IR 05000424/1987032

Insp Repts 50-424/87-32 & 50-425/87-23 on 870518-22. Violations Noted:Failure to Classify Security Event Per Emergency Plan Requirements & Inconsistencies Between Classification Procedure Emergency Action Levels & Plan

ML20216B293
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	06/10/1987
From:	Decker T, Gooden A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216B095	List: IR 05000424/1987032 ML20216B090 ML20216B203 ML20216B293
References
50-424-87-32, 50-425-87-23, IEB-79-18, IEIN-83-28, NUDOCS 8706300057
Preceding documents:	ML20236M597 (3 November 1987)
Download: ML20216B293 (12)

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UNITED STATES i .Y. ' "

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' NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Report No.: 50-424/87-32, 50-425/87-23L U l-

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^ Licensee

- Georgia Power' Company s 'P.-0. Box,454 >

l Atlanta, GA 30302 -

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' Docket'Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.:  : NPF-68, CPPR-109'

"- ' Facil.ity Name:- Vogtle Electric: Generating Plant ~

. Inspection Conducted: May 18-22, 1987

. Inspector: h. st-Jp-8 k '4>-/o-87

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A. Goodeh- .Date Signed

. Accompanying-Personnel:. EFD; Testa Approved by: //d b6 /,-/O 67

.T. R. Decker, Chief Date Signed-

.gl Emergency Preparedness Section: ..

, Division.of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

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SUMMARY.-

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Scope:- This - routine unannounced inspection._ was in the area' of emergency

preparedness : .

Results: . Three violations were identified - (1) failu're to classify 'a security

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event' in' accordance with the Emergency P_lan requirements (2): inconsistencies between the Classification Procedure . Emergency Action Levels (EALS) and the EALS in the Emergency Plan, and (3) failure-to provide training 'to 'various members of-the emergency-response organization in accordance with the Emergency Pla .

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REPORT DETAILS- l

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, LLicensee Employees; .

t*T. -Greene~,.. Plant Manager: .. . f-

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• P.- R. Bemis, Manager, Engineering, Maintenance -and 0perations and Radiological Safety

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,.*S. C. Ewald, Manager, Radiological. Safety

.*A.:E..Desrosiers, Health Physics Superintendent

-.*W. C. Gabbard, Senior. Regulatory Specialist:

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L*K. W. Whitt, Generation Engineer

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L*D.' Smith, Construction Engineer

• D.' Smith,. Superintendent,. Nuclear. Operations

• C. C. Miller,. Superintendent- of Outages and Planning-

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• R. M. Odom, Supervisor,; Nuclear Safety and Compliance

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• P. D.' Rushton,iTraining.and Emergency Preparedness Manager

*J. N. -Roberts, Emergency Preparedness Supervisor 1 '

• L.,E. Mayo, Emergency Preparedness. Specialist

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'*R.cM. Bellamy, Plant.' Support Manager

,' . *W. F. J Kitchens,; 0perations Manager -

• W. E. Mundy Equality _ Assurance' Supervisor:

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• D., F. Hallman, Chemistry Superintendent ~

1*P.1H. Burwinkel . Engineering Supervisor

• C. E. .Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager

• J. .Mb Randolf Plant' Engineer

• '*Si.R. Edwards, Operations-Engineer

*G.s R.- Frederick, Quality Assurance Engineering Supervisor 4 L *M.1Griffis, Maintenance Manager <

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< *W. -L o Burmeister, Operations Supervisor, Startup _

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M. Kurtzman, Supervisor, Health Physics, Chemistry Training- .

. M.iKirkpatrick,: Senior Methods'and Training Specialist ~ 1

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J.:Caldwell, Lead Instructor Wackenhut Training' Institute -l 1* Cure, Plant Health Physicist o

.A.;LBalducci, Radiation' Engineer .

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J. ;Pietro,: Senior Quality Assurance' Field Representative

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P. O'Neel,; Security Shift Superviso ;W. K. Taylor. Security Shift. Supervisor

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D.1 Warren, Nuclear ' Security Specialist for Administration

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, M.. Craven,: Security Manager  !

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H.:.Butterworth, On-Shift.0perations Supervisor j

$ .E.jd.' Kazensky, On-Shift Operations Supervisor  !

"R[Legrand,ShiftSupervisor ,

.E.:M.-Thornton, Jr., Shift Supervisor  !

