ML20198B202
| ML20198B202 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1998 |
| From: | Cowgill C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Ted Sullivan BOSTON EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9812180105 | |
| Download: ML20198B202 (25) | |
Text
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I December 9,1998 Mr. Theodore A. Sullivan Vice President - Nuclear and Station Director BEC Energy Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360-5599
SUBJECT:
MID-YEAR INSPECTION HESOURCE PLANNING MEETING - PILGRIM
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
l On November 10,1998, the NRC staff held an inspection resource planning meeting (IRPM). The 1 RPM provided a coordinated mechanism for Region i to adjust inspection
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schedulu, as needed, prior to the conclusion of the Plant Performance Review cycle in May 1999.
This letter advises you of our plenned inspection effort resulting from the Pilgrim Station IRPM review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for sc.heduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Enclosure 1 details our inspection plan for the next 6 months. Resident 1
inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
~ cor.tains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this IRPM process to arrive at an integrated view i
of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or j
other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Pilgrim Station. The IRPM may also J
i-have ccasidered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had nccurred since the last l
NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration.
This material will be placed in the PDR as part of the normalissuance of NRC inspection L
reports and other correspondence.
l We willinform you of any changes to the inspection plan. If you have any questions, please contact me at 610-337-5233.
Sincerely, l
l l
Original Signed By:
i l
Curtis J. Cowgill, Ill, Chief 9812180105 981209 s Brang 5 r
PDR ADOCK 05000293 Division of Reactor Projects 4
G PDR s
Docket No. 50-293 p Ol
Enclosures:
') Inspection Plan p'
f Plant issues Matrix
. (fdf RLS/ fit
Mr. T. Sullivan 2
cc w/ enc!:
R. Ledgett, Executive Vice President - Operations J. Alexander, Nuclear Assessment Group Manager D. Tarantino, Nuclear information Manager S. Brennion, Regulatory Affairs Department Manager J. Fultm. Assistant General Counsel R. Haliisor, Department of Public Health, Commonwealth of Massachusetts The Honorable Therese Murray The Honorable Joseph Gallitano -
T. MacGregor, Mass. Dept. of Public Comm. & Energy Chairman, Plymouth Board of Selectmen Chairman, Duxbury Board of Selectmen Chairman, Nuclear Matters Committee Plymouth Civil Defense Director P. Gromer, Massachusetts Secretary of Energy Resources J. Miller, Senior issues Manager J. Fleming A. Nogee, MASSPIRG Office of the Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts T. Rapone, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Chairman, Citizens Urging Responsible Energy Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee l
I f
I
.=
Mr. T. Sullivan 3
Distribution w/ encl:
Region i Docket Room (with concurrLaces)
PUBLIC Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident inspector H. Miller, RA/W. Axelson, DRA DRP Director, Region l DRP Deputy Director, Region I DRS Director, Region i DRS Deputy Director, Region 1 DRS Branch Chiefs, Region l C._ Cowgill, DRP R. Suminers, DRP D. Cullison, DRP C. O'Daniell, DRP R.' Ragland, DRS L. Prividy, DRS Distribution w/enci (VIA E-MAIL):
B. McCabe, OEDO C. Thomas, NRR A. Wang, NRR R. Correia, NRR DOCDESK Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\ BRANCH 5\\2-PG\\PPR\\PILIRPM.RJS f
73 receive a copy of this document. Indicate in the box: *C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure
- E' = Copy with attachment / enclosure
- N'=
l No copy
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OFFICE Rl/DRP l
Rl/DRP/B5 l
/
l NAME RSummers/ceo CCowgill DATE 12/ /98 12/ /98 12/ /98 12/ /98 12/ /98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 4
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ENCLOSURE 1 PILGRIM INSPECTION PLAN FOI. DECEMBER 1998 THROUGH MAY 1999 Inspection Program Area / Title Planned Dates Type inspection 81700 Physical Security Program 01/11/99 Core S lid Radwaste Management &
86750 01/19/99 Core Transportation 37550 &
Engineering Program & Followup 01/25/99 RI 92903 AE Team inspection Findings a ntenance Rule BaseHne 62706 04/05/99 OA Inspection Followup adoactive Waste Tmatment -
84750 04/19/99 Core Effluent Monitoring Occupational Radiation Exposure E3750 04/26/99 Core (Outage)
- ia ve ste Treatment -
84750 05!17/99 Core Environmental Monitoring Legend:
IP Inspection Procedure Number Tl Temporary instruction Program / Sequence Number Core -
Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatnry at all plants)
OA Other inspection Activity RI Additional Inspection Effort Planned by Region i SI Safety initiative inspection E1-1
at O
F s
ENCLOSURE 2 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX t
E 2-1
PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Descs/ption 2/15/98 Negative IR 97-13 L
1-OPS 1B Manual scram due to due to increasing reactor water level during power reduction for refueling 456 LER 97-03-01 1C outage. Violation cited in IR 97-01.
3/7/97 Positive IR 98-01 L
1-OPS 2A Loss of preferred off-site power and oil spill due to an electrical fault in the main transformer 455 LER 97-04-00 while shutdown. Proper operation response to the loss of power 8/26/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
1-OPS 1B The conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. Operators responded 444 effectively to two plant transients. In one instance, operators gained control of a recirculation pump wnich suddenly increased in speed due to a controlier malfunction. This action took only six seconds and averted a potential plant transient or reactor scram.
8/28/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
1-OPS 1A Reactor engineers and operators closely monitored minor reactor power oscillations and initiated 443 action to lower power to prevent exceeding the instantaneous reactor power limit.
8/28/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
1-OPS 1C Review of operator overtime data revealed that the licensee maintains sufficient licensed 442 operations personnel to maintain adequate shift coverage without routine heavy use of overtime.
8/28/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
1-OPS 1A The licensed and non-ficensed operators were knowledgeable of plant and equipment status 441 during equipment rounds.
07/09/98 Positive IR 98-05 N
OPS 1A The conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. A May 28,1998, plant down 425 power was well controlled and executed.
07/09/98 Positive IR 98-05 N
1-OPS 1C The recently revised process for tracking equipment and system degraded conditions and 424 4B performing and reviewing operability determinations was well defined, clearly donJmented, and consistently applied. The new tracking program provides operations personne e.th sufficient information to understand the impact of the degraded equipment on a component and system basis.
