IR 05000348/1980029
| ML20002B460 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1980 |
| From: | Bradford W, Martin R, Mulkey J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20002B457 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-80-29, 50-364-80-41, NUDOCS 8012110620 | |
| Download: ML20002B460 (11) | |
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'o UNITED STATES
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3, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
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101 MARIETT A sT., N W., SUITE 3100 O
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ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30303 g
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Report Nos. 50-348/80-29 and 50-364/80-41 Licensee: Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Birmingham, AL 35202 Facility Name: Farley Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos. NPF-2 and CPPR-86 Inspection at Farley Plant near Dothan, Alabama Inspectors:
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W/ti/fo gW. H. Bradford Dati $ikned yk Ib/w je
@. P. Mulkey Date'S'ignsd Approved by:
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D'. Martin, Section Chief, RONS Branch Dat(e Sfgned SUMMARY Inspection on September 1 through September 30, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 216 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of plant tours, witnessing of preoperational testing, Unit 2 plant testing status, and Unit I plant operations, open items, action items required to be completed prior to fuel loading.
Results Of the six areas inspected, no items of noricompliance or deviations were iden-tified.
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a DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
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W. G. Hairston, Plant Manager J. D. Woodard, Assistant Plant Manager W. D. Shipman, Maintenance Superintendent D. Morey, Operations Superiatendent R. S. Hill, Operations Supervisor R. W. McCracken, Technical Su;erintendent D. E. Mansfield, Startup Superintendent, Unit No. 2 R. M. Coleman, Supervising Engineer H. M. McClelland, Plant Engineer H. Garland, Maintenance Supervisor C. Nesbitt, C & HP Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included Shift Supervisors, Shift Foremen, technicians, plant operators, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organizations
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S. M. Hall, Westinghouse Startup Services Manager and certain Westinghouse startup engineers.
NRC Resident Inspector W. H. Bradford 2.
Exit-Interview
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews
on September 19, 1980 and September 30, 1980, with the plant manager and l
selected members of his staff-The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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5.
Plant Tours
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Tours of selected plant areas were conducted throughout the reporting l
period. The following items, as available were observed:
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a.
Fire Equipment Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppression i
equipment.
b.
Hcusekeeping Minimal accumulations of debris and maintenance of required cleanliness levels in systems under or following testing.
c.
Equipment Preservation i
Maintenance of special preservative measures for installed equipment as applicable.
d.
Component Tagging Implementation and observance of equipment tagging for safety or equipment protection.
e.
Communication Effectiveness of public address system in all areas toured.
f.
Equipment Controls
E'.fectiveness of jurisdictional c'ntrols in precluding unauthorized work on systems turned over for initial operations or preoperational testing.
g Foreign Material Exclusion Maintenance of controls to assure systems which have been cleaned and flushed are not reopened to admit foreign material.
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Security
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Implementation of security provisions for both Units.
Within the above areas, no items of noncompliance or deviations were observed when compared to the applicable station _ programs and procedures.
6.
Witnessing of Preoperational Testing.
i The inspectors witnessed portions of preoperational test procedure no.
058-5-003, " Reactor Protection Time Response". Test results were reviewed to verify that-acceptance criteria were met.
The performance of the test was evaluated against the requirements of ANSI N18.7-1972, section 6.0,
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" Test and Inspection Procedures",' ANSI N45.2-1971, Section 12, " Test Control",
and chapter 14 of the FSAR, " Initial Tests and Operation".
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Within the areas inspected there were no deficiencies identified.
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Unit No. 2 Plant Testing Status The status of the licensee'. Phase II Preoperational Testing Program was reviewed and is summarized oelow:
Testing Completed - 63%
Testing in Progress - 24%
Testing not started - 11%
Test Data approved - 50%
8.
Unit No. 1 Plant Operation The inspector reviewed plant operation to ascertain conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications and Administrative Procedure No. 16,
" Conduct of Operation - Operation Groups".
The following areas were reviewed:
The licensee's adherence to the limiting conditions for operation.
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b.
Instrumentation and recorder traces were observed fer abnormalities, Approved procedures were adhered to by the operating staff.
c.
d.
Proper shift manning.
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Operating logs and records were reviewed.
f.
That the flow path for selected engineered safeguards trains were in the correct lineups, electrically and mechanically, for components that must actuate on an initiation signal.