L. P. Lane, Shift' Clerk

T. B.. Jones,! Shift Clerk J. J. Gilmarten Supervisor Engineering Staff ,

.M. A. Deinhardt, Quality' Concerns Coordinator  !

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Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, security office members and office personne Other Organizations J. ' Purucker, Nuclear Group Supervisor, PFE-0/Bechtel J. D. Hurd, Deputy Manager, PFE-0/Bechtel ,

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• J. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector

• R. Schepens, Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview  : Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 22,'1987, with '

those persons indicated.in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the f areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. Station management did not agree with the inspection findings, consequently no commitments were given by the licensee regarding the findings. The following new items were identified during this inspection:

One unresolved item * described in Paragraph 7 (verify that Plan and l procedures are being submitted to NRC within 30 days of the effective date, and that appropriate personnel and organizations were sent copies of Plan and procedural changes) and three violations discussed in Paragraphs 4 and 8. The violations involve: (1) failure to classify a security event in accordance with Emergency Plan requirement, (2) inconsistencies between the classification procedure and the EALs in the Emergency Plan, and (3) failure to provide training to members of the emergency organizatio The inspector telephoned the Station Emergency Preparedness Supervisor on May 26, 1987, to inform the licensee that a Region II review of the report details presented in Paragraph 4 below resulted in the identification of a violation of Technical Specifications (Procedures shall be established, ;

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implemented, and maintained covering the Emergency Plan implementation) as compared to an Inspector Followup Item as discussed during the exit meetin In addition, the licensee representative was informed that recent guidance from NRC headquarters recommending evacuation as an immediate protective action recommendation following a General Emergency declaration (as compared to sheltering recommendation in IE Information Notice No. 83-28) resulted in acceptance of Table 1' recommendations from Implementing Procedure 91305-C, " Protective Action Guidelines," rather than an inspection finding as discussed during the exit meeting. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the . inspector during this inspectio * Unresolved Items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviation _

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1 3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters q This subject was not addressed in the inspectio . EmergencyDetectionandClassification(82201) )

i Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Sections I j and IV.C; and Section D of the licensee's Emergency Plan, this program area was inspected to determine whether the licensee used and understood a standard emergency classification and action level schem The inspector reviewed the licensee's classification procedure titled !

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" Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions," Revision No. The event classifications in the procedures included the four classes specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Part IV.C and the Emergency Plan. The classification procedures appear to be user friendly consisting of initiating conditions from Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654, and the symptomatic i approach involving the loss of fission. product barriers. The procedures l did not appear to contain impediments or errors which could lead to !

untimely. classification. However, it was noted during the procedural review that selected emergency action levels (EALs) were inconsistent with the initiating events specified in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654 and Table D-2 of the Vogtle Emergency Plan. Examples of the inconsistencies are as-follows: The loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power is listed as an Alert in the Vogtle Emergency ~ Plan (Tabled-2) and Appendix 1 of HUREG-065 However, Figure 4 of the licensee's classification procedure (91001-C) lists this event as a Site Area Emergenc Most of all alarms (annunciators)'or indicators lost is listed as a Site Area Emergency in the Emergency Plan (Table D-2) and Appendix 1 of NUREG-065 However, Figure 4 of the classification procedure does not include this event under any of the four emergency classification !

i Licensee representatives took exception and acknowledged this finding as a j demonstration of conservative EALs to assist . Control Room personnel in '

recognizing and properly classifying events. This item is identified as a violation of Technical Specifications Section 6.7.1.d., which requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the Emergency Pla Violation (50-424/87-32-01, 50-425/87-23-01): Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure No. 91001-C is inadequate for implementing the Emergency Plan event classification due to inconsistency between the Plan and Implementing Procedure EAL Selected emergency action levels (EALs) specified in the classification procedures were reviewed. The inspector noted that some of the EALs were based on parameters obtainatile from Control Room instrumentatio i

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OThe Linspector7 verified that the- licensee's notification

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.includedi criteria for ! initiation ~ of Toffsite notificationsE and for -

'developmenti of ' protective : action recommendations. 'The ' notification : .

