ML20140B792
| ML20140B792 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 03/17/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140B782 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-348-97-01, 50-348-97-1, 50-364-97-01, 50-364-97-1, NUDOCS 9704010214 | |
| Download: ML20140B792 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000348/1997001
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)
REGION II
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Docket Nos:
50-348 and 50-364
License Nos:
Report No:
50-348/97-01 and 50-364/97-01
Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company. Inc.
Facility:
Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP), Units 1 and 2
Location:
7388 North State Highway 95
Columbia. AL 36319
Dates:
January 4 - February 15, 1997
Inspectors:
T. Ross, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Bartley, Resident Inspector
Approved by:
P. Skinner. Chief, Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
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Enclosure 2
9704010214 970317
ADOCK 05000348
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Farley Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-348/97-01, 50-364/97-01
This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations,
engineering, maintenance, and plant support.
The report covers a 6-week
neriod of resident inspections.
Operations
Operations personnel performed well while maintaining plant conditions
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during Unit 1 and 2 at steady state full power operation.
Power
reductions and increases on both units were well controlled
(Sections 01.1 and 01.3).
The conduct of Operations personnel and
management was consistently in compliance with procedures and regulatory
requirements (Sections 02.4 and 02.5).
Unit 1 new fuel receipt inspection and transfer to the s)ent fuel pool
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was performed in a deliberate and methodical manner, witlout incident
(Section 01.2).
Housekeeping and )hysical conditions were generally adequate, although
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certain areas loot particularly poor.
Licensee efforts to improve
targeted areas was evident.
However. overall efforts to improve plant
appearances are proceeding very slowly.
Overall plant lighting is good
but remains a persistent challenge (Section 02.1).
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System walkdowns verified that selected safety systems were properly
aligned and capable of fulfilling their design function (Sections 02.2).
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Licensee efforts to identify. resolve, and prevent problems remained
effective (Section 07.1).
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Employee concerns collected during exit interviews with contractors
during the last Unit 2 outage were not forwarded to the Concerns
Coordinator and were not processed according to Concerns Program
procedures (Section 07.2).
Maintenance
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Maintenance and surveillance testing activities were routinely conducted
in a thorough and competent manner by well qualified individuals in
accordance with plant procedures and work instructions (Sections M1.1
and M1.4), except for one instance (see below).
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A violation was issued for numerous examples of failing to follow
procedure by a test engineer during surveillance testing of the Unit 1
Penetration Room Filtration system.
The test engineer also lacked
familiarity with the test procedure and in-depth knowledge of the system
being tested (Section M1.3).
Enclosure 2
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fnoineering
Configuration Control Board meetings continue to be an effective process
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in screening and prioritizing proposed design changes (Sec* ion E1.1).
Corporate and onsite engineering support in resolving numerous issues
regsrding Penetration Room Filtration system operability, design
requirements, reportability, and testing was responsive, well
coordinated. and thorough (Section E2.1).
Plant Sucoort
Health Physics control over the radiologically controlled area, and the
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work activities conducted within it, was good.
Efforts to ensure proper
use of personnel dosimetry have been generally effective, yet 3roblems
have not been completely eliminated.
Several instances of pro 31 ems with
contamination control catches were identified (Section R2.1).
Security activities continued to be performed in a conscientious and
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capable manner, assuring the physical protection of protected and vital
areas.
Corrective actions to address improper key carding of vital area
doors were prompt and effective (Section S1.1).
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The Unit 1 smoke detection system in containment continues to be
unreliable (Section F2.1).
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Enclosure 2
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Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated continuously at 100% power for the entire inspection period,
except for two short power reductions.
On January 19, while at 89% power for
routine main turbine generator (MTG) governor valve (GV) testing, the MTG #2
throttle valve (TV) actuator shaft sheared, and the #3 GV actuator shaft
became unpinned.
The #3 GV was repinned and unit returned to full power on
January 22, with the #2 TV in the failed closed position.
Later, on
January 22, the unit was reduced to about 30% power after the #4 TV
unexpectedly drifted partially closed and then reopened.
The #2 TV actuator
linkage and the #4 TV electro-hydraulic servo control valve were subsequently
replaced.
Unit I returned to full power on January 25.
Unit 2 operated continuously at 100% power for the entire inspection period.
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except for January 31 through February 3.
During this weekend unit power was
reduced to 15% power to conduct scheduled steam generator (SG) flushes and a
boron soak.
I. Doerations
01
Conduct of Operations
01.1 Routine Observations of Control Room Goerations
a.
Insoection Scooe (Insoection Procedure (IP) 71707)
Resident inspectors conducted frequent inspections of ongoing plant
operations in the Main Control Room (MCR) to verify proper staffing,
operator attentiveness, adherence to approved operating procedures,
communications, and command and control of operator activities.
The
inspectors also regularly reviewed operator logs and Technical
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S)ecifications (TS) Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) tracking
sleets, walked down the Main Control Boards (MCB), and interviewed
members of the operating shift crew to verify operational safety and
compliance with TSs.
The inspectors regularly attended daily plant
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status meetings to maintain awareness of overall facility operations,
maintenance activities, and recent incidents. Morning reports and
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Occurrence Reports (ors) were reviewed on a routine basis to assure that
potential safety concerns were properly reported and resolved.
b.
Observations. Findinas and Conclusions
Overall control and awareness of plant conditions during the inspection
period remained excellent.