07/09/98 Positive IR 98-05 N
1-OPS 3B Licensed operator performance in training scenarios was generally adequate. The Pilgrim 423 5A training staff identified a weakness in an operator's use of an emergency operating procedure SC (EOP) and provided appropriate remedial activities. Additionally, training evaluations were acceptable. Plant experience was incorporated in the scenarios.
05/19/58 Positive IR 98-02 4
1-OPS 1A Generally good operator performance was noted during the period.
399 FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 1 21 October 1998
PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 05/19/98 Positive IR 98-02 L
1-OPS 1B A planned power reduction to 50% power and retum to fu!I power was completed well with no 398 noted operator human performance issues. The pre-evolutionary briefing, good communications and the use of a dedicated reactivity manager contnbuted to the pcsitive operational controls.
2/24/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
1-OPS 1A Good use of self-checking and procedure adherence was evident during the performance of 385 3A rottine plant evolutions. This was especially evident during two power reductions performed to support work int he condenser bay.
11/14/97 Negative IR 97-11 N
1-OPS SC Continued operation of the recirculation pump motor generator set with wom exciter brushes 380 was not rigorously evaluated nor was a problem report initiated.
11/14/97 Negative IR 97-11 N
1-OPS SB Operators did not properly assess the effect of a leaking reactor vessel water level keep fill relief 379 SC valve nor did they initiate a problem report.
2/24/98 MIS IR 98-01 N
1-OPS SC Corrective actions to resolve a broad procedure adherence problem were determined to be 356 adequate to close two previous procedure adherence violations. The initial corrective actions were not entirely effective, but additional corrective measures were developed and either implemented or are planned to be implemented this year.
2/24/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
1-OPS 3C The Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee (NSRAC) was effective in the eva:uation of 355 pote:.tial safety significant issues. Meaningful discussions occurred that focused on reactor safety.
2/24/98 Negative IR 98-01 N
1-OPS 3C Procedures for cold weather were properly implemented. The cold weather p sgram at BECo 354 was determined to be weak in that not all instrumentation for cold weather protection gets periodically calibrated / tested and is thereby subject to potential failure.
2/24/98 MIS IR 98-01 N
1-OPS 3A The control room high efficiency air filtration system was properly configured to support system 353 MAINT operability. No substantive concems were noted during the walkdown of the system.
Surveillance requirements were properly captured in BECo surveillance procedures.
2/24/98 Negative IR 98-01 N
1-OPS 3A A mechanical joint leak in standby liquid control system was identified and discussed 352 with the nuclear watch engineer for resolution. The licensee cleaned the area and monitored to determine if an active leak existed.
2/24/98 Positive IR 98-01 L
1-OPS 1A An operations self assessment was determined to be self critical with the identification of areas 351 for improvement and the use ofindustry peers during the review was considered to be a strength.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 2 21 October 1998
PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Descripdon l
1/6/98 Negative IR 97-13 N
1-OPS SA - A partially clogged cooling air inlet screen on the "a" residual heat removal pump motor was not 346 3A detected by operators on rounds or managers on tour. Operator human performance.
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l 1A t
1/6/98 Negative IR 97-13 S
1-OPS 3B An inadvertent reactor water cleanup isolabon during post scram conditions was an operator
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343 3C pmLiirence issue that broadly warranted increased training on the use of the letdown valve.
1 1/6/98 Negative IR 97-13 L
1-OPS 3A A reactor Opwisivi did not detect a diverging temperature trend between the reactor vessel 342 1A flange and the adjacent shell temperature.
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1/6/98 Positive IR 97-13 N
1-OPS 1A Two reactor startups were characterized by clear communications and e5ective control by shift f
l 337 3B supervision. Senior reactor operator poifornwnce was good in that distrachoris to the operating I
3A crew were minimized, and the diverging vessel to flange temperature differential was identified r
i and the plant heatup secured.
j 116/98 Posibve IR 97-13 N
1-OPS 1B Operators responded effectively by using proper command-and-control and procedure usage in f
323 3B response to a feed water system regulating valve malfuncbon which resulted in a turbine trip and resultant automabc reactor scram. The post trip review coinn.:c,J by operations support l
i personnel and the readiness for restart meeting focused on proper evaluaton and resolution of I
any equipment and human pmLiivence issues.
I 4
i 11/10/97 Positive IR 97-11 L
1-OPS 1A BECo (Boston Edison Co.) promptly notified the NRC of an intemal safety concem involving an 311 SC ooerator log disciopancy in 1989. A good initial BECo response was evident by hiring the services of an independent investigative sennce and limiting the licensed duties of any operator i
who may have been in the control room at the time. Minimum shift manning was not
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compromised.
l 11/10/97 VIO IR 97-11 L
1-OPS 3A Three individual licensed operator errors, involving the tagout preparer, tag hanger and 310 VIO 97-11-01 1A independent venfier, resulted in tagging an electncal breaker in the wrong position. Collectively, these errors resulted in a violabon of the PNPS (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) tagging program.
11/10/97 Negative IR 97-11 N
1-OPS 5B Investigation into the cause of the 125VDC ground expenenced during "B" diesel starts was not 309 2A aggressively pursued, and the troubleshooting plan delayed due to the battenes being cross-tied.
11/10/97 Negative IR 97-11 S
1-OPS 1B The recirculation pump trip event was handled very well by the operating crew by following l
308 3C procedures to place the plant in a stable and safe condition. The root cause and corrective achons were deterrnined to be good. Root cause was inadequate procedure. LER 97-16 closed in inspecbon report 98-01.
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i FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 6/28/98 Page 3 21 October 1998 l
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PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 11/10/97 Positive IR 97-11 N
1-OPS 1A Generally, the conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious. Operators closely i
307 3A monitored an increase tailpipe temperature from safety relief valve 3D which indicated pilot valve seatleakage.
05/19/98 Negative 8' D-02 N
1-OPS 1A A few operator perforncnce issues were noted indicating a minor weakness in control room formality. The inspector idenfied a failure of an operator to circle a plant parameter that was outside of the expected range for a non-technical specification required instrument. The NRC identified that the technical specification clarifications in the control room copy cf the technical specifications were not being updated. Also, the inspector noted a problem with a chart recorder l
on a back control panel. The licensee identified the failure of field operators to promptly detect a decreasing trend in the standby diesel generator glycol level.
