IR 05000293/1987054
| ML20149E935 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1987 |
| From: | Conklin C, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149E928 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-87-54, NUDOCS 8801140061 | |
| Download: ML20149E935 (6) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. . ,- . . U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-293/87-54 Docket No.
50-293 License No.
DPR-35 Priority Category C Licensee: Boston Edison Company 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Facility Name: Pilgrim Generating Station Inspection At: Plymouth, Massachusetts Inspection Conducted: Decembar 8 -10, 1987 /2!/y!M Inspectors: n/ date C.Conkfl'n,TeamLeader,EPS, EP&RP&, DRSS R. Hogan, NRR C. Warren, SRI J. Lyash, RI T. Kim, RI Approved By: e[[aw Mt4c /d /
W. J. Lar.Wttsp/Qibf, EPS, date EP&RPB, DRSS Inspection Summary: Inspection on December 8-10, 1987 (Report No.
50-293/87-54) Areas Inspected: ROJtine announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on December 9, 1987.
The inspection was performed by a team of five NRC Region I personnel.
Results: No violations were identified.
Emergency response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
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~ - . W DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted The following licensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on December 10, 1987.
R. Bird, Senior Vice President - Nuclear R. Varley, Assistant to the Vice President S. Hook, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator A. Lee, Onsite Emergency Preparedness Coordinator L. Dooley, Technical Training Supervisor T. Sowden, Radiation Section Manager R. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager K. Heifield, Site Director J. Seery, Technical Section Manager The team observed and interviewed several licensee emergency response personnel, controllers and observers as they performed their assigned functions during the exercise.
2.
Emergency Exercise The Pilgrim Generation Station partial participation exercise was conducted on December 9, 1987 from 8:00 AM to 2:00 PM.
There was limited participation by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health.
2.1 Pre-exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives held meetings and had telephone discussions with licensee represent-atives to discuss objectives, scope and content of the exercise scenario. As a result, changes were made in order to clarify certain objectives, revise certain portions of the scenario and ensure that the scenario provided the opportunity for the licensee to demonstrate those areas previously identified by NRC as in need of corrective action.
NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on December 8, 1987, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario.
The licensee stated that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviation or disruption of normal plant operations.
The exercise scenario included the following events: - A contaminated, injured person; . . - -.
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. - A loss of condensate pumps, with resultant reactor trip; - A stuck open Safety Valve, with concurrent loss of HPCI; - A primary containment penetration failure, with release to the atmosphere; - Declaration of Unusual Event, Alert and General Emergency Classifications; - Calculation of offsite dose consequerces; and - Recommendation of protective actions to state officials.
2.2 Activities Observed During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, five NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augment-ation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed: 1.
Detection, classification and assessment of scenario events; 2.
Direction and coordination of the emergency response; 3.
Augmentation of the emergency organization and response facility activation; , 4.
Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of ! pertinent plant status information; 5.
Communications /information flow, and record keeping; 6.
Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; 7.
Provisions for inplant radiation protection; 8.
Performance of offsite and inplant radiological surveys; 9.
Maintenance of site security and access control; l 10.
Performance of technical support, repair and corrective , l actions;
11. Assembly, accountability and evacuation of personnel; l l t - _ . _
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Preparation of information for dissemination at the Emergency News Center; and 13. Licensee response to contaminated, injured personnel.
3.0 Exercise Observations The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facil-ities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency response plan and implementing procedures.
3.1 Exercise Strengths The team also noted the following actions that provided strong positive indication of their ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions: - Classifications made by the Control Room and Technical Support Center (TSC) staff were prompt and correct, and subsequent notifications were timely; Protective action recommendations were timely and conservative, and - considered both plant conditions and field conditions.
The licensee interfaced well with Massachusetts Department of Public Health personnel in the E0F; - Staff members in each ERF made good use of emergency and implementing procedures; i - Staff augmentation was prompt and each ERF was setup and activated
in a' timely manner; and
- Staff members in each ERF demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the plant and coordinated effectilely with their respective counterparts.
l l 3.2 Exercise Weaknesses The NRC team identified the following areas where weaknesses were observed which could have degraded the response and should be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action.
These items are tracked as Inspector Followup Items (IFI).
l 50-293/87-54-01: The initial notification forms utilize standard l information.
They do not allow for approval by the Emergency Director. Additionally, they do not provide for the consideration l l l . ...
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. of protective actions that may be necessary in certain Site Area Emergency Classifications.
50-293/87-54-02: Several key emergency positions in the organization do not have sufficient depth to support prolonged operations.
For example, there were only two individuals trained and assigned as the E0F Emergency Coordinator.
50-293/87-54-03: Dose projections made on the portable computer did not agree with the projections made on the HP-85.
The staff was unable to resolve these differences. Additionally, the staff was unable to make a default dose projection based upon plant conditions.
50-293/87-54-04: The TSC appeared to focus on implementation of a single activity or course of action when multiple options were available. This was apparently as a result of long periods of time required to dispatch onsite repair teams, a lack of consideration of emergency dose limits until late in the exercise and no apparent assessment of conditions or prioritization of tasks.
4.0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items I The following items were identified during previous inspections (Inspection Report No. 50-293/86-39).
Based upon observations made by the NRC team during the exercise the following open items were acceptably demonstrated and are closed: (CLOSED) 50-293/86-39-01: The chronology status board in the TSC was not maintained up to date.
(CLOSED) 50-293/86-39-02: Although the TSC was staffed in a timely manner, and ready to assume its responsibilities, the Emergency Director did not relieve the control room and activate the TSC in a timely manner.
(CLOSED) 50-293/86-39-05: Gaitronics usage procedures were informal.
5.0 Licensee Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on December 10, 1987, during which the key licensee controllers discussed observa-tions of the exercise. The licensee indicated these observaticns would be evaluated and appropriate corrective actions taken.
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. 6.0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique The NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report at the end of the inspection. The team leader summarized the observations made during the exercise.
The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed and no violations were observed. Although there were weaknesses identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would adequately provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
Licensee management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appro-priate action would be taken regarding the identified open items.
At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.
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