During tours of the MCR, the inspectors
observed that the Unit 1 MCBs and Balance of Plant
Janels were
frequently in a " blackboard" condition.
Whereas, tie Emergency Power
Board and Unit 2 MCBs consistently had one or two persistent annunciator
alarms.
Aggressive efforts to maintain MCB deficiencies at very low
levels were effective.
The combined number of MCB deficiencies remained
below 15, the lowest level for many months.
Operator attentiveness and
Enclosure 2
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res)onse to changing plant conditions remained very good.
Interviews
wit 1 the operators indicated that they were well aware of plant
conditions and the status of on-going activities.
01.2 Receint. Insoection and Transfer of New Fuel For Unit 1 (IP 60705)
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The inspectors observed the receipt. inspection, and transfer of new
fuel assemblies from the shipping containers to the Unit 1 spent fuel
3001 (SFP).
Inspectors reviewed FNP-0-FHP-3.0. Receipt and Storage of
iew Fuel. Revision 28. and verified that licensee Jersonnel were
following the procedure.
Licensee personnel were (nowledgeable and very
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methodical in their handling and inspection of the new tuel assemblies.
01.3 Resoonse to Unit 1 Governor Valve and Throttle Valve failures (IP 71707)
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On January 19. 1997, while troubleshooting the 1B reheat stop valve. the
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- 2 TV went shut for ro apparent reason (it was later determined that the
actuator shaft had si?ared).
Later that day, the #3 GV became unpinned
and drifted shut.
An inspector was in the MCR when the #3 GV went shut
and observed the crew's response to the transient and troubleshooting
efforcs.
The inspector determined that shift response was prompt and
well-controlled.
Troubleshooting efforts and analysis of plant
conditions were thorough and conservative.
On January 20 the inspector
observed the retest of the #3 GV, including the 3re-evolution briefing.
The inspector determined that the Jre-evolution 3riefing was thorough
and covered potential problems.
T1e operators' control of the plant and
communications were excellent.
02
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1 General Tours of Soecific Safety-Related Areas (IP 71707)
General tours of safety-related areas were performed by the resident
inspectors to examine the physical conditions of plant equipment and
structures, and to verify that safety systems were properly aligned and
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in good material condition.
These general walkdowns included the
accessible portions of safety-related structures systems and
components were in the following areas:
Unit 1 and 2 SFP and SFP cooling pump rooms
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Unit 1 and 2 new fuel storage areas
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Unit 1 and 2 piping penetration rooms (PPR) on 100 foot elevation
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Unit 1 and 2 PPRs on 121 foot elevation
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Unit 1 and 2 electrical penetration rooms and vital motor control
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centers
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Unit 1 and 2 penetration room filtration (PRF) systems
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Unit 1 and 2 charging pump rooms and hallway
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U.nt 2 residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger (HX) rooms
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Unit 2 RHR pump rooms
Unit 1 and 2 component cooling water (CCW) pump and HX rooms
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Enclosure 2
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Unit 2 CCW surge tank and safety parameter display system
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uninterruptible power supply (UPS) rooms
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Unit I refueling water storage tank (RWST)
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Unit 2 post accident hydrogen analyzers
Unit 1 and 2 vital 4160 volt alternating current (VAC) switchgear
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and vital 600 VAC load center rooms, trains A and B
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Turbine building
Unit 1 and 2 vital 125 volt direct current battery chargers,
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inverters and buses
Emergency diesel generator (EDG) building
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Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump rooms
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Unit 1 motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump rooms
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Unit 1 and 2 containment spray (CS) pump rooms
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Service water intake structure (SWIS)
including service water
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system (SWS) pumps and switchgear
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Unit 1 and 2 control room emergency filtration system (CREFS) and
control room air conditioning system (CRACS)
General material conditions and housekeeping for both units were
adequate.
Plant areas were generally clear of trash and debris, but
most painted surfaces of floors and equipment were chipped, stained and
looked well worn.
Efforts to improve physical appearances of targeted
plant areas and equipment are ongoing, indicating continued management
attention.
However, overall efforts to improve plant a)pearances are
]roceeding very slowly.
Equipment and housekeeping pro]lems identified
)y the inspectors during their routine tours were reported to the
responsible Shift Supervisor (SS) and/or maintenance department for
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resolution.
None of these problems represented operability concerns.
Some of the more significant and/or repetitive discrepancies identified
by the inspectors included:
Numerous burned out lights in various rooms in the Radiologically
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Controlled Area (RCA), especially the new fuel storage and SFF
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areas;
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Flooding inside the Unit 1 RWST missile shield:
4KV SWS breakers in the SWIS were not properly secured for seismic
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qualification considerations; and.
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Poor physical conditions of charging pump skids, especially
2B charging pump (excepting 2A charging pump that was recently
cleaned and painted).
02.2 Biweekly Insoections of Safety Systems (IP 71707)
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Resident irspectors used IP 71707 to verify the operability of the
following selected safety systems:
Unit 1 high head safety injection (HHSI) system
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Unit 2 CCW system
Enclosure 2
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Accessible portions of these systems were verified to be properly
aligned and operable.
The inspectors did not identify any significant
issues that adversely affected system operability.
However, the
ins)ectors did identify a number of minor problems (e.g.. equipment
lea (s. labeling incon.sistencies, burned out lighting, inadequate catch
containment) that were identified to the SS.
