IR 05000293/1987047
| ML20237E022 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1987 |
| From: | Blumberg N, Joe Golla, Napuda G, Rebelowski T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237E018 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-87-47, NUDOCS 8712280095 | |
| Download: ML20237E022 (20) | |
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i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-293/87-q Docket No.
50-293 License No.
DPR-35 Licensee:
Boston Edison Company M/C Nuclear 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Facility Name: Pilgrim Nulcear Power Station Inspection At:
Plymouth and Braintree, Massachusetts i
Inspection Conducted: October 5-9, 1987 Inspectors:
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'G /hapuda, Senior Reactor Engineer
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po6.(Rebelowski, Senior Reactor Engineer d a te'
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/D ~/5-6'y
' olla ' Reac' tor Engineer date Accompanied by:
J. Swoboda, Institute of Atomic Energy, People's Republic of Poland (IAEA) - Observer Approved by [N. Blumberg, Chief, Opera p nal Programs
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date Section, 08, DRS Inspection Summary:
Routine announced inspection on October 5-9, 1987 (Report No. 50-293/87 T7)
Areas Inspected: Hydrogen Water Chemistry Modification, Procurement, Material Management, and QA/QC interfaces with Procurement and Local Leak ~ Rate Testing.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8712280095 871218 PDR ADOCK 05000293
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DETAILS
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Persons Contacted Boston Edison Company M. Akhtar, Modification manager
- T. Beneduci, Training Supervisor
"S. Bibo, Audit Group Leader-Quality Assurance Department (QAD)
F. Clifford, I&C Supervisor
- B. Dunn, Compliance Engineer F. Famulari, Quality Control Group Leader-QAD A. Felix, Performance Analysis Engineer
- P. Hamilton, Compliance Group Leader J. Larsen, Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) Program Manager-General Electric (GE)
- P. Manderino, STA/ Senior Test Engineer
- J. Mattia, Surveillance Group Leader-QAD G. Nelson, GE Manager K. Oberly, HWC Site Project Manager-GE D. O' Leary, I&C Supervisor D. Peyvan, Test Engineer-Quadrex Corporation
"J. Purkis, Senior Systems Specialist
- K Roberts, Nuclear Operations Manager J. Sheldon, HWC Production Manager-GE
- R. Sherry, Chief Maintenance Engineer
- C. Stephenson, Senior Compliance Engineer
- B. Tucker, HWC Project Manager US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- J. Lyash, Resident Inspector
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- Attended the exit meeting on October 9, 1987.
Discussions and interviews were held with other licensee administrative, technical, operations, quality verification and support personnel.
2.0 Hydrogen kater Chemistry System Modification 2.1 Background The licensee's response to the Intergranular Stress Corrosion Crack-ing (IGSCC) identified during 1984 in the reactor coolant system piping was to institute a number of programs to mitigate further IGSCC.
One of programs was to introduce a change to the water chemistry program that would reduce the Electrolytic Chemical Potential (ECP)
of the reactor coolant water by injecting hydrogen into the feedwater system to reduce the dissolved oxygen concentration and maintain a high purity in the reactor coolant thus reducing the susceptibility
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of reactor piping and materials to IGSCC.
This hydrogen injection system process is designated as the Hydrogen Water Chemistry System.
Two sources of Hydrogen and Oxygen are available on site,-a passive i
system utilizing bottled storage facilities for both hydrogen /cxygen and an electrolytical process to produce hydrogen and oxygen.
2.2 Electrolytical Generation of Hydrocen/0xyoen Gases l.
The Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) system consists of a number of components including:
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Electrolytic Process - Batteries of cells where the disassociation of water occurs and is purified, washed and
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leaves as a low pressure gas.
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Hydrogen Compressor Module (HCM) which takes the low pressure hydrogen and compresses it to a greater pressure than the suction pressure of main feed pumps.
(500 psig)
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Hydrogen Injection / Vent Module (HI/VM) monitors hydrogen flow paths.
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Offgas Oxygen Injection Module - divides the purified oxygen into two flow paths that inject into offgas and condensate piping.
2.2.1 Inspectors Observations / Comments The inspector expressed concern in that the operator will a.
add KOH (Electrolyte) to each cell until the fixed per-centage is reached.
