IR 05000293/1987053

Forwards Text from Augmented Insp Team Insp Rept 50-293/87-53,describing Findings & Open Items from Evaluation of Loss of Offsite Power Event on 871112

ML20154B051
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	03/08/1988
From:	Warren C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Highfill K BOSTON EDISON CO.
Shared Package
ML20154B016	List: IR 05000293/1988007 ML20154B012 ML20154B022 ML20154B051
References
NUDOCS 8805170044
Download: ML20154B051 (5)

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UNITED 8TATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j ~g REGION 1

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• ,t 475 ALLENDALE ROAD

'$ [ KING OF PRUSSI A, PENNSYLVANI A 19408 ,

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ATTACHMENT 2 March 8, 1988 MEMORANDUM FOR: K. Highfill, Station Director FROM: C. Warren, Senior Resident Inspector - Pilgrim SUBJECT: NRC FOLLOWUP TO AIT INSPECTION 50-293/07-53 An NRC Augmented Inspection Team was dispatched to Pilgrim to evaluate a loss of offsite power event occurring on November 12, 198 The recults of this inspection are documented in inspection report 50-293/07-5 In trder to coordintte and track NRC inspection f ollowup we have collected pertinent raport text, and grouped the findings into five appropriate areas.

, Description of the findings and corresponfing open item numbers are attache Item A.1 end E.2 have been designated at restart item .

Thank you for your time and attention to these matter '

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Si r.c er ol y, i

Clay C. Warren Attachment

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cCt l R. Blough J. Wiggins i

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S. Collinc Kane l J. Durr i

i i 8805170044 890506 PDR ADOCK 050002 3 i

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ATTACHMENT

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A. Menacement Issues and Commitments (Unresolved Item 87-53-01): During the inspection the licensee identified several actions they are considering taking to improve the stations ability to respond to future similar events. These actions included completing the installation of the third emergency diesel, installation of a backup instrument air compressor and installation of additional instruments to analyze switchyar d transient All of the foregoing equipment changes will be completed before reactor restar . Reference: Report cover letter, Section 6.3. A written response

! describing the details of these actions was requeste ' Overall management of the recovery effort was somewhat fragmented and f unclea Coordination and communication between groups would be substantially enhanced by well defined management guidelines for this  ;

' type of event (i . e. one in which the formal emergency response -

l organization is not mobilized).

Reference: Report Section 2.3, 5.3 and A written response was .

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requeste !

! Develop and implement procedural guidelines f or administrative 1y staf fing

] the TSC to support the operating organization in situations where 4 Emergency Plan activation is not appropriat r

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Reference Report section 5.3, 5.4 and .

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B. Ocerations (Unresol ved Item 07-53-02): ,

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i- The operators were not aware of the alarm indicating the reduced voltage on the 345 kV of f site power source prior to the loss of of f site power.

They were also unaware of the alarm indicating the blown f uses in the analog trip system power supply. The f ailure to utilize these alarms should be reviewed and appropriate corrective actions develope '

Reference:' Report sections 2.3, 4.1.1.2, 4.1.1.6, and 4.1.2.4. A written '

response was requested.

The plant configuration bef ore the event and the equipment that was out

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of service f or maintenance created operational situations that could have j been more serious under other circumstances with substantial dccay heat.

1 Describe what considerations will be made in tne future to assure that

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essential and non-esser.tial equipment removed from service for outage

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maintenance de not create undue operational inflexibilities.

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Reference Report sections 2.3, 5.4 and 5.P,. A written response was j requested.

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OL Re-evaluate energency action levels regarding loss of onsite and offsite power f or situations where f uel is loaded in the reactor vessel and RCS temperature is less than 212 degrees Reference: Report sections 5.2 and . Certain procedures governing degraded plant conditions (e.g., loss of power and loss of instrument air) may not be sufficient to clearly guide recovery actions from events of this natur Also procedures for restoring offsite power should be reviewed against past operating ,

experience, especially events caused by severe weather, and revised to reflect lessons learned and anticipated problems which may need resolution to optimize power recovery tim Reference: Report section 4.3.3, 4.3.5, 5.8, 6.3 and . Strengthen communications practices to assure clear understanding and directed actions.

