ML20247D548
| ML20247D548 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1989 |
| From: | Kane W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Bird R BOSTON EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247D552 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8905250467 | |
| Download: ML20247D548 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000293/1989080
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MAY 081989
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Docket No. 50-293
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Boston Edison Company
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ATTN: Mr. Ralph G. Bird
Senior Vice President - Nuclear
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
RFD #1 Rocky Hill Road
Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360
Gentlemen:
This refers to the Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) led by Mr. Eugene Kelly of
this office and conducted on April 13-19, 1989, at the Pilgrim Nuclear ' Power
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Station, Plymouth, Massachusetts, and from April 17-26, 1989, in the Region I
office. - The Team performed a focused technical analysis of the facts associ-
ated with the overpressurization of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)
system which occurred on April 12, 1989. The Team's preliminary findings were
discussed with Messrs. Hf ghfill, Grazio and Kraft of your staff, at the exit
meeting held .in the Region I office on April 19, 1989. A number of phone calls
were conducted subsequent to April 19, 1989 between your staff and the Team to
discuss the status of ongoing reviews by Boston Edison Company (BECo) and to
provide additional information needed to finalize the Team's findings.
The Team concluded that the safety significance of the April 12, Ic89 pressur-
ization transient was minor since several barriers remained intact or available
to mitigate the effects of a potential intersystem loss of coolant accident,
and that the high temperature and pressure effects of the transient on RCIC
system equipment were minimal.
There were however numerous proximate human
factors and equipment-related causes that, considered collectively, raised a
broader and more fundamental issue regarding your processes to assure defense
in depth in the conduct of plant operations. Significant weaknesses at several
working levels in your organization were revealed regarding shift supervision's
control of su'rveillance testing, licensed operator cognizance of plant condi-
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tions, procedural adherence / validation and independent verification of work
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activities.
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The AIT identified several corrective action recommendations that warrant your
continued consideration, and they are detailed in Section 2.3 of the enclosed
report.
Several of these recommendations have already been either committed to
in your letter to the NRC dated April 21, 1989 or adopted or proposed as part
of your Oversight Committee's review of the overpressure transient.
No
response to these recommendations is requested at this time.
Issues which may
be considered for enforcement action by the NRC were identified by the Team,
but will be addressed in separate correspondence.
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY IR PILGRIM 50-293/89-80 - 0001.0.0
05/08/89
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' Boston Edison Company
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M 08 M
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The AIT found your Oversight Committee, which guided three separate investi-
gatory teams in response to the transient, to be well structured and compre-
hensive.in its approach.
To date, you have proposed sound corrective actions
which correlate well with the principal causal factors of the event. Broader,
and longer term actions remain to be assessed, both by your Management Over-
sight and Assessment Team (MO&AT) and Peer Review process, as well as by the
NRC's Restart Panel. Also, our reviews indicate that the completion of your
EPIC process computer is needed to accurately reconstruct ' the sequences of-
future events.
We appreciate the cooperation of your entire organization with our AIT, which
allowed for our efficient evaluation of a large amount of technical information
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in a short period of time.
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Sincerely,
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William F. Kane, Director
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Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
AIT Report No. 50-293/89-80
Attachments:
As stated in Enclosure
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cc w/ Enclosure and Attachments:
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K. Highfill, Station Director
R. Anderson, Plant Manager
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J. Keyes, Licensing Division Manager
E. Robinson, Nuclear Information Manager
R. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager
The Honorable Edward J. Markey
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The Honorable Edward P. Kirby
The Honorable Peter V. Forman
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B. McIntyre, Chairman, Department of Public Utilities
Chairman, Plymouth Board of Selectmen
Chairman, Duxbury Board of Selectmen
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Plymouth Civil Defense Director
P. Agnes, Assistant Secretary of Public Safety, Commonwealth of Massachusetts
S. Pollard, Massachusetts Secretary of Energy Resources
R. Shimshak, MASSPIRG
Public Document Room (PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (2)
0FFICIAL RECORD COPY IR PILGRIM 50-293/89-80 - 0002.0.0
05/08/89
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. Boston Edison ~ Company-
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MAY 0 81989-
bec w/ Enclosure and Attachments:
Region'I Docket Room (with concurrences)
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Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o Enclosure and Attachments)
W. Russell,.RI
W. Kane, RI
S. Collins, RI~
J. Wiggins, RI
R.-Blough,.RI
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J. Lyash, RI
M.' Kohl, RI
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R.' Bores, RI
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K. Abraham, RI
C. Warren, SRI - Pilgrim
J. Taylor, EDO
B. Clayton, EDO
T. Murley, NRR
S. Varga, NRR
B. Boger, NRR
R.'Wessman, NRR
D. Mcdonald, NRR
E. Rossi, NRR
J. Carter, NRR
E. Jordan, AEOD
Team Members and Their Supervisors
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY IR PILGRIM 50-293/89-80 - 0003.0.0
05/08/89
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