02.3 Enaineered Safeauards Feature System Walkdown (IP 71707)
A detailed walkdown of the PRF system was conducted during this
inspection period: the results will be documented in NRC inspection
report (IR) 50-348, 364/97-04.
02.4 Taa Orders (IP 71707)
During the course of routine resident inspections, portions of the
following tag orders (TO) and associated equipment clearance tags were
examined by the inspectors:
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e TO# 97-039-1
TDAFW pump
e TO# 97-113-2
2A service air compressor
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e TO# 97-163-2
2A charging pum)
e TO# 97-172-2
Unit 2 main tur)ine #2 throttle valve
e TO# 97-234-1
o TO# 97-255-2
2B charging pump room cooler
e TO# 97-278-2
2D SWS pump
e TO# 97-336-1
1-2A EDG
e TO# 97-388-1
1A PRF
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All tags and TOs examined by the inspectors were properly executed and
implemented.
02.5 TS LCO Trackina (IP 71707)
Resident ins)ectors routinely rer ewed the TS LC0 tracking sheets filled
out by the slift foremen (SF) whenever a TS LCO action statement was
entered.
All tracking sheets for Unit 1 and 2 reviewed by the
ins)ectors were consistent with plant conditions and TS recuirements,
wit 1 one exception.
On February 12, 1997, o)erators taggec out the
B train CREFS and CRACS to complete Design C1ange Package (DCP)
S95-0-8816.
The shift personnel properly entered and logged the one
time 30-day TS LCO for the CREFS recirculation filtration function and
for the CRACS.
However, when reviewing the Unit 1 LC0 log on
February 14. an inspector noted that the SF had not processed an LCO
tracking sheet for the 7 day LC0 of the Train B CREFS pressurization
function.
The resident inspector questioned why operators had not
initiated a TS LC0 tracking sheet.
The inspector determined that the
specific cperators questioned (i.e. . SF) were not aware that the
pressurization function was not aart of the one-time 30-day extension.
The inspector discussed this witl Operations supervision and determined
Enclosure 2
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that, although the specific shift personnel were not aware of the 7-day
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LCO Opeations management was aware of a id tracking the out-of-service
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time. TH inspector verified that the LCO action time was not exceeded.
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Quality Assurance in Operations
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07.1 Effectiveness of Licensee Control in Identifyina. Resolvina. and
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Preventina Problems (IP 71707 and 40500)
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The resident inspectors briefly reviewed all newly initiated ors and
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completed ors approved by the Operations Manager during the inspection
period to ensure that plant incidents which affect or could potentially
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affect safety were properly documented and processed in accordance with
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FNP-0-AP-30. Preparation and Processing of Incident Reports.
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Revision 22.
Certain selected ors were reviewed is detail as part of-
the routine inspection program.
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Overall, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's program for
identifying and resolving problems remained effective and was being
accomplished in accordance with FNP-0-AP-30.
Plant personnel and
management exhibited an appropriate threshold for identifying problems,
initiating ors. and assigning formal root cause teams.
Each new OR
received prompt attention and was regularly discussed in the morning
status / plan of the day meeting.
Furthermore, the Operations manager
continued to pursue the OR backlog with other managers to reduce the
number.
The following ors were reviewed for accuracy. completeness, and
reportability; and adequacy of corrective actions was confirmed or
verified:
OR 1-97-033; MCR Pressurization Damper Sticking Open
OR 1-96-406: Nitrogen bottle tied off to service air piping
OR 2-96-390: IBD Rod Control Power Cabinet Failure
OR 1-97-015: Unit 1 #2 Throttle Valve Failed Closed
07.2 Emoloyee Concerns Proaram
On February 13. an inspector met with the site manager for Williams
Power Corporation (WPC) and a licensee representative from Plant
Modification and Design to discuss implementation of the Southern
Nuclear Company (SNC) Concerns Program, in particular the exit interview
process for contractors. According to section 5.14 of the SNC Concerns
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Program. Revision 1. exiting employees should be given the opportunity
to state their concerns in writing using a standard form, and whenever
possible exiting employees wil1 be given an exit interview prior to
departing the site. Completed exit interview forms are then forwarded
to the Concerns Coordinator (CC).
Section 5.7. for quality and non-
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Quality concerns, states that an investigation report wil1 be prepared
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and submitted, normally within 30 days.
The results of the
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Enclosure 2
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investigation will then be summarized and sent to the concerned
individual via an acknowledgement letter.
During the meeting with the WPC site manager, the inspector
independently reviewed exit interview forms containing specific concerns
by contract employees that were filled out following the recent Unit 2
refueling outage.
Some of these forms were dated in November 1996: most
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were not dated.
Only one of the forms documented the conduct of an exit
interview.
Of the completed forms reviewed, six of them documented
concerns regarding the quality of FNP Health Physics (HP) personnel and
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practices, and inadequate. emergency communications capability in certain
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areas of the plant.
None of the forms had been forwarded to the CC for
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processing in accordance with the SNC Concerns Program.
Consequently.
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none of the FNP concerns had been investigated. The inspector
subsequently met with the CC and responsible manager to discuss the
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Concerns Program, and specifically questioned how the WPC exit interview
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forms were overloo'ked.
By the end of the inspection report period, the
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licensee was still reviewing this issue.
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II. Maintenance
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M1
Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 General Comments
Inspectors observed and reviewed portions of various licensee corrective
and preventive maintenance activities. and witnessed routine
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surveillance testing to determine conformance with plant procedures.
work instructions. industry codes and standards, technical
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specifications (TSs), and regulatory requirements.
a.