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Reference: Report section 5.4 and . In reviewing procedure 2.4.25, Loss of Shutdown Cooling it was noted that the immediate operator actions provided no specific guidance on action required to restore shutdown cooling. Similarly, the subsequent operator actions did not specify any mitigating actions to be taken for conditions other than f ull buses A5 and A6 and PCIS logics available, i

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During the event, when the "B" Diesel Generator was out of service and panel Y-4 was without power, the licensee initiated a temporary modification scheme to provide power to the control circuit of the RHR suction outboard valve 47. Contingency proceduresfor the' single failure ,

of either onsite emergency power system train (i . e. , loss of either Y-3 i or Y-4) should be considere ;

References Report section 4.1.2.4 and 6.4.

. Maintenance (Unresolved Item 87-53-03):

4 The inoper.pbility of the "B" emergency diesel generator (EDG) during the event resulted from inadequate or incomplete maintenance procedures. The

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binding of the prelubrication pump and the leaking fuel injectors could ,

have been prevented from interfering with the recovery operations if adequate procedures for repair and post ma,intenance testing were employed. Maintenance requests contain very brief descriptions of actual

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material conditions f ound (as-found) and few specific details of work performed, parts replaced and post work testin More aAtention to detail in preparaticn, execution and disposition of safesy-related maintenance requests should be evaluated.

4 Reference: Report section 2.3, 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.3. A written response was

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. BECo should continue actions to reduce ing ess of ground water to the process building and the consequential radiological bu-de t Reference: Report sections 5.7 and . The practice of having the main generator bus quick disconnect links installed during an outage should be reviewed relative to the recent event.

l References Report section . Procedure 3.M.3-9 should be revised to reflect operational consideration for backfeeding with offnormal electrical system lineup Reference: Report sections 4.1.1.3.2 and 4.1. . On April 26, 1987 the "B" EDG lube oil temperature switch low (LOTSL) was replaced after failure (MR 87-61-33). The switch that failed was

. actually a lube oil temperature switch high (LOTSH) which had been

' installed in place of the LOTSL under MR 87-61-15 during some previous maintenance activit It was not evident at the time of the inspection what controls were applied to MR 87-61-15 in substituting a LOTGH for a LOTS The evaluation of acceptability of this replacement is an issue to be f ollowed up in f uture NRC inspection Reference Report section 4.2. . The post repair testing of the current transformer did not consider the effect of the high voltage overstressing of the circuit components. The circuit should be properly tested to assure no lat4nt f aults are presen Reference Report sections 4.2.2.1 and 4. ,

.D. Gurveillance (Unresolved item 87-53-04): Develop procedures that describe and control testing activities on switch yard equipment and transformer Reference ' Report sections 4.1.1.3.3 and 4.1. _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _J .,

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. Some emergency diesel generator instrumentation, although being read and recorded, was not being evaluated and trended for consistency. An assessment should be made of the surveillance readings being taken and a determination made regarding the readings that are necessary and usefu Further, responsibility for evaluating these readings should be assigned, e.g., output current on each phase is neither monitored, recorded nor trende In addition, a review should be conducted to ascertain if all appropriate instrumentation in being monitored and recorded during the conduct of the EDG surveillance testing for determination of operability of the equipmen Reference: Report sections 4.2.2.1 and 4. E. Continuino Technical Evaluations (87-53-05): The operation of the startup transf ormer dif f erential lockout relay was

. apparently the result of a transient for which the protection was not designe The transformer did not experience an internal fault and the

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. operation of the lockout delayed the re-energization of the station from offsite power sources. The actual cause of the differential lockout needs to be conclusively establishe Reference: Report sections 2.3 and 4.1.1.6. A written response was requeste . The blown f uses in the analog trip system were the apparent result of a common cause. The cause of this condition should be identified and corrected or determined to be acceptable before the reactor is restarte Reference: Report sections 2.3 and 4.1.2.4. A written

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response was requested.

Additional investigation such as strainer and 'ilt'er inspection would be l appropriate to ensure that the f oreign materitl that damaged the EDG prelube pump was not externally generated (i . s. , from some other failed component). The licensee agreed to open both the lube oil strainers and j the filter on "B" EDG at the next opportunit Ref erencer, Report section 4.2. . The licensee's actions taken in response to IE Notice 87-28 will be

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reviewed separately as part of ongoing NRC inspection activitie Reference: Report section 4.3.3 and 4. I The 11 censee's FLM No.87-641 review, including determination of a requirement for root cause analysis and corrective action plan, was not I yet complete at the end of the AIT inspectio The licensee's further

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actions regarding Ft<M No.87-641 will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspectio Re,ference Report section 4.3.3.

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