In order to perform this task, the operator must stand on a platform and place his hand above a live D.C. bus bar to connect and disconnect fill hose.
The licensee believes that no hazard exists due to the low i
voltage involved.
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The present electrolysis procedure does not address recom-mended protective clothing. The licensee stated that fill procedures will include required protection clothing.
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(Shields,gi;ves, boots, aprons,etc.)
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The required ventilation / heating supplied to the Electro-lytic facility (must be maintained above 40 F) is not insulated. The licensee believes that no insulation will be needed, due to a short piping run.
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System catalytic purifiers are not installed but will be put into the system after preoperational testing.
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During the inspection of the Hydrogen Injection /Ven't Module, it was observed that certain piping was bent (instrument tubing) due to the limited support on this
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The licensee stated that a review of instrument.
hangers would be made and any deficiencies would be corrected.
Additional Discussion The observations included a review of'the hydrogen detectors, alarms, purge gas system electrolyte level controls, lighting protection base foundation, hydrogen and oxygen delivery systems; no deficiencies were identified.
Main Control Module The heart of system control is the Nuclear Measurement Analysis j
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and Control (NUMAC) main control module which includes a computer that interf aces with all. system components and provides the following functions.
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Provide. control signals to open and close valves.
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Provide control signals to operate HWC components.
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Provide control signal to demand hydrogen generation as a function of feedwater flow.
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Display valves positions.
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Display messages indicating HWC status and prompt the operator on required actions, f.
Display operator options.
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Permanently display select variables on the screen, while others will appear on demand. All such variables are signals from sensors located at various places in the plant.
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Provide contacts to operate plant alai.us.
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Record and display select variables. Recording is limited
.to memory capability, however, this data can be made available to a host computer.
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In order to maintain offgas 0 within limits, provide an
adjustable ramp rate that will control hydrogen demand.
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Provide two types of automatic system shutdown (ASD):
(1) Type 1 ASD: A controlled shutdown that will have the proper time delays and ramp rates to maintain offgas 0 within limits.
(2) Type 2 ASD:
Emergency shutdown which shuts down the HWC system at a rapid rate.
Observation This display and computer is locateJ on the back panel in the
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control room.
Inspection of the unit revealed that protective rubber sleeves around input cables were not properly secured.
The licensee stated that during reoperation testing, wiring will receive a red line check and operational testing at which time final inspection of wiring will be performed.
Summary The inspection of components noted acceptable workmanship in all areas. Minor discrepancies were satisf actorily addressec'.
2.3 Plant Design Change Review for HWC References:
Documents listed in Attachment 1 used by licensee for Hydrogen j
Water Chemistry design changes.
ANSI N18.7-1976, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance I
for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants.
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BECo Quality Control Manual - Chapter 3 (Design Control),
Chapter 10 (Test Control-ANSI.N45 2.11 1974 Section 3.2).
Design Change Control Implementation The licensee procedures have established the following:
Methods for initiating a design or modification change.
- A design change request control form that requires documentation
of completion of required reviews, evaluations and approvals prior to acceptance of changes for operations.
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4 Methods for a review of modification that address
unreviewed safety questions.
The HWC Project was identified by the organization responsible for performing design work.
Status of the project.is maintained by the Project Manager whose responsibilities include conduct of safety evaluations, procedure approvals and overall coordination of
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activities.
The licensee inspection and review of Plant Design Changes that addressed the HWC Project were well documented and addressed numerous
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safety evaluations that considered all known hazards.
The inspector i
found no discrepancies in his' review of the referenced design changes.
Specific observation / inspection of protective walls and components were conducted and no discrepancies were identified that
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would cause HWCS operation that could threaten plant or personnel I
safety.
2.4 Crack Arrest Verification System l
The Crack Arrest Verification (CAV) System is an on-line system l
which exposes pre-cracked fracture mechanics test specimens, made of similar material as the BWR structural and primary water systems, to primary coolant.
The CAV system measures the crack growth which occurs and characterizes the chemical and electrochemical properties of the specimens' environment.
Observations at the locations of the components that constitute the CAV system were conducted.