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That the licensee's equipment tag out records for maintenance were in accordance with Administrative Procedure No. 14, " Safety and Clearance Tagging".
Within the areas inspected no items of noncompliance ur deviations were identified.
9.
Open Items Closed (364/80-06-02)
This item concerned constant load spring hanger mounting arrangements
missing top support spacers.
The reporting inspector also questioned the installation of the threaded inch top support bolt.
The licensee has inspected the questionable hangers under Field Change Request No. 50011-1, dated 9/13/80.
The inch threaded top support bolt has been removed and a 5/8 inch shoulder bolt has been installed.
The inspector has reviewed these hangers and verified that they are installed in accordance with Figure 66 of the Grinnell Specification. The appropriate drawings and hanger sketches were also utilized in this review.
The inspector has no further questions.
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10.
Unit No. 2 Action Items Required to be Completed Prior to Fuel Loat ng i
The inspector reviewed and verified the following items had been completed.
These items are required to be completed by the licensee prior to fuel loading on Unit No. 2.
The items are identified by Task numbers and Safety Evaluation Report (Supplement No. 4) section numbers.
There are other outstanding items which the licensee is required to complete prior to fuel loading. The inspector will review and verify the completion of the remaining items prior to fuel loading.
Task Ns 1.A.1..
Shift Technical Advisor The licensee has placed. shift technical advisors (STA's) on shift who serve in a dedicated capacity. The STA will report to the shift supervisor during emergency conditions..The duties of the STA are addressed in Administrative Procedure No. 16, " Conduct of Operation-
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Operations Group".
A training program has been initiated and is in progress to administer additional training for STA's commensurate with NUREG-0578. The licensee has stated that this training will be completed by January 1,1981.
Task No.
1.A.1.3 Shift Manning The licensee has submitted a letter of September 8, 1980 which describes their proposal for shift manning. By telephone conversation with the Region Il office, this proposal of shift manning is acceptable to the Commission.
The shift manning and overtime limitations are addressed in Admin-istrative Procedure No. 16, " Conduct of Operations, Operations Group" and meet the NRC requirements.
Task No.
1.A.2.1 Immendiate Upgrading of R0 and SRO Training and Qualification The inspector has reviewed the licensee's revised training program to verify that the training program has been upgraded to meet the reg _ ire-ments of the TMI-2 action plan. The training program includes training in heat transfer, fluid flow and thermodynamics.
The inspector did not review the program to determine if the program was adequate. This will be determined by another branch of the NRC.
. Task No.
1.A.2.3 Administrative of Training Programs for. Licensed Operators The inspector reviewed the qualifications of the licensee's training personnel and has verified that SRO and RO instructors hold a valid SRO licens.
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Task No.
I.B.I.2 Evaluation of Organization and Management Improvements of Operating Licensee Applicants The inspector participated in this NRC team inspection conducted on June 24, and June 30 - July 2, 1980. The results of this inspection are documented in inspection report number 50-364/80-27.
Task No.
I.C.1 Short Term Accid at Analysis and Procedure Revision (Small Break LOCA)
The inspector provided assistance and interfaced with the NRR review team.
Comments resulting from this review have been received by the licensee. The licensee has been cleared to go to 5% power with the
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present precedures.
The inspector will verify that the required changes to the appropriate procedures have been completed prior to exceeding 5% power operation.
Task No.
1.C.7 NSS Vendor Review of Low Power Test Procedures
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The licensee has submitted a letter dated September 5,1980 to the Region II office which states that the low power physics test proce-dures, power ascention test procedures, special test procedures and emergency operating procedures have been transmitted to the NSS vendor (Westinghouse) for their review and comments.
Comments have been received by the licensee from Westinghouse on the low power physics test procedures, the special te st procedures, and the emergency operating procedures.
These comments are under review by the licensee and the NRC.
This item will remain open pending the receipt of the review comments from Westinghouse on the remaining test procedures and the final.
review by the licensee and the NRC.
(364/80-41-01)
Task No.
I I.G.1 Training During Low Power Testing l
The inspector has reviewed the licensee's training plan to verify that
? > censed personnel will participate in and observe the testing during t e low power testing program.
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II.B.4 Training for Mitigating Core Damage The licensee has submitted a letter to the NRC, dated July 29, 1980, which describes the training to be adminstered for mitigating core
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damage.