' procedures? required that offs 1te notificationsibe .made promptlyc after'

declaration"of an' emergenc '

s The'; inspector? discussed with licensee representatives. the coordination ofc

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EALs:with State'and local. official Licensee! documentation showed that'

the blicensee had. discussed the' EALs during July and September 1986 with

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State 1andflocaliofficials, and that these officials agreed with the.:EAL used by the.' license Interviews 'wereL held ,with. two On-Shift ' Operations Supervisors, and two Shift Supervisors to verify that they~ understood.theLrelationship between core status Lande such core damage indicators as containment' high-range -

monitor inadequate-core-cooling ' indicator, : high-range effluent monitor,- <

fuel 3 temperature in_dicator,: and containment hydrogen, monitor. With the; .j'

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s_ exception of'one On-Shift. Operations ~ Supervisor, all intervie'wees appeared ;

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knowledgeable.of:the:various core-damage indicators and their relationship tocorestatusf(see'paragraphbelow).-

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The' responsibility and ' authority. for: classification . of emergency. events and initiation of. emergency actions were prescribed in: licensee procedures-and. int the Emergency' Pla Interviews' with : selected key. members of the-licensee's emergency organization revealed that these personnel understood; their responsibilitiesRand authorities in; relation (to ~ accident classification,' notification,'and protective action" recommendation '

s LThe. inspector reviewed the sequence of; events resulting from' the_ discovery ofl a' suspected -bomb device, interviewed selected . personnel: involved in the event, reviewedLthe Vogtle Security Plan', Emergency, Plan- and Implementing

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L Procedure, and . licensee documentation (Security Department' report and the, Unit.1^ Shift . Supervisor's ' Log) regardingithe; incident of < May 13,198 Based on.the review of licensee documentation (which included pictures of:

the device), interviews with licensee personnel, and the actions that were taken by111censee personnel in response-to'the device',1 1t appears that the

' licensee responded as though the ' device' posed a . real. . security threa Some of'the actions that were taken included: (1)Levacuationoflevels 3 and 4 'of the Unit 1 Control Building,- (2) area was. cordoned off, (3)

offsite' support was requested from a Military Explosive Ordinance Disposal-

. (E0D) . Unit,' and - (4) a security alert was declared. According to..the

~11censee's : Emergency Plan (Section D. Tabled-1) and Implementing Procedure No. 91001-C, " Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions," ~ Revision 4, Figure 4, under : Security EALS, a security

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. threat:or attempted sabotage should be classified as a Notification of Unusual . Event (N00E). Although the licensee took exception to this

incident as being a bonafide security threat, the inspector informed the licensee that this finding is identified as a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q)

.which requires a licensee to follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix ,

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.l Violation (50-424/87-32-02, 50-425/87-23-02): Failure to classify a ;

security event in accordance with the Vogtle Emergency Plan, Section D, {j Table 0-1, Item !

Selected Emergency Operation Procedures. (E0Ps) were reviewed t,y the inspector and discussed with licensee personnel. The E0Ps provided d directions to users concerning timely classification of accidents. All ;

personnel interviewed appeared to be familiar with the classification information in the E0P I Walk-through evaluations involving accident classification problems were conducted with two On-Shift Operations Supervisors, and two Shift .

Supervisors. With the exception of one On-Shift Operations Supervisor, !

all interviewed personnel promptly and properly classified the' i hypothetical accident situations presented to them, and appeared to be familiar with appropriate classification procedures. One On-Shift Operations Supervisor incorrectly _ classified an incident regarding a potential release of large amounts of fission products. The walkthrough scenario involved a reactor coolant leak and core melt sequence in which significant releases from containment had not taken place. However, the ,

post accident monitoring system indicated that containment. failure leading to a direct atmospheric release was imminent. The interviewee incorrectly i declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NOVE) for a reactor coolant leak of 55 GPM, which is the EAL for an Alert classificatio In addition, i following a large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA), the interviewee ,

failed to upgrade from the incorrect classification of N00E to the Site l Area or General Emergency classification. Thit mattar -is further discussed in Paragraph 8 regarding trainin !