2.5 Hydrogen Water Chemistry Control Training The following instructional Modules have been developed to familiarize the plant operators, mechanical and electrical main-tenance technicians with the HWC systems.
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Crack Arrest Verification - Mechanical Maintenance Hydrogen Injection System - Electrical Maintenance
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Electrolytes Hydrogen Injector - Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)
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Extended Test System - SRO The lesson plans cover classroom training, tours of components and instruction on new procedures. A review of operator / maintenance training in the above areas will be completed at a subsequent inspec-t!cn as this phase of training has not yet been completed.
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2.6 Testing on site
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The components that make up the HWC system have been assembled as a unit by various onsite pipe fabrications and electrical cabling.
The initial testing of piping was performed during construction of the system.
The following volumetric tests were reviewed, TP 87-121, Demineralized Water Supply to Gas Generator.
TP 87-156, H process line gas generator to Purge Module.
TP 87-157, Test of Oxygen Process Line TP 87-158, Inert Gas Line and H vents.
TP 87-160-1,- HCM Return to Main Condenser.
All tests met acceptance criteria of design test pressures, hold times, lineups and maintenance of cleanliness.
The licensee has an. operational test program under the modification management group that has been scheduled for completion _during startup of the reactor.
The program addresses the calibration and operating performance of the components as a complete system.
The inspector observed the calibration of one gauge at the new water chemistry sampling sink in the reactor building.
2.7 Quality Assurance During the initial design changes necessary to tie existing and new systems together, the construction, preoperational testing and opera-tions were monitored by various licensee quality assurance groups.
The inspector, during the review of new shielding walls noted that various concrete pours, seven day and 30 day concrete core strength were monitored by the quality assurance groups. The licensee has established hold points during preoperational testing. The inspector did not identify any discrepancies in testing overview by quality assurance.
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2.8 Summary of Findings The inspection of the Hydrogen water chemistry program verified th'e following.
Piant Design Changes identified where necessary and addressed'
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all identified safety issues.
Drawings were being revised to reflect as built condition.
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Preoperational Testing was in the early' status of performance.
Identified testing was properly documented.
Operation Procedures have been generated.
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Management has involved multi-discipline design groups in its review of the HWC system and this is indicated by excellent reviews and documentation of the modification activities.
The components satisfy long term licensee needs in the quality
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of materials and in manufacture.
Radiological hazards have been addressed in the Operation
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Procedures.
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A training program has been established and written procedures have been generated.
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The areas of increased levels of radiation and methods of water sampling are to be addressed in a subsequent inspection that will verify the licensee previous surveys of expected radiation levels.
No violations were identified.
3.0 Procurement The procurement program was reviewed to determine its technical adequacy and if it was properly implemented.
Interviews were conducted with key personnel and procurement documents were reviewed to determine if (1)
document preparation was in accordance with administrative control, (2)
appropriate reviews and approvals were accomplished and (3) technical and quality requirements were met.
The manner in which commercial grade (i..e., off the shelf) items were purchased was assessed 'particularly to assure that evaluations for suiti'ility of application were done; support-ing documentation justified safety related use; and, acceptance criteria verified critical attributes and or characteristics.
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3.1 Purchase Order Process i
A group of material management and procurement personnel have a.
recently been assigned to onsite locations in an effort to improve the quality and timeliness of the procurement process.
Nuclear Engineering Department (,NED) personnel have also been recently assigned onsite to improve and expedite the technical aspects of procurement. To complete the enhancement of the human factors aspect of purchases, especially those originated onsite, Quality Engineering Group (QEG) personnel have been assigned to the site.
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Purchase Orders (PO) are initiated by onsite plant personnel and as a general rule such items are replacement and or spare parts.
Purchases associated with modifications are initiated by engineering personnel responsible for the desigt, change work.
A requisition is the first step in the procurement process and it receives a technical and quality requirements review.
Procure-ment personnel then transcribe the requisition into a computer as a PO and this is electronically transmitted offsite where the PD is issued after final administrative approval.