11/10/97 Positive
!R 97-11 N
1-OPS 1A The training staff developed acceptable written and operating tests, and administered and 3A evaluated the tests effectively. A notable strength of the program was the training evaluators, who were particularly good at determining how well operators and crews mastered training objectives. Their high standards for performance were reflected in their critical and objective assessments. Based on these favorable attributes, the inspectors concluded that the requalification program was very good and contributed to safe plant operation.
8/15/97 Negative IR 97-02 L
2-28 A briefloss of shutdown cooling resulted from inadequate procedure. SECo corrective actions 453 LER 97-06 MAINT were appropriate for the circumstances.
5/19/98 Negative IR 98-02 L
2-1A A high energy line break door was found open at power. The door was removed during a 449 NCV LER 97-10-01 MAINT maintenance activity. Improper configuration control.
NCV 98-02-05 8/28/98 Negative IR 98-06 L
2-1A Several pressure transmitters were calibrated with the plant on-line rather than a refueling 448 NCV LER 97-14 MAINT 2B outage as required by technical specification.
NCV 96-06-01 8/28/98 Negative IR 98-06 L
2-3B Relay for the pipe break detection circuit in the RHR system did not energize during surveillance
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I 447 NCV LER 97-12-01 MAINT due to improperly set contacts.
NCV 98-06-02 8/28/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
2-2B Routine work and surveillance activities were well planned and executed.
L 440 MAINT 3B 8/28/98 Negative IR 98-06 N
2-28 The chemistry department was slow to report the initial indication of water in the core spray 439 MAINT 3A pump motor bearing oil sample.
L FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 4 21 October 1998 I
PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX ~
l Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 8/28/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
2-3A Good coordination was noted between the various departments to investigate and prorrlptly 438 MAINT restore the core spray pump to service once this issue was identified.
8/28/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
2-2B The core spray pump unavailability time was properly accounted for during the maintenance 437 MAINT activity in accordance witn the maintenance rule requirements.
07/09/98 Positive IR 98-05 N
2-3A The inspector observed portions of selected maintenance activities and determined that 422 MAINT activities were performed using approved procedures and completed with satisfactory results.
Communications among work and support groups were good and supervisor oversight was acceptable. The inspector also verified through document review that technical specifications were satisfied and maintenance was performed by qualified personnel.
07/09/98 Positive IR 98-05 N
2-SB NRC identified a potentially degraded solenoid valve (SV) 302-21C which supplies air to the 421 MAINT SC west scram discharge instrument voluine outboard vent and drain valve. A detailed operability evaluation was completed including performance based testing to determine that an immediate operability problem did not exist. A detailed test procedure and work package were written and implemented which replaced the potentially degraded solenoid valve. A root cause investigation was planned to identify any potential intemal defects or failure mechanism.
06/29/98 eel IR 98-04 N
2-2A The team identified that the risk significant anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) mitigation 414 Negative MAINT 28 function of the CRD system was not addressed in the basis document. In response to the teams finding, the expert panel determined that the CRD pumps were risk significant for their ATWS mitigation function and therefore, unavailability criterion was required. BECo's failure to establish appropriate performance criteria for the CRD system is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(2).
06/29/98 eel IR 98-04 L
2-2A BECo's review identified the system should have been placed in an (a)(1) status by May 1997 413 Negative MAINT 2B but the status change had not occurred until December 1997. The s'$us change was required due to repetitive functional failures on the feedwater regulating valves. BECo's failure to place the systems into an (a)(1) status in a timely manner commensurate with safety is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(2).
06/29/98 eel IR 98-04 L
2-2A BECo's review identified the system should have been placed in an (a)(1) status by July 10,1996 412 Negative MAINT 2B but the status change had not occurred until November 1997. The status change was required due to in-service and local leak rate test functional failures that occurred in April 1995 which exceeded the established system performance criteria. BECo's failure to place the systems into j
an (a)(1) status i" a timely manner commensurate with safety was an apparent violation of 10 1
CFR 50.65 (a)(o l
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FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 5 21 October 1998 l
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PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source in SFA Code item Description 06/29/98 eel IR 98-04 N
2-2A The team identified that the heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) units for the reactor 411 Negative MAINT 2B building 480V switch gear environmental enclosures were not included in the scope of the MR.
These HVAC units were designed to protect the associated switchgears (which provide power to essential equipment loads) from high energy line breaks in the secondary containment. These units should have been included in the scope of the MR because the associated switchgears are relied upon to mitigate the consequences of an accident or transient. This is an example of an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (b).
06/29/98 eel IR 98-04 N
2-2A The team reviewed BECO's (a)(3) assessment report and determined the report was 410 Nega'ive MAINT 2B appropriately self-critical (" Boston Edison Company - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station -
SB Maintenance Rule (a)(3) Periodic Assessment - July 10,1996 through April 17,1998 Operating Cycle 11," dated April 21,1998). However, the assessment report was not completed in a timely manner and four sections (8.0 - Preventative Maintenance Optimization, 9.0 - Operating Experience Review,11 - Plant walkdown, and 14 - Review of Documentation) of the report were not completed until the week after the inspection completed. The requirement for completion of l
the self assessment is linked to the refueling cycle. Refueling outage (RFO-11) was completed in April 1997 and therefore the (a)(3) assessment report should have been completed at the end of RFO 11. This is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(3).
06/29/98 eel IR 98-04 N
2-2A The team identified that the firewater system function of providing a backup water supply to the 410 Negative MAINT 2B screenwash system was not included in the scope of the rule. It appeared that this function should have been included in the scope of the MR because its failure could result in a scram or safety system actuation. This is an example of an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (b).
06/29/98 Positive IR 98-04 N
2-2A Systems, structures and components (SSCs) performance criteria for reliability and unavailability 409 MAINT 28 were conservatively established for most systems and were directly related to the failure rates assumed in the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). However, Boston Edison Company's l
(BECO's) failures to consider the anticipated transient without sciam mitigation function and establish appropriate performance criteria for the control rod drive system was a violation of 10 CFR 50.66 (a)(2).
06/29/98 Positive IR 98-04 N
2-2A The condition monitoring program for structures and the overall material condition of the SSCs 408 MAINT 2B walked down were good.