Two violations and no deviations were identifie . Protective Action Decision-making (82202)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) and (10); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3;,and Section J of the licensee's Emergency Plan, this area l was inspected to determine whether the licensee' had 24-hour-per-day ,

capability to assess and analyze emergency conditions and make j'

recommendations to protect the public and onsite workers, and whether offsite officials had the authority and capability to initiate . prompt protective action for the publi The inspector discussed responsibility and authority for protective action decision-making with licensee representatives and reviewed pertinent portions of the licensee's Emergency Plan and Procedures. The Plan and Procedures clearly assigned responsibility and authority for accident assessment and protective action decision-making., Interviews with members of the licensee's emergency organization showed that these personnel ,

understood their authorities and responsibilities with respect to accident I assessment and protective action decision-makir l l

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i Walk.through evaluations involving protective action decision-making were i conducted with two On-Shift Operations Supervisors and two Shift i Supervisors, all of whom appeared to be cognizant of appropriate onsite l protective measures and aware of the range of protective action i recomendations appropriate for offsite protection. . Personnel interviewed were aware of the need for timeliness in making initial protective action recommendations to offsii.e officials. Interviewees-demonstrated adequate understanding of the requirement that protective action recommendations be based on core condition and containnent status even if no release is in

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Licensee procedures made provisions for contacting respnnsible offsite -

authorities on a 24-hour basis. Backup communications links with offsite authorities were available via commercial phone and two-way radios. The inspector independently confirmed during a communicator walkthrough ;

(d3scussed in Paragraph 8 below) that offsite decision-makers with ;

aut'iority for emergency response activities could be contacted via the !

Emergency Notification Network (ENN) by observing a communications drill with Burke County and Georgia Emergency Management Agency from the Technical Support Cente No violations or deviations were identifie . Notification cod Communication (82203)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50,47(b)(5) and (6); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D; and Section E of the licensee's Emergency Plan, this area was inspected to detemine whether the licensee was maintaining a

capability for notifying and comwnicating (in the event of an emergency)

among its own personnel.

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/ The inspector discussed with a licensee representative actions that were

[. / taken in response to IE Bulletin No. 79-18, " Audibility Problems i Encountered On Evacuation of Persunnel From High-Noise Areas." The

/ inspectur was informed that testing had not been completed at this time to

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determine wriat, if anyx corrective actions will be necessary to assure

audibility throughout t.he high-noise areas of the plant. The licensee was informed that this item is considered an inspector followup item pending completion of the testing and a review of the test results of-Procedure No. 1-6QF-01 from the startup and test progra Inspector Followup Item (50-424/87-32-03, 425/87-23-03) Complete testing and verify audiMlity of alarms in high-noise area ;

The inspector reviewed the licensee's automatic computer based telephone

' notification system for Emergency Plan augmentation. The notification ;

system will, upon initiation, automatically dial and redial if necessary telephone numbers from preset telephone lists. Results from the 5/11/87

. ulephone test were reviewed and it appears that an adequate number of i

emergency response personnel were successfully contacted. The inspector

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I observed - that there was no .hard copy backup. of the computer based telephone call-out list immediately available at the' telephone

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notification point should the automatic system fail to perfor '

Inspector Followup Item (50-424/87-32-04, 425/87-23-04) Pro'ide;a v current l hard copy back up. of.the. computer based -telephone call out list at the telephone notification poin _,

Additional elements. in this area will be reviewed during. a' future !

inspectio :

L No violations or deviations were identifie . Changes to the. Emergency. Preparedness Program (82204) a Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(16); 10 CFR 50.54(q); aad .10 CFR Part 50 ' i Appendix E, Sections IV and V, this area was' reviewed to determine whether j

<hanges were made to: the progrum since the operating license was . issued ' i-(March 1987) and to note how these changes affected the overall state'of

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j emergency : preparednes j

T,The inspector. discussed the licen'see's: program for. making changes to the; ,

Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures. 'he inspector. reviewed th t . licensee's- system (delineated in Emergency Hs Implementing Procedure

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'No. 91701-C " Preparation and Control of Emergency planning Documents") for

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review and, approval of: changes to the Plan ano Procedures.1. The inspector ,

1. vdrified that changes to the' Plan and Procedures. were reviewed and

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' approved by management. -However, it could not be determined if Plan and Procedural changes were' submitted to NRC within 30 days of the effective <

L/ \ date, ai required by regulations. At the time.of the inspection, document controi records were being microfiched.. As a result,- the records' were ,

inau# table. :This item was discussed with the licensee as being l unr:esolved and will be reviewed during a . subsequent inspectio j

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. Unr'e sb1ved Item (50-424/87-32-05, 425/87-23-05): Verify that Plan and i