The licensee has submitted a letter to the NRC, dated September 25,
1980, stating that the previously approved traini.ag program for mit-l l
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igating core damage will begin on September 29, 1980 and will be completed prior to operation above 5% power.
The inspector will verify that the training has been administered and has been completed prior to exceeding 5% power.
Task NO.
II.E.4.1 Containment Dedicated Systems - h'ydrogen Control The inspector reviewed Emergency Operating Procedure FNP-2-EOP-1.0-
" Loss of Reactor Coolant" and FNP-2-SOP-10.0, " Post LOCA Containment Pressurization and Vent System" to verify that the operation of the hydrogen recombiners was described. Training in these procedures has been incorporated into the Unit 2 Operator training program.
Task No.
II.F.1 Additional Accident Monitoring Instrumentation The inspector reviewed FNP-0-RCP-25, "Caemistry and Health Physics Activities During a Radiological-Accident" Rev. 1, dated 5/15/80 to verify that a procedure had been issued which covers the operation of the additicaal accident monitoring instrumentation.
Task NO.
II.F.2 Inadequate Core Cooling Instruments (saturation meter)
The inspector reviewed FNP-2-SOP-44.2, " Core Subcooling Monitoring System" dated 8/4/80 which describes the operata wn of the subcooling monitor. The inspector verified that the subcooling monitor had been installed. The calibration and functional testing of the monitor has been completed. The inspector will verify that the testing of the subcooling monitor has been completed and that the system is functional prior to fuel load. -(364/80-41-02)
Task No.
II.G.1 Emergency Power for Pressurizer Equipment The inspector reviewed the appropriate electrical drawings to verify the following:
1.
That the power operated relief valves (PORVS) solenoid valves are powered from train A and B 125VDC buses, respectively. That these buses are. powered through associated battery chargers which can be supplied from the train A'or B diesel generators upon loss of offsite power or from the 125VDC. batteries.
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That the PORV motor operated block valves are powered-from their associated train A or B emergency buses.
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That the pressurizer level indication power supply for.each
- channelized' indicator is powered by the corresponding 125VDC emergency bus.
The licensee is presently installing a back up air supply system to the PORV's. Electrical power to the solenoid valves-is supplied from the 125VDC buse _
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III.D.3.3 Inplant Radiation Monitoring The inspector verified that the licensee has the capability for
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accurately determining the pre =ence of airborne /radiciodine in areas within the plant where plant personnel may be present during an accident.
The present instrument on site is a " Nuclear Measurement Iodine Monitor".
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This instrument is a single :hannel analyzer utilizing silver zeolite
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cartridges. The procedure w_Ach details the calibration and operation of the monitor is described in FNP-0-RCP-25, " Chemistry and Health
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Physics Activities During a Radiological Accident (Short Term)". The inspector verified that appropriate Health Physics personnel have received training in the operation of this monitor.
The licensee has received a new monitor on site which is the Eberline IM-2 module. This instrument is scheduled to be placed in service at a later date.
Task No.
II.K.1.C.I.17 Safety Injection Trip on Low Pressurizer Pressure The inspector verified that the automatic initiation of cafety injection on coincident low pressurizer pressure and leve? had been removed by a design change to initiate a trip with a low pressurizer pressure signal.
This design change is documented in Plant Change Notice No. 13-79-382 Rev. I dated 5/18/79 Task No.
II.K.1 IE Bulletin on Measures to Mitigate Small-Break LOCAs and Loss of Feedwater Accidents The inspector has verified that the appropriate plant procedure have been modified to require that the operability of the redundant safety related system will be verified prior to removing a safety related system from service. The operability of the system will be verified prior to returning it to service. This includes performing independent valve verification following major outages or significant maintenance in areas containing safety related equipment. Administrative proce-dures require that a board walk-down inspection be performed at the beginning of each shift to determine: system alignment, electrically and mechanically; that the operator's log reflects the removal from service and return to service of all safety related equipment; and that shift relief and turnover logs accurately reflect the disposition of safety related systems.
Task No.
II.K.3 Final Recommendation of B&O Task Force The inspector verified that the licensee had modified the pressure intergral derivative controller installed on the pressurizer relief valve (PORV) to eliminate spurious openings of the PORV.