06/29/98 Positive IR 98-04 N
2-2A Corrective actions were taken when an SSC failed to meet its goal, performance criteria, or 407 MAINT 2B experienced a functional failure with some exceptions. BECo permitted the primary containment and feedwater systems to remain under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) when preventative maintenance failed to assure that these SSCs can perform their intended function in violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2).
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 6 21 October 1998
PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 06/29/9[ Positive IR 98-04 N
2-2A BECo's SSC scoping, SSC function identification, and system boundary descriptions were 406 MAINT 2B generally acceptable. However, in violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b) BECo failed to include in the scope of the rule the heating, ventilation and air conditioning system for the reactor building 480V switch gear and the firewater system backup supply to the screenwash system 06/29/98 Positive IR 98-04 N-2-
2A The methods and calculations that BECo established for making risk determinations, and for 404 MAINT 2B establishing performance criteria were acceptable. The expert panel's decisions regarding the performance criteria, risk ranking and knowledge of on-line and shutdown maintenance risk assessment were appropriate.
06/29/98 Positive IR 98-04 N
2-2A BECo*s program adequately balanced availability and reliability. However, BECo's (a)(3) 403 MAINT 2B assessment should have been completed at the end of RFO 11 in April 1997 and was not completed until after the inspection in vioiation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(3).
06/29/98 Positive IR 98-04 N
2-2A The process for essessing risk associated with scheduled maintenance work activities was 402 MAINT 2B generally good and was being property implemented at the site. Probabilistic risk assessments were not used to assess the overall plant risk in certain conditions. The persons interviewed expressed sufficient knowledge of the risk assessment process to implement the maintenance rule program. BECo's approach to shutdown risk program was also reasonable.
06/29/98 Positive IR 98-04 N
2-2A System engineer and operations department personnel knowledge of the MR and their 401 MAINT 2B associated responsibilities was adequate to ensure acceptable implementation of the maintenance rule.
06/29/98 Positive IR 98-04 N
2-SA Program revision and substantial improvements were implemented just prior to the inspection 400 MAINT 2A due, in part, to the thoroughness of the licensee's self-assessment and audit processes 2B 05/19/98 Positive IR 98-02 1.
2-2B Thorough planning and controls were used during a planned downpower for work on the "B" 397 MAINT 3A feed water system regulating valve. Survei!!ance test data was properly evaluated to ensure acceptance criteria were met.
05/19/98 Positive IR 98-02 L
2-2A The process for assessing risk associated with scheduled on-line maintenance work activities 396 MAINT 2B was good.
05/19/98 Negative IR 98-02 L
2-2A Several lower level equipment problems were identified by the inspector in the plant which 395 MAINT SA collectively indicate that some conditions adverse to quality were not promptly identified and corrected.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 7 21 October 1998
PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 05/19/98 Negatve IR 98-02 L
2-3B An inadequate maintenance work plan resulied in damaging an intemal cooling coil in the "A" 394 MAINT core spray pump motor. The resultant increased work scope cost an additional 530 millirem of radiation exposure and an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of safety system unavailability.
9/19/97 Negative IR 97-11 L
2-2A Power was reduced due to the loss of the "A" first point feed water heater. A false high level 384 MAINT alarm and isolation occurred due to a steam leak from a blown level transmitter gasket.
11/14/97 Negative IR 97-13 L
2-2A The failure of a local level control valve on the "D" moisture separator drain tank caused a high 383 MAINT level condition on the tank. Power was reduced to effect repairs.
2/24/98 Negative IR 98-01 L
2-2A Power was reduced to make temporary repairs to a steam leak from a zinc injection skid 382 MAINT isolation valve.
2/24198 NCV IR 98-01 L
2-3A Maintenance workers incorrectly worked on the wrong valve.
375 Negative URI 96-03-02 MAINT 2/24/98 NCV IR 98-01 L
2-3A Two equipment issues emerged during the April 1997 reactor startup which affected operational 374 Negntive URI 97-02-01 MAINT activities. These included sluggish control rod movement and feed water regu!ating valve performance. Based on timely and comprehensive corrections actions taken by the licensee to correct the issue of inadequate preventive maintenance, this violation of is being treated as a NCV.
2/24/98 NCV IR 98-01 L
2-3A The "B" recirculation system pump tripped due to an inadequate surveillance test procedure.
373 Negative LER 97-016 MAINT This non-repetitive Licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as an NCV.
1/6/98 Negative IR 97-13 L
2-3A After maintenance was completed, the specified post woi f.est was not adequate. Corrective 370 NCV URI 96-80-02 MAINT actions taken to address weakness identified in 1996 work control packages (missed post work tests) were timely and comprehensive. This licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a NCV.
2/24/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
2-3A Operators completed a high pressure coolant injection surveillance test in a competent manner 358 MAINT using proper self checking. A test anomaly was properly resolved with the assistance of the system engineer and l&C (instrumentation and control) technicians.
2/24/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
2-3A Work activities were performed within the techr:ical specification limiting condition for operation 357 MAINT 38 a!! owed time and performed ahead of schedule. A good questioning attitude was demonstrated by the maintenance craft and good communications between maintenance and engineering was noted in resolving the torque value for the "C" residual heat removal terminal box. Good procedural adherence was observed for all activities observed.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 8 21 October 1998
PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 116/9 8 Positive IR 97-13 N
2-3A Routine and emergent maintenance tasks were completed by experienced workers with 347 MAINT 3B generally good results. A planned emergency diesel generator iimiting conditions for operations maintenance outage was better planned and executed than one during the previous period.
1216/97 Negative IR 97-13 S
2-3A Maintenance troubleshooting efforts were effective in identifying the most probable cause why 328 LER LER 97-026 MAINT 2A feed regulating valve 642A failed open on December 6,1997, resulting in a reactor scram. The BECo post trip review team determined that an instrumentatica and controls corrective maintenance activity during the main steam isolation valve shutdown outage inadvertently interfered with the proper positioning of the valve clip located in the valve positioner. This was another instrumentation and control human performance issue. The system engineer properly applied the maintenance rule criteria for this maintenance preventable failure. Corrective actions were thcrough.
11/23/97 Positive IR 97-13 S
2-SC An unplanned preventable shutdown resulted from degraded main steam isolation valve FSIV) 327 LER LER 97-025 MAINT 2A actuator closing springs which was considered a maintenance functional failure. The licensee 58 expanded the corrective actions to restore margin on all MSIVs. The use of a quarterly surveillance test, beyond the technical specification requirements, to detect actuator degradation at an early stage was a positive initiative.