_ Procedures are being submitted to' NRC within 30 days of the effective i

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date,4and appropriate personnel and organizations were sent copies of Plan and Proadural change ' Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that no significant modifications to facilities, equipment, or instrumentation were completed !

since the last inspection.- j

The organization and management of the emergency preparedness program were f reviewed. The inspector verified that there had been no significant l changes in the organization or. assignment of responsibility for the plant and corporate emergency' planning staffs since the last inspectio However, the. inspector's discussion with a licensee representative l e

disclosed that the . position of Director for Burke County Emergency l Management Agency had been reassigned since the last inspectio (

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for distribution of changes to the Emergency Plan and Procedure Document control records were not auditable at this time, but will be reviewed during a subsequent j inspectio l No violations or deviations were identifie . Knowledge and Performance of Duties (Training) (82206)

Pursuant to 10CFR50.47(b)(15) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F, this area was inspected to determine whether emergency response personnel understood their emergency response roles and could perform their assigned function j The inspector reviewed the description (in the Emergency Plan) of the !

training program, training procedures, and selected lesson plans, and interviewed members of the instructional staff. Based on these reviews ,

and interviews, the inspector determined that the licensee had established I a formal emergency. training progra .l Records of training for key members of the emergency organization for the period December 1,1985 to May 20,1987, were reviewed. The training records revealed that some personnel designated as part of the 60 minute augmentation . call out list or given interim responsibilities in the emergency organization were not provided with appropriate trainin According to the training records, 5 of 62 people on the 60 minute augmentation call out list were not current in their training, and one of those five individuals had not received any required specialized Emergency ;

Plan training prior to assignment in the Emergency Response Organizatio The failure to ensure that all personnel expected to respond to an

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emergency receive the required training was identified as a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q).

Violation (50-424/87-32-06, 425/87-23-06), Failure to provide training to j emergency response personnel in accordance with the Emergency Pla l In response to IE Information Notice No. 85-80, " Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class. Implementation of An Emergency Plan, and Emergency Notifications," the inspector interviewed two Shift Clerks who may be designated as an Offsite Communicator for the Control Roo The Offsite Communicator is responsible for initial communications to the offsite l- agencies (State and county) via the emergency notification network (ENN).

l The inspector conducted walkthrough evaluations with each of the i The communicators were asked to demonstrate information

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communicator i transmission via the ENN using a drill message. During one walkthrough the communicator demonstrated information transmission via the ENN with the State of Georgia and the Burke County Warning Points. The final i walkthrough was simulated using commercial phones. The interviewees demonstrated familiarity with the Control Room communication systems

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(primary and backup) and the responsibility as a communicator during an emergenc Although no problems were observed during walkthrougt.s,

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interviewees had not completed the required training (violation as stated ..

above). )

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l The inspector conducted walkthrough evaluations with selected key members ,

of the emergency organization. During these walkthroughs, individuals )

L were given various hypothetical sets of emergency conditions and data and l asked to talk through the response they would make if such an emergency 1 actually existe With the exception of one On-Shift Operations !

Supervisor, all interviewees demonstrated familiarity with emergency l procedures and equipment, and no problems were observed in the areas o i emergency detection and classification, notifications, . assessment action j (including plant conditions), dose calculation, and protective ' action l decision-makin One.0n-Shift Operations. Supervisor (0S05) was provided q initiating conditions for the Alert classification; however the OSOS incorrectly classified the event as a Notification of Unusual Event and i failed to upgrade the classification to Site Area Emergency. The 1 interviewee's training records were reviewed and verified that required I training had been provided. Based on the records review and walkthrough, j it appears that additional training may be needed for the interviewee on )

emergency detection and classificatio !

One violation and no deviations were identifie I Dose Calculadon and Assessment (82207)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), this area was inspected to determine whether there was an adequate method for assessing the consequences of cn actual or potential radiological releas The inspector reviewed 91304-C, Computerized and Manual Back-up Methods {

for Release Rate and Dose Calculations. The procedure had provisions for j calculating doses for ground, monitored and unmonitored pathways such as j the plant building vents, containment leakage, and steam releases. . The i procedures allowed for refinement of dose projections through j incorporation of feedback from field monitorin q

The inspector reviewed a report attached to an Interoffice Memorandum i dated October 3,1986, titled " Comparison of the Vibrant Computer Code."