This work is documented in FNP-STP-201.21, " Pressurizer Pressure
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Control" dated 9/11/79.
The inspector verified that the aniticipatory reactor trip upon turbine trip had been modified so that it will be by passed at power levels lass than 50%.
This trip has been set at 35% reactor power.
This item is documented on the following: Westinghouse Change Notice No.'s. 10603 and 10611 and by Startup Work Request No. 5803, completed on 11/9/79.
SER Section 5.4.2 Low Temperature Overpressure Mitigation System The reactor overpressure mitigation system is addressed in section 3.4.9.3 of the unit No. 2 T. aft Technical Specifications. This speci-fication states in part that two RHR relief valves must be operable when the RCS cold leg temperature is less than or equal to 310 F, except when the reactor vessel head is recoved, and the associated RHR relief isolation valves are open or a reactor coolant system vent of greater than 2.35 sqaare inches is operable.
The operation of the overpressure mitigation system is addressed in unit operating procedures FNP-2-UOP-1.1, FNP-2-UOP-2.2, and FNP-2-U0P-7.0.
SER Section 5.9.4 Steam Generator Inpsection Ports The steam generator inspection ports have been installed on the Unit No. 2 steam generators and have been inspected by the inspector. The documentation concerning the installation of the inspection ports is documented on inspection report 50-364/80-33.
SER 7.3 ESF Reset Controls - IEB 80-06 The inspector witnessed the conduct of test procedure No. 548-6-001
" Plant Response to Integrated Safeguards Without Black out".
During the integrated safeguards testing, all safety related equipment remained in its emergency mode upon reset of the ESF signal. This is documented by Alabama Power Company memo No. A4.16 dated September 10, 1980.
SER 8.2 - Offsite Power System The licensee committed to performing a test on Unit which would measure the electrical parameters under steady state load conditions on the 4160 volt bus 2G, 600 volt buses 2E and 2T, and 208 volt bus 2T safety buses which had been determined by analysis to exhibit the largest voltage drops during the worse case analysis. These buses were loaded with auxiliary loads and the upstream auxiliary bus was loaded with one 7000 horsepower circulating water pump. The licensee has performed this test. The test results are documented in test procedure no. 548-6-001, " Plant Pesponse to Integrated Safeguards Without Blackout".
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The other deficiency associated with this condition was that with two units operating, only diesel generator 2-C train B will be dedicated to the river water system, leaving only four river water pumps avail-able. The failure of diesel generator 2C could leave the plant with no river water pumps available.
The licensee has taken corrective action to correct this deficiency.
These corrective actions are documented in Plant Change.otice No.78-246.
The testing performed to verify the corrective action is documented in the follwoing test procedures:
024-5-001 -
Diesel Generator Load Sequencing Pre-op (Train A)
024-5-003 -
Diesel Generator Sequencing Pre-op (Train B)
024-5-004 -
Diesel Generator 1-2A, IC, IB, 2C Response to Loss-of-Offsite Power / Safety Injection - Unit I and Unit 2.
548-6-002 -
Plant Response to Integrated Safeguards With Black out.
SER 7.7.1 Environmental Qualification of Pressure Transmitters The inspector has verified the placement of environmentally qualified ITT LOT 2 Barton Transmitters.
The quality control of these trans-mitters is documented in an ITT Barton Quality Control Release dated April 20, 1979. The purchase order number is 546-CLC-292852.
The installation of these transmitters is documented in contruction Work Request No. 2-54-08 dated 10/5/79 and Plant Change Notice No.
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l SER 7.10 Temperature Effects on Level measurement I
The inspector has verified that the insulation of the steam generator narrow range level instrumentation reference legs has been completed.
i This work is documented by Construction Work Request No._2-63-36 dated l
3/21/80 and Operating Change Request No. 2-3601 dated 1/10/80.
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assure that the operator will account for temperature effects on
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reference legs during the post-accident monitoring period:
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~10-i E0P-1.0 Loss of Reactor Coolant
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Loss of Secondary Coolant SER 9.3.1 Auxiliary Feedwater System
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By letter of December 20, 1978 the licensee stated that a separate 3 i
kilovolt-ampere uninterruptible power system would be added to the auxiliary feedwater system to supply power fcr controls of the
i steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
The inspector has inspected and verified that the above 3 kilovolt
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ampere uninterruptible power supply has been installed.
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