1/G/98 VIO IR 97-13 L
2-SB The anticipated transient without scram system was declared inoperable when instrumentation 325 Negative VIO 97-13-01 MAINT 3A and controls (l&C) technicians inadvertently installed a 24 vde relay into a 125 vde application.
3C The relay failed when placed in service. The event was caused by a work control planner and supervisor errors. A violation was issued.
1/6/98 NCV IR 97-13 N
2-3A The NRC identified two l&C (instrumentation and control) human performance issues with the 322 Negative MAINT SA potential use of expired thread sealant and the inadvertent opening of a pctcock valve on the tube oil strainer for the "A" emergency diesel generator.
11/10/97 Negative IR 97-11 S
2-SC The failure of the "A" salt service water (SSW) motor shafts resulted from fatigue failure due to 313 URI 97-11-03 MAINT SB improper pump assembly. Based on the satisfactory alignment checks of the "B", *C", "D", and
- E" SSW pumps and the metallurgical evaluation performed on the failed shafts, the failure mechanism is not a generic concem for the other SSW pumps. The corrective actions taken after the first "A" SSW sh: *! failure were ineffechve in that the replacement shaft failed 54 days later.
a FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 9 21 October 1998
t PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX i
i Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Descriptiors 11/10/97 VIO IR 97-11 N
2-3A A planned limiting condition for operation (LCO) maintenance outage on the "A" emergency r
312 VIO 97-11-01 MAINT 1A diesel generator did not go as smoothly as past LCO maintenance issues. The NRC identified SC two problems including an inadequate tagout for the X-103A starting air compressor and also l
untimely corrective achon for a broken coolant expansion tank Hi/Lo level alarm dating back to 1993.
t 2/6/98 Negative IR 97-13 L
3-ENG 4A Safeguards buses de-energize and losses off-site power during storm while shut down. The 452 LER 97-07 loss of safety related systems was due to inadequate design control measures. Violation 97 02 previously cited in NRC inspechon report I
3/24/98 Negative IR 98-01 L
3-ENG 2A Set point of safety relief valve popping pressure exceeded technical specification value during 451 LER 97-08 surveillance.
[
12/11/97 Negative IR 97-11 L
3-ENG 4A Reactor core isolation cooling system tripped on over speed during surveillance. Cause was -
450 LER 97-09 due to a result of a gear change made during the refueling outage. A violation was issued in IR 97-02 against design control.
j 8/28/98 Negative IR 98-06 L
3-ENG 4C Temporary power cables and extension cords Jraped to class 1E conduits in violation of j
446 NCV LER 97-22 iRai separation entena NCV 98-06-05 8/20/98 Negative IR 98-06 L
3-ENG 4C Radwaste building was not in a configurabon consistent with the tomado depressurization 445 NCV LER 97-23-01 analysis. A second door had been added and not subsequently removed after the original door NCV 98-06-06 had been repaired.
l 8/28/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
3-ENG 5A An effective questioning attitude by the engineering staffled to the identification of the 436 LER 98-14 inadequate implementation of the 4.16kV degraded voltage protechon logic. Engineering p
LER 98-15 evaluations were performed that concluded the emergency AC power system was operable but outsxie design. No immediate correchve actions were necessary; procedures were already in l
place to prevent this scenario from occurring, and the delay in iestoring core cooling after a DBA-LOCA was determined not to cause the peak clad temperature to exceed the temperature i
limits specified in 10CFR 46. Correchve achons are being developed that will be implemented i
during the next refueling outage, presently scheduled for April 23,1999, to modify the degraded grid voltage relay setting.
8/28/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
3-ENG 5A The engineering staff closely followed the guidance contained in NRC Generic Letter 91-18, 435 SC Revision 1, during the identificabon and resolution of three adverse design control conditions j
involving a potential containment leakage path, electncal hot shorts and use of incorrect seismic dampir,g factors l
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 10 21 October 1998 i
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PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 8/20/98 Positive IR 98-09 N
3-ENG 4B A sample of four operability evaluations were found to be adequately supported by engineerirg 428 evaluations. Management oversight of the OE process was evident, including an integrated assessment of cumulative effect.
8/20/38 Positive IR 98-09 N
3-ENG SB Sufficient management attention is being focused to address sigrFcant Problem Reports 427 SC awaiting engineering resolution. Self-assessments and audits were being performed.
8/20/98 Positive IR 98-09 N
3-ENG SC Corrective actions associated with previous NRC inspection findings were effective, and 426 being implemented as stated in responses and reports.
07/09/98 Positive IR 98-05 N
3-ENG 4A An implemented increase in the response time for the scram discharge volume high reactor 420 water level scram instrumentation reduced spurious half scrams during post scram conditions and met the safety related setpoint change methodology criteria. A calculation and minor design change carefully evaluated the effect of increased response time.
05/19/98 Positive IR 98-02 L
3-ENG 4B Engineers resolved two degraded equipment issues involving the residual heat removal 393 LER 98-05 quadrant room cooler supports and a thru-wall pipe leak in the outlet of the "B" turbine building closed cooling water heat exchanger. In both cases, interim corrective actions included physical modifications and demonstrated effective teamwork between engineers and the maintenance staff.
05/19/98 Negative IR 98-02 L
3-ENG SC Engineering review of the failure of a salt service water pump shaft did not detect a subtle pump 392 pedestal alignment problem until a second shaft failure occurred. The licensee's root cause evaluation after the second shaft failure addressed the specific concem for the SSW pumps, but did not evauate the oversight in the design and/or work control process which overlooked a previous modification.
2/24/93 NCV IR 38-01 N
3-ENG 3A A written engineering evaluation regarding lowering feedwater temperature at the end of an 376 Negative URI 96-10-02 operating cycle did not discuss all pertinent aspects of the final safety analysis report.
Subsequent review determined that lowering the temperature did not adversely affect the eva!uation. The identified weakness were isolated in nature and was of minor significance.
1/6/98 Positive IR 97-13 L
3-ENG 3A Error in core thermal power calculation. An omission existed in calculation due to original 372 NCV LER 95-12 calculation error. This licensee identified and corrected viobSon is being treated as a NCV.