Insoection Scooe (IP 61726 and 62707)
The resident inspectors observed all or portions of the following
maintenance and surveillance activities, as identified by their
associated work order (WO) work authorization, or Surveillance Test
Procedure (STP):
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FNP-2-STP-11.2. 2B RHR Pump Quarterly Inservice Test
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FNP-1-STP-16.1. lA CS Pump Quarterly Inservice Test
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FNP-1-IMP-220.22. Calibration of Containment Air Temperature
Recorder and Indicator
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FNP-1-STP-17.0. Containment Cooling System Train B Operability
Test
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FNP-0-IMP-425.3. Pressure Actuated Switches (Unit 1 TDAFW Pump)
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WO 00538634. Replace TDAFW Pump Drain Pot Level Control Valve
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FNP-1-IMP-205.2. Safety Injection Header to BIT tank Flow FT-943
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WO 470202. Clean and Flush 2A Air Compressor Cooling Jackets
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WO S00079676. B Train MCR HVAC. Install New Motor and Sheeve
(DCP S95-0-8816)
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WO S96005269. Install Blanks for A Train MCR Recirculation Unit
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WO 96006106. Replace 2A HHSI Pump Seal
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WO M9700045. Repair Unit 2 #2 TV
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' NP-2-ETP-4181. Technical Support Center Filtration Systems
Performance Testing
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FNP-1-STP-124.0. Penetration Room Filtration Performance Test
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DCP 595-0-8816. B Train CRACS Modification
b.
Observations. Findinas and Conclusions
All of the maintenance work and surveillance testing observed by the
inspectors was performed in accordance with work instructions,
procedures, and applicable clearance controls.
No adverse findings were
identi fied.
Safety-related maintenance and surveillance testing
evolutions were well planned and executed.
Responsible personnel
demonstrated familiarity with administrative and radiological controls.
Surveillance tests of safety-related equipment were consistently
performed in a deliberate step-by-step manner by personnel in close
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communication with the main control room (MCR).
Overall. operators and
technicians appeared knowledgeable, experienced, and well trained for
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the tasks they performed.
M1.2 Calibration of Unit 1 Containment Sorav (CS) System Flow Transmitter and
Indicator. B Train
On January 28. an inspector observed Instrumentation and Control (I&C)
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technicians attempt to calibrate the 1B CS system flow indicator in
accordance with FNP-1-IMP-208.2. Containment Spray Flow FT958B Loop
Calibration. Revision 11.
This dual train flow indicator was recently
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replaced due to problems with the train A indication, so I&C technicians
also had to perform an initial calibration of the B train flow
indicator.
The A train indicator had already been calibrated and
returned to service on January 24.
During the 1B CS flow indicator
calibration. I&C technicians determined that the indicator would not
calibrate within prescribed tolerances.
Consecuently, the technicians
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stopped, notified the shift supervisor (SS), anc left the MCR to discuss
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the matter with their supervision.
Up to this point the I&C
technicians had performed their calibration activities according to
procedural instructions and had proceeded as far they could without
additional guidance.
On January 28. the 1B CS flow indicator was determined to be out of
calibration and could not be readily adjusted within allowed tolerances.
The indicator had been left uncalibrated over the previous weekend,
after being re) laced.
However, the current operating crew had been
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unaware that t7e 1B CS flow indicator was not calibrated prior to
releasing work to the I&C technicians on January 28.
Apparently, the
various operating crews did not adequately turn over the status of the
1B CS flow indicator nor identify it in any visible manner on the main
control board (MCB) (e.g.
deficiency tag).
The inspector discussed
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this situation with the Operations manager, who promptly sent a Night
Orders memo to all licensed shift personnel explaining the problem and
reiterating management expectations.
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M1.3 Unit 1 Penetration Room Filtration (PRF) Performance Test
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a.
Insoection Scooe (IP 61726)
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- The inspector observed the performance of FNP-1-STP-124.0 Penetration
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Room Filtration Performance Test. Rev.11, while it was being conducted
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on the Unit 1. Train A PRF system. The ins)ector started the
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observation just as Operations started the 3RF system, per step 7.5.
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b.
Observations and Findinas
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The inspector started identifying deficiencies with the 3erformance of
the STP almost immediately.
Upon entering the Unit 1 PR
room, the
inspector observed the Engineering Support (ES) engineer shifting the
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test apparatus from the Train B filter housing to the Train A filter
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housing. The ES engineer and a contractor had mistakenly set u) their
equipment on the Train B PRF filter housing. They recognized t1eir
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mistake when operators started Train A.
This error did not impact the
operability of the Train B PRF due to the method of installing the test
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equipment.
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The inspector reviewed the official test copy of the procedure and noted
that step 7.4 (visual inspection) had been signed off .1s complete and
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that steps 5.0 (Precautions and Limitations) and 6.0 U nitial
Conditions) were signed off by the SS but not the test supervisor
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(i.e.. ES engineer). The inspector asked the ES engin.er to describe
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the scope of the visual inspection which had been per' n ed. The ES
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engineer then explained that an external visual inspcctu n was
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performed. The inspector reviewed the procedure in more detail and
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noted that step 7.4 referred to an inspection check list in Data Package
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STP-124.0A. After reviewing the inspection checklist. Data Sheet 2.
