failed to document and identify that the switch on the fire protection system panel to zone FSP-2A-59 was in the override position on all four hour watch rounds conducted between 8:30 a.m.
on February 24, through 4:00 p.m.
on February 25 (approximately 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br />).
The rover watch logs for auxiliary building, (R Type G7.31, Rev. 8) sheets 1 and 4 requires the Units 1 and 2 fire protection panels on 121'
elevation of the auxiliary building to be inspected every four i
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hours.
The concerned panel is located on elevation 121'.
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5 on the log informs the system operator to notify the shif t foreman of all systems in override.
Prior to the system l
operator finding the switch in the override position on February l
25 at 7:30 p.m., the panel had apparently been inspected six to eight times by several system operators without noting that the
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switch.to zone FPS-2A-59 was in the override position.
This inattention to detail is considered a procedural violation of the instructional notes on the operator's logs.
These two discrepancies are identified as Violation 348,364/89-07-01, failure to follow procedures for restoration of fire protection system to service following maintenance activities and failure to record equipment operating data and characteristics during system operators watch rounds.
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A separate violation is not being issued for not meeting the action statement of TS 3.7.11.2.
This TS section requires a continuous fire watch to be established for areas containing i
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inoperative sprinkler systems protecting areas containing redundant safe shutdown components. The principle root cause of the TS violation is attributed to the failure to follow i
procedures which were designed to prevent a TS violation.
(3) Repairs to Unit 1 Condenser On March 23, at 10:00 p.m., Unit I reduced power to 75% to plug two leaking tubes in condenser water box BB.
The unit was returned to full power at 5:00 a.m. on March 26. The inspectors witnessed operations at the reduced pcwer range and portions of the return to full power operations.
No discrepancies were noted.
(4) Rigging and Handling The inspectors observed various work activities which required an effort by the craftsmen in assuring that loads were properly fastened, lifted and supported.
The inspectors had some concerns about two instances where they saw seismic I equipment i
supports being used to support encapsulated valve box covers.
These valve box covers weighed between about 1000 to 2000 pounds and were located in Unit 2 RHR pump rooms.
The licensee evaluated the two instances where the seismic 1 supports were used to support the encapsulated valve boxes and found that no damage was done to the supports.
Also, the licensee drafted procedure FNP-0-GMP-6.4, General Guidelines and Precautions for Rigging. The procedure was issued on March 31, 1989.
The inspectors reviewed the procedure and found that it contains
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sufficient guidance to allow safe and acceptable rigging and
handling practices.
The inspectors have no further questions about this matter at this time.
Except as noted, no additional violations or deviations were identified.
However, a failure to follow procedure violation was identified which is similar to violations identified in previous RII reports.
This repeat violation does not indicate that operations personnel as a group are performing unsatisfactorily.
The NRC is aware that APC0 management has strongly emphasized the need for personnel to comply fully with documented procedures and instructions.
However, the repeat violation documented above indicates that improvements still need to be made to assure that operators comply more fully with procedural requirements.
4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors witnessed the licensee conducting maintenance surveillance test activities on safety-related systems and components to verify that the licensee performed the activities in accordance with TS and licensee requirements. These observations included witnessing selected portions of
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each surveillance, review of the surveillance procedures to ensure that administrative controls and tagging procedures were in force, determining that approval was obtained prior to conducting the surveillance test and the individuals conducting the test were qualified in accordance with plant approved procedures.
Other observations included ascertaining that i
test instrumentation used was calibrated, data collected was within the l
specis ied requirements of TS, arv identified discrepancies were properly
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noted, and the systems were cot. u tly returned to service. The following specific activities were observed:
1-STP-4.3 Charging Pump 1C Quarterly IST i
0-STP-52.2 Diesel Fire Pump No. 2 1-STP-23.8 CCW Valves IST 1-STP-80.1 Diesel Generator 1B Operability Test l
2-STP-80.1 Diesel Generator 2B Operability Test l
0-STP-80.1 Diesel Generator 1-2A Operability Test l
0-STP-80.2 Diesel Generator 1C Operability Test i
2-STP-604.0 Pressurizer Safety Valve Test 2-STP-608.1 Main Steam Line Safety Valve Test 2-STP-627 Containment Penetration Local Leak Rate Test of Valves (Valves Q2P17V099 & Q2 P17HV3045)
During the performance of Test 0-STP-80.1 on March 27, Diesel Generator 1-2A experienced a slow start from using air header number 2.