1/6/98 Negative IR 97-13 L
3-ENG 3A Wired containment isolation valve resulting from a personnel error during an improper 371 NCV LER 95-08 modification installation in 1993. This licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as an NCV.
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FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/S8 Page 11 21 October 1998
PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 2/24/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
3-ENG 4C Improvements in the control and oversight of vendor services addressed previous problems in 362 this area.
2/24/98 VIO IR 98-01 N
3-ENG 3C A past programmatic problem with updating the final safety analysis report was closed out as a 361 4C violation.
2/24/98 VIO IR 98-01 N
3-ENG 4B A violation of reporting requirements resulted when engineering personnel initiated an 360 VIO 98-01-07 5A engineering evaluation for a newly discovered problem with the emergency dicsc! generator (EDG) fuel oil system but failed to follow the established problem report process by initiating a problem reportin a timely manner.
11/19!97 eel IR 97-12 N
3-ENG 4C There were unreviewed safety questions (USQ) for the replacement and the subsequent 350 eel 97-12-01 modification of two 480/120 volt safeguard control transformers. One apparent violation with two examples of 10 CFR 50.59 pertaining to unreviewed safety questions were identif.ed.
Inadequate digital modification change process.
2/24/98 NCV IR 98-01 L
3-ENG 4A Single failure vulnerability of the emergency diesel generator fuel oil supply system. Failure to 341 Positive LER 98-001 4C clearly translate design basis assumptions into the licensing basis and failure to establish proper LER configuration control.
1/6/98 Positive IR 97-13 N
3-ENG SC CorrectNe actions have been taken by BECo to address the backlog of open vendor manual 335 4C changes. The open VMCR have not contributed to problems with plant equipment. The failure to process all vendor manual changes in a timely manner was previously determined to be a non cited violation.
1/6/98 eel IR 97-13 L
3-ENG 3A With a single salt service water (SSW) pump operation per loop and under degraded power 334 Negative LER 97-015 SA conditions, the SSW breaker overload heater protection relays for any pump could have tripped LER SC the pump and, therefore, violate technical specification 3/4.5.B. Operable Core and Containment Cooling Systems. This condition was unknown by the licensee prior to receipt and review of the new SSW pump performance testing curve in August 1997. The licensee determined that this conditca was reportable. This condition is an apparent design control violation.
1/6/98 Positive IR 97-13 N
3-ENG 4C BECo*s (Boston Edison Co.) tracking and trending program was consistent with the guidelines 332 SA established in Generic Letter 89-10. The licensee made effective use ofindustry information.
1/6/98 NCV IR 97-13 N
3-ENG 4C Design-basis motor operated valve calculations were updated to reflect the latest technical 331 Positive 3C information. Isolated cases were identified in which calculations needed to be updated, but the SA licensee was aware of the discrepancies and revisions either were planned or in progress.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 12 21 October 1998
PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 1/6/98 Positive IR 97-13 N
3-ENG 4C The licensee demonstrated the design-basis capability of its GL 89-10 motor operated valves.
330 3B The licensee committed to obtain additional information to bolster the assumptions by June 30, 3C 1998. The licensee appropriately adjusted MOV (motor operated valve) program design assumptions in response to industry information. Program assumptions regarding load sensitive behavior, stem friction coefficient, and extrapolation of test data were acceptable for GL 89-10 program closure.
1/6/98 VIO IR 97-13 N
3-ENG 48 An unplanned power reduction and technical specification logging vioiation resulted from 329 VIO 97-13-02 SB incorrect readings from a temporary modification made on the reactor vessel flange temperature elements. The licensee did not adequately evaluate the cause of and develop effective corrective actions to preclude the recurrent instances of the temporary temperature detectors from becoming dislodged from the reactor vessel flange. The elements moved / separated from
+
the reactor vessel flange on three separate occasions. The failure was a violation of involving inadequate corrective actions.
11/19/97 Negative IR 97-12 N
3-ENG 4C From June 1993 to 1996, because of General Electric's calculation error, Pilgrim environmental 317 qualification (EO) files for the affected Limitorque components and the acoustic monitors did not contain the appropriate post-accident containment temperature profile to which these components were required to be qualified to. The issue for the GE calculation error was documented in NRC inspection report 97-05 as an apparent EQ violation.
11/19/97 Positive IR 97-12 L
3-ENG SB The environmental qualification (EO) equipment that required requalification due to containment 316 SC environment changes resulting from the containment spray flow rate reduc 3on in 1988 (Limitorque limit switches, Marathon terminal blocks, Klerite cable, Rockbestos cable, and the acoustic monitors for the safety re!ief valves) was qualifiable to the corrected post-accident profile without requiring additiona! tests.
11/10/97 Positive IR 97-11 S
3-ENG SC BECo (Boston Edison Co.) was susceptible to the suppression pool bypass path under certain 314 LER 97-24 4A plant evolutions (torus inerting). Prompt actions were taken by the operations department NCV 98-06-07 manager upon identification of the issue to prevent placing the plant in a condition outside of its design.
11/19/97 VIO IR 97-12 N
3-ENG 4C The requalification for 9 General Electric electrical penetrations was acceptable. However, from 304 VIO 97-12-02 March,1996 to April,1997, these 9 GE electrical containment penetrations were not qualified in that the qualification methodology (thermogravimetric analysis and linear slope comparison analysis) used by BECo had not been validated by test results to be equivalent to the method specified in the Guidelines for Evaluating EQ of Class 1E Electrical. This was a violation.
L FPOM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 13 21 October 1998
PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 12/4/97 LER IR 97-05 L
3-ENG SC Operation outside the design basis of the plant during periods of time when ambient temp 276 VIO 97-05-03 4A exceeded 88 degrees F that adversely affects the emergency diesel generator operation.
LER 97-21-00 Ambiguity in the final safety analysis report. One of several salt service water licensee self assessment issues. Identified by BECo (Boston Edison Co.), but not formally entered in the problem reporting process and corrected.
12/4/97 LER 1R 97-05 N
3-ENG SC Operation outside the design. Residual heat removal flow rate during a loss of coolant accident 275 VIO 97-05-04 4C established as low as 4800 gpm (gallons per minute) in procedures. Th;s is less than the 5100 LER 97-20-00 gpm established in the final safety analysis report. Inadequate translation of analysis parameters into operating procedures. Also a reportability concem. Was a salt service water licensee self assessment potentialissue.