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" Visual Inspection Check List." the inspector concluded that an internal
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visual inspection of the filter housing was required. Also, the
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inspector noted that step 5.4 of the " Precautions and Limitations"
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required tagging out the system prior to performing the visual
inspection. The inspector then reviewed the official test copy and
found that Data Sheet 2 did not contain any signoffs for the visual
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inspection. This discrepancy and the requirement to tagout the system
were identified to the ES engineer, who appeared unfamiliar with the
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visual inspection checklist. After further discussion, the ES engineer
stated they would conduct the internal visual inspection after
completing the flow. High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter, and
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charcoal filter tests. The sign off of step 7.4 by the engineer prior
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to completing this step and the failure to sign off steps 5.0 and 6.0
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prior to commencing the test are examples of Violation (VIO)
50-348/97-01-01: Failure To Follow PRF Operability Test Procedure.
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The inspector observed the conduct of the flow and filter tests. These
tests were mainly conducted in accordance with the procedure.
However,
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the irispector noted t'nat when the 12-inch exhaust line did not meet the
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minimum flow, the test personnel performed a horizontal traverse
measurement and averaged the readings with the vertical traverse
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measurement.
The horizontal traverse was not performed on the other
duct. The inspector questioned the contractor about this practice and
determined the practice was not prohibited nor was it directed by the
procedure.
The data table for recording the data only provided spaces
for one traverse measurement.
The contractor was knowledgeable, professional, and very familiar with
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the equipment and ventilation system design requirements.
However, the
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contractor was not familiar with plant specific procedural requirements.
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The ES engineer in charge of the test also did not appear to be familiar
with the test procedure, nor the test equipment. The inspector's
observations and the engineer's failure to follow procedure
requirements, were subsequently discussed with ES supervision and
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management.
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The test personnel completed the flow and filter tests and proceeded to
start the internal inspection.
Prior to opening the filter housing, the
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inspector again reminded the ES engineer of the requirement to tag out
the system as required by step 5.4.
The ES engineer continued with the
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inspection without tagging out the system. This is another example of
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VIO 50-348/97-01-01: Failure To Follow PRF Operability Test Procedure.
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The inspector discussed the tagout requirement with the ES engineer a
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third time and suggested that the issue (whether or not the tagout was
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required) be resolved with the Unit 2 SS prior to performing the STP on
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Unit 2.
The inspector also discussed the procedural violations with the
Unit 1 SS who promptly initiated Occurrence Report (OR) 1-25-028.
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The inspector verified that the flow. HEPA filter, and Charcoal filter
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test results met the acceptance criteria.
The air flow measurements
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indicated an airflow of 4509 cubic feet per minute (cfm).
This was only
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9 cfm above the minimum band of the acceptance criteria (5000 2 500 cfm)
and 491 cfm below the systems design flow as identified in the Updated
Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
The inspector reviewed ap)licable TS surveillance requirements (SRs) and
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determined that TS 4.7.8.3.1 required performing a visual ins)ection
prior to the HEPA and Charcoal filter leak tests. However, t1is
requirement was inconsistent with the conduct of STP-124.0 observed by
the ins)ector, because the internal visual inspection was performed
after tie HEPA and Charcoal filter leak tests.
The inspector reviewed
the procedure and determined that it did prescribe the test sequence to
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ensure conformance with the TS SRs.
However, the sequence in which the
engineer performed the test did not comply with the TS SRs.
Licensee
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Enclosure 2
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personnel were unaware that the TS required a visual inspection to be
performed first.
Licensee management took prompt and comprehensive corrective actions in
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response to the inspector's findings.
These actions included
,
counselling the test engineer, a major revision of STP-124.0, and re-
'
performance of the STP using the revised procedure. The revised version
of STP-124.0 was re-)erformed on Unit 1 Train A on February 6.
The
inspector observed t1e test and determined that the previously
identified procedural deficiencies were corrected.
c. Conclusions
The ES engineer supervising the test was not familiar with the test
procedure, the test equipment. nor PRF system operability to adequately
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oversee the contractor.
Three examples of failure to follow procedure
were identified.
Licensee corrective actions were prompt and
comprehensive.
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M1.4 Desion Chance Packaoe (DCP) S95-0-8816. Tie-In of New Control Room Air
.
Conditionino System (CRACS). B Train
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On February 12, 1997, the licensee initiated the final stage of
DCP S95-0-8816 by tagging out the B train CRACS and Control Room
Emergency Filtration System (CREFS).
The B train CRACS outage was
scheduled for 21 days. An ins)ector observed the start of work,
including installation of blanc flanges in the ducts for preserving MCR
pressure boundary integrity and the removal of the old comaressor,
receiver, and cooling coils.
Previous observations of wor ( on the CRACS
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modification were documented in irs 50-348, 364/96-03 and 96-09.
The
inspector determined that the work was well planned and coordinated.
M8
Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues (IP 92902)
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M8.1
(Closed) VIO 50-348.364/95-21-02: Excessive Maintenance Overtime During
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Refueling Outage
,
The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence dated
March 26, 1997 and initiated Corrective Action Report (CAR) No. 2186.
An inspector reviewed the licensee's letter and completed CAR, including
attached training sheets.
The inspector also reviewed applicable
changes made to FNP-0-AP-64 Work Schedules for Personnel, Revision 3.
,
I
that incorporated new administrative guidelines to prevent recurrence.