The engine required approximately 15 seconds to reach full speed.
It was immediately restarted using both air start headers and reached full speed in less than 8 seconds which met the TS requirements.
MWR 197478 was issued to investigate and correct the slow start problem.
The problem was found to l
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be caused from trash in the air distributor restricting the flow of air to
the engine.
The engine started satisfactorily after the distributor was cleaned.
The first pressurizer safety valve tested by 2-STP-604.0 failed low by 6 psi. Therefore, to meet tha IST program the remaining two safety valves were required to be tested.
The second valve tested satisfactorily but the third valve failed low by 8 psi. All of the valves were adjusted and then satisfactorily retested. These tests were conducted March 25 through March 27.
All five of the safety relief valves on each of the three loops of the main steam system were tested on March 25.
Four of the safety valves passed and the remaining 11 failed.
Seven failed from 1 psi to 16 psi lower than the required minimum set points and four failed from 1 psi to 5 psi higher than the maximum set points.
In general, the safety valves failed on the conservative side.
However, the licensee is reviewing the test results to determine if this is a reportable item.
No violations or deviations were identified.
The results of the inspections in this area indicate that the program was effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's maintenance activities to verify the following:
maintenance personnel were obtaining the appropriate tagout and clearance approvals prior to commencing work activities, correct documentation was available for all requested parts and material prior to use, procedures were availaale for all requested parts and material prior to use, procedures were available and adequate for the work being conducted, maintenance personnel performing work activities were qualified to accomplish these tasks, no maintenance activities reviewed were violating any limiting conditions for operation during the specific evolution, the required QA/QC reviews and QC hold points were implemented, post-maintenance testing activities were completed, and equipment was p.operly returned to service after the completion of work activities.
Activities reviewed included:
MWR 197428 Investigate and correct slow start problems with diesel generator 1-2A.
MWR 178542 Replace motor actuator for containment spray isolation valve MOV 8820.
MWR 190656 Replace Unit 2 inoperative source range detector N-32 with
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new detector.
MWR 182873 Plug leaking condenser tubes in Unit 1 main condenser water box B-B.
No violations or deviations were identified.
The results of the inspections in this area indicate that the program was effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives.
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6.
Inspection of Quality Verification Function (35702)
l The inspectors reviewed the quality control (QC) organization established I
to provide independent review and verification of work performed by the site contractor (" Fluor") who will perform most of the PCN modifications during the current Unit 2 refueling outage.
The group includes 23 personnel well experienced in all disciplines, i.e.
mechanical, electrical, civil and nondestructive examination.
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meet the Level II inspector qualifications of ANSI N45.2.6 except for two employees who are Level I inspectors.
The inspectors have interviewed several of the QC inspectors and verified that each was qualified to perform his assigned duties.
The licensee's QC program to verify compliance of construction documents by the principle site contractor, Fluor, appears to be effective.
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7.
Design Changes and Modification (37700 and 27828)
The inspectors evaluated a plant design change (PCN B88-2-5280) which affected a class 1E underground electrical duct bank. The change provided the design requirements to abandon a portion of the duct bank which supplies electrical power to Unit 2 service water valve boxes and other miscellaneous equipment located north of the auxiliary building.
The decision was made to abandon the duct bank after it was found to be i
settling.
The licensee felt that if corrections were not made the cables
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installed in the duct bank could be damaged.
The design required the existing cables in the sinking duct bank section l
to be cut and abandoned.
New cables are required to be installed in a
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cable trench which is to be supported and placed on top of the abandoned f
duct bank.
The new cables would be spliced at each end to the unaffected
cables.
l The inspectors noted that the design change package considered: 10CFR 50.59 applicability; a safety evaluation; applicable FSAR sections; codes,
standards and regulations; and,10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirements.
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design verification required a multi-discipline design review.
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method resulted in reviews being completed by civil, mechanical, electrical, and control systems design personnel.
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l The inspectors observed portions of the in-process work associated with the above PCN.
The work activities which were observed included the following:
l The removal of a concrete slab which had been installed on the soil
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above the duct bank required to be abandoned.
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Excavation of the backfill adjacent to the duct bank.
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Relocating an installed storm drain.
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Installing the forms and the additional concrete supports for the
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concrete trench which will contain the new electrical cables.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
The results of the
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I inspections in this area indicate that the program was effective with l
respect to meeting the safety objectives.