12/4/97 LER IR 97-05 N
3-ENG SC Analysis assumption to close reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) valve supplying 274 VIO 97-05-01 4A cooling water to non-essential heat loads during LOCA (loss of coolant accident) not translated LER 97-019 into procedure, contrary to the final safety analysis report identified during the licensee's self-assessment (SWSOPI) of the salt service water system. NRC identified several reportability concems. Potential escalated enforcement action taken. Not properly translated into residual heat removal operating procedure. Also several issues were not formally entered into the problem reporting process and corrected.
12/4/97 LER 1R 97-12 L
3-ENG 4A Plant operation outside of environmental qualification envelope due to non conservative drywell 272 LER 97-18-00 temperature profile. Incorrect assumption in computer model. LER not closed 12/4/97 Negative IR 97-05 N
3-ENG 4B Past operation with salt service water temperatures above 65 degrees F was temperature 271 LER VIO 97-05-02 SC assumed in the accident analysis. Plant analyses or calculations of record were not consistent LER 97-17-00 1A with nor properly translated into applicable operating procedures.
10/24/97 Positive IR 97-08 L
4-PS SC Loss of special nuclear material. Additional items were identified as part of a followup to 458 NCV LER 97-01-00 previous violation.
NCV 97-08-04 10/24/97 Negative IR 97-08 L
4-PS 4B Steam jet air ejector sampling not performed IAW technical specifications. Sample location 457 NCV LER 97-02-00 1A changed due to a GE SIL that made recommendation. Licensee concluded that a TS change NCV 97-08-05 was not required to change the sample location since specific location was not stated.
10/24/97 Negative IR 97-08 L
4-PS 3B NRC notification not made when turbine effluent monitor was out of service as required by 454 NCV LER 97-05-00
,1 A technical specifications (TS). Instrument was inoperab!e and operations did not recognize that MCV 97-08-06 the TS applied while the unit was shutdown and no potential for release of radioactive material existed.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 14 21 October 1998
PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 8/28/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
4-PS 1C An effective radiological environmental monitoring program was implemented and maintained in 434 accordance with regulatory requirements.
8/28/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
4-PS 1C The licensee effectively maintained and implemented a meteorological monitoring program in 433 accordance with regulatory requirements.
8/28/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
4-PS 1C QA audits and surveillances were thorough and of sufficient depth to assess performance and 432 2B implementation of the REMP.
8/28/98 Positive IR 98-06 N
4-PS 1C The contract laboratory continued to implement excellent QA/QC programs for the REMP, and 431 continued to provide effective validation of analytical results and the programs are capable of ensuring independent checks on the precision and accuracy of the measurements of radioactive materialin environmental media.
8/28/98 Negative VIC 98-06-08 N
4-PS 1C Two vio!ations were identified by the NRC that related to the fire protection program. The 430 SA licensee subsequently took thomugh corrective actions including performing detailed root cause LER 97-29 evaluations, issuance of two related LERs, detailed problem extent review for other degraded LER 98-12 fire barriers, and prompt reso!ution of hardware and testing deficiencies.
8/28/98 Negative IR 98-06 N
4-PS 1C An ALARA concem that could potentially result in higher cumulative radiation exposure for 429 operators who perform turbine standard inspections was effectively addressed by the licensee.
07/09/98 Positive IR 98-05 N
4-PS 1C Reasonable As Low As is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) dose goals were established for 419 1998, the ALARA Commtee was actively investigating dose reduction measures, and several significant dose reduction initiatives were planned including installation of permanent shielding in the drywell and reactor building, and a chemical decontamination of portions of the residual heat removal (RHR) system.
07!09/98 Positive IR 98-05 N
4-PS 1C Contamination controls in major plant work areas were generally good as evidenced by a 418 spacious radiological controlled area (RCA) access control facility, a separate RCA tool room, and maintenance of clean areas in the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) room, reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) room, and areas around the hydraulic control units (HCUs). Rain water intrusion into several enclosed radioactive material storage areas located outside of the plant had the potential to spread contamination.
07/09/98 Negative IR 98-05 N
4-PS 2A Housekeeping deficiencies in the torus room and retube bui! ding detracted from otherwise good 417 conditions in major plant work areas.
FRCM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 15 21 October 1998
PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 07/09/98 Positive IR 98-05 N
4-PS SA Quality assurance oversight and the problem report system were effective in the identification, 416 SB evaluation, and resolution of radiological control program deficiencies.
SC 07/09/98 Negative IR 98-05 N
4-PS 1C The NRC identified several potential deficiencies in the fire protection program. One issue 415 involved the identification of a major defect in an Appendix R raceway enclosure which protects safe shutdown cables. Further NRC review will be required to determine the safety significance and proper enforcement action for these deficiencies 05/19/98 Positive IR 98-02 L
4-PS 4B A significant dose reduction activity in the "D" thru "G" condensate demineralizer room was 391 effectively performed. The use of a design change in the resin transfer line to the spent resin storage tank eliminated the need for manual transfer of drums filled with spent resin. The dose rates in the room dropped from 500 - 1000 mr/hr to 10 - 15 mr/hr, which was a significant reduction. In a second dose reduction activity, a portable high pressure water source was used to clean the 51 foot elevation floor drains in the reactor building.
05/19/98 Positive IR 98-02 L
4-PS 3A Proper radiological practices were demonstrated by maintenance workers when opening and 390 venting the RCIC pressure detectors and during work on the "B" feed regulation valve.
03/12/98 eel IR 98-03 N
4-PS SC in general, the licensee maintained an effective security program. However, the inspectors 389 Weakness determined that multiple examples of equipment failures associated with the protected area assessment system existed. Assessment aid concems were identified in the licensee's 1996 and 1997 quality assurance (QA) audits as well as in the 1995-1997 NRC security inspection reports. The failure to address known programmatic weaknesses is a concem.
03/12/98 Positive IR 98-03 N
4-PS 3A The 1996 and 1997 security, access authorization, and FFD audits were thorough and in-depth, 388 3B alarm station operators were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities, and communication requirements were being performed in accordance with the NRC-approved physical security plan (the Plan). Personnel search equipment was being tested and maintained in accordance with licensee procedures and the Plan, personnel and packages were being properly searched prior to protected area (PA) access and controls were in place, which included a departmental self-assessment program, for identifying, resolving, and preventing programmatic problems.
