ML20154B051
| ML20154B051 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 03/08/1988 |
| From: | Warren C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Highfill K BOSTON EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154B016 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8805170044 | |
| Download: ML20154B051 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000293/1987053
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UNITED 8TATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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475 ALLENDALE ROAD
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KING OF PRUSSI A, PENNSYLVANI A 19408
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ATTACHMENT 2
March 8,
1988
MEMORANDUM FOR:
K.
Highfill, Station Director
FROM:
C.
Warren, Senior Resident Inspector - Pilgrim
SUBJECT:
NRC FOLLOWUP TO AIT INSPECTION 50-293/07-53
An NRC Augmented Inspection Team was dispatched to Pilgrim to evaluate a loss
of offsite power event occurring on November 12, 1987.
The recults of this
inspection are documented in inspection report 50-293/07-53.
In trder to
coordintte and track NRC inspection f ollowup we have collected pertinent
raport text, and grouped the findings into five appropriate areas.
Description of the findings and corresponfing open item numbers are attached.
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Item A.1 end E.2 have been designated at restart itemc.
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Thank you for your time and attention to these matters.
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Si r.c er ol y,
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Clay C.
Warren
Attachment
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R.
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J. Wiggins
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J. Durr
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8805170044 890506
ADOCK 050002 3
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ATTACHMENT
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A. Menacement Issues and Commitments (Unresolved Item 87-53-01):
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1.
During the inspection the licensee identified several actions they are
considering taking to improve the stations ability to respond to future
similar events.
These actions included completing the installation of
the third emergency diesel, installation of a backup instrument air
compressor and installation of additional instruments to analyze
switchyar d transients.
All of the foregoing equipment changes will be
completed before reactor restart.
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Reference:
Report cover letter, Section 6.3.
A written response
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describing the details of these actions was requested.
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2.
Overall management of the recovery effort was somewhat fragmented and
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unclear.
Coordination and communication between groups would be
substantially enhanced by well defined management guidelines for this
' type of event (i . e.
one in which the formal emergency response
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organization is not mobilized).
Reference:
Report Section 2.3,
5.3 and 5.4.
A written response was
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requested.
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3.
Develop and implement procedural guidelines f or administrative 1y staf fing
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the TSC to support the operating organization in situations where
Emergency Plan activation is not appropriate.
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Reference
Report section 5.3,
5.4 and 5.0.
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B. Ocerations (Unresol ved Item 07-53-02):
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1.
The operators were not aware of the alarm indicating the reduced voltage
on the 345 kV of f site power source prior to the loss of of f site power.
They were also unaware of the alarm indicating the blown f uses in the
analog trip system power supply.
The f ailure to utilize these alarms
should be reviewed and appropriate corrective actions developed.
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Reference:' Report sections 2.3,
4.1.1.2,
4.1.1.6,
and 4.1.2.4.
A written
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response was requested.
2.
The plant configuration bef ore the event and the equipment that was out
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of service f or maintenance created operational situations that could have
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been more serious under other circumstances with substantial dccay heat.
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Describe what considerations will be made in tne future to assure that
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essential and non-esser.tial equipment removed from service for outage
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maintenance de not create undue operational inflexibilities.
Reference
Report sections 2.3, 5.4 and
5.P,.
A written response was
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requested.
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Re-evaluate energency action levels regarding loss of onsite and offsite
power f or situations where f uel is loaded in the reactor vessel and RCS
temperature is less than 212 degrees F.
Reference:
Report sections 5.2 and 5.8.
4.
Certain procedures governing degraded plant conditions
(e.g.,
loss of
power and loss of instrument air) may not be sufficient to clearly guide
recovery actions from events of this nature.
Also procedures for
restoring offsite power should be reviewed against past operating
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experience, especially events caused by severe weather, and revised to
reflect lessons learned and anticipated problems which may need
resolution to optimize power recovery time.
Reference:
Report section 4.3.3,
4.3.5,
5.8,
6.3 and 6.4.
5.
Strengthen communications practices to assure clear understanding and
directed actions.
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Reference:
Report section 5.4 and 5.8.
6.
In reviewing procedure 2.4.25, Loss of Shutdown Cooling it was noted that
the immediate operator actions provided no specific guidance on action
required to restore shutdown cooling.
Similarly, the subsequent operator
actions did not specify any mitigating actions to be taken for conditions
other than f ull buses A5 and A6 and PCIS logics available,
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During the event, when the
"B" Diesel Generator was out of service and
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panel Y-4 was without power, the licensee initiated a temporary
modification scheme to provide power to the control circuit of the RHR
suction outboard valve 47.