8.
Decay Heat Removal (Generic Letter 88-17 and TI 2515/101 and 71707)
During the weeks of March 20 and March 27 the inspectors evaluated the licensee's actions which they have taken to prevent and, if necessary, respond to loss of decay heat removal during operations with the reactor coolant system partially drained.
The inspection emphasis was placed on Unit 2 as it was scheduled for a routine refueling outage which began on March 24.
The licensee responded to the Generic Letter 88-17 which detailed NRC's concerns about loss of decay heat removal during nonpower operation; the letters of response were dated December 29, 1988 and January 27, 1989.
When the resident inspectors conducted their evaluation in this area they utilized the licensees' response letters listed above and NRC temporary instruction TI 2515/101 for guidance.
The evaluation included reviewing an APC0 audit of this activity, interviewing on-shift operators, observations of operations activities, and reviewing the procedures which were revised and/or written by APC0 in response to Generic Letter 88-17.
The following observations were noted during the evaluation:
Training - The inspectors interviewed at least five on-shift
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operators concerning the issues listed in the generic letter and the APC0 procedures which were reviewed or written to address the concerns listed in the letter.
The operators were found to be sufficiently familiar with both the generic letter and with the resulting APC0 procedures.
l Containment Closure - TSe licensee has prepared procedures and j
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controls which should assure that containment closure could be
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attained prior to the time at which core uncovery would happen if loss of RHR event occurred.
Operations procedure 50P 1.11, Mid Loop Operations contains the specific guidance and controls in this area.
Temperature Indication - The inspectors verified that the licensee i
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provided at least two independent, continuous reactor coolant temperature indicators which represented core exit condition. These indicators were provided with the reactor vessel head still on the vessel.
RCS Water Level Indication - The licensee provided two independent
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RCS water level indications during reduced inventory condition, the indicators were being monitored almost continuously by operations
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personnel.
Periodic level readings were being taken every 15 minutes I
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when RCS inventory was being reduced and then hourly afterwards.
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During routine operations, the operators RCS Perturbations
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generally maintained the plant in a sufficient stable condition.
RCS Inventory - The licensee had at least two available means of
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adding inventory _ to the RCS in addition to the pumps that are a part of the normal decay heat removal system. Two methods established for adding inventory to the RCS were alternate charging and a part of the normal decay heat removal system.
Hot Leg Flow Paths - Standard Operations Procedure, S0P 1.11 was
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established to contain sufficient controls to assure that all of the RCS hot legs are not blocked simultaneously by nozzle dams unless an adequate vent path is provided to prevent pressurization of the upper plenum of the vessel.
No violation deviations were identified. The results of the inspection in this area indicate that the program established by the licensee for decay heat removal was effective with respect to meeting the safety objectives.
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Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews throughout the report period and on April 7, with the plant manager and selected members of his staff.
The inspection findings were i
discussed in detail.
The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings
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and did not identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspection during this inspection.
ITEM NUMBER DESCRIPTION AND REFERENCE
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348,364/89-07-01 Failure to follow procedures for restoration of fire protection system to service - paragraph 3.B.2.
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10. Acronyms and Abbreviations
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l AFW -
Auxiliary Feedwater A0P -
Abnormal Operating Procedure AP
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Administrative Procedure APC0 -
Alabama Power Company Code of Federal Regulations CFR
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CCW Component Cooling Water
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Design Change Deviation Report DR
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Emergency Contingency Procedure ECP
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EIP -
Emergency Plant Implementing Procedure EQ
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Environmental Qualifications ESF -
Engineered Scfety Features EWR -
Engineering Work Request F
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Fahrenheit
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GPM -
Gallons Per Minute ISI -
Inservice Inspection IST Inservice Test'
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LC0 -
Limiting Condition for Operation M0V Motor-0perated Valve
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M0 VATS - Motor-0perated Valve Actuation Testing MWR -
Maintenance Work Request NCR -
Nonconformance Report NRC -
Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR -
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation PMD -
Plant Modifications Department QA
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Quality Assurance Quality Control QC
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RCP -
Radiation Control and Protection Procedure Reactor Coolant System RCS
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Safety Injection SAER -
Safety Audit and Engineering Review Steam Generator S/G
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SSPS -
Solid State Protection Systen Solenoid Operated Valve S0V
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STP Surveillance Test Procedure
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Service Water Technical Specification TS
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TSC -
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Work Authorization
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