03/12/98 Negative IR 98-03 N
4-PS 3B Security training was generally being performed in accordance with the training and qualification 387 (T&O) plan. However, the inspectors noted that the licensee has not conducted drills associated with tactical response training for over 18 months.
03/12/98 Positive IR 98-03 N
4-PS 1C The inspectors determined, by physical verification, discussions with security supervision, and 386 procedural reviews, that locks and keys were being maintained as required in the Plan.
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 16 21 October 1998
PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRa Date Type Source ID SFA Code item Description 1/6/98 Positive IR 97-13 N
4-PS 3A Operators closely folicwed the alarm response procedure for the failure of a digital controIIer 381 function for a recirculation system motor-generator set.
2/24/98 Negative IR 98-01 N
4-PS 2A Boron residue from a mechanical joint leak in the stand-by liquid control system was not 378 cleaned.
02/24/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
4-PS SC The minimum number of compensatory measures in place and the prompt response to repair 369 identified degraded conditions indicates good management of security equipment.
2/24/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
4-PS 3C Ouality assurance (QA) audits were sufficient to effectively assess the radioactive liquid and 368 gaseous effluent control programs. The licensee implemented a good quality assurance (QA)/ quality control (OC) program to validate measurement results for effluent samples.
2/24/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
4-PS 3C The inspector concluded: (1) effluent control procedures were sufficiently detailed to facilitate 367 performance of all necessary steps; (2) the licensee effectively implemented the technic:'3 specifications (TS)/offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM) requirements for reporting effluent releases and projected doses to the public; and, (3) the licensee's ODCM contained sufficient specification, information, and instruction to acceptably implement and maintain the radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent control programs.
2/24/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
4-PS 3C The plant air balance was maintained in accordance with established design specifications and 366 the updated final safety analysis report.
2/24/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
4-PS 3C An adequate air cleaning surveillance program existed for the standby gas treatment and control 365 room air cleaning systems.
2/24/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
4-PS 3C An adequate calibration program was maintained and implemented for selected effluent / process 364 area radiation monitoring systems.
2/24/98 Positive IR 98-01 N
4-PS 3C Effective radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent control programs were maintained and 363 implemented.
1/6/98 Positive IR 97-13 N
4-PS 3B Overall, proper radiological controls were demonstrated by the maintenance craft during 348 replacement of the main steam safety relief valve.
1/6/98 NCV IR 97-13 N
4-PS 3A One poor practice was identified when a maintenance supervisor demonstrated poor 336 Negative contamination control work practices which had the potential to cause a personnel contamination by retrieving his cellular phone from inside of the anti-contamination clothing without removing his rubber gloves and placing the receiver against his face FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 17 21 October 1998
- ~..-
PILGRIM PLANT ISSUES MATRIX l
Date Type Source
.lO SFA -Code Nem Descrip6on 11/10/97 Negatrve IR 97-11 N
4-PS 3A Two instances of poor radiological precuces were observed including an overflowed protectiv.e 315 clothing receptacle and spillage of water from dewatering rig outside of a posted contamination area. Minor cleanliness issues w e observed in the Torus Room.
11/7/97 Positive IR 97-10 N
4-PS 3B Overall performance of the emergency response organization was very good. Simulated events 306 were accurately diagnosed, proper mitigation actions were performed, emergency declarations were timely and accurate, and off-site agencies were notified promptly. No exercise weaknesses, safety concems, or violations of NRC requirements were observed.
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FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 Page 18 21 October 1998
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN P.M. TABLE.
i e
NRC Nuclear Regulatory COiinini e
BECo Boston Edison m I
i 1
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)
L L
4 s
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.i t
r i
i L
1-i P
I F
r i
1 T
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 21 October 1998 t
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n-,
~ - - - - -. - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
.=
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE COLUMNS The actual date of an event or significant issue for those items that have a clear date of occurrence (mainly LERs), the date the source of the infeiniai;On was issued (such as for EAls), or the last date of the inspechon period (for irs).
7)pe The ;,vw; cation of the item or finding - see the Type / Findmgs Type Code table, below.
Source The document that describes the findings LER for Licensee Event Reports, EAL for Enforcement Action Letters, or IR for NRC Inspechcn Reports.
AD ldentificahon of who discovered issue: N for NRC; L for Licensee; or S for Self Identifying (events).
SFA SALP Funchonal Area Codes: OPS for Operabons; MAINT for Maintenance; ENG for Engineenng; and PS for Plant Support.
Code Template Code - see table below.
Details of NRC findings on LERs that have safety significance (as stated in irs), findings described in IR Executive Summaries, and amplifying information contained in EALs.
i TYPE / FINDINF., CODES TEMPLATE CODES j
ED Enforcement Discrrison - No Civil Penalty 1
Operational Performance: A - Normal Operations; B - Operations During Transients; 1
and C - Programs and Processes Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance Weakness Overall Weak Licensee Performance 2
MaterialCondition:A - Equipment Condition or B - Programs and Processes f
eel
- Escalated Enforcement item - Waiting Final NRC Action 3
Human Performance: A - Work Performance; B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities /
l t
Training; C-Work Environment VIO Veolabon Level 1, II, Ill, or IV 4
Engmeenng/ Design: A - Design; B - Engineering Support: C - Programs and Processes
}
NCV Non-Cited Violabon l
DEV Deviation from Licensee Cwc i-uiient to NRC 5
Problem idwnt;Tn t;wi and Resolution: A -Identificstion; B - Analysis; and C -
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^
Resolubon l
Positive Individual Good inspechon Finding Negative Individual Poor inspecbon Finding NOTES:
Eels are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for
[
LER Licensee Event Report to the NRC escalated enforcement action in accordance with the
- General Statement of Policy and ji Procedure for NRC Enforcoiiient Action"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600.
URI" Unresolved item from inige.uwi Report i
However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decisior on the issues Licensing Licensing issue from NRR identified by the Eels and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made. Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee will be provided
{
MISC Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP),
with an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a Declared Emergency, NOix,wifwni nce issue, etc. The predechal enhnt conference.
type of alt MISC findings are to be put in the item URis are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in quesbon is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or
[
a violation. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and s
the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
j L
FROM: 10/1/97 TO: 8/28/98 21 October 1998 I
I r
.