Results from the licensee's Vibrant code were compared to results from codes used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (IRDAM), Savannah River Plant,. Georgia Department of Natural Resources (GDNR), and South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Thirteen 1 scenarios were developed from NUREG/CR 3012 Vol. III guidance and each of j the models generated the associated doses for comparisons. Whole body and !

thyroid doses were compared and the tabular and graphed results presented, j Although some differences existed between the individual methods, the 1 overali comparisons of results showed the difference to be within '

acceptable limit l The licensee procedures made provision for timely incorporation of dose j assessment results into the offsite protective action recommendation )

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1 proces However, during interviews with key licensee emergency response personnel, they all appeared to recognize the uncertainties associated with dose projections and the importance of making protective action recommendations based on plant condition An inspection and operability check was made of selected equipment and support items used for dose assessment at the TSC. No problems were observe The inspector requested and observed dose assessment walk-throughs by selected ' licensee personnel designated as responsible for dose projection i during an emergency. The individuals demonstrated the ability to make such calculations using both manual and . computerized method Each individual observed was able to produce acceptable results by either metho No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Audits (82210)  ;

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and (16) and 10 CFR 50.54(t), this area was . inspected to determine whether the licensee had performed an independent review or audit of the emergency preparedness progra Records of audits of the program were reviewed. The records showed that an independent audit of the program was conducted by the Quality Assurance Department under the direction of the Quality Assurance Site Manager from February 9-20, 1987 and was documented in Audit Report No. OP-12-84/02, dated March 16, 198 This audit fulfilled the 12-month frequency requirement for such audits. The audit records showed that the State and local government -interfaces were evaluated, and that findings concerning the interfaces were made available to State and local government authorities. Audit findings and recommendations were presented to plant and corporate managemen Licensee Emergency Plans and Procedures required critiques following exercises and drills. Licensee documentation for the March 12, 1987 ,

Savannah River Plant drill showed that critiques were held following periodic -drills as well as the annual exercise. The records showed that deficiencies were discussed in the critiques, and recommendations for corrective action were mad The licensee's program for followup action on audit, drill, and exercise l findings was reviewed. Licensee procedures required followup on deficient areas identified during audits, drills, and exercises. The licensee had established a tracking system as a management tool in following up on actions taken in deficient area No violations or deviations were identifie ,

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.11 11. Allegation Followup Allegation (RII-87-A-0059)

No PA outside: Unit 2 to alert workers in an emergenc Discussion Cognizant members of the licensee's Quality Concerns Department were contacted to determine the status of the Unit 2 site warning syste The inspector reviewed licensee documentation which indicated that an

, alerting system for the Unit 2 construction workers had been

-. installed, and was being tested on a weekly basis.. The~ inspector observed' the weekly test of the Site Warning System on May 20, 198 ;

NRC personnel were stationed at two different locations on the Unit 2 l construction . site: (1) Coating Facility and (2) Field Support '

Building.- In addition, licensee personnel observed the test from

' Level D. of the Auxiliary Building, and an area near thel Pullman

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Trailers. No problems were noted with:the audibility of sirens or ;

the.' Unit 1 PA system. Discussions with licensee personnel disclosed. i

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that an Emergency Response Procedure (GD-A-55) had been'developedLan issued . for the Unit 2 construction site.- According to licensee representatives, this procedure addressed an orderly, rapid and safe evacuation of the Unit 2 sit Conclusions Dur.ing the weekly site warning system test conducted on May 20, 1987, it was noted .that the PA system speaker was audible to the Unit 2 construction ' site. . Discussions with licensee personnel disclosed t

,that drills. are being planned for construction . personnel once training . has been completed. on the Unit 2. emergency response procedur ,

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Inspector Followup Item (50-424/87-32-07, 425/87-23-07): Complete training' for; all Unit 2 construction personnel and Georgia Power personnel outside Unit 1 protected area boundary (PAB) regarding the Unit 2 Emergency Response Procedure (GD-A-55).

1 Inspector Followup (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI)' 86-12-76: Apparent discrepancy

.-between HP-210 detector iodine detection efficiencies used onsite/inplant and offsite iodine air activity determination should be resolved (5.4.2). .

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Documentation: indicates that detector efficiencies have been removed from procedure body.

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