Contingency proceduresfor the' single failure
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of either onsite emergency power system train (i . e. , loss of either Y-3
or Y-4) should be considered.
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References
Report section 4.1.2.4 and 6.4.
C. Maintenance (Unresolved Item 87-53-03):
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1.
The inoper.pbility of the
"B" emergency diesel generator (EDG) during the
event resulted from inadequate or incomplete maintenance procedures.
The
binding of the prelubrication pump and the leaking fuel injectors could
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have been prevented from interfering with the recovery operations if
adequate procedures for repair and post ma,intenance testing were
employed.
Maintenance requests contain very brief descriptions of actual
material conditions f ound (as-found) and few specific details of work
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performed, parts replaced and post work testing.
More aAtention to
detail in preparaticn, execution and disposition of safesy-related
maintenance requests should be evaluated.
Reference:
Report section 2.3,
4.2.2.2 and 4.2.3.
A written response was
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requested.
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2.
BECo should continue actions to reduce ing ess of ground water to the
process building and the consequential radiological bu-den.
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Reference:
Report sections 5.7 and 5.8.
3.
The practice of having the main generator bus quick disconnect links
installed during an outage should be reviewed relative to the recent
event.
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References
Report section 5.8.
4.
Procedure 3.M.3-9 should be revised to reflect operational consideration
for backfeeding with offnormal electrical system lineups.
Reference:
Report sections 4.1.1.3.2 and 4.1.1.6.
5.
On April 26, 1987 the
"B" EDG lube oil temperature switch low (LOTSL) was
replaced after failure (MR 87-61-33).
The switch that failed was
. actually a lube oil temperature switch high (LOTSH) which had been
' installed in place of the LOTSL under MR 87-61-15 during some previous
maintenance activity.
It was not evident at the time of the inspection
what controls were applied to MR 87-61-15 in substituting a LOTGH for a
LOTSL.
The evaluation of acceptability of this replacement is an issue
to be f ollowed up in f uture NRC inspections.
Reference
Report section 4.2.2.2.
6.
The post repair testing of the current transformer did not consider the
effect of the high voltage overstressing of the circuit components.
The
circuit should be properly tested to assure no lat4nt f aults are present.
Reference
Report sections 4.2.2.1 and 4.2.3.
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.D. Gurveillance (Unresolved item 87-53-04):
1.
Develop procedures that describe and control testing activities on switch
yard equipment and transformers.
Reference ' Report sections 4.1.1.3.3 and 4.1.1.6.
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2.
Some emergency diesel generator instrumentation, although being read and
recorded, was not being evaluated and trended for consistency.
An
assessment should be made of the surveillance readings being taken and a
determination made regarding the readings that are necessary and useful.
Further, responsibility for evaluating these readings should be assigned,
e.g.,
output current on each phase is neither monitored, recorded nor
trended.
In addition, a review should be conducted to ascertain if all
appropriate instrumentation in being monitored and recorded during the
conduct of the EDG surveillance testing for determination of operability
of the equipment.
Reference:
Report sections 4.2.2.1 and 4.2.3.
E. Continuino Technical Evaluations (87-53-05):
1.
The operation of the startup transf ormer dif f erential lockout relay was
apparently the result of a transient for which the protection was not
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designed.
The transformer did not experience an internal fault and the
. operation of the lockout delayed the re-energization of the station from
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offsite power sources.
The actual cause of the differential lockout
needs to be conclusively established.
Reference:
Report sections 2.3 and 4.1.1.6. A written response was
requested.
2.
The blown f uses in the analog trip system were the apparent result of a
common cause.
The cause of this condition should be identified and
corrected or determined to be acceptable before the reactor is restarted.
Reference:
Report sections 2.3 and 4.1.2.4.
A written response was
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requested.
3.
Additional investigation such as strainer and 'ilt'er inspection would be
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appropriate to ensure that the f oreign materitl that damaged the EDG
prelube pump was not externally generated (i . s. , from some other failed
component).
The licensee agreed to open both the lube oil strainers and
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the filter on "B"
EDG at the next opportunity.
Ref erencer, Report section 4.2.2.2.
4.
The licensee's actions taken in response to IE Notice 87-28 will be
reviewed separately as part of ongoing NRC inspection activities.
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Reference:
Report section 4.3.3 and 4.3.5.
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5.
The 11 censee's FLM No.87-641 review, including determination of a
requirement for root cause analysis and corrective action plan, was not
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yet complete at the end of the AIT inspection.
The licensee's further
actions regarding Ft<M No.87-641 will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC
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inspection.
Re,ference
Report section 4.3.3.
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