Copies of the P0 are' forwarded to the station Quality Assurance Department (QAD) receipt inspectors who are located in the onsite ware-house. After the item (s) arrive and are accepted by QAD inspectors, documents associated with the P0 are gathered into a package (s) and forwarded to the records department for micro-filming and computer data storage.
3.2 Technical Review of Purchase Orders The P0s(listed in Attachment 1) associated with.the items selected during a tour of the warehouse (see Paragraph 3) were reviewed to verify that appropriate requirements had been incorporated, approved vendors were used and onsite actions were adequate.
Nuclear Engineering Department (NED) procedures (see Attachment 1)
describe the engineering input and review process for P0s and include those measures necessary to purchase commercial grade items for
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safety related ese.
The engineering evaluation and or actions neces-sary to justify use of commercial grade items for safety related i
application are documented on a Commercial Quality Item record. A Material Receipt Inspection Requirements (MRIR) form, preopera-tional/ post installation testing and or other actions necessary to assure the items suitability are included in the CQI. A conditional release is assigned to the item should any verification action take place.af ter it is issued from the warehouse.
This ensures followup by Quality Control or other QAD personnel to assure those require-ments are met.
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The following aspects of the engineering procureme'nt process
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were adequately implemented and considered technically l
appropriate for the items sampled.
Inclusion of 10 CFR 21 into P0 11284 for cable and P0 25092
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for solenoid valves An engineering study (ESR 86-436) and safety evaluation for
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P0 STR016779 for motor operators
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Shelf life requirements listed in PD 25092 for solenoid.
Valves (the assembled items contained non metallic 0-Rings)
Shelf life and service life calculations and a requirement
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for test reports in P0 STR017579 for cylinder gaskets (commercial grade)
The use of a Material Receiving Inspection Report (No.
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87-9370) for the examination and acceptance of a Salt i
Water Service Water Pump into warehouse stock that had been rebuilt by onsite maintenance personnel.
No violations were identified.
3.3 QA/QC Involvement and vendor control The Quality Engineering Group (QEG) of the Quality Assurance Depart-ment (QAD) is responsible for the evaluation and approval of vendors.
Approved vendors are listed on an Approved Supplier List (ASL) that is controlled and distributed by the QEG. This group reviews requi-sitions prior to their transcription into Purchase Orders (PO) and the issued PCs are compared to the requisitions during receipt i
inspection and also on a sampling basis during routine audits.
A file is maintained for each vendor and contains the results of quality manual reviews, surveys, audits, surveillance, annual evaluations, receipt inspection results, onsite and offsite cor-l rective action documents and other pertinent records on the vendor's
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performance. The ASL indicates the commodities that the vendor may supply, the next audit date, previous date of the annual evaluation and any conditions placed on procurement from the vendor.
The vendor files contain records that justify the manner in which purchases can be executed with each supplier.
The vendors who supplied the items sampled during the warehouse tour were approved for the particular type of product, listed on the ASL and their respective files contained appropriate records. The files of two additional vendors, who supplied commercial grade items, were reviewed and contained records of those actions necessary to justify use of those suppliers.
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.The warehouse supervisor pointed out that a new type of high rack was
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Nwing ' dced to the exigt ng storage capacity.
Ceiling paddle fans a
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had been added to aid air cir:ulation.
Temperature balance was very good.
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\\i A computerized data base is used for inveptory control and fnP.1ating 4) ' /
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stock purchases. Shelf life and maintenance information is also in
domputer data bases.
Proper locet. ion, purchase Order (PO) numbees, s
specific care required, storbge donditions and other ay ects/ t f 7/.
s material management were verified for the sampled ipml The t/c'fi sion of the licensee to exempt several motors from Mriodic shaft
g rotation was verified oy an independent calculation.
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s General warehouse conditions pz.d 'iiem spe:if6pequirer,
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implemented in accordance with ' established procedures (t.- Att.ach-ment 1).
The procedures were found to be consistent witn regulatory-
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requirements and licensee commit ents.
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s In an effort to better );pport procurement actiot.; initiateo at the station, the QEG has two members assigned temporaf f d th the site.
It was noted that these individuals interface quite closely w%th their procurement and material managemert counterparts. ! Iteas evident that the procurement process has improvec under the new
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arrangements.
The interfaces between the QEG onsite engineers.and
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'S Nuclear Engineering Department (NED) personnel recently assignda to
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the site were not reviewed in depth but it appears that this.c/ range-ment has influenced the apparent improvements in the procurgmerp process, s
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No violations were identified.
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4.0 Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT)
i The purpose of the inspection in this area was to ascertain that LLRT is being administered adequately, and conducted in compliance with the,
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regulations stipulated by 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.
Local Leck Rate Testing '
was witnessed to evaluate the performance of LLRT personnel conducti:10 the i
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testing.
Procedures were reviewed for their technical adequacy to 'a'r'ovm
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the intended activities.
Other LLRT record keeping and related
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documentation was reviewed to determine the adequacy of overall i
s administrative control of the LLRT program, r
4.1 Testing Witnessing Theinspectorwitnessedtheperformanceoftestactivitiestov\\erify that:
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4 Approved test procedures were available and in use.
- The procedures were adequately detailed to assure satisfactory
performance.
Parts and materials were properly identified.
- Qualified test equipment and tools were used.
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The inspector witnessed portions of the following LLRTs:
Drywell Equipment Hatch Seal, Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) Valves SV-5065-77 and SV-5065-78. The inspector verified by inspection that the PASS lineup was in an effective test configuration and that the test personnel followed the LLRT procedure. The tests were successful, the equipment hatch and PASS valves passed their at-ceptance criteria and the test personnel were observed to be knowledgeable of their duties.
No violations were identified.
4.2 Test Instrumentation Calibration records for the LLRT instruments used to perform the tests described in Section 4.1 were reviewed by the inspector.
Also reviewed were calibration records for the standards used to test the LLRT instruments.
Test Records indicated'that the standards were calibrated within frequency and were traceable to the National Bureau of Standards (NBS).
No violations were identified.
4.3 Administrative Control The inspector reviewed documentation relevant to the overall administrative control of the Local Leak Rate Test program.
Informa-tion which documented the status of the following activities and criteria were reviewed:
Recording of test results; determination of maximum pathway leakage; LLRT equipment calibration test acceptance criteria; and, maintenance request, summary and control forms.
The information reviewed was found to be current and adequate to provide proper administrative control of the LLRT program.
No violations were identified.
4.4 Test Results l
Local Leak Rate Testing was in progress at the time of the inspec-l tion, therefore a final local leak rate total was not available.
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The inspector cecermined that the licensee is calculating the maximum pathway leakage for test results to be applied in the determination of the total local leak rate, and the minimum pathway leakage is determinea for penetration leakage that will be added onto the integrated total of the upcot'ng containment integrated leak rate test (CILRT).
This will be done to assess the "As Found" containment leak rate.
These are the accepted methods of determining penetration leakages.
. Local leak rate test results will be reviewed during a future inspection prior to startup.
No violations were identified.
4.5 Personnel Trainina And Qualifications The qualifications and training of test personnel were discussed with a licensee representative.
In addit'on the inspector avaluated the performance of test personnel curing the test witnessing and reviewed relevant training records.
The inspector determined that the test personnel were qualifieo unaer a licensee training program for test personnel which is geared specifically toward qualifying individuals at different levels to either assist or supervise the conduct of local and integrated leak rate testing.
Individuals interviewed by the inspector were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and technical aspects of leak testing.
No violations were identified.
4.6 LLRT Failure of Torus Main Exhavst Valves The inspector discussed the status of LLRT results with the licensee.
The licensee informed the inspector that the penetration incorporat-ing the torus main exhaust valves A0-5042A and A0-5042B (8" Butterfly valves) showed a high leakage. Total penetration leakage was measured on September 21, 1987 to be 156.2 Standard Liters per Minute (SLM).
This amount of leakage alone is greater than that allowed by plant technical specifications for total leakage through all contain-ment isolation valves, that is.6La or 126.2 SLM.
The inspector discussed with the licensee efforts to identify the root cause of the LLRT failure and effect repairs.
The licensee indicated they were currently investigating the problem and had two possible root causes identified. One possible root cause being a newly installed containment modification which resulted in a length of piping being welded onto the piping between thu two torus main exhaust valves.
This length of piping was intended to become part of
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the direct torus vent line (DTVL) system which is now capped. The supp' tition is that the capped length of piping although supported by pipe hangers has resulted in a toraue at each torus tsin exhaust'
bypass-valve 5041A, B which promoted tr.e leaks;;
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The other possible root cause for the leakage may be attributed to resin from the condensate demineralized resin regeneration system migrating to and coating on the inside seating surfaces of the torus-main' exhaust valves A0-5042A, B.
The resin was suspected and dis-covered on the inside of these valves by the licensee upon removal of the valves for maintenance. A path for resin from the condensate demineralized resin regeneration system to the torus main exhaust system exists because both systems communicate with the standoy gas treatment system. The resin was suspected to be there because the problem with resin coating in otner areas of the plant has existed before. The licensee indicated that a filter was installed in the resin regeneration system prior to the last operating cycle which has j
been effective in stopping the spread of resin and that the resin l
which coated the inside of the torus main exhaust valves was re-sidual, The inspector raised the concern that this may happen again after startup of the plant and once again deter good seating of the valves.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's concern and stated i
that investigation into the problem is ongoing and that a resolution I
will be effected before plant startup.
The licensees progress toward
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resolving this safety concern will be tracked by the NRC as
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unresolved Item No. 87-47-01.
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i 4.7 OA/00 Coveraae of LLRT The inspector discussed coverage of Local Leak Rate testing with a I
QC representative and reviewed selected Quality Control inspection-reports.
It was determined that QA and QC have been providing continuous coverage of selected Local Leak Rate Testing throughout the outage.
Based on the above review and observations, it is concluded that QA/QC coverage of LLRT activities is adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in l
order to ascertain ahether they are acceptable items, items of
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noncompliance, or deviations. An unresolved item is discussed in j
paragraph 4.6.
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6.0 Management Meetings
Licensee management was inforrred of the scope and purpose of the inspection at the entrance meetir; or4 0: ccer 5, 19E7.
The fincing of the inspection were discussed with licensee representatives during the course of the-inspection and presented to licensee management at the October 9,1987 exit meeting (see Paragraph I for attendees)
The inspectors provided no written material to the licensee during the inspection.
Licensee management requested the opportunity to review the issued report of this inspection so as to assure that it contains no proprietary information prior to its releast to the Public Document Rooms.
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ATTACHMENT 1
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PURCHASE ORDERS (PO) REVIEWED PO 31284, Cable (Material Rece vinc Irspection Report (MRIRT 860450)
P0 CR31507, Motor Operators (MRIR 87-7464)
PO 25092, Solenoid Valves (MRIR 85-211)
- j P0 STRO 17579, Cylinder Gasket Set for Emergency Diesels (MRIR 87-0018)
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PROCEDURES REVIEWED
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Local Lea 6 Rate Testing
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Proteaure No. 8.7.1.3, Local Leak Rate Test Program, Revision 13 Procedure No. 8.7.1.5, Local Leak Rate Testing of Primary Containment Penetrations and Isolation Valves, Revision 29 Master Surveillance Tracking Schedule (Contains LLRT Status Information)
Nuclear Organization Procedures (NOP)
83A16, 10CFR21 - Reporting of Defects of Noncompliance, dated 09/19/85 N0r84A8, Control of Commercial Quality Items., dated 11/04/85 NOP8304, Housekeeping, dated 01/15/86 Nuclear Engineering Department Procedures (NED)
NED 3.02, Preparation, Review, Verification, Approval and Revision of Design Documents for Percanent Plant Design Changes, Revision 3 NED 3.10, Bid Evaluation, Revision 1 NED 4.01, Procurement of Items and/or Services, Revision 12
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NED 4.02, Specifying and Reviewing Supplier Engineering and Quality Verification Documentation, Revision 4 NED 4.05, Evaluation of Commercial Quality Items and Specification of
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Procurement Requirements, Revision 0 NED 15.02, Supplier Nonconformance Reports, Revision 1
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ATTACHMENT 1
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Quality Assurance Deoartnient Procedures (DAD)
QAD 4.01, Review of Preliminary Procurement Documents Prepared
- y LE:c. Et, : ion :E QAD 4.04, Review and Approval of Deviations Forms Purchase Order / Contract (s), Revision 4 QAD 4.06, Procurement of Items and' Services, Revision 4
. QAD 7.01, Receipt Inspection, Revision 7 QAD 7.03, Supplier Procedure Review, Revision 0 QAD 7'.04, Evaluation of Supplisrs, Revision 4 QAD 7.05, Preparation anc Issuance of :ne BECo.QA Approved Supplier List, Revision 1 QAD 7'.06, Supplier History Fiie, Revision 2 QAD 7.07, Survey of Suppliers, Revision 1-QAD 7.08, Review and Approval of Supplier QA Program, Revision 1 QAD 7.09, Acceptance of Items and Services, Revision 2 QAD.7.10, Audit of Suppliers, Revision 1 QAD-10.01, Conduct and Reporting of Source Inspections, Revision 7 QAD 16.08, Supplier Finding Reporting and Follow Program, Revision 2 Plant Design Changes (PDCs) Reviewed PDC No.85-578, Conceptual Design -
Design and installation of Electrolytic g
Hydrogen Water Chemistry System (HWCS) and associated
modular and piping and injection.
I PDC No.85-57A, Hydrogen Gas Generator Building - Non Q.
PDC No.86-10A, Gaseous Hydrogen Storage Facility - Non Q.
i PDC No.86-10A, Gaseous Hydrogen Storage Facility - Non Q.
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PDC No.86-10C, Drilling of "Q" structure and Walls for equipment mounting and penetrations.
(Safety Related)
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[TTACHMENT'l
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PDC No'.86-100, Oxygen Piping Change (Non-Q).
PDC No.86-11A,- Crack Arrest Verification System. '(CAVS)-(Safety F.. ;. ?
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Fi;pr % unting only).
PDC No.86-11B, Continuation of 86-11A on tie-ins on interfacing
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system (Mounting of units safety related).
PDC No.86-80A, Installation and Removal of Electrochemical Potential
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Testing Probe (SR).
PDC No.86-808, Reactor Intunala H.W.C. Monitoring System (SR).
' PDC No. 83-42, Concensate Feedwater/ Reactor Water Sampling and Analysis Improvements (SR).
Safety Evaluations Reviewed Safety Evaluation System PDC 1967 Electrolytic Bldg.85-57A 1967 Electrolytic INJ.85-57B 1944 ETS H Foundation 86-10 A
1986 ETS H Underground 86-10 B
Piping 1965 ETS Injection SYS86-10C 2017 ETS 0 Foundation 86-10D
1931 CAVS86-11A 1950 CAVS TIE-INS86-11B 2140 Incore Probe Instal.
86-80 A 2139 Incore Probe Sys.
86-80 B 2004 Condensate /Feedwater 83-84 Reactor Water Sampling and Analysis
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" ATTACHMENT 1
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Test Procedures
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TP 87-121, Demineralized Water Supply to Gas Generator TP 87-160-1, HCM Return to Main Condenser TP 87-156, H Process Line Gas Generator to Purge Module
TP 87-157,.
Oxygen Process Line TP 87-158, Inert Gas Line and H Vents
Four (4) Boston Edison Quality Control Inspection Reports Covering Local Leak Rate Tests VENDOR REFERENCE MANUALS Graham Manufacturing Company, Inc. - Hydroge Compressor Module - LOI-205-85066.
Stuart - Electrolytic Hydrogen Plant-The Electrolytic Corporation.
Specification for Heating and Ventilation of the Pilgrim Electrolytic Gas Generation Facility.
Maintenance Manual - Air Handling Equipment.
TRAINING INSTRUCTIONAL MODULES
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I&C Technicians - Crack Arrest Verification (CAV)
I&C Maintenance - Hydrogen Injection System (HIS)
Mechanical Maintenance (HIS)
Mechanical Maintenance (CAV)
Electrical Maintenance (HIS)
Senior Reactor Operator Hot License - Electrolytic Hydrogen Inspection (EHI)
Senior Reactor Operator Hot License - Extended Test System (ETS)
Training Program for Test Personnel, Certification
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