Furthermore, the inspector reviewed the " Maintenance 1996 Fall Outage
Schedule" for October 5 through November 29, 1996, and selected time and
attendance sheets for certain maintenance teams during the Unit 1 outage
to verify that scheduler practices and actual working hours limited
personnel overtime per FNP-0-AP-64 and TS requirements.
Licensee
corrective actions were effective, this violation is closed.
Enclosure 2
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M8.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-364/95-09: Entry into Mode 2
with Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Detector Inoperable: and
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LER 50-364/95-09-01. Entry Into Specified Condition With A Intermediate
Range Neutron Flux Detector Inoperable
4
These LERs are considered closed based on inspector review and licensee
actions taken to address VIO 50-364/95-20-03 as discussed below.
M8.3 (Closed) VIO 50-364/95-20-03: Reactor Startup With Disconnected Nuclear
Instrumentation System (NIS) Intermediate Range Detector (NI-36)
The licensee responded to this violation in correspondence dated
February 21. 1996 and initiated CAR No. 2184. An inspector reviewed the
licensee's letter, completed CAR, and applicable STP revisions for
source range. intermediate range. and power range NIS instrumentation.
,
These procedures were revised to provide clearer instructions. and
>
require independent verification, when reconnecting NIS detector cables.
The corrective actions detailed in CAR No. 2184 were consistent with the
corrective actions described in the LERs of Section M8.2 above.
The
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inspector verified that Unit 2 intermediate range NIS channel NI-36 was
returned to service. This violation is closed.
M8.4 (Closed) VIO 50-348. 364/95-18-03: Uncontrolled Use Of Non-temperature
Compensated HEISE Gauges
The inspector verified that the corrective actions described in the
licensee's response letter dated December 19, 1995, were reasonable and
complete. The inspector spot checked test pressure devices in the
Calibration Lab and Hot Instrument Shop and found them to be properly
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labelled.
No similar problems were identified.
This violation is
closed.
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M8.5 (Closed) LER 50-364/95-005: Manual Reactor Trips Following A Loss Of
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Electro-hydraulic Fluid
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This event was documented in Inspection Report (IR) 50-348.364/95-11.
The inspector reviewed the LER and the licensee's failure analysis.
.
which determined that the failures were due to excessive stresses on the
"
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tubing caused by mechanical and hydraulic oscillations, which were in
turn the result of servo valve failures.
The licensee replaced the
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servo valves and conducted extensive vibration analysis.
The licensee
has also taken significant (and successful to date) actions to im) rove
the quality of the Electro-hydraulic Control system fluid. This _ER is
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closed.
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Enclosure 2
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III. Enaineerina
El
Conduct of Engineering (IP 37551)
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E1.1 Confiauration Control Board Meetina
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On January 8.1997, inspector attended a regular bimonthly meeting of
the Configuration Control Board (CCB). At this meeting a number of new
ideas and previously tabled ideas were discussed.
Responsible and
affected groups made presentations to the CCB.
Based on the
presentations and collegial deliberations. the CCB decided which ideas
to recommend as design changes and when they could be scheduled.
Overall, the inspector considered the CCB to be an effective process for
screening new ideas and prioritizing proposed design changes.
One of the ideas discussed was Idea Form 196-013 regarding potential
improvements for the Unit 1 containment smoke detection system 1A-22.
In response to Request for Engineering Assistance (REA) 96-1179.
Southern Company Services had evaluated 196-013 and proposed several
solutions to improve 1A-22 reliability.
The CCB approved implementation
of a design change for both units to replace 1A-22 and 2A-22 with
entirely new, independently addressable, smoke detection systems.
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However, due to competing resources and priorities the CCB did not
choose to recommend replacement until the 1998 refueling outages for
both units.
E2
Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
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E2.1 Penetration Room Filtration (PRF) System Desian and Licensina Bases. and
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Testina Reauirements
1
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During the months of January and February the inspectors had frequent
,
meetings and conference calls with Corporate and onsite engineering
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support (ES) management and personnel regarding numerous PRF system
issues. These issues involved Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR) design discrepancies, deficient operating and emergency
.
procedures, excessive penetration room inleakage due to boundary
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degradation. and failure to fully implement technical specification (TS)
,
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surveillance requirements (SRs). As a consequence, the licensee
developed several operability determinations implemented extensive
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penetration room boundary repairs revised plant procedures.
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re-performed surveillance tests, and requested enforcement discretion to
address PRF system related problems.
Due to the number and complexity
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of these issues, the inspectors will document the details and
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conclusions from their inspection efforts in inspection report
(IR) 50-348, 364/97-04.
Corporate and onsite engineering staffs have
!
coordinated well throughout the discussion and resolution of these
issues, and provided good, responsive support to Operations.
ES has
taken the lead in revising PRF system surveillance test procedures
Enclosure 2
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(STPs) to conform with applicable American National Standards Institute.
Inc. (ANSI).N510 sections and conducting the tests.
E8
Hiscellaneous Engineering Issues (IP 92903)
E8.1
(Closed) LER 50-364/95-02. includina revision 1: Increased Clad Oxide
and Deposit Coating On Fuel
Both the original LER and subsequent revision were issued on a voluntary
basis by the licensee.
Unit 2 was the pilot plant for reactor coolant
system (RCS) zinc injection in a pressurized water reactor to help
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mitigate primary water stress corrosion cracking.
After Cycle 10
operation, the licensee observed unexpected indications of potentially
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excessive clad oxidation and abnormal CRUD deposition on the removed
fuel.
Subsequent root cause investigations by the licensee and vendor
concluded that the anomalous clad oxidation behavior was within design
limits and that zinc injection had no more than a small detrimental
effect.
The inspectors met with the licensee and vendor on several
occasions during their investigation, and directly observed clad oxide
measurements of Unit 1 and 2 spent fuel assemblies.
was not restarted on Unit 2 during Cycle 11 while the root cause
investigation was in progress.
The licensee now plans to recommence
zinc injection on Unit 2 during the Summer of 1997.
After Cycle 12. the
,
fuel will be reexamined, and de)ending upon the results, the licensee
may begin zinc injection on bot 1 units.
This LER is closed.
E8.2 (Ocen) Insoector Followuo Item (IFI) 50-348. 364/95-18-06: Electrical
Distribution System Functional Inspection (EDSFI)-Degraded Voltage
Commitments
This IFI documented two commitments made in SNC letter to the NRC dated
June 6.1995, that were also identified in a Safety Evaluation Report
dated August 9. 1995.
The commitments were:
e
Include LCOs and SRs for the degraded grid alarm relays in the
Improved Standard TS (ISTS) package, and if SNC decided not to
implement the ITS. to submit a TS amendment within six months of
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the decision not to implement ITS.
e
Document the offsite system operating voltage range and its
purpose in the UFSAR update to be performed in the spring of 1996.
The inspector verified that the offsite system operating voltage range
and its purpose were in Section 8.2.2.4 of UFSAR. Revision 13.
Discussions with the licensee indicate that they will incorporate the
LCOs and surveillance for the degraded grid alarm relays in their ISTS
application package.
However, at this time the specific ISTS section
had not been written.
This item will remain open pending completion of
this ISTS section.
Enclosure 2
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-E8.3 (Closed) IFI 50-348. 364/96-02-01: Seismic Monitoring System FSAR Update
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(Closed) IFl 50-348/96-04-07: Review of UFSAR, Revision 13
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These IFIs concerned the updating of the UFSAR for plant modifications.
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The inspector reviewed Revision 13 of the UFSAR and verified that
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Section 3.7.4 was updated to reflect the modifications made to the
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seismic monitoring system. The inspector also selected four
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modifications performed during U1RF13 and verified that the changes were
reflected.in Revision 13 to the UFSAR. These IFIs are closed.
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IV. Plant Suocort
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R2
Status of Radiological Protection Facilities and Equipment
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R2.1 Tours of the Unit 1 and 2 Radioloaically Controlled Areas (RCAs)
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ilf 71750)
!
During the course of the inspection period, the resident inspectors
conducted numerous tours of the auxiliary building RCA for Units 1
and 2.
In general, health physics (HP) control over the RCA, and the
work activities conducted within it, were good. Corrective actions to
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address past problems with impro]er wearing of personnel dosimetry have
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been effective, although the pro)lem has not been eliminated.
However,
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several instances of inadecuate catches for controlling the spread of-
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contamination were observec by the inspectors (e.g. , 2B Residual Heat
r
Removal Heat Exchanger (RHR HX). Unit 2 High Head Safety Injection
(HHSI) flow orifice) and were identified to the shift supervisor (SS).
51
Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
S1.1 Routine Observations of Plant Security Measures (IP 71750)
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During routine inspection activities, resident inspectors verified that
portions of site security program plans were being properly implemented.
This was evidenced by:
proper display of picture badges by plant
personnel: appropriate key carding of vital area doors: adequate
stationing / tours of security personnel: proper searching of
packages / personnel at the primary access point and service water intake
structure (SWIS).
Security activities observed during the inspection
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period were performed well and were adequate to ensure physical
protection of the plant.
However, on January 6, an inspector observed
several maintenance personnel enter the main control room (MCR) without
waiting for the green light to clear on the card reader for the MCR
vital area door. Although the individuals involved appeared authorized
for entry into the MCR, the inspector became concerned that this
)ractice was inconsistent with the licensee's policy regarding proper
cey card use
After notifying the Security Chief, immediate actions
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were implemented to ensure proper use of vital area card readers.
The
Security Chief and Maintenance Manager took prompt and effective
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Enclosure 2
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corrective actions to ensure all site personnel were reacquainted with
plant policy on the use of card readers.
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F2
Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment
F2.1 Unit 1 Containment Fire Detection System InoDerable (IP 71750)
The Unit 1 Containment smoke detection system 1A-22 has failed numerous
times for extended periods (see Inspection Report 50-348.364/96-15,
Section F2.1). At the beginning of this inspection period.1A-22 was
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inoperable and had been since November 2. 1996.
While 1A-22 remained
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inoperable, the inspectors verified that operators implemented the
compensatory measures prescribed by the Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report (UFSAR) Fire Protection Program (i.e.. monitoring containment air
temperature on a regular basis).
On January 24. maintenance personnel
conducted a containment entry and were able to locate a failed smoke
detector, replace it, and return 1A-22 to service.
However, on
February 16. 1A-22 failed again.
Poor reliability of 1A-22 has been a
chronic problem for which the licensee is currently planning a design
change as a longterm fix (see Section E1.1).
In the meantime. the
Maintenance department is considering a proactive replacement plan of
existing smoke detectors during the upcoming Unit 1 refueling outage
that targets detectors with the highest. failure rate.
L Manaaement Meetinas and Other Areas
)
X1
Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Commitments
l
A recent discovery of a licensee o]erating its facility in a manner
contrary to the UFSAR description lighlighted the need for a special
focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or
parameters to the UFSAR descriptions.
While performing the inspections
discussed in this re] ort. the inspectors reviewed the applicable
portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected.
The
inspectors verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the
observed plant practices, procedures and/or parameters, the only
exceptions being several discrepancies associated with the PRF system
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that are described in IR 50-348, 364/97-04.
X2
Exit Meeting Summary
The resident inspectors presented the inspection results to members of
licensee management on February 18. 1997, after the end of the
inspection period. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
The resident inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials
examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No
proprietary information was identified.
Enclosure 2
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
<
M. Ajluni. SNC (Corporate) Licensing Manager - Farley Project
B. Bell Maintenance Team Leader
R. Coleman. Maintenance Manager
S. Dawkins. Concerns Coordinator
L. Enfinger. Administrative Manager
S. Fulmer. Technical Manager
D. Grissette. Operations Manager
T. Harrison. WPC Site Manager
R. Hill. General Manager - FNP
.
C. Hillman. Security Chief
D. Jones. SNC (Corporate) Engineering Manager - Farley Project
R. Martin. Su)erintendent Operations Support
M. Mitchell,
iealth Physics Superintendent
C. Nesbit. Assistant General Manager - Support
J. Powell. Superintendent Unit 2 Operations
R. Rogers. Engineering Support Supervisor - Engineering Support
L. Stinson. Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
,
J. Thomas. Engineering Support Manager
NRC
J. Zimmerman Project Manager - Farley Nuclear Plant
,
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
i
IP 37551:
Onsite Engineering
IP 40500:
Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying. Resolving, and
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Preventing Problems
i
IP 60705:
Spent Fuel Pool Observations
"
IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations
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IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations
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IP 71707:
Plant Operations
IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities
IP 92902:
Followup - Maintenance
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IP 92903:
Followup - Engineering
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Enclosure 2
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
Iygg Item Number
Status
Descriotion and Reference
-VIO
50-348/97-01-01
Open
Failure To Follow PRF Operability
Test Procedure (Section M1.3)
Discussed
Tyag Item Number
Status
Descriotion and Reference
IFI
50-348, 364/95-18-06
Open
EDSFI-degraded Voltage Commitments
(Section E8.2)
Closed
TY2g Item Number
Status
Description and Reference
_
50-348.364/95-21-02
Closed
Excessive Maintenance Overtime
During Refueling Outage
(Section M8.1)
LER
50-364/95-02
Closed
Increased Clad 0xide and Deposit
Coating On Fuel (Section E8.1)
LER
50-364/95-02-01
Closed
Increased Clad 0xide and Deposit
Coating On Fuel (Section E8.1)
LER
50-364/95-09
Closed
Entry Into Mode 2 with Intermediate
Range Neutron Flux Detector
Inoperable (Section M8.2)
LER
50-364/95-09-01
Closed
Entry into Specified Condition with
an Intermediate Range Neutron Flux
Detector Inoperable (Section M8.2)
50-364/95-20-03
Closed
Reactor Startup with Disconnected
Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS)
IR Detector (NI-36) (Section M8.3)
50-348, 364/95-18-03
Closed
Uncontrolled Use of Non-temperature
Compensated HEISE Gauges
(Section M8.4)
LER
50-364/95-005
Closed
Manual Reactor Trips Following a
Loss of Electro-hydraulic Fluid
(Section M8.5)
Enclosure 2
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IFI
50-348, 364/96-02-01
Closed
Seismic Monitoring System FSAR
Update (Section E8.3)
IFI
50-348/96-04-07
Closed
Review of UFSAR. Revision 13
(Section E8.3)
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
ANSI
American National Standards Institute. Inc.
Administrative Procedure
Corrective Action Report
Concerns Coordinator
CCB
Configuration Control Board
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Component Cooling Water
cfm
Cubic Feet per Minute
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
CRACS
Control Room Air Conditioning System
Control Room Emergency Filtration System
i
Design Change Package
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EDSFI
Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection
Engineering Support
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ETP
Engineering Test Procedure
'
Fuel Handling Procedure
farley Nuclear Plant
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GV
Governor Valve
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High Efficiency Particulate Air
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High Head Safety Injection
Heat Exchanger
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Instrumentation and Control
IFI
Inspector Followup Item
Instrumentation Maintenance Procedure
IP
Inspection Procedure
IR
Inspection Report
Improved Standard Technical Specifications
Improved Technical Specification
!
LC0
Limiting Condition of Operation
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LER
Licensee Event Report
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MCB
Main Control Board
1
Main Control Room
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Main Turbine Generator
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NIS
Nuclear Instrumentation system
NRC
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Occurrence Report
Piping Penetration Room
Penetration Room Filtration
Radiologically Controlled Area
REA
Request for Engineering Assistance
Enclosure 2
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Refueling Water Storage Tank
SF
Shift Foremen
Spent Fuel Pool
Southern Nuclear Company
SR
Surveillance Requirement
Shift Supervisor
Surveillance Test Procedure
Service Water Intake Structure
Service Water System
Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feedwater
TO
Tag Order
TS
Technical Specifications
TV
Throttle Valve
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Uninterruptable Power Supply
VAC
Volt Alternating Current
Violation
Work Order
WPC
Williams Power Corporation
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